

## The Force of Evil Circumstances: The Apache Scouts at Cibecue

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Led from their cells to the waiting gallows, the three Apache scouts walked past the assembled witnesses: three troops of cavalry, a single infantry company, and two companies of their fellow Indian scouts.<sup>1</sup> Upon surrendering themselves they had protested their innocence, but were now resigned to their fate. They refused to beg for their lives. That would not be the Apache way. Addressing the onlookers for a last statement, one stated that to beg would only bring laughter and ridicule.<sup>2</sup>

The three men had served as American soldiers, but this day they would die like true Apache warriors. Decisions made by their U.S. governmental and military masters had conspired to put them in a situation that ultimately challenged their allegiance to their tribal, familial, and religious loyalties. In attempting to serve two diametrically opposed masters, they had been thrust into a maelstrom of circumstances which forced them to choose one master or the other. The helplessness of their position and their corresponding decision contributed to a disaster not of their own making, and these three men would pay the steepest price for the ensuing debacle at Cibecue Creek.

From the beginning it was an event misreported, misinterpreted, and misunderstood. Its execution and reportage suffered from bad planning and bad timing. What was first reported as a military disaster on the scale of Custer's defeat at the Little Bighorn evolved into an event involving a much smaller casualty list, still a military defeat, but multiplied in scope by the element of alleged treachery on a large scale.

On Monday, August 29, 1881, General Eugene A. Carr left Fort Apache, Arizona Territory with 117 men, including five officers, seventy-nine soldiers, a surgeon, a guide, an interpreter with five assistants, nine civilians, Carr's fifteen-year-old son, Clark, and twenty-three Apache scouts.<sup>3</sup> Carr was acting on orders from his department commander, Brevet Major General Orlando B. Willcox. Willcox, in turn, had issued the orders at the request of the San Carlos Reservation agent, J. C. Tiffany.<sup>4</sup> Tiffany had become alarmed at the activities of a medicine man named Noch-ay-del-klinne and had telegraphed Carr that he wanted the Apache mystic, now called Prophet by his followers, "arrested or killed or both."<sup>5</sup>

Tiffany had become concerned over the tone of Noch-ay-del-klinne's teachings. The Prophet had managed to foment a religious revival among his adherents, teaching them rituals, a new dance, and promising to raise from the dead two recently murdered chiefs of opposing Apache sub-tribes. It had also been reported that the new teachings would ultimately result in the disappearance of the whites from Apacheria.<sup>6</sup>

Carr and his force located the Prophet at his village on Cibecue Creek, forty-six miles from Fort Apache, on August 30. The slender, five foot, six inch, 125 pound holy man<sup>7</sup> offered no resistance and agreed to return to Fort Apache with the soldiers.<sup>8</sup> As the column started back

<sup>1</sup> Charles Collins, *Apache Nightmare: The Battle at Cibecue Creek*, The Civilization of the American Indian Series (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 201.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Dan L. Thrapp, *The Conquest of Apacheria* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), 221.

<sup>4</sup> Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indians, 1866-1891*, The Wars of the United States Series (New York: Macmillan, 1973; Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), 372.

<sup>5</sup> Thrapp, 220-221.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 218.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 217.

to Fort Apache large numbers of the Prophet's Apache adherents followed. When the soldiers stopped to camp for the night, the Apaches, many painted for war, drew closer. Carr ordered them back.<sup>9</sup> Determining what exactly happened next depends upon sorting through a variety of sources. Someone opened fire, and each Apache scout was forced to make an immediate individual decision as to where his loyalty lay. Early reports of the Cibecue battle were confused and contradictory. Who had fired the opening shots? What role had the scouts played in the fight and why?

What is certain is that the early reports were grossly inaccurate. The *Daily News* of Denver reported "That so gallant and experienced an officer as General Carr, colonel of the Sixth Regiment of cavalry, has fallen a victim to the Apache whirlwind, is sad news indeed."<sup>10</sup> Even the venerable *New York Times* reported "... Gen. Carr and his command have all been massacred by the White Mountain Indians ... There were 110 men and 7 officers killed."<sup>11</sup> Under the page one headline BETRAYED BY HIS SCOUTS, the *New York Times* reported on September 5, 1881, "There can be no doubt that the massacre was the direct result of a conspiracy between the scouts and the hostile Apaches, and that Col. Carr and his men were deliberately led to the slaughter-pen by the scouts."<sup>12</sup> Denver's *Daily News* of September 6 echoed this early version of the Cibecue battle stating that Carr's command had been "so surprised by the sudden treachery of the Indian scouts that they were actually murdered, the common chances of battle being out of the case."<sup>13</sup>

However, only one day after blaring BETRAYED, the *New York Times*, on September 6, this time on page four, offered a very different account. Declaring, "To the credit of the Apache race, by common consent ranked among the most implacable and treacherous of all Indian people, it may be said that great surprise and incredulity were manifested among persons ... familiar with Indian warfare when it was said that these useful scouts had deliberately betrayed their employers." The *Times* contradicted its own previous day's headline, positing that, "It does not now appear that they have done anything of the kind."<sup>14</sup>

In fairness to the *Times* it should be pointed out that while the article of the fifth condemning the scouts appeared on page one, and the article of the sixth casting doubt on that condemnation which appeared on page four does not necessarily constitute a deliberate slight. The *Times*, like most newspapers and the nation as a whole, was consumed by the melodrama attached to President James Garfield's agonizingly slow dance with death that had begun with his wounding by Charles Guiteau on July 12, 1881, and finally ended with his death on September 19.<sup>15</sup> Garfield's condition and the political ramifications of his assassination dominated newspaper coverage during this time period.

After the definitely not deceased Carr and his command made their harried return to Fort Apache on August 31, it was determined that the column had, in fact, only five killed, four wounded, two of whom would perish from their wounds,<sup>16</sup> and that Noch-ay-del-klinne and six

<sup>8</sup> Rein Vanderpot and Teresita Majewski, *The Forgotten Soldiers: Historical and Archaeological Investigations of the Apache Scouts at Fort Huachuca, Arizona*, Technical Series 71, prepared for the Department of the Army (Tucson, AZ: Statistical Research, Inc., 1998), 16.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas W. Dunlay, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers: Indian Scouts and Auxiliaries with the United States Army, 1860-1890* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 171.

<sup>10</sup> *Daily News* (Denver, Colorado), 6 September 1881.

<sup>11</sup> *New York Times*, 4 September 1881.

<sup>12</sup> *New York Times*, 5 September 1881.

<sup>13</sup> *Daily News* (Denver, Colorado), 6 September 1881.

<sup>14</sup> *New York Times*, 6 September 1881.

<sup>15</sup> Sean Dennis Cashman, *America in the Gilded Age: From the Death of Lincoln to the Rise of Theodore Roosevelt*, 3d ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 255-256.

<sup>16</sup> Utley, 372.

Apache scouts were among the eighteen Apache dead.<sup>17</sup> The Battle of Cibecue proved to be, in terms of military losses, the costliest battle between American soldiers and Apaches in Arizona's history. But what made the incident unique was the fact that at least some of the twenty-three Apache scouts had indeed participated in the battle on the side of Noch-ay-del-klinne's followers. This was the only reported incident of mutiny by Indian scouts in the long history of their employment beside American troops.<sup>18</sup>

The reaction to and the impression of the scouts' betrayal was, and remains, mixed. This new Apache "war" or "outbreak" proved to be short-lived. By late September most organized Apache resistance had already ceased.<sup>19</sup> Five of the scouts accused of firing on their soldier allies surrendered on September 20. These five were court-martialed by the army at Fort Grant under charges of mutiny, desertion, and murder.<sup>20</sup> Some of the mutinous scouts remained at large for the present,<sup>21</sup> and no other scouts were ever punished for their role at Cibecue.<sup>22</sup>

Of the five who surrendered, two were dishonorably discharged from the army and sentenced to long prison terms at Alcatraz. The other three, Sergeant Dandy Jim, Sergeant Dead Shot, and Private Skippy, were sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out on March 3, 1882, at 12:30 in the afternoon. Ranks of soldiers stood to attention before the gallows, gathered both as witnesses and as protection against any Apache retaliation. That retaliation was limited to the suicide, by hanging, of Dead Shot's wife.<sup>23</sup>

Modern historians have also adopted a number of different versions of the Cibecue affair. In their 1998 history of the Fort Huachuca Apache scouts prepared for the Department of the Army, Rein Vanderpot and Teresita Majewski claim that it was Noch-ay-del-klinne's followers, led by a former scout named Sanchez, who initiated the battle and were then joined by the scouts.<sup>24</sup> The Fort Huachuca history is not footnoted, but in their acknowledgements the authors state that the majority of the sources for their history are contemporary members of the Apache tribe. The reader can only surmise that their interpretation of the Cibecue affair's flashpoint is based on Apache oral tradition.

In *The Conquest of Apacheria*, Donald Thrapp cites General Carr as writing that it was Dead Shot who initiated the combat. As the column, with Noch-ay-del-klinne secured as a prisoner, began to set up camp for the evening, the scouts complained that the area was unsuitable due to the presence of anthills. When told to move beyond the anthills, "... the scouts dropped their guns in the position of load, and loaded; an Indian at the head of those mounted and armed, also one of the scouts, Dead Shot, gave war whoops, and the scouts and all commenced firing."<sup>25</sup>

Robert Utley, arguably the twentieth-century's preeminent historian of the American West, in *Frontier Regulars* claims it was Noch-ay-del-klinne's followers who fired first and were instantly reinforced by the scouts. In Utley's account the attack followed directly after the column, dogged by the Prophet's closely-following adherents, had set up camp. "As the command bivouacked for the night, they suddenly attacked. At the same moment the scouts mutinied."<sup>26</sup> Utley did not footnote his source for this information.

<sup>17</sup> William B. Kessel, "The Battle of Cibecue and its Aftermath: A White Mountain Apache's Account," *Ethnohistory* 21, no. 2 (1974): 127.

<sup>18</sup> Victoria A. O. Smith, review of *Apache Nightmare: The Battle at Cibecue Creek*, by Charles Collins, *Journal of Military History* 64, no. 1 (January 2000): 210.

<sup>19</sup> Utley, 373.

<sup>20</sup> Vanderpot and Majewski, 16.

<sup>21</sup> Thrapp, 230.

<sup>22</sup> Utley, 373.

<sup>23</sup> Thrapp, 230.

<sup>24</sup> Vanderpot and Majewski, 16.

<sup>25</sup> Thrapp, 224.

<sup>26</sup> Utley, 372.

In his introduction to *Lt. Charles Gatewood & His Apache Wars Memoir*, Louis Kraft does not identify who fired the first shot. “Carr’s arrival at Noch-ay-del-kinne’s village ... and his subsequent arrest ... ignited a firefight that resulted in a revolt by native scouts (White Mountain and Cibecue Apaches).”<sup>27</sup> Kraft’s source is a letter written in 1926 by Lieutenant Thomas Cruse to Charles Gatewood, Jr., the son of Lieutenant Charles Gatewood who usually commanded this company of scouts, but was absent due to illness on this occasion. Cruse was a West Point graduate and had been assigned to Arizona in 1879 with the expressed duty of command of Indian scouts.<sup>28</sup>

In his own book, *Apache Days and After*, originally published in 1941, Cruse mentions the encroaching Apaches being ordered back. “Sanchez was one of these and with three or four others lifted rifles and fired. Instantly, at least a hundred other shots roared.”<sup>29</sup> Cruse singles out one scout as firing on the troopers. “Dandy Jim the Sergeant shot Captain Hentig, killing him instantly.”<sup>30</sup> As to the other scouts, “... I had my back to them, arranging for a herd guard. I knew of their part in the fight only afterward.”<sup>31</sup>

Citing General Carr’s report as his source, Charles Collins in his book, *Apache Nightmare*, claims that Dead Shot said something in Apache to the scouts after a couple of shots had been fired in the soldiers’ direction from the Prophet’s followers. Lieutenant William Harding Carter saw the scouts raise and fire their weapons in the direction of Troop D. “Some scouts knelt; others stood up when they fired. They fired at approximately the same time.”<sup>32</sup>

Thomas Dunlay of the University of Nebraska’s Center of Great Plains Studies expanded on Cruse’s version of events in his book, *Wolves for the Blue Soldiers*. Dunlay states that Cruse believed that the scouts had no preconceived plan to fire on the soldiers. Cruse, in Dunlay’s opinion, was “sure that the man who began the firing was a former scout called Sanchez, the only man Cruse thought should hang for his connection with the affair.”<sup>33</sup> Ironically, Sanchez received no punishment and later served as a scout again under General George Crook.<sup>34</sup>

Conspicuous in its absence from all of the above historians’ accounts is Crook’s interview of several of the scouts present that day at Cibecue. While not the first officer to employ Apache scouts, Crook was the one officer most associated with their use and had deployed them in his campaigns against hostile Apaches from 1872-1875.<sup>35</sup> Crook had been sent north to participate in the campaign against the Sioux in March 1875.<sup>36</sup> Crook returned to Arizona in 1882<sup>37</sup> and on September 23, 1882 he met with a number of the scouts from the Cibecue column and recorded their version of events.<sup>38</sup>

According to the scout Kulo, as camp was being set up, “The cook fired a shot at us, and we all started to run away from him and ran to the pack train... As we ran there, the white

<sup>27</sup> Louis Kraft, introduction to *Lt. Charles Gatewood & His Apache Wars Memoir* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), xxvii.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 186, footnote 43.

<sup>29</sup> Thomas Cruse, *Apache Days and After* (Caldwell, ID: Caxton Printers, 1941; reprint, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 111.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 111-112.

<sup>32</sup> Collins, 52.

<sup>33</sup> Dunlay, 171.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 167-168.

<sup>36</sup> John G. Bourke, *On the Border with Crook* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1891; Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 239.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 433.

<sup>38</sup> Peter Cozzens, ed., *Eyewitness to the Indian Wars 1865-1890*, vol. 1, “John G. Bourke Diary 60: 21-63, United States Military Academy Library” (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), 295.

soldiers opened fire upon us.”<sup>39</sup> The scout, Charlie, claimed he was making bread when the firing began. “I don’t know who commenced the firing. I ran off with the other Indian scouts when they scattered.”<sup>40</sup>

Also missing from the Anglo-American histories cited above is the version of the Cibecue event as related by Dead Shot’s own son, Tom Friday. In 1938 Mr. Friday’s account was written down by the local missionary to the White Mountain Apaches.<sup>41</sup> Friday admitted that he himself was not present and that he was told of these events only afterward.<sup>42</sup> In Friday’s account, the first shots at Cibecue were fired by a soldier acting under orders. In this description of the battle, Noch-ay-del-kinne’s brother approached the tent where the medicine man was being held under guard, only to be ordered back by the “commanding officer.” When the brother continued towards the tent, the “commanding officer” ordered the guard, “Shoot that man.”<sup>43</sup>

There are valid questions and concerns regarding the use and veracity of oral histories, and Native American and Euro-American worldviews are certainly influenced by cultural and language differences, but this is a topic beyond the scope of this paper. It is apparent, though, that the interviewees would have had a number of concerns. The scouts interviewed by Crook may very well have been motivated by fear of retribution. Tom Friday may have wished to protect his father’s name and memory. They may also have been, as was common among Indians of the Indian Wars and early Reservation periods, desirous of telling their trusted white interviewer what they thought he wanted to hear. It is also quite possible that their versions hold every bit as much truth as the versions presented by the white historians. Whatever the “truth” or “truths” of Cibecue be, it appears more than a little ethno-centric that the white historians cited above choose not to give any mention at all of the Apache version of the Cibecue event.

Who fired the first shot may never be known. The person who did so may not even be aware himself. It is clear that tensions were high and the potential for armed confrontation was palpable. It does appear certain that the scouts had no preset plan to ambush their soldier companions. It is equally certain that some of the scouts did indeed mutiny and fire on the soldiers. The pertinent question is not who fired the first shot, but rather why did the scouts open fire on the soldiers?

Notably, General Carr was, unlike many other military commanders at the time, experienced in the use of Indian scouts. In 1869 he had completed a successful campaign in Nebraska against the Cheyenne in which he had employed 150 Pawnee scouts.<sup>44</sup> When ordered by Willcox to arrest Noch-ay-del-kinne, Carr, according to Collins, “did not feel comfortable” about employing his Apache scouts for this particular operation.<sup>45</sup> Dunlay writes that Carr “was uncertain whether his scout company ... could be depended upon,” if trouble erupted with the Prophet’s followers, many of whom were relatives of the scouts.<sup>46</sup> Thrapp reports that Agent Tiffany had once sent his Apache police to arrest the medicine man, but they had returned to the agency sulking and without their arms.<sup>47</sup>

Vanderpot and Majewski repeated Thrapp’s report of the Apache police’s refusal to act against the Prophet and agreed with Utley that a number of the scouts had themselves come under Noch-ay-del-kinne’s influence.<sup>48</sup> Cruse wrote that each of his scouts had asked for passes

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 299-300.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 300.

<sup>41</sup> Kessel, 123.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 132.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 131.

<sup>44</sup> George Bird Grinnell, *Two Great Scouts and Their Pawnee Battalion: The Experiences of Frank J. North and Luther H. North* (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1928; Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1971), 202.

<sup>45</sup> Collins, 33.

<sup>46</sup> Dunlay, 170-171.

<sup>47</sup> Thrapp, 220.

<sup>48</sup> Vanderpot and Majewski, 16; Utley, 371.

to attend the Prophet's ceremonies. Given passes, the scouts overstayed their allotted time and returned from the dances angry and exhausted. "Dozens of small incidents showed that something, or someone, was giving them new thoughts."<sup>49</sup>

Everyone involved in the actual "boots on the ground" execution of the Cibecue operation was conflicted. Carr was not on good terms with his commander, Willcox, and personally felt that the mission assigned to him was unnecessary and fraught with risk.<sup>50</sup> When Carr questioned Cruse about using the scouts for the upcoming operation, Cruse told him that he felt the scouts wanted to be loyal but that their own families were adherents of the Prophet. He suggested using Yuma, Mojave, and Chiricahua scouts instead.<sup>51</sup> Most of the officers and the post's civilian interpreter, Sam Bowman, agreed with Cruse.<sup>52</sup> Carr telegraphed Departmental Headquarters on August 13, seeking permission to discharge his own scouts and use others for the Cibecue mission. But, in a case of tragic bad timing, the telegraph lines were down and Carr did not receive an affirmative reply to his request until after the operation was over.<sup>53</sup>

In the 1882 interviews with Crook, the scouts told of their own misgivings. They complained that Carr had not understood them the way that Crook had. Alchisay stated that when they had served under Crook, "We were all content; everything was in peace."<sup>54</sup> But when Crook went north and he and his officers were replaced with new men, "We couldn't make out what they wanted: one day they seemed to want one thing; the next day, something else."<sup>55</sup> The scout Pedro related that the Apaches had danced before. "I have never heard that there was any harm in that, but that campaign was made just because the Indians over on the Cibecue were dancing."<sup>56</sup>

Thus, the scouts were marching to arrest a man whom some of them had followed. They were to assist in the detaining of a man who in their eyes had committed no crime and who posed no threat to their white officers. Noch-ay-del-kinne had been an army scout; he had traveled to Washington to see the president. He had attended a white man's school in Santa Fe and been introduced to Christian beliefs while there.<sup>57</sup> Given his close connections to white American culture, it is unclear why the military officials feared him as they did.

He was also a man that the Apache scouts' family members and friends admired. Following the orders of their white officers was leading them into direct confrontation with their own families, as well as their fellow tribesmen. Once that confrontation escalated to violence the scouts were placed in a no-win situation.

The aftermath of the Cibecue battle was messy for the high-ranking army officers involved. Willcox pursued formal charges against Carr for exceeding his orders and thereby precipitating the battle. A court of inquiry investigated the charges and cleared Carr of any major wrongdoing and cited him only for minor errors in the disposition of his forces during the battle.<sup>58</sup> Utley argues that the court could have come down harder on Carr. "Carr seemed to ignore highly visible evidence of the volatile disposition of the Apaches ... Also, even though he knew the scouts to be under Nakaidoklini's spell, he failed to guard against their disaffection."<sup>59</sup>

Perhaps this charge is a little harsh. Carr had discussed the scouts' disposition with Cruse and had requested their discharge from his superiors. Failing to receive that permission, due to the downed telegraph, Carr felt that he must use the forces at his disposal, including the scouts.

<sup>49</sup> Cruse, 96.

<sup>50</sup> Utley, 372.

<sup>51</sup> Cruse, 100.

<sup>52</sup> Collins, 32-33.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>54</sup> Cozzens, 295.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 297.

<sup>57</sup> Cruse, 93-94; Thrapp, 217.

<sup>58</sup> Utley, 374.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

“They were enlisted soldiers of my command for duty; and I could not have found the Medicine man without them. I deemed it better also that if they should prove unfaithful it should not occur at the Post.”<sup>60</sup>

Carr called the scouts together before departing Fort Apache and explained that his goal was to bring Noch-ay-del-kinne back to the fort, in order that the Prophet may offer the military an explication of his teachings. Carr reassured the scouts, “That I was not going to hurt him.”<sup>61</sup> It is also quite possible that Carr hoped that the scouts’ very presence would help to calm those very “volatile dispositions” that Utley made note of. Perhaps the fact that some of the scouts themselves had participated in the ceremonies at Cibecue would calm the fears of the Prophet and his followers. One scout, Sergeant Mose, asked for and was given permission to travel ahead and notify Noch-ay-del-kinne of the column’s approach and of its mission.<sup>62</sup>

Utley reserves his harshest criticism for Willcox. This conclusion appears to be quite justified. It was Willcox who, at Tiffany’s behest, ordered the Prophet’s arrest.<sup>63</sup> Utley describes Willcox’s post-battle charges against Carr as “a petty maneuver to evade responsibility that the record plainly shows to have been his.”<sup>64</sup> General of the Army, William T. Sherman, criticized Willcox’s handling of the entire affair and ordered Crook’s return to Arizona to replace him.<sup>65</sup>

The entire episode had turned out to be a black eye for the U.S. Army. General Irvin McDowell, who directed army operations in Arizona from San Francisco,<sup>66</sup> admitted that the decision to arrest Noch-ay-del-kinne, which had set in motion the entire affair, was a mistake. In unspoken recognition of that mistake, no Apache “civilians” were pursued or punished by the army for their participation in the Cibecue battle.<sup>67</sup>

Most of the mutinous scouts were casualties in the hostilities that followed the battle.<sup>68</sup> It would also appear that the army was less than totally committed to punishing all the scouts who had mutinied at Cibecue. It is only necessary to point out that Sanchez, while not a scout, but a former scout at the time of the battle, was identified by some as the one who fired the first shot. Yet Crook saw fit to later reenlist his services as a scout.<sup>69</sup>

The U.S. Army would continue to employ Apache scouts against their fellow tribesmen and other enemies. They would aid in the final surrender of Geronimo and in the pursuit of the outlaw Apache Kid. They served alongside American soldiers in Mexico during Pershing’s Punitive Expedition of 1916.<sup>70</sup> The last four Apache scouts would not be retired from U.S. service until 1947.<sup>71</sup>

The five unfortunates who were punished for the Cibecue incident may have been as much victims of their own decisions to surrender as of the army’s desire to revenge its Cibecue dead. As Carr had said, they were in fact, enlisted soldiers under his command.<sup>72</sup> Three of the men, Sergeants Dead Shot, Dandy Jim and Private Skippy were tried in mid-November 1881 and were quickly found guilty of violating a number of Articles of War and sentenced to death by hanging.<sup>73</sup> Private Mucheco was sentenced to life imprisonment at Alcatraz and another scout,

<sup>60</sup> Thrapp, 221.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Utley, 372.

<sup>64</sup> Utley, 374.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 377.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 171.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 374.

<sup>68</sup> Dunlay, 172.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 171.

<sup>70</sup> Vanderpot and Majewski, back cover.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 43.

<sup>72</sup> Thrapp, 221.

<sup>73</sup> Collins, 183.

identified only as Scout 11,<sup>74</sup> was sentenced to eight years, also at Alcatraz.<sup>75</sup> Both of these men were released and returned to their people by executive order on June 29, 1884.<sup>76</sup>

Once the accused scouts had placed themselves in army custody, the army had no choice but to act. Still, there were those in the ranks who were reluctant to see the scouts punished. In his book about his days with the Apache, Lieutenant Cruse wrote, "I have always regretted the fate of Dead Shot and Skippy ... It seemed to me that they were swept into the fight by excitement and the force of evil circumstances."<sup>77</sup> Such a statement could well be used to sum up the actions of all the Apache scouts at Cibecue.

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 183, 204.

<sup>75</sup> Cruse, 139.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.