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EDITOR'S NOTE

This volume of the *Fairmount Folio* is a witness to several changes made to the "tradition" that was established in 1996 when the first volume was published. We have increased the format of the journal, and changed the font and the overall appearance of the pages, with the hope that such adjustments would present the essays in a manner befitting their quality. We did preserve the basic layout of the previous volumes, and the order in which the articles and reviews appear.

Besides the gratitude owing to the editorial board, I would like especially to thank Dr. Hundley and Dr. Klunder for their patience and detailed comments; Denise Burns, whose help in scanning articles prevented us from missing the already broken deadlines; and Holly Wright for her valuable advice on the choice of fonts and page design.

Tomas Zahora

A NEW HOPE:
THE IDEA OF A STRATEGIC DEFENSE

WILLIAM JAMES BUCHHORN

Since August 1953, when the Soviet Union detonated its own "Super Bomb" (multi-megaton thermonuclear device), the best national defense against nuclear attack was to have so many nuclear weapons that no enemy would dare risk a retaliatory strike.   This idea soon became policy. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) was the heart of all policies of Deterrence; and (at least initially)[1] all the players in the Cold War seemed to agree with Robert Oppenheimer that starting World War III would soon lead to a world where the only way super powers could resolve their conflicts would be "with sticks and stones."[2] By 1983, the possibility of a sudden -- no, instantaneous -- nuclear holocaust had become the whole planet's worst nightmare.   President Reagan stumbled onto a way to give humanity an alternative.

On the evening of March 23, 1983, Ronald Reagan made a televised address which

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[1] Currently, there is some debate about the degree to which the Soviet Union subscribed to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction and the degree to which an acceptance of this idea was projected onto them by the West. The notion that the Kremlin might not have seen the possibility of winning a nuclear war as completely hopeless began to emerge in the mid-1980s and some historians have begun to wonder if this idea might not have had some influence on Ronald Reagan's decision in 1983 to pursue the emerging technological aspects of Strategic Missile Defense. The possible alternate view of reality that the Soviets might have possessed was best expressed by Richard Nixon in 1999: Victory Without War (New York: Pocket Books, 1988):

> Official views on nuclear weapons inside the Kremlin differ strikingly from those inside the Washington beltway. Americans believe that nuclear war is unthinkable. In its two-hundred-year history the United States has lost a total of 650,000 lives in war. Therefore, in the minds of Americans, no rational leader could contemplate starting a war that would kill tens of millions of people. But the leaders of the Soviet Union, which has lost over 100 million lives in civil war, two world wars, purges, and famines in this century, have a different perspective. Kremlin leaders put an entirely different value on human life. The Soviet government, after all, killed tens of millions of its own citizens just for the sake of creating collective farms. . . .While the current Soviet propaganda line is that a nuclear war is unthinkable, Moscow intends to take whatever measures will help it prevail if the unthinkable ever occurs (76).

[2] Academic oral tradition repeatedly assigns the quotation: "World War Two was fought with tanks and machine guns; World War Three will be fought with nuclear weapons; and World War Four will be fought with sticks and stones," to J. Robert Oppenheimer -- but if this is true, the source for this quotation has proven itself to be strangely elusive. According to Daniel B. Baker's Political Quotations (Detroit: Gale Research, 1990) a similar phrase appeared in the November 17, 1975, issue of Maclean's but it was written by Lord Louis Mountbatten: "If the Third World War is fought with nuclear weapons, the fourth will be fought with bows and arrows." I prefer the powerful images that the assumed Oppenheimer quote generates over the much weaker, but documented, Mountbatten line; and, therefore, I have chosen to include it in this essay.

offered both America and the world a new way of thinking about a problem that had become the ultimate no-win situation. The radical idea that he proposed that night soon became a symbol for the hopes and fears of a planet whose continued existence had become a matter of day-to-day debate. It forced the world to reconsider the awesome technological powers at its disposal and question the thinking behind the policies which, for decades, had dictated how these forces would be used:

> Would it not be better, [President Reagan asked] to save lives than to avenge them? . . . What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest on the threat of instant US retaliation to deter a Soviet attack: that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies? . . . I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace; to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.[3]

And instantly, the world was a different place. Almost everyone on the planet chose to forget that a great percentage of the speech was nothing less than a justification of the president's policy of increasing spending on more conventional defense measures – and that this idea was, itself, a justification of those controversial spending practices[4] – instead, the dream of a nuclear-free world captivated the imaginations of millions on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

It is necessary to say that Reagan stumbled onto this way to give humanity an alternative to nuclear holocaust – because the *idea* of a Strategic Defense Initiative had a life of its own that Reagan could not control. The concept that there might just be a way to end nuclear war forever became the light at the end of the tunnel for countless millions of humans around the globe. And it was this shift in thinking that contributed to the Cold War's end only eight years after President Reagan started everyone dreaming. But this is not to say that the Strategic Defense Initiative was the first time anyone had ever thought of the various ways that a country could defend itself against an enemy's missiles. The history of ballistic missile defense (BMD) begins in the later stages of World War II.

Today, weapons that can move faster than the speed of sound are common place and easily understood by the human imagination, but in 1944 they were brand new. Perhaps the most interesting fact about the German V2 rocket which Hitler had developed to bring

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[3] U.S. President. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1983), Ronald Reagan, 1983, vol. 1, 442-3.

[4] "I know this is a formidable technical task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of this century. . . . It will take years, probably decades, of effort on many fronts. . . . And as we proceed we must remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a solid capability for flexible response" Ibid., 442-3.

Britain to its knees was the fact that it moved so fast that it exploded before the sound of it approaching caught up with it. It is something of an understatement to say that the English were terrified by this weapon. As a result, they researched every conceivable method of missile defense available at the time; but, in the end, decided that the best defenses would cause more of a loss in lives than would simply allowing the missile to run its course and reach its target.[5]

Fortunately, the war did not last much longer; but the need to develop a viable missile defense did not die. American research scientists were busily developing the first working Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs)[6] and realized that it was only a matter of time before someone else developed the capability of lobbing a warhead at the United States. Projects WIZARD and THUMPER were instigated by the Army Air Forces in March 1946 as research and development projects to discover a way to stop enemy missiles once they were launched. To be effective, the Army realized that its anti-missile missiles would have to be capable of intercepting a device which was possibly moving at over 4,000 mph and flying at an altitude as high as 500,000 feet.[7] The possibility of making such a system work seemed hopeless. But research continued and by 1955, as the threat of the Soviets developing nuclear tipped Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles increased, major breakthroughs were made which brought the dream of a ballistic missile defense system into reality.

Eleven years later both the United States and the Soviet Union had anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) capability. But there were serious questions about whether or not such a system would work under fire. And there were serious questions about the morality of such systems as well. The Arms Race was well under way in the sixties and the huge stockpiles of weapons that it created were seen as a way to guarantee that nuclear war would never occur because both sides would be equally annihilated by any attempt to engage in a nuclear conflict.[8] Anti-ballistic missile defenses were seen by both America and the Soviet Union as the enemy's attempt to subvert the Deterrence that the MAD philosophy provided. And so, both sides soon began to look for a way to prevent the other from using ABMs to develop a First Strike Capability by creating a national ABM system that would be able to defeat a retaliatory strike by its missile-ravaged, and consequently weakened, opponent.   So great

[5] See Jack Manno, Arming The Heavens (New York: Dodd Mead, 1984), 7-14.

[6] The key word in this sentence is "working." At the very end of World War Two, Hitler's scientists had created a three-stage version of the V2 that would have been capable of reaching New York. Had the war gone on a few months longer, these weapons would surely have been launched. See: Basil Collier. The Battle of the V-Weapons: 1944-5 (New York: Morrow, 1965), 150-2.

[7] Donald R. Baucom. The Origins of SDI, 1944-1983 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 6.

[8] By 1974, nuclear proliferation had reached such an absurd level that Henry Kissinger began to ask: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority. . . . at these levels of numbers. What do you do with it?" See: Roger P. Labrie, ed. SALT Handbook: Key Documents and Issues, 1972-9 (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979) 264-5.

was this fear that it lead to one of the few agreements to come out of the first Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) which began in 1969: the 1972 ABM Treaty. The idea behind the treaty was that by limiting the number of anti-missile defenses systems to one guarding each nation's capital and one ICBM launch site, mutually assured destruction would be guaranteed and the possibilty of a nuclear war would be deterred.[9]

And the idea seemed to work. This agreement basically put a stop to all further ABM development by both sides until March 23, 1983 when President Reagan effectively annulled the contract.

So the question arises: "Why did the President's advisers suggest that he make such a radical move?" And the answer is, simply, that they did no such thing. As Donald R. Baucom points out in The Origins of SDI 1944-1983, several key members of Reagan's cabinet had no idea what the president's speech was to be about on March 23 until they were briefed at the dinner party that was held immediately before Reagan went on TV.[10] The idea to go ahead with the plan to begin work on a system of anti-missile, space-based, laser defenses was entirely the president's own decision.

This is not too surprising when it is understood that President Ronald Reagan was much more aware of just how vulnerable America really was against an all out nuclear attack than the average person could have imagined. One of the formative moments of Reagan's life was his tour of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) headquarters in the summer of 1979. Here he learned that the very center of North America's conventional nuclear defenses was, itself, defenseless. It would only take one, comparatively small, nuclear warhead to remove NORAD (even the parts of it that were underground) from the face of the planet. And it would be absurd to assume that the Soviets only had one such nuclear warhead aimed at the instillation that was primarily responsible for launching the combined American and Canadian nuclear arsenals in the event of a war. Shortly after this visit, in an interview with a reporter from the Los Angeles Times, Reagan got to the heart of both his own and much of America's attitude toward the way the arms race had left the country open to enemy attack:

> I think the thing that struck me was the irony that here, with this technology of ours, we can do all this yet we cannot stop any of the weapons that are coming at us. I don't think there's been a time in history when there wasn't a defense against some kind of thrust, even back in the old-fashioned days when we had coast artillery that would stop invading ships if they came.[11]

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[9] Department of State. "Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems" 26 May 1972, TIAS no. 7503, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 23, pt. 4.

[10] Baucom, 195.

[11] Edward Tabor Linenthal, Symbolic Defense: The Cultural Significance of the Strategic Defense Initiative (Chicago: U. of Illinois Press, 1989), 6.

This point should not be downplayed because it has much to do with the mass cultural movement that the Strategic Defense Initiative would become. It is important to realize that since the country's founding, America had prided itself on its invulnerability. The fact that the Soviet Union had enough ICBMs pointed at North America to wipe the continent off the globe punched a serious hole in that concept of American invulnerability. One of Reagan's key objectives as president was to make the country strong again. He wanted to find a way to give America back the security that the Cold War had stripped from it. Missile-zapping satellites orbiting the planet soon became his own personal answer to that mission. In The Great Transition, historian Raymond L. Garthoff tells us that "The main reason for his sudden, and tenacious, attraction to the idea was a strong desire to escape the confines of mutual dependence for survival."[12]

From almost the first minute he was in office, Ronald Reagan had been looking for a way out of the Deterrence Trap. He found it in an organization called the High Frontier.[13] This group was led by Daniel O. Graham, three-star general and former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who had resigned his post in 1979 and become one of Reagan's campaign advisers. He too was of the opinion that, for much of the past decade, America had been falling behind in the Arms Race and that the Soviets possessed such a numerical superiority in weaponry that they were nearing a First Strike Capability because they would soon have enough weapons to completely devastate the U.S. with their first assault, thereby preventing the launching of a retaliatory response. To his cause of finding a way to prevent this disaster from occurring, Graham had recruited former under-secretary of the army Karl R. Bendetsen; long time friend of Reagan's and president of the Adolph Coors Brewing Company, Joseph Coors; William Wilson and Jaqulein H. Hume, two more influential friends of Reagan; physicist Edward Teller who had worked on the Manhattan Project and later participated in the development of the first hydrogen bomb; and George Keyworth who was influential in the development of X-ray laser technology and had recently received an appointment as presidential science adviser. Together this group began to push and shove their way through Washington calling out the virtues of space-based missile defenses to anyone who would listen – especially those people closest to the president.[14] After nearly two years of constantly playing the role of gadfly buzzing in the president's ear, the group's efforts paid off when Ronald Reagan decided, after meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to verify the feasibility of their idea for a system of laser equipped satellites. It is clear now that members of the 'High Frontier" were the "advisors" that the president referred to in his speech when he said:

[12] Raymond L. Garthoff. The Great Transition (Washington D.C.: Brookings,1994), 99.

[13] A recorded message from President Reagan that endorses High Frontier as the group primarily responsible for the ideas contained in the March 23, 1983, speech is available at the High Frontier web site: "High Frontier" http://highfrontier.org/ Viewed 2-3-99.

[14] For a more detailed examination of the activities of High Frontier see: Baucom, 141-70.

In recent months, however, my advisors, including in particular the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have underscored the necessity to break out of a future that relies solely upon offensive retaliation for our security. Over the course of these discussions, I have become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence. . . . Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a mission to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today. . . . current technology has attained a level of sophistication where it is reasonable for us to begin this effort.[15]

Unfortunately, the people who were the experts on "current technology" outside of Washington did not all agree with the president on the "reasonableness" of his plan. Perhaps it is a cliche to say that the scientific community "went ballistic" over the idea of laser weapons in space – but it is, nonetheless, a particularly apt phrase. The fact is that within moments of the president bidding a goodnight to his television viewing audience, the tempers of some of the brightest minds in the country had flared and everyone seemed to be dividing up into two camps: those who believed in the president's grand vision – and those who thought he should be removed from office due to mental incompetence. Almost immediately, the press labeled the plan "Star Wars" after George Lucas's classic, genre-defining, space-opera of 1977. And the question of whether or not this was meant to be a derisive term continued for the entire life of the program.

In some ways, Ronald Reagan had set himself up for the term "Star Wars" to be attached to his plan by having himself referred to the Soviet Union as an "Evil Empire" just eight months before his Strategic Defense vision was made public.[16] In fact, the name Strategic Defense Initiative did not even exist until a need to counter the negative connotations of "Star Wars" became a necessity. Nor, for that matter did any official research organization exist until after the president's speech. This tendency of Reagan to do the important spadework after the announcement had already been made created such a fog around Reagan's vision that the criticisms that followed were almost inevitable. As historian Simon J. Ball nicely put it:

Since the plan was conceived as a speech rather than as a strategic program the nature of this 'formidable technical task' which would develop systems so that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles' was not clear. A detractor

[15] Public Papers of the President, 1983, vol. 1, 442-3.

[16] Ibid., vol.2, 742-8.

Paul Nitze, recorded that: "within the United States government . . .there was little understanding of what the SDI program was to entail. Was it to be a research program only, was it to provide an impenetrable shield, was it to be accomplished within the terms of the ABM treaty and therefore come about as a result of cooperative transition with the Soviet Union, and, finally, in what time periods were all these things to take place?"[17]

Choosing to believe in the president's vision became, for most who chose to do so, more a matter of personal conviction than logic. And because Reagan's own commitment to Strategic Defense Technology was itself based on faith not science, logical arguments against it were pointless and did nothing to stop the plan from proceeding.[18] Which is not to say that those arguments were not made; in fact, just the opposite is true, and in many ways, the complexities of the technological issues that the Strategic Defense Initiative brought to the forefront of casual conversation are fascinating in and of themselves. Between 1983 and 1991, scores of books were written discussing both sides of the same standard "Star Wars" questions: "Could it work?" "How could it be defeated if we did make it work?" "What, exactly, are the moral issues involved?" "How effective would it have to be?" A brief examination of these four questions is more than sufficient to provide an understanding of the heated atmosphere of the time.

The most virulent aspect of the debate was, understandably, the question of whether a satellite based anti-missile system would work at all. Obviously, the president believed that it would. And his "advisors" at High Frontier were sold on the idea before he was. So, then, who was on the opposition's side and what were they saying?

The Union of Concerned Scientists, the first group to speak out about the quantum leaps of logic that the President's plan was asking the American public to blindly accept, was by far the most effective. Perhaps this is because their membership roster reads like a *Who's Who* list of modern physicists and nuclear weapons specialists. Renowned astronomer Carl Sagan even had a seat on both the Ballistic Missile Defense and the Anti-Satellite Weapons panels. By June 3, 1983, members of these committees were testifying before Congress and

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[17] Simon J. Ball. The Cold War (New York: Arnold, 1998),190.

[18] As Raymond L. Garthoff says in The Great Transition (Washington D.C.: Brookings,1994):

The idea of unleashing American technological genius to provide a total defense of the country appealed to Reagan's nostalgic, even atavistic, deep-seated desire to see America again invulnerable, self-reliant, freed from the shackles of interdependence, with its fate no longer tied to mutual security, to mutual vulnerability through mutual deterrence. President Reagan's dream was, indeed, as he proclaimed at the outset and often thereafter, even when only he still believed it, that his SDI would make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." His commitment was not based on science but on faith, so scientific-technical and military-technical arguments (to say nothing of political-military ones) were   irrelevant   and   his   vision unchangeable. (516)

doing their best to make sure that the people who would be allocating the money for the president's plan knew just how far-fetched a notion it really was. Besides the fact that there was no reason to think that it would work, they claimed, there was plenty of reason to think that any satellites that we put into space could only make the existing situation worse. One of the gravest dangers that they cited was the fact that the enemy could hardly be expected to sit back and allow us to fill the heavens with missile-zapping satellites without devising some way to eliminate those satellites. They envisioned a whole array of anti-satellite-satellites and anti-anti-satellite-satellites and satellite-seeking-space-mines and anti-mines and anti-mine-defenses until the whole thing escalated and the distance between here and the moon was peppered with hostile debris. And they foresaw the possibility of a war in space breaking out among all these unmanned devices – with whole battalions of satellites firing on one another – triggering a real war on Earth. When Congress went ahead and launched a $26 billion, five-year, SDI research and development program anyway, they took their case directly to the American people.[19]

The title of the book published by the Union of Concerned Scientists was a description of their basic message: The Fallacy of Star Wars: Why Space Weapons Can't Protect Us. In just under three-hundred pages, they launched their own all-out attack on every aspect of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Here we find out more about how both nuclear missiles and lasers really work than anyone would ever have dreamed was possible without a Ph.D. in physics. For instance, it is not widely known that the earth's atmosphere acts as a natural X-ray, laser, and particle beam scatterer and, therefore, nullifier. This is one of the main reasons why any system that zaps missiles out of the sky has to be based in space. But because of this, there is a simple countermeasure to these devices that president Reagan would rather you did not know: simply shorten the ICBMs boost phase so that it never leaves the atmosphere. It might take a little redesigning of the existing arsenal but it is certainly a measure that is no challenge to the Soviets.[20]

The proponents of Strategic Defense also wasted no time making their side of the issue known. Their basic attitude was summed up nicely in late 1983 by Patrick J. Friel, who criticized all the opponents of the president's system as being too quick to make final judgements on technology that had not yet been properly researched. It was far too early, he said, to come to solid conclusions because it is always possible that while working with "immature technology" one might be able to make a breakthrough that redefines the realm of possibility. As a case in point, Friel reminds us that, "there were many capable scientists and engineers who believed the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile would not work or that the warheads would never survive the reentry thermal environment."[21]

[19] Union of Concerned Scientists, The Fallacy of Star Wars: Why Space Weapons Can't Protect Us (New York: Vintage, 1984), 286; Garthoff, 514.

[20] Union of Concerned Scientists, 41.

[21] Patrick J. Friel, "Spaced Based Ballistic Missile Defense: An Overview of the Technical Issues" In Keith B. Payne, ed. Laser Weapons in Space: Policy and Doctrine (Boulder: Westview, 1983), 32.

Alternatives soon began to emerge just in case laser technology never became the final solution to the nuclear dilemma. Many in High Frontier and elsewhere began to call for a reopening of BAMBI, a program that had been both conceived and abandoned in the mid-1960s that put both the launch sensor systems and the interceptors in space together. Under this plan, an array of 492 "space trucks" would circle the earth at distances of 300 nautical miles from each other. When an enemy launch was detected each of these "carriers" would fire an array of "kinetic kill vehicles" at the missile while it was in its "boost phase"[22] Stripped of jargon this last sentence basically means that a system of half-missile-launcher, half-launch-detector, combination satellites would take aim at a Soviet missile as it climbed into the upper atmosphere and then fire several non-nuclear projectiles at it. Such projectiles were called kinetic kill vehicles because they relied solely on the force of their collision with the hostile missile to put that missile out of commission. To understand this concept clearly just imagine one bullet colliding with another bullet in mid-air. High Frontier was particularly fond of this system because it would rely entirely on existing technology and would therefore be an "off-the-shelf" system that America could deploy as soon as the "trucks" were built.

Many people were opposed to undertaking any type of Strategic Defense Initiative because they saw the existing system of Mutually Assured Destruction and Deterrence as being more morally correct than the "Star Wars" alternative. And there simply was no way around the fact that President Reagan had forgotten all about the ABM Treaty of 1972 when he decided to go ahead with his plan to find a way to make America safe from nuclear attack.

Section One, Article Five, of the ABM Treaty clearly states that "Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, space-based or mobile land-based."[23] That, however, did not stop many in Washington from trying to find a loophole that they might be able to fit SDI into. But their quest to discover some ambiguity in the words "space-based" or "develop" or "components" did not lead to much and generally only succeeded in leaving feelings of absolute disgust in their opponents.[24]

Another issue was the question of just what America would do with the ability to make the Soviet nuclear arsenal useless once we got it. In 1988, philosopher Steven Lee wondered if we might not simply be trying to get the upper hand and use our technological advances to bully the Soviets into complying with our demands. He then went on to argue that even

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[22] Ibid., 18.
[23] Department of State, "Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," 26 May 1972, TIAS no. 7503, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 23, pt. 4.

[24] See Alan M. Jones Jr., "Implications of Arms Control Agreements and Negotiations for Space-Based BMD Lasers," in Keith B. Payne, ed., Laser Weapons in Space: Policy and Doctrine (Boulder: Westview, 1983), 36-105.

if we did achieve the lofty ambition of making SDI into a real system, we still would not stop producing our huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons because no one would ever completely trust SDI. Lee and many others found themselves wondering: How do you test such a thing? The only way to do so is by starting a full-scale nuclear war – and that certainly is not a moral proposal. So, we would continue to build just as many missiles as before, but now, we would be building satellites too.[25]

President Reagan had opened up a can of worms in 1983 when he used the words "impotent and obsolete" to describe the state that he wanted to leave the Soviet nuclear arsenal in. This gave many the impression that any proposed SDI program must be guaranteed to be one-hundred percent effective before satellite construction was even begun – and this was patently impossible. The Union of Concerned Scientists, for instance, was always overwhelmingly pleased to pass on the incredible number of weapons that a 99.9 percent effectiveness would require. This is particularly evident in the way they countered the idea of using self-guided kinetic kill vehicles to stop Soviet weapons in the reentry phase of the attack:

> If 10,000 autonomous homing vehicles are directed at 10,000 reentry vehicle targets, the attack will average 63 percent kill, and 3,700 reentry vehicles will survive. Nearly 70,000 autonomous homing vehicles are needed to reduce the number of surviving reentry vehicles to ten, or a 99.9 percent kill. Similarly, if the threat cloud contains 100,000 objects, then 700,000 vehicles must be sent against them to achieve a 99.9 percent kill. This illustrates the advantage the offense enjoys by using large numbers of objects.[26]

The flipside of this issue was expressed by Alun Chalfont in his book, Star Wars:

> The aim is not to provide 100 percent 'leakproof' protection, either for the population of the United States or its retaliatory missile force. It is to demonstrate a capacity to destroy so many attacking missiles that the Soviet Union would not know how many targets, or which targets, would be destroyed. This would make a first nuclear strike an even more problematical option than it is today, thus increasing the credibility of the deterrent.[27]

But not all of the debate was cloaked in rhetoric and techno-babble. The common "man on the street" was as quick to take a stand on the issue of the Strategic Defense

[25] Steven Lee, "Morality, the SDI, and Limited Nuclear War," Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 17, no.1 (Winter 1988).

[26] Union of Concerned Scientists, 136-7.

[27] Alun Chalfont, Star Wars: Suicide or Survival (Boston: Little, Brown, 1985), 84.

Initiative as were the government specialists and independently concerned scientists.   In 1985, William Safire, writing for the New York Times Magazine, asked his readers to send in their suggestions for new acronyms to define SDI since the president had recently expressed his disdain for the label "Star Wars" and Safire was, himself, not too fond of SDI or any of its officially proposed replacements: Study of Protection (STOP), Security Assured for Each (SAFE), and Mutual Assured Safety (MAS).[28] A month later he'd had over 600 responses.   On the side of those in favor of SDI Safire selected: Defense of Outer Space (DEUS); Security Against Nuclear Extinction (SANE); Shield Against Fatal Encounter (SAFE), Defense In Space Against Russian Missiles (DISARM); Hostile Projectile Elimination (HOPE), Defense Oriented Missile Employment (DOME);and, since there are apparently no taboos on two of the same acronyms, Shield Against Nuclear Extinction (SANE).   The opponents of the plan got their chance to deride it with acronyms like: Western Intercontinental Missile Protection (WIMP); Ballistic Offensive Neutralization Zone, and Bulwark Order Negating Zealous Offensive (both BONZO); Defensive Umbrella (DUMB); and finally, Wistful Attempts to Circumvent Killing Ourselves (WACKO).[29]

It was not long before both sides realized the value of television advertising as a means of getting their message to the public.   The two most successful ads were the opposition's "Twinkle, Twinkle" and the pro-SDI "Peace Shield".[30] In "Twinkle, Twinkle" we see a little boy dressed in pajamas looking out of his bedroom window at the night sky and singing "Twinkle Twinkle Little Star" to his teddy-bear.   As he sings, one star begins to glow and become brighter and brighter until it explodes and the little boy and his teddy are blown away.   As the picture fades, the characteristic, mechanically-assisted breathing of the Star Wars trilogy's primary villain, Darth Vader, grows steadily louder until the fiend finally speaks and reveals the commercial's message: "Stop Star Wars. Stop weapons in space."

"Peace Shield" soon became known to those who would deride it as "The Crayola Ad" because it depicted a child's multicolored drawing of a stick figure family standing outside a small house. The sun in the sky has a frown on its face at the beginning but as the little girl narrator begins to tell us how her daddy has told her all about how it is now possible to stop nuclear wars from occurring, the sun's frown changes to a smile. The ad claimed that we could now stop missiles in outer space so they would not be able to hit our houses and that this would make it impossible for anyone to win a nuclear war. "And if nobody could win a war," the little girl decides at the end, "there's no reason to start one."

It is uncertain how much good either of these ads did to win people over to the side that had spent the money on the attempt. In fact, it is uncertain how much good any part of the two campaigns did in changing people's minds in any respect. Choosing to believe in an end to nuclear terror or choosing to scoff at the president's scientific delusion was almost

[28] William Safire, "Acronym Sought" New York Times Magazine (Feb. 24, 1985), 10.

[29] William Safire, "New Name for 'Star Wars' " New York Times Magazine (Mar. 24, 1985), 15-6.

[30] Linenthal, 108.

as much a matter of personal conviction as a decision to practice one religion over another.
Arguments based on logic did little to affect the faith of anyone once the decision to choose
one side over the other had been made. However, all the noise that both camps generated
did not fall on deaf ears. Someone else was following SDI's development as well.

In The United States and the End of the Cold War, historian John Lewis Gaddis
examines the effect of the American Strategic Defense Initiative on the USSR and decides
that:

> Strangely, of all the efforts to promote internal reform in the Soviet Union through
> external pressure, SDI – which was never intended for that purpose – may have
> been the most effective. For as the Soviet Union sank more and more deeply into
> the "stagnation" that characterized the final Brezhnev years, the task of keeping
> pace with a new American military buildup imposed heavier and heavier burdens
> on an already severely strained economy, especially in connection with developing
> the sophisticated technology required to operate new weaponry. Coming at this
> moment of exhaustion, SDI's challenge to yet another round of costly research and
> development can only have been discouraging in the extreme to the Russians. . . . It
> clarified the price of continued backwardness, and in this way – as visions of defeat
> stemming from backwardness have often done in Russian history – cleared the way
> for dramatic change.[31]

By the time Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the economy of the Soviet Union was
in hopelessly bad shape. The new premier quickly realized that he had two choices
regarding America's SDI plan: he could throw billions of rubles at a potential fantasy, or he
could put the same money back into revitalizing his own economy. Of course, he did the
only rational thing under the circumstances and chose the latter option. But by this time
the situation had gotten so out of control that nothing he did made much of a difference.[32]
Three years later the Soviet economy had continued to decline so much that former
president Richard Nixon was able to sum up the situation in his book 1999: Victory
Without War:

> When Gorbachev looks beyond the regions of his immediate frontiers, he finds all
> his communist clients in the Third World queuing up for handouts. They are not
> allies but dependencies. . . . Lenin wrote that capitalist countries turned to
> imperialism as a profit making venture. If that was true, the communist revolution
> in Russia certainly did usher in a new era, since Moscow's empire impoverishes

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[31] John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War (New York: Oxford U. Press, 1992), 44.

[32] Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War (New York: Routledge, 1995), 356.

rather than enriches the Kremlin. Vietnam costs the Soviet Union over $3.5 billion a year, Cuba over $4.9 billion, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia a total of over $3 billion, and Nicaragua over $1 billion. Moscow's imperial domain costs the Kremlin over $35 million a day.[33]

As a consequence of this strain, Gorbachev began to show an increased willingness to accommodations with the West. And SDI soon became the best bargaining chip that America had ever invented.

Throughout the course of SALT I and II and START, America had continually come away from the negotiating table as the party that had given up the most.[34] But president Reagan refused to part with any aspect of SDI – even when doing so would have gained him much more in Soviet concessions than the hopelessly impractical system he envisioned was truly worth. The collapse of the summit at Reykjavic, Iceland, in 1986 is a perfect example of this. The Soviets were offering to cut nuclear forces by an astonishing 50 percent over five years and to totally eliminate ballistic missiles within ten years if only America would agree to abandon its plan to deploy an SDI system and limit all further research on ABM systems to the laboratory. Reagan refused and walked out of the meeting.[35]   President Nixon understood Reagan's tenacity. Although he was clearly convinced that SDI was, scientifically, a hokey notion at best, he realized that it was of immense value to America as a means to exert leverage over the Soviet Union. He predicted that the first thing that Gorbachev would do once President Reagan's successor was in office would be to try to undercut SDI because he can not imagine that any president other than Ronald Reagan could stand up the vast public criticism. But, President Nixon cautioned, giving away any piece of the Strategic Defense Initiative at that point would be, "a disaster for U.S.

[33] Nixon, 36.

[34] Actually, this complex problem has two major aspects. The first was the American tendency to cut military expenditures on projects that could have been "bargained away" instead. In essence, this often left the negotiators with nothing to give up at the bargaining session because Washington had already cut the funding for the programs that the Soviets were worried about. For a discussion of the effects of this on negotiations regarding missiles and missile defenses, see Baucom, 184-92 (this section also contains an interesting look at the way one specific religious attitude toward nuclear weaponry [The National Conference of Catholic Bishops' 1981 pastoral letter: The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response] was able to cause considerable havoc in the "real world" of strategic arms negotiations).

The second part of the problem was the fact that American negotiators often seemed more interested in making a deal than they did in making a deal that was beneficial to their country. Chapter five of President Nixon's 1999: Victory Without War (titled "How to Negotiate With Moscow" (160-194)) examines several of the mistakes that America made in its previous negotiations and prescribes alternate tactics that Nixon claims will enable American negotiators to come away from the bargaining table in a better position than they were when they stepped up to it.

[35] Garthoff, 288.

security."[36]

By 1991, the problem of whether or not to give in on SDI had been solved because, suddenly, there was   no one on the other side of the table to give it away to.   For all practical purposes the Soviet Union had ceased to exist.   The Strategic Defense Initiative's contribution to this development should not be overlooked.   Although it was never a working system, it was a working *idea* and, as such, had as profound an effect on the East as it did on the West.   The Soviet Union simply did not have the money to throw away on it that America could easily afford, and this did little to boost the morale of those who were scrambling to do whatever it might take to save their swiftly failing way of life.   "In short," as Richard Crockatt put it in 1995, "American strength of will and material resources at a critical moment in Soviet history tipped the scales in the United States' favor."[37]

But the disintegration of the Soviet Union did not magically remove the threat of nuclear war.   Huge stockpiles of Soviet ICBMs still exist today even if the government that commissioned them has faded into history.   This fact, combined with the increasing ability that radical Third World countries have shown in developing their own nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missile technologies has kept the idea of a Strategic Defense Initiative of some sort alive.

Beginning in 1990, when it began to look like some kind of massive change would soon be taking place within the Soviet Union, SDI proponents began to shift their worries onto other potentially threatening nations.   In the Rand Corporation's Strategic Defense Issues for the 1990s, the fact that there were several countries which were "undeclared" nuclear powers was expressed as common knowledge.   The four countries listed as such were Israel, South Africa, India, and Pakistan (the last two have just recently come out of the nuclear closet).   And then there was the fact that chemical weapons were relatively easy to produce and not everyone felt the same way about the atrociousness of their use that the West often assumed that they did.   Ballistic Missile production had become so commonplace in the Third World that there was a widespread commercial trade among the various minor powers in both the missiles themselves and the parts necessary to build and maintain them.   And Israel, India, Brazil, and even Iraq's Saddam Hussein, all had the ability to launch weapons into space.[38]

A little over a year later, the United States would find itself engaged in battle with Hussein and be forced to realize just what tiny countries like Iraq were becoming capable of.   Saddam's SCUD missile launches against Israel were the contemporary equivalent of Hitler's V2s – but now there was a defense against these weapons of mass terror that had been a technological impossibility in the mid '40s: the Patriot missile.   In many ways, the

[36] Nixon, 92-3.

[37] Crokatt, 356.

[38] James T. Quinlivan, George L. Donohue, and Edward R Harshberger, Strategic Defense Issues for the 1990s (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1990), 3.

televised coverage of the successes of the Patriot missiles in the Gulf War did more to alleviate the public demand for SDI than the end of the Soviet Union did. The issue almost seems to disappear from the public consciousness around 1992 when the publication of books arguing the pros and cons of "Star Wars" virtually ceases – but it did not disappear from the consciousness of those in Washington quite so easily.

On March 17, 1999, the Senate decided by a vote of 97-3 to allocate $10.5 billion to create a system to defend the US against long-range missile attacks "as soon as technologically possible." This decision was spurred on both by the recent ICBM tests of the "rogue" states of North Korea and Iran (both of whom have been working on developing nuclear capability for several years), and by the increased awareness of the possibility of an accidental firing of a single nuclear tipped ICBM by China or Russia. Although it still awaits approval by the president, the proposed system would be capable of defending against small-scale launches using kinetic kill vehicle interceptors directed by space-based launch and trajectory detectors. Its limited scope is a far cry from president Reagan's grand vision of a system that would be capable of destroying thousands of hostile missiles – but this also gives it the benefit of being a technological possibility in the very near future.[39]

Yet it was the grand vision of president Reagan that the current plans for a national Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Defense System owe their existence to. And, in some ways, it is also to this vision that the Cold War owes the end of its existence to. Ronald Reagan's dream of creating a working system of space-based lasers that would render the Soviet nuclear arsenal "impotent and obsolete"[40] might have been a delusion, but the idea that it could work was enough to give many people a new hope for a nuclear-free future. As Raymond R. Gartoff says, "The vision was a mirage. But it had a significant impact."[41] In this way, the *idea* of SDI was even successful when it was being slandered. People the world over were taking a stand on Strategic Defense and arguing its pros and cons so much that they seem to have overlooked the fact that they were doing something that they had never really done since the possibility of mutually assured nuclear annihilation became a terrifying fact of their everyday lives: they were talking about the logic behind the MAD philosophy. Ronald Reagan's March 23, 1983, address to the nation was the first time in the history of

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[39] The information in this paragraph was "breaking news" when this essay was being written. See primarily: Eric Schmitt. "By Wide Margin, Senate Approves Missile Defense System" New York Times, 18 March 1999, A 22. Also of interest is: Helen Dewar, "Senate, 97-3, Endorses a Commitment To Deploy Anti-Missile System" The Washington Post, 18 March 1999, A 4.

Also, it is interesting to note that the idea that a Strategic Defense System is necessary in the event of an accidental firing of a nuclear weapon has been a part of the SDI debate from its very beginning. It was one of the key issues that High Frontier used to justify their claim that an SDI system was a national imperative. For an example of this, and to see their founder in action, see: Daniel O. Graham. "SDI: Technical Reality and Political Intransigence," in Dorrinda G. Dallmeyer, ed., The Strategic Defense Initiative: New Perspectives on Deterrence (Boulder: Westview,1986), 25-42 (especially 29).

[40] Public Papers of the President, 1983, vol.1, 443.

[41] Gartoff, 516.

the Cold War that anyone in a position to create change had ever really asked if maybe there was not a better way of "dealing with other nations and human beings [than] by threatening their existence"[42] – but it would certainly not be the last time that anyone asked this question. And that was SDI's real benefit to humanity. Although it might have been a hopeless fantasy when looked at logically, the Strategic Defense Initiative was one of the most powerful ideas to come out of the twentieth century. In fact, it was so powerful as an idea that before a single satellite could be built, it had made it possible for people on both sides of the Cold War to imagine a world that was free of nuclear terror – and, as a consequence, it soon made it possible for people on both sides of the Cold War to begin to look for a way to make that fantasy into reality.[43]

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[42] Public Papers of the President,1983, Vol.1, 442.

[43] Our knowledge of history is always in flux. As this essay goes to press, testing has begun on the "smaller scale" ABM system mentioned above. This has renewed interest in Ronald Reagan's SDI program and several researchers are currently asking important questions concerning whether President Reagan actually intended to build anything in the SDI program or whether this whole episode was not just a highly elaborate attempt to "rattle the Ruskies." These new developments promise to be exciting enrichments to this field of study.

TIBERIUS DOWN THE LINE

WILLIAM JAMES BUCHHORN

Throughout history, men have fought over the question of who would be the next one to rule over ancestral territory. History is filled with stories of people who wanted so badly to be "king" or "emperor" that they tried every ploy that they could think of to attain those positions of supreme power. Usually, the rewards associated with being the sole person in charge of an immense mass of people and land are considered to be so great that few who had either been born into it, or been thrust into by the whims of chance, ever refused it or tried to find some way to avoid the responsibility. However, this does not mean that there were not exceptions to this rule. But refusing to serve as the sole ruler of a given state is not always a practical option. Clearly, Tiberius (42 B.C.E.-37 C.E.), Rome's second emperor (r.14-37 C.E.), fought his appointment as his step-father Augustus' replacement as ruler of the Roman possessions as much as anyone in history has ever fought any forced assumption of responsibilities that entirely conflict with their basic natures and desires in life. But, due to the realities of the Roman political state immediately following the death of Augustus in 14 C.E., namely the fact that had Tiberius refused to serve as emperor, civil war would have broken out almost immediately, refusing the position was hardly an option.

So, after only a short time dragging his heels and trying to will away the inevitable, Tiberius gave up protesting his selection for the position and allowed himself to be called emperor of Rome. But, if he had only known the way that the scholars and writers were going to continuously appraise and reappraise their assessments of every little detail of his day-to-day existence, often completely re-slanting a previous author's interpretation of a given event that occurred during his reign to justify their own personal ambitions and objectives, he might have been so disgusted by the whole mess that he would have been inspired to find some way to make the old Republic work again.

One of the problems with examining the historiography of a figure from ancient history, such as Tiberius, is that modern scholars do not have all the pieces needed to complete the puzzle. They do not have all the sources needed to understand the entire history of Tiberius. We know that Tacitus (c.55-c.117 C.E.) and Suetonius (69-140 C.E.) had access to the same books and documents and that each author used these sources to create a version of Tiberius which suited his own particular purposes and reason for having chosen to write history; but, usually, we do not know what the titles of these sources were, or who wrote them. And when we do know these things about an ancient's sources, we almost never have those sources to consult because, most likely, the last human to lay eyes on them was a churchman like Otto, bishop of Freising who, as a historian in the Middle Ages, tried to preserve every scrap of ancient knowledge that he could--but did not succeed.[1]

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[1] Otto's birthdate is disputed. It is variously given as somewhere between 1105 and 1111. We do, however, know that his The Two Cities was composed from 1143 to 1147 C.E. and that The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa cuts off with his death in 1158.

For instance, we know that both Tacitus and Suetonius used information from, Tiberius' own autobiography when they wrote their histories because both mentions it in the course of his work--but where that autobiography has gone is anyone's guess. Modern historians, like Frank Burr Marsh and Barbara Levick, are therefore forced to recreate their particular versions of Tiberius from atrociously incomplete accounts which many agree are barely even worth the label of "history" as we now use it because these works are often little more than thinly disguised vehicles for their author's own personal objectives and biases.[2]

To understand Tacitus' account of Tiberius, for instance, it is necessary, first, to understand a few facts about Tacitus himself. This is because most scholars now believe that the historian had a strong personal grudge against Tiberius[3] which can only be adequately explained by examining a few key details of Tacitus' own history.

Whether or not Tacitus was a part of the noble Roman aristocracy by birth is still a point of debate; but it hardly matters because by marrying the daughter of Julius Agricola he became, if nothing else, an aristocrat by association. He soon came to the attention of the emperor Vespasian (r.69-79 C.E.) and was made a candidate for the questorship. He served in this office under the emperor Titus (r.79-81 C.E.) then became a praetor during Domition's reign (81-96 C.E.) . Next, he spent several years in the provinces. When he returned to Rome, he was just in time to become an involuntary participant in the emperor Domition's final acts of terror. Apparently, as a member of the senate who valued his own life, Tacitus had no choice but to vote to condemn to execution many members of the aristocracy who were innocent of every crime except having a fortune that Domition coveted.[4] Witnessing this abuse of the law of treason had a major effect on Tacitus and his hatred of the emperors and their abuses can only be understood once his hatred of one particular emperor, Domition, is acknowledged.[5] This is important to understand because it this hatred of the emperors that drove him to write a chronological history of all their misdeeds.[6]

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[2] For a discussion of the various ways that Tacitus has "obvious defects" as a historian, see: Harold Mattingly. "Introduction" Tacitus: The Agricola and The Germania (New York: Viking Penguin, 1986), 11.

[3] As Charles Edward Smith says in Tiberius and the Roman Empire (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat, 1972): "In the main, Tacitus' attempts to blacken the reputation of Tiberius are the result of his bias against the principate," 160.

[4] Mattingly, 40.

[5] In the Agricola, Tacitus illustrates this point nicely by saying: "The worst of our torments under Domition was to see him with his eyes fixed upon us. Every sigh was registered against us; and when we all turned pale, he did not scruple to make us marked men by a glance of his savage countenance--that blood-red countenance which saved him from ever being seen to blush with shame," Chapter 45.

[6] Sir Ronald Syme suggests in Tacitus (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958) that Tacitus had ambiguous feelings about the emperors which was brought about by his association with the senate. On the one hand, Tacitus longed for the Republic; but he also understood that it was ridiculous to imagine that it could ever

Tacitus says in the opening chapter of his <u>Annals</u>: "my purpose is to relate a few facts about Augustus--more particularly his last acts, then the reign of Tiberius, and all which follows, without either bitterness or partiality, from any motives to which I am far removed."[7]   Then he goes on to completely disregard this guideline that he has given himself--it is now believed that his critique of Tiberius is always bitter and designed to further his own motives. He dispenses with his "few facts" about Augustus (r.27 B.C.E.-14 C.E.) in just five paragraphs and then his scathing review of the "abuses" of Tiberius takes up almost the entire length of the rest of his work. This is because Tacitus saw Augustus and Tiberius in a completely different way than we might expect. Because Augustus always maintained the illusion that he was just the "Princeps," that is to say, "the first among equals" and continued to have his powers reinvested in himself by the senate at regular intervals, Tacitus did not see him as we do today. For Tacitus, Augustus was just, as Julius Caesar (b.100 B.C.E.-d.44 B.C.E.) still is to us, a bridge between the Republic and the Empire: Tiberius, then, who maintained none of the illusions that Augustus was so careful to keep up, was, in Tacitus' mind, the real founder of the Empire and, as such, became the epitome of all that was wrong with the system.

From the very beginning of his discussion of Tiberius, it is easy to see that Tacitus is determined to paint as bleak a picture of the emperor as possible. This is especially apparent in the way that he shifts the focus of his discussion from Augustus to Tiberius: ". . . the same report told men that Augustus was dead and that Tiberius Nero was master of the state. The first crime of the new reign was the murder of Postumus Agrippa."[8]

From the very first moment that we meet Tiberius, we are forced to see him as evil. Today, it is generally believed that Tiberius not only had nothing to do with the execution of Postumus but did everything in his power to see that those who were guilty of the crime were punished.[9] Tacitus deliberately obscures the facts so that his portrayal of Tiberius can begin as badly as possible. And this continues throughout his history: deliberately selecting only the facts that will back up the point that he is trying to make and letting all contradictatory evidence remain unmentioned--or, if he does mention it, presenting it in such a way that Tiberius looks as bad as possible. Continuing with the Postumous example, for instance, we are told by Tacitus that even though Augustus had problems with Postumous Agrippa, and that even though he might have had him banished to an island because of his displeasure with his character,[10] he was not the type to give an order that one

work again. Nor does he long for a "better" type of emperor exactly, because "[benevolent] despotism enfeebles the will and blunts intelligence," 547. Instead, he seems to favor, in his desire for a better type of ruler, "the ideal of the middle path, liberty but not license, discipline but not enslavement," 548.

[7] Tacitus, <u>Annals</u>, I, 1.

[8] ibid., 5-6.

[9] Frank Burr Marsh. <u>The Reign of Tiberius</u> (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1931), 50.

[10] Many historians have speculated that Postumous might have been mad or, at least, highly unstable. See also Robin Seagar, <u>Tiberius</u> (Berkely: U of California Press, 1972), 46, for a discussion of

of his own family members should be murdered. Tacitus tells us that Tiberius would have been more than happy to commit such a crime:

> Beyond a doubt, Augustus had often complained of the young man's character, and had thus succeeded in obtaining the sanction of a decree of the senate for his banishment. But he never was hard-hearted enough to destroy any of his kinsfolk, nor was it credible that death was to be the sentence of the grandson in order that the stepson might feel secure. It was more probable that Tiberius and Livia, the one from fear, the other from a stepmother's enmity, hurried on the destruction of a youth whom they suspected and hated.[11]

For Tacitus, the fact that not everyone in the world wants to be the ruler of Rome was such a completely unfathomable concept that he could only assume that Tiberius' initial reluctance to assume the full powers of the emperorship was nothing more than a thinly disguised way to root out his enemies among the senators and aristocracy. He also suggested the possibilty that Tiberius could have been motivated by a concern for public opinion:

> [He wished] to have the credit of having been called and elected by the state rather than of having crept into power through the intrigues of a wife and a dotard's adoption. It was subsequently understood that he assumed a wavering attitude, to test likewise the temper of the nobles. For he would twist a word or a look into a crime and treasure it up in his memory.[12]

Sometimes, this tendency to hold Tiberius personally responsible for every event that occurred during his reign becomes almost silly. Tacitus even blames him for creating many of the problems that plagued the Empire during Tacitus's own lifetime. This is easy to see in the way that Tacitus makes Tiberius responsible for the revolt of the military which occurred shortly after Tiberius' ascension. The commander, Junius Blaesus, gave his men a day off to celebrate the beginning of Tiberius' reign (or, Tacitus remarks, to mourn the end of the reign of Augustus) and Tacitus cites this incident as the "beginning of demoralization of the troops, of quarreling, of listening to the talk of every pestilent fellow, in short, of craving for luxury and idleness and loathing discipline and toil."[13] Tacitus is really going out of his way to pin an existing social problem of his own time on Tiberius. The men mutiny and get their leader (Blaesus) to listen to them and make accommodations to their demands

how Postumous was of "low intelligence and uncouth disposition."

[11] Tacitus Annals, I, 6.

[12] Ibid., 7. It is also interesting to note the way that the last sentence of this passage echoes the selection from the Agricola quoted in note 4.

[13] ibid., 16

and then, after word gets around that this has worked, others get the idea that it is profitable to mutiny and a whole string of these things break out; and Tacitus would have us believe that none of this would ever have happened if Tiberius had not been promoted to emperor. He does this even though he is aware of the real complaints of the mutinous men because he lists their demands and the real reasons for their revolt in a later passage.[14] Clearly, he is choosing to present this incident in a way that further slanders Tiberius.

Tacitus continues his chronology of the reign of Tiberius in this fashion until the reader is convinced that Tiberius is the worst thing that ever happened to Rome. And he does this even though there are plenty of other events that occurred during the twenty-three-year reign of Tiberius that Tacitus could have made into his ultimate evils of Roman history. Take, for instance, the intricate machinations of a man who did want, more than anything else in the world, to be the sole ruler of Rome: Lucius Aelius Sejanus (d.31 C.E.) Although Sejanus was so convincing in his deceitful practices that he could remain Tiberius' close personal friend and advisor even after he had secretly poisoned his son, Drusus, Tacitus pins all the blame for Sejanus' actions on Tiberius. This is not only because the emperor had befriended him, but if the reclusive Tiberius would only have been in Rome more, rather than hiding out in his island retreat, Sejanus would never been able to abuse the Roman state in the way that he did.

Tacitus even finds a way to make Tiberius' own society hold him responsible for the abuses of Sejanus. Once it became known that Sejanus had either killed or put out of commission several others whom he believed could come between him and the highest seat in the Empire, all those who had struggled to be his friends during his days of glory began to come under suspicion even though they had immediately abandoned him once the extent of his atrocities became common knowledge. Tacitus shows us the way that one knight, Marcus Terentius, defended himself by bravely addressing the senate and pinpointing the "real cause" of the "Sejanus problem":

> It was really not Sejanus of Vulsinii, it was a member of the Claudian and Julian houses, in which he had taken a position by his marriage-alliance, it was your son-in-law, Caesar, your partner in the consulship, the man who administered your political functions, whom we courted. It is not for us to criticize one whom you may raise above all others, or your motives for so doing. Heaven has intrusted you with the supreme decision of affairs, and for us is left the glory of obedience. And, again, we see what takes place before our eyes, who it is on whom you bestow riches and honors, who are the most powerful to help or to injure. That Sejanus was such, no one will deny. To explore the prince's secret thoughts, or any of his hidden plans, is a forbidden, a dangerous thing, nor does it follow that one could reach them.[15]

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[14] See Tacitus, Annals, I, 26, 31, 34, and 37, for Tacitus' more complete history of these events.

[15] Tacitus, Annals, VI, 8.

The tendency to make Tiberius into the worst evil that Rome ever faced continues throughout the entire length of Tacitus' extremely thorough probe into the emperor's career. Therefore, when his last words on his subject do finally come around, the reader is not too surprised that they are, in essence, just one final jab against the person who Tacitus holds responsible for every crime of every emperor who would follow: ". . . he was infamous for his cruelty, though he veiled his debaucheries, while he loved or feared Sejanus. Finally, he plunged into every wickedness and disgrace, when fear and shame being cast off, he simply indulged his own inclinations."[16]

Another writer, Suetonius, handled his examination of the Tiberius in an entirely different manner. In fact, if Suetonius and Tacitus were not contemporaries one would almost be forced to claim that Suetonius must have used Tacitus' mentioning of Tiberius' "wickedness and disgrace" and his tendency to "indulge his own inclinations" as his jumping off point for the ideas about the emperor that he was determined to propagate.

Just as it was necessary to begin a discussion of Tacitus' account of Tiberius with an examination of Tacitus himself, it is also necessary to begin the discussion of Suetonius in the same way. It is important to realize that Suetonius was not, exactly, a historian as we understand the word today. He was a popular writer. A simple examination of the titles of some of his other books, none of which still exist, will prove this. Besides the Twelve Caesars, he also wrote books like Lives of Famous Whores, Illustrious Writers, Roman Dress, Physical Defects of Mankind, and Greek Terms of Abuse. Unlike Tacitus, he was not writing to fulfill the conditions of a personal vendetta; but he was writing with a specific goal in mind just the same. He chose to write a national history for the simple fact that Rome's twelve Caesars are almost guaranteed to provide him with a lively subject. Put bluntly, Suetonius was not just writing to record his country's history: he was writing to entertain. In fact, if he were around today he would almost certainly be labeled a hack. It soon becomes apparent to anyone who takes the time to compare Suetonius' accounts of the lives of the emperors with any other ancient source that he was clearly more of a sensational biographer than he was anything else.   Obviously, he did not care as much about the "truth" of what he was saying as he did about the effect his words produced.

Suetonius begins his examination of Tiberius in the same way that he begins all his portraits of the emperors, on a positive note. In fact, because he always follows this set pattern in his writings, scholar Arnaldo Momigliano suggests that he "was under the influence of an antiquarian approach to biography"[17] and defines the formula that he consistently follows as "the combination of a tale in chronological order with the systematic characterization of an individual and his achievements."[18] Therefore, it is not surprising

[16] Ibid., 51.

[17] The "antiquarian tradition" mentioned is, primarily, the Greek tradition. See: Arnaldo Momigliano. The Development of Greek Biography (Cambridge: Harvard, 1993), 20.

[18] Ibid., 18. He goes on to say that, as such, the biographies of Suetonius are more suited to literary

that he begins by talking about how Tiberius came from the Claudian family in two different ways and was therefore doubly noble and highly suited to be emperor. Then he states that Tiberius was a precocious statesman and how he gave his first public address at his father's funeral when he was only nine years old. By the time he is thirteen, he has become the leader of his peers; and when he comes of age, he proves himself to be generous by staging a huge gladiatorial contest with lavish prizes. He marries Vipsania Agripinna and has a son, Drusus, but this is where the positive side of Tiberius ends.

Because Augustus has other plans for him, he is soon forced to divorce the wife he loves and marry Augustus' trampish daughter, Julia. Suetonius tells us that:

> Tiberius took this very ill. He loved Vipsania and strongly disapproved of Julia, realizing, like everyone else, that she had felt an adulterous passion for him while still married to his father-in-law Agrippa. Tiberius continued to regret the divorce so heartily that when, one day, he accidentally caught sight of Vipsania and followed her with tears in his eyes and an intense unhappiness written on his face, precautions were taken against his ever seeing her again.[19]

Unlike Tacitus' account, in which Augustus made Tiberius his heir because he had no choice in the matter; in Suetonius, Augustus actually liked Tiberius before he decided that he might make a good emperor. The reader is provided with excerpt after excerpt from several letters of Augustus that praise Tiberius for this or that worthy accomplishment. In this way, Suetonius gets his readers to really like Tiberius--and then he pulls the rug out from under them.

Once Tiberius is in office his true nature begins to show itself. Suetonius accuses Tiberius of disguising his evil from the beginning. As an example, Suetonius says that, as a young officer, Tiberius had earned such a reputation for heavy drinking that his name, Tiberius Claudius Nero, began to be replaced with the nickname "Biberius Caldius Mero," which, in Latin, means "Drinker of hot wine with no water added."[20] This is made even worse by the fact that once he is emperor, he quickly promotes his drinking buddies to high offices.[21] In fact, his true vices instantly take over to the point that he even establishes a heretofore unknown and unnecessary government office: Comptroller of Pleasures.[22]

Suetonius claims that even Tiberius' refusal to accept the title of "Father of his

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figures and were just a further use by Suetonius of a technique that he learned during the course of writing his Illustrious Writers. Momigliano then decides that the pattern followed by Plutarch: "a straightforward account of events," is more suited to the type of subject that Suetonius had chosen to portray (see page 19).

[19] Suetonius Tiberius 7.

[20] Ibid., 42

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

Country" was something that he did for the good of Rome because he knew his own tendencies and knew just how much he would abuse the title once he got it.[23] In fact, there are so many abuses of power in this text that it soon becomes necessary to steal a line from Suetonius himself and say that: "A detailed list of Tiberius' barbarities would take a long time to compile; I shall content myself with a few samples."[24]

Suetonius tells us that Tiberius' retirements to his island home of Caprae were not something that he necessarily did because the strain of governing Rome, the strain of "holding the wolf by the ears,"[25] was too much for him--but because it was only on this island that all of Tiberius' true depravities could be freely exercised. So widely known was this trait, according to Suetonius, that island itself began to be commonly referred to not as Caprae, but as "Caprinium," which basically meant that it was the "Old Goat's Island."[26]

Suetonius then goes into great lengths to describe all of Tiberius' alleged sexual practices until the effect of all this is simply overwhelming for his reader--but even Suetonius apparently has limits to what he can report and we know that Tiberius has thoroughly stretched them because he tells us:

> Some aspects of his criminal obscenity are almost too vile to discuss, much less believe. Imagine training little boys, whom he called his 'minnows' to chase him while he went swimming and get between his legs and lick and nibble him. Or letting babies not yet weaned from their mother's breast suck at his breast or groin--such a filthy old man he had become.[27]

And the list does not stop there but continues on for several pages. But what is worse is the way that Tiberius abuses his political power just as much as he excersizes his sexual depravity.

Tiberius soon begins a reign of terror that is more like something we would expect from Domition than from the Tiberius that we have come to know from Tacitus' work. He begins to abuse both his own family and the noble families of Rome to such an extent that no one is safe and no one knows who will be next. He will kill anyone for any crime he can dream up to satisfy his urge to see death and torture all around him.[28] He is a tyrant both

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[23] Ibid., 67.

[24] Ibid., 61.

[25] Ibid., 25.

[26] Ibid., 43.

[27] Ibid., 44.

[28] "Not a day, however holy, passed without an execution; he even desecrated New Year's Day." Ibid., 61.

to Romans and to visiting foreigners without discretion.[29] In fact, things soon became so bad in Rome that Suetonius tells us that:

> People could now be executed for beating a slave, or changing their own clothes, close to an image of Augustus, or for carrying a ring or coin, bearing Augustus' head, into a lavatory or brothel or for criticizing anything Augustus had ever said or done. The climax came when a man died merely for letting an honor be voted to him by his native town council on the same day that honors had once been voted to Augustus. Tiberius did so many other wicked deeds under the pretext of reforming public morals--but in reality to gratify his lust for seeing people suffer--that many satires were written against the evils of the day, incidentally expressing gloomy fears about the future.[30]

Suetonius claims that these abuses continued up to the very end of Tiberius' life. He says that everyone in Rome suffered so greatly under his cruel hands that "the first news of his death caused such joy at Rome that people ran about yelling: 'To the Tiber with Tiberius!' and others offered prayers to Mother Earth and the Infernal Gods to give him no home below except among the damned."[31] But, as interesting as Suetonius' account of Tiberius might be, historians today believe that there is really very little real substance to it and that most of its more outrageous parts are far more likely to be products of Suetonius' imagination than they are to be events that really occurred.

In 1931, historian Frank Burr Marsh tried to get to the truth about Tiberius by constantly asking the question: "If Tiberius was not really as black as he has been painted, how did it come about that he was so misrepresented?"[32] He came to his conclusions by going back to the texts and trying to see if the incidents that are presented in them conflict in any way with the slant that the ancient authors are trying to give them. Basically, it is his discussion of Tacitus and his motives that make up the ideas that are expressed in the first few paragraphs of this essay's Tacitus section. He decides that if there was any truth to most of the anecdotes that Suetonius presents, these incidences would surely not have been passed up by Tacitus who was more than willing to throw anything into his discussion of Tiberius that could have made Tiberius look as bad as possible. The difference is that Tacitus never resorted to making up his examples whereas Suetonius never hesitated to do so whenever he needed to illustrate some particular point.[33] He tells us:

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[29] Ibid., 56.

[30] Ibid., 58-59.

[31] Ibid., 75.

[32] Marsh, 1.

[33] Ibid. 274.

For any serious study of the period we can neither trust Suetonius nor ignore him. He is a good witness as to the view of Tiberius prevalent among the Romans after the emperor's death, and we may accept, though with some caution, such of his stories as fit into the framework of facts furnished by Tacitus. General statements which are not sustained by Tacitus must be disregarded entirely, and, where Tacitus and Suetonius differ, we should follow Tacitus unless there are good reasons for thinking that on the particular point in question Suetonius happens to have reproduced a more reliable authority.[34]

But perhaps it seems a bit pedantic to focus on Marsh's methodology in such detail--it is not, because it is only by understanding the historian, his goals, and his reasons for writing that we are able to understand why his version of the story looks the way it does. Marsh's Tiberius, for instance, is formed by his re-examination of the standard sources for Tiberius's history; not just Tacitus and Suetonius, but Dio Cassius and Josephus and a small handful of others. He sets himself the goal of finding conflicts among these sources that allow Tiberius to be re-envisioned from a "modern" perspective. In Marsh's eyes, therefore, Tiberius soon loses his evil edge and becomes a magnificent leader who was willing to sacrifice everything for the good of his country.

In Marsh's interpretation, all of Tiberius's stalling around before he agreed to take on the responsibilities of Empire were nothing less than an attempt on his part to find some way of really making the Republic work again. Marsh suggests that he only agreed to accept the title and the position once it became clear to him that nothing short of the one man rule that Augustus had introduced would suffice to keep the noble families of Rome from tearing the Empire to shreds.[35] He claims that Tiberius constantly tried to reform his government-- but the senate just would not let him change Rome in any fundamental way and he was forced to live out the rest of his life as a reluctant emperor because those beneath him simply did not have his strength of vision.[36] Consequently, a friction developed between Tiberius and the senate. He alienated most of the aristocracy as well. His repeated attempts to make the government work explain the picture of him that Tacitus and Suetonius were able to create simply by relying on the still disgruntled family memories of the descendents of those aristocrats and senators not even a hundred years later. But, Marsh demands that we try to view the events of Tiberius' reign without bias and by the end of his book decides that: "If we look at Tiberius as he appeared to all the world except the conscript fathers and the populace of Rome, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to deny his claim to a place among the best and greatest of the emperors."[37]

[34] Ibid., 277.

[35] Ibid., 16.

[36] Ibid., 228.

So, by this point, it becomes almost impossible to formulate a true picture of an ancient figure like Tiberius because the versions of him that we have are constantly being added to and re-evaluated. It seems sometimes like any author can just take Tiberius and make him into whatever he or she will. Take, for instance, the example of Barbara Levick's Tiberius The Politician, published in 1976. Perhaps the best definition of this work is to call it a "uniquely postmodern perspective" because it takes so many of the standard things that we assume are basic truths about Tiberius and turns them on their heads. Instead of the man who fought tooth and nail to be allowed to do anything but be emperor, Levick presents someone who is completely opposite this stereotype. Her version of Tiberius was constantly and consciously scraping his way to the top. He still hesitates in accepting the Principate--the position he has been fighting all his life to obtain--but here it is only because the circumstances warrant this course of action and he is struggling to define that position to himself and determine just what his powers are. In fact, Tiberius, in this book, is so bent on achieving the ultimate position of power in the Roman world that he never even bats an eye when he is ordered to divorce Vipsania for Julia--after all this just brings him one step closer to the power that he craves so badly. Astoundingly, Levick makes this claim even though it is a key feature of all ancient and modern portrayals of Tiberius and one of the best reasons that Suetonius gives for the way that Tiberius later behaves. She even goes so far as to claim that "sentiment over his regret for Vipsania is out of place. He was a free agent, acting as thousands of Romans had acted before him: for political reasons."[38]

Levick continues her attack on all previous scholars of Tiberius by correcting the idea that Augustus had just appointed Tiberius to be the "regent" who would hold the position of emperor until Gaius and Lucius came of age. This idea, she claims, is completely out of place in any examination of Tiberius because it is an idea that is more appropriate to more recent monarchies than it is to Rome.[39] Likewise she criticizes the ancient view that Augustus had only selected Tiberius to be the next Princeps because all the other, "better," choices had died off:

> *Imperium* was conferred for use, not show, and it could be used to secure an indefinite number of renewals; nor was there any global monarchical power which could be conferred on a "guardian." If Tiberius was advanced to a position of unassailable power, the step was virtually irrevocable and power would last, if he chose, for the rest of his life.[40]

She also believes that Augustus could hardly have risen to the position of power that he held in Rome if he was as prone to make bad character decisions as the ancients would have us

[37] Ibid., 229.

[38] Barbara Levick Tiberius The Politician (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), 37.

[39] Ibid., 31

[40] Ibid., 31-2.

believe. Tacitus, she claims, would have had just as much evidence to compare Tiberius to Hadrian (b.76-d.138 C.E.), if he had wanted to, as he did to Domition. His love of things Greek and his determination to hold the empire to its existing borders are two examples she gives.[41] He simply chose to make Tiberius look as bad as possible because he, personally, did not like the system that Tiberius represented. She echoes Syme by suggesting that this was partly due to his senatorial position, but goes on to say that the sources he used were also "disparate in nature, scope, and veracity."[42] Furthermore, she claims that even if he had examined all the transcriptions of Tiberius' speeches that he could find and questioned all the senators that he could find whose fathers and grandfathers had sat on the senate while Tiberius was in power, that he still would not have been able to give us an accurate portrait of Tiberius because his own, personal failings often got in his way:

> That Tacitus' portrait is not a convincing whole--more of an expressionist sketch--is a measure of the disparity of the sources and of his honesty in handling them, but also of his impatience of routine detail, of his inability to resist the epigrammatic but misleading punch-line, of his taste for satire (both traits he shared with his subject).[43]

Also of interest is her claim that both Tacitus and Suetonius were far too willing to include gossip and select pieces of the oral tradition in their portraits because they were more interested in fostering the development of scandal than they were of portraying Tiberius as he really was.[44]

Levick justifies the way that Tiberius was later perceived as a cruel and harsh tyrant by blaming the senate for much of the undeniable evil that happened during his reign. The senate is to blame for all the atrocities that Tacitus and Suetonius cite--not the emperor. In her opinion, Tiberius is to be blamed more for allowing the senate to conduct its own business without interfering than he is for being personally evil. In fact, it is even a positive point on his behalf, because this is a clear indication that he was deliberately trying to restore at least some of the decision-making power in Rome to the senate. It is necessary that we see Tiberius as having an extremely limited position throughout the *Maiestas* trials, the mass-murder of the wealthy and the seizure of their personal property, that occurred during his stint as emperor. He had an extremely limited ability to do anything to stop the senate from doing as it pleased in these matters. Levick tells us that, if anything, Tiberius tried to tame the senate's innate tendency to bring charges against its own members because, as time goes on, fewer and fewer of the accused were executed and many more were merely

[41] Ibid., 222.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., 222-3.

[44] Ibid.

imprisoned. She suggests that junior senators had much to gain from successful accusations of their peers--up to one fourth of the accused person's property and possibly even an advancement to the "traitor's" rank were possible "rewards" for bringing an enemy of the state to light. She further points out the facts that the *Maiestas* trials did not end with the death of Tiberius but continued into the reigns of both Claudius (r.41-54 C.E.) and Nero (r.54-68 C.E.)--and that the extremely cruel penalties which Tiberius was accused of having devised for his own twisted purposes were nothing more than standard punishments that were used in the Republic. She even suggests that the senators might often have tried to outdo each other with the severity of their punishments in order to adequately express the horror that they felt over the crime that had been committed. And she concludes by telling us:

> The inherent faults of the senatorial court are obvious. How far they had developed before Tiberius took over the administration is not clear because the evidence is lacking. The court's essentially political nature and its docility, its ability to accept new charges as well as those on the statute book, its fluid procedure, its freedom to take charges separately or together, to alter penalties and rewards, its uncertain role, doubling court of law and legislative body, all are pernicious failings that emerge to daylight in the pages of Tacitus, Dio, Suetonius, and, for a much later period, Pliny.[45]

But even Barbara Levick's radical departure from all the standard features of Tiberian historiography can not compare with the unique perspective of one of the medieval world's most illustrious historians: Otto, Bishop of Freising. Unlike the others in this list, Otto never intended for Tiberius to be the center of any real part of his discussion because his scope is simply too large to go into detail on any one person in the way that any of the other authors that we have examined so far do. He is writing a Universal History with a teleological perspective. His purpose for writing is almost indoctrinary. The account he gives of Tiberius is little more than an interesting anecdote in a much larger story--but, what an interesting anecdote it is.

It seems perfectly logical that a medieval historian like Otto would choose to examine the life of Tiberius, because he was emperor during the most significant events in the life of Jesus, having taken the Principate when Jesus was somewhere around fourteen years old. Therefore, given the way that Tacitus and other historians that Otto would have read, especially Suetonius, treat Tiberius and his alleged depravity, one would expect that Otto would cite such behavior as a reason why Jesus had to come to earth when he did. But this is not the way that Otto treats his subject at all.

He begins his account of Tiberius by telling us that he was the best of all possible

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[45] The information in this paragraph is a condensed, and slightly re-ordered version of Levick's Eleventh Chapter: "Tiberius and the Law: The Development of *Maiestas.*" The quoted material is from 199-200.

rulers. In fact, he was even generous to a fault. Otto cites several incidences where those who were brought to trial before him for one crime or another learned that "Tiberius was indeed merciful but lax in his punishment of evildoers, a fault of almost all clement judges."[46] Tiberius even refused to raise taxes in Rome and the Provinces despite the urgings of the senate, because "it is the duty of a good shepherd to sheer his flock, not to eat it up."[47] But everything changed after Jesus was crucified.[48]

According to Otto, as soon as Pontius Pilate began to hear about the way that Jesus had come back from the dead after being crucified by his own troops, he was so astounded that he checked into the life of Jesus and decided that Rome did, indeed, have a new god in its midst:

> After the resurrection and ascension of the Lord, Pilate wrote to Tiberius Caesar concerning His life, His miracles, His passion and His resurrection also. Upon hearing this Tiberius brought a proposal before the senate recommending that He should be worshipped among the gods. But the senate refused to ratify Caesar's edict because the case had not been laid before them first; they even voted that all adherents of this name should be extirpated from the city . For this reason the emperor was transformed from a very mild prince into a most savage beast, and ordered a great many of the senators and nobles to be put to death. And so it came to pass that, because they were unwilling to accept Christ as king, they found their king Caesar an avenger.[49]

Thus, according to Otto, Tiberius became the cruel tyrant that Tacitus and Suetonius wrote of because the senate refused to acknowledge Jesus as a deity. His method was simply to take the same basic pattern that the ancient sources gave him, such as the way that Tiberius began his career as a person who was somewhat good and then his evil becames apparent after he had been in power for a while, and add his own reasons for why the shift in Tiberius' personality must have occurred.

Therefore, it must be concluded that it is not really possible to know anything certain about an ancient figure given the way that every author who takes up an examination of the subject comes up with almost an entirely different picture than the historians who have gone

[46] Otto, Bishop of Freising, The Two Cities; reprinted in The Columbia University Records of Civilization series. Austin P. Evans and Charles Knapp eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), 233.

[47] Ibid. This "proof" of Tiberius' inherent goodness is especially interesting because Otto is obviously stealing it almost verbatim from Suetonius and adapting the information that he finds there to suit his own purposes. See Suetonius, Tiberius, 131.

[48] Or, as Otto puts it: "The Lord deigned to come to His passion and to be crucified" The Two Cities, 235.

[49] Ibid., 236.

before. Until some major discovery of ancient texts clears up the gaps in the historical record, each individual reader of history and each individual writer of history are forced to formulate their own conclusions. All we can ever know is only a little better than a "best guess." But, history is not done with Tiberius yet. As we continue down the line, we will only continue to look back at Tiberius and rewrite his life to suit our needs. We reshape him every time we think of him; and we do the same with all the characters we know from history. We can never know these people personally, so we create them for ourselves as we try to put what we know of history into perspective.

Therefore, a careful examination of the historiography of Tiberius is just as important as any examination of Tiberius himself because historiography proves that there is nothing solid about the past except the fact that people are repeatedly overwhelmed by the urge to understand the people who have come before them. But, in order to do this, we must also remember that it is equally important to try to understand the people who are telling us the story.

GEORGE CATLIN:
EXPLORER AND PAINTER OF THE MANDAN

AMY TRUJILLO

In a time when the majority of the United States' citizens viewed the Native American tribes as savages and a nuisance, George Catlin managed to capture a realistic view of these peoples. Catlin's art is probably the most receptive of the early Native American painters. His paintings demonstrated an understanding and even an appreciation of the native people. In 1837, few people in or outside of the United States had a clear picture of what the tribes of the Plains and the Rocky Mountains looked like. The copious amount of paintings, sketches and materials that Catlin brought back with him give some of the best, and in many cases, the only information about the tribes before the serious interference of Euro-American settlers and the government. For the majority of his adult life, Catlin traveled in the Louisiana Purchase Territory documenting the people through his paintings and his writing. Still, there is no doubt that Catlin believed that the Native Americans were doomed. One of the main motives behind Catlin's work was to document these people before they disappeared or the United Stated government changed their way of life forever. In many ways, Catlin was the first ethnographer of the native peoples and one of the most successful in capturing the tribes before outside interference.[1] He was willing to paint and describe the Indians accurately. He did not give in to the stereotype of portraying the tribes as bloodthirsty savages. Through his art he attempted to show the American people the reality of the tribes, both good and bad, and doing this became his life's work.

Catlin's childhood and the area he grew up in heavily influenced his opinion of the Indians in later life. Catlin was born in 1796, in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania at a time when the people of the area vividly remembered the Indian presence. During the Revolutionary War, the Iroquois, who were allied with the British, attacked in what became known as the Wyoming Valley Massacre. While this was actually a battle between the British and the Americans and their respective Indian allies, the fact that the Iroquois dominated the battle led the Americans to label it a massacre.[2] During the fighting, Catlin's mother, then aged seven, was taken prisoner by the Iroquois. She was treated well and eventually was released without coming to any harm. While many people lived in fear of this tribe, Mrs. Catlin always believed that they were a decent people. Her time among them was one that she remembered fondly. Catlin's father also had a great respect for the local Indians. A veteran of the Revolutionary War and a lawyer, he had an avid interest in recording some of the Indian's history.[3]

[1] Kathryn S. Hight, ""Doomed to Perish': George Catlin's Depictions of the Mandan," *Art Journal* 49. No. 2 (Summer): 119.

[2] Joseph R. Millichap, *George Catlin*, Western Writers Series (Boise: Boise State University Press, 1977), 7.

As a child, Catlin must have heard stories about the Iroquois and other tribes from his parents and this doubtlessly influenced him, but he also had an encounter with an Indian at the age of nine.   Catlin and his family moved to Broome County, New York, near the Susquehanna River where there was still a slight Indian presence.   When the family plowed their field they often dug up beads, arrowheads and other artifacts of the Indians who had lived there.[4]   When he was nine Catlin was out hunting deer when he met an Oneida Indian, On-O-Gong-Way, who was also hunting.   While at first afraid, he realized that the man meant him no harm, and eventually they became friends.[5]   This friendship cemented Catlin's belief that the Indians were not savages and would later be the guiding factor of his interest in other tribes.

This interest turned into a career path when he saw the various chiefs heading to Washington to meet with national leaders.   This was especially true of the Seneca chief, Red Jacket, who was an eloquent speaker and considered to be one of the more noble Indians of his time.   While his father insisted that he become a lawyer, Catlin always had an interest in art.   Seeing these Indians made Catlin decide to become an artist.   He studied with Thomas Sully and spent hours examining the famous Peale Gallery in attempts to better his abilities. Catlin knew some success as a miniature painter because of his skill in capturing the character of the person.   He also attempted to paint historical works, these were heralded, and Catlin was the first to be named a Pennsylvanian Academician.[6]   From there, he decided to head into the West to document the lifestyle of the western tribes while they remained relatively unchanged by the influence of Euro-Americans.

In the 1830's Catlin traveled to St. Louis.   There he met Governor William Clark and was commissioned to paint his portrait.   When Catlin told the governor what he wanted to do, Clark became his mentor.   The governor set up meetings with Indian delegations that were passing through.   Catlin received instruction and advice from Clark about the western territory and the etiquette involved in dealing with the Indian chiefs.   Catlin went to treaty councils and painted some of his first works of Indians in their natural setting.   Although he went back to St. Louis as winter set in, he had begun the process of documenting the Indian tribes.   During the time he was in St. Louis, Clark encouraged his friends to have their paintings done by Catlin to allow him to have some source of income.   Because of this support, when he was ready to head west, he set up his headquarters in St. Louis.[7]

That winter Catlin returned to spend the winter with is wife, Clara in New York City. He also traveled to Washington to paint several more Indian delegations that were visiting at

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[3] Ibid. 8.

[4] George Catlin, *Rambles Among the Indians of the Rocky Mountains and the Andes*, (London, Gall and Inglish, 1966), 7.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Loyd Haberly, *Pursuit of the Horizon* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 26.

[7] George Catlin, *Letters and Notes on the North American Indians.* Michael McDonald Mooney, ed., (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, 1975), 335-36.

that time. During this time, Catlin accepted as much work as he could with the help of his father. In order to do what he planned, he had to have enough money to supply his expedition and leave his wife, during his absence. He also began a process that he continued throughout his travels. He had made many sketches of the Indians in his travels with Clark, and in the winter, he took the opportunity to finish the paintings in oil.[8]

George Catlin had a number of reasons for wanting to go into the western territories: curiosity, ambition, and, most importantly, his respect for the Indians and his desire to capture what they were like before they were gone. At the same time as Catlin was heading to St. Louis, the federal government was solidifying its Indian policy. On April 24, 1830, the Senate passed the Indian Removal bill, which allowed the government to remove the Five Civilized Tribes to land west of the Mississippi River. On May 26, President Jackson signed the bill into law stating that it would, "provide for an exchange of lands with the Indians residing in any of the States or Territories and for their removal West of the Mississippi."[9] Over thirty thousand Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek and Seminole were moved to land in the Indian Territory over the next seven years.

Scholars looking back at the removal see it as one of the most atrocious events in American History. Catlin joined white Americans of that time in the belief it was only way for the Indians to continue to exist, because the Indians were becoming a vanishing race. Catlin viewed the Indians as inferior or, at least, a less evolved people who could not stand a chance against the Euro-Americans. The scientific thought of the early nineteenth century believed that the Indians were evolved to about the point of the early Britons in the time before Christ. The only way for the Indians to survive was to separate them for their own protection. Andrew Jackson was a believer in this theory. While a renowned Indian fighter, Jackson believed that the land west of the Mississippi could be a safe haven for the Indians.[10] He stated that:

> Surrounded by the whites with their arts of civilization, which by destroying the resources of the savage doom him to weakness and decay, the fate of the Mohegan, the Narragansett, and the Delaware is fast overtaking the Choctaw, the Cherokee, and the Creek. That this fate surely awaits them if they remain within the limits of the States does not admit of a doubt. Humanity and national honor demand that every effort should be made to avert so great a calamity.[11]

[8] William H. Truettner, *The Natural Man Observed: A Study of Catlin's Indian Gallery*, (Washington D. C.: Smithsonian Press, 1979), 18.

[9] Hight, 119.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Andrew Jackson, Indian Removal Speech, in William H. Truettner, *The Natural Man Observed: A Study of Catlin's Indian Gallery*, (Washington D. C.: Smithsonian Press, 1979), 18.

This view of a childlike and weak people became common among whites for several reasons. The leading scientists and philosophers believed that the Indians were morally weaker because they could not resist the temptations of alcohol and other white vices. They also accepted that they were physically weaker because of their susceptibility to European illnesses.[12]

This philosophy drove Catlin to document the Indians removal through his paintings and his writings. He did not think that he could save the Indian themselves; what he wanted was to save their culture, through his work. He felt that his paintings would allow the Native people to, "live again upon the canvas, and stand forth centuries yet to come, the living monument to a noble race."[13]

The only way Catlin saw the Indians surviving in anything similar to their original environment was if the government created a national reserve between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains. He wished that everything in the West could be saved: the flora, the fauna and the people so that there would be, "a beautiful and thrilling specimen for America to preserve and hold up to the view of her refined citizens and the world in future ages! A nation's Park, containing man and beast, in all the wild and freshness of their nature's beauty!"[14] While this shows that Catlin was interested in preserving the Indians, it also revealed that he saw them, just slightly, as objects. Their value was in their uniqueness. The idea of preserving the Indians like an endangered species may seem odd today, but to the people of the 1830s, it was a natural extension of Indian removal. The Indians could not exist in white society; in fact they were happier without the interference and complications of European civilization. Therefore, the Indians should be removed where they were free to live as they wanted.[15]

With this knowledge of Catlin's thoughts on the Indians, it is extremely interesting to see how he portrayed them in his art and literature. The numerous trips that Catlin made gave him a far better idea of what the tribes were actually like than anyone except the mountain men and trappers who actually lived with the Indians. One of the most important groups that Catlin painted was the Mandan. This tribe had helped the Lewis and Clark Expedition, and was nearly destroyed by smallpox in 1837. Catlin visited the Mandan village, located on the mouth of the Knife River in the Dakota Territory, five years before the epidemic struck. It is worth noting that he felt that the Mandan were a good people and that he considered them to be one of the more noteworthy of the forty tribes that he documented.[16]

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Daniel, Tyler, ed., *Red Men and Hat Weavers: View Points in Indian History*, (Fort Collins: Colorado State University Press, 1976), 31.

[15] Ibid.
[16] John C. Ewers, ed., *George Catlin's O-Kee-Pa: A Religious Ceremony and Other Customs of the Mandans* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 1.

Catlin vividly described the houses, clothing and everyday activities of the Mandan. The only other significant recorded sources of information about these Indians came from the German Prince Maximilian of Wied and Lewis and Clark's journals, but they had distinctly different agendas than Catlin. They recorded the customs of the people from a military and diplomatic perspective, and were not worried about the Indians disappearing. Since Catlin believed that the Indians were a dying breed, his work was an attempt to capture the spirit of a people for the future not their potential value to the United States as allies. Prince Maximilian spent the winter of 1834 with the Mandan and kept a detailed account of his stay while the artist Karl Bodmer painted. Catlin spent the summer with them, and saw and recorded first hand the religious and hunting rituals that Maximilian only learned about from tales that the chiefs had told him.[17]

Since Catlin saw many of their religious rituals, including the O-kee-pa, he started off his description by saying that the Mandan were not the only tribe to practice rituals of this kind. This was a yearly creation ceremony that the Mandan believed renewed the tribe. Catlin points out the similarities between the Mandan's creation story and the story of the Ark: the significance of a dove, the destruction of the world, and the saving of the people by their use of a big canoe. While he describes this story in detail he does his best to make sure the reader knows it did not have ancient origins. He did not want to perpetuate the idea that per-historical Euro-Asians had somehow influenced the tribe, rather he attributes the story to a group of Welsh who had settled and assimilated with the tribe in the 1700s, and notes that it was unique to the Mandan. None of the other tribes that Catlin visited had a story that involved a canoe.[18]

The O-kee-pa started with the appearance of a man, Nu-mohk-muck-a-nah, bearing a sacred pipe, who opened the medicine lodge for the ritual so that the tribe would not be destroyed. The people were ordered to their wigwams and stay there. Four men who had gone through purifying rituals then cleaned the lodge for the next day's ceremonies. During the cleaning, Nu-mohk-muck-a-nah went to each house and told the creation story to the residents and suggested that they might want to make sacrifices to the water.[19]

Catlin's description of the ceremony goes on for pages in beautiful detail. He does his best to describe the ceremony as he saw it. He does not make very many value judgments on what the people were doing. He may have been horrified by some of the self-mutilating "torture" that occurred during the ritual, but he recognized that it was part of the Indian culture no matter how abhorrent it was to his western sensibilities. Catlin realized that these people would be changed forever by prolonged contact with the white man. He probably knew that the days of ceremonies like the O-kee-pa were numbered if the government and religious groups had anything to say about it. His detailed description of the Mandan ritual is one of the only first-hand accounts by a white man in existence. Since the Mandan were

[17] Ibid., 36.

[18] Ibid., 44-45.

[19] Ibid., 449-51.

virtually wiped out by the smallpox, the unique ceremonies and religious beliefs that Catlin witnessed were never seen again. Catlin's account also is significant because of his artistic ability. Prince Maximillian described what he had been told, but Catlin's left a visual record of what he had seen for future generations.

The Mandan's destruction demonstrated to Catlin that his belief about the future of the Indians was right. The Mandan had been friendly and mostly receptive to the Euro-Americans. Their physical "weaknesses" lead to their downfall. Catlin was grief stricken to hear about the tribe's demise, but in the end he was an entrepreneur. He realized that now that the tribe was gone, the value of his work, both monetarily and historically, had been enhanced. Catlin had gone out with the intention of capturing the Indians in the natural state to make a monument to a vanishing people. At the opening of his gallery, Catlin proclaimed that his art would allow the Mandan to live on and that it would show that they were, "a strange, yet kind and hospitable people whose fate, like that of all their race is sealed; whose doom is fixed to live just long enough to be imperfectly known and then fall before the fell disease or sword of civilizing devastation[20]

Catlin also gives a detailed description of their lodges. He stated that the roofs were made of two to three feet of clay that was waterproof and that these roofs were sturdy enough that many members of the tribe used them for family gatherings and look outs. Inside the lodges, the floors had been so worn over the years that they were almost like tile and so hard that it was impossible to break the crust. Catlin was extremely impressed by the size of these structures saying that they could easily hold over forty family members. The house was warmed by a large fire that was a center of activity for the family. They spent much of their time around the fire, "reclining in all the most picturesque attitudes and groups, resting on their buffalo-robes and beautiful mats of rushes."[21]

Catlin genuinely liked the Mandan people. He went to the Indians to see what they were like in their natural environment and he was not displeased by what he found. He was impressed by their dress calling it "strange and majestic" or "lofty" and, rather typically for an artist, spent a great deal of time describing the ornamentation of quills and fur. He also describes their hairstyles and the general appearance of the people.[22] On the whole, he felt that the people back east that studied the Indians by examining the visiting chiefs were being foolish. The Indians were not acting like they would if they were in their home villages.[23]

Catlin seemed to be amused and slightly concerned, that initially the women and the shamans of the tribe did not want their pictures painted. They felt that it was a form of magic that cut a person in half. After a time, Catlin convinced the people that his work was harmless and he painted many portraits, especially of Chief Four Bears, whom he described

[20] Hight, 120-21.

[21] Catlin, *Letters and Notes*, 142-143.

[22] Haberly, 68-69.

[23] Hight, 145.

as majestic. Catlin became friend the friend of Four Bears and he described an occasion when they shared a meal. He notes that he was the guest of Four Bears since it was the custom of the tribes in that area to never eat with a guest but to serve him until he was satisfied. Despite the fact that Catlin could not speak Mandan and Four Bears could not speak English, the two managed to carry on a conversation through sign language and pantomime.[24] Catlin was genuinely impressed with the character and comradeship that the people demonstrated in their daily conversations:

> With minds uninfluenced by the thousand passions and ambitions of civilized life, it is easy to concentrate their conversation upon the little and trifling occurrences of their lives. They are fond of fun and good cheer, can laugh heartily at a slight joke, examples of which their life furnishes them from an inexhaustible fund, enabling them to cheer their little circle about the fire-side with endless laughter and garrulity.[25]

One of the things that Catlin did was to try and give the people back in the United States some sort of common ground with the Mandan and the other tribes. He may have felt that the Indians were inferior, but he wanted his kinsmen to be able to identify human qualities in the tribes. In one instance, he described the bedding areas of the tribe. He said that they slept on bedsteads that were very similar to what the people back east used. While this may seem like a trivial detail, it made the people reading the book feel like they had something in common with the tribe.[26]

While Catlin's written work is important for its descriptions and his opinions about the various tribes that he visited, his paintings and sketches are his most enduring legacy. His gallery of Indian art was the most extensive at that time. Others may have been better artists, but Catlin's work was widely published in the early years of the nineteenth century. Until Fredrick Remington and Charles Russell started publishing their work, it was Catlin's art that was used in magazines and books and was seen by thousands of people.[27]

Through his art, Catlin attempted to document every aspect of Indian life. Unlike Charles Bird King and some of his own earlier work, his later concentration was not on portraits, but genre paintings. He did paint plenty of portraits and these are often the only evidence that history has concerning the looks and traditional garb of the chiefs and the people as a whole. Catlin painted their houses, their dresses and equipment, how they played and how they lived. In one painting, "Tchung-kee," Catlin illustrated how the Mandan's played a summer game with a ring and a pole. The grass is green and a large

[24] Haberly, 71.

[25] Catlin, *Letters and Notes*, 145.

[26] Ibid., 144.

[27] Mary Sayre Haverstock, "The Art and Guile of George Catlin," *Americas*, May/June 1983, 2.

group of people are watching as a man throws a stone ring and two others give chase. Catlin gave a description that went along with the painting. He said that Tchung-kee was the Mandan's favorite game and that they played it almost every day on a clay court that the villagers had built nearby. Catlin managed to capture the excitement the people felt and the action involved in the game. He described it as a "beautiful athletic exercise," and his painting showed his appreciation.[28]

Other notable paintings by Catlin are the ones that capture more of a feeling of the Wild West. These are mostly later works that Catlin made because he realized that people were more interested in the action that they were in the life scenes. Catlin may have been fascinated with the lives of the Indians, but he knew that he had to support himself and his family, so he painted what would sell. Many of these paintings show the Indians hunting, dancing, fighting, and holding councils. In "Death of the White Buffalo" a group of braves approach a white buffalo that they had brought down. As they approach they see that two bears are attempting to take the carcass. Many of these were painted later in his life and show the influence that the European battle and propaganda paintings had on him. His style becomes far more extravagant as he tried to keep people interested in his work. While paintings like this have less historical value, they are beautiful examples of Catlin's work. Through these action paintings, Catlin also hoped to gain more support for the sale of his gallery to the government.[29]

As Catlin painted and his work grew into a large gallery, he had the idea of selling it to the United States government. This became his dream but it was never to be. The government was dedicated to Indian removal and although he had some powerful friends in the legislature, it never passed through Congress.[30] At the end of his life Catlin was forced to sell the gallery to Joseph Harrison, Jr. He could no longer afford its preservation. It was only after his death that the collection was donated to the Smithsonian by Harrison's widow and became one of the nation's treasures.[31]

George Catlin had a profound effect upon the history of western art in the United States. For decades afterwards, artists, journalists, and editors would turn to the works of Catlin when they needed examples of Native American art. His incredible productivity made him an easy resource for anyone to use. He dedicated the majority of his life to compiling almost endless sketches and paintings. His highly publicized gallery and books made him one of the best known and praised artists of his time.[32]

Looking back its not surprising that Catlin based his life work upon the tribes of the West. Since his early childhood he had been fascinated by the idea of the "Wild Indian." It

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[28] Truettner, 266.

[29] Ibid., 299-300.

[30] Haverstock, 2.

[31] "Frist Artist of the West," *American History*, October 1994, 14.

[32] Ibid.

is to his credit that he was able to get past the stereotype; he showed the Mandan and other tribes as they were, not as his audience may have expected. Although considered more of a performer than an artist during his life, Catlin's paintings, sketches and memoirs managed to catch as least a glimpse of life in the tribes. His conviction that the tribes were doomed may have made him portray the Mandan and others in a more sympathetic light, but the importance of his documentation is undeniable. Almost all of the tribes that Catlin painted were extinct 50 years after his travels among them. Catlin's work is a treasure for historians and the world, through his paintings and sketches, the lifestyle and humanity of the peoples he encountered will be see for generations to come.

OF BLOOD, BOOKS, AND HOLY MEN

Tomas Zahora

"The intimacy of your love used to rejoice me greatly when I was with you," the monk, teacher, scholar, and poet Alcuin wrote to the monks of Lindisfarne after the monastery had been sacked on June 8, 793, "but conversely, the calamity of your tribulation saddens me greatly every day, though I am absent." Alcuin wrote from the court of Charlemagne, where he had heard the terrible news of the first of a number of Viking raids that would eventually devastate the monasteries of Northumbria in the ninth century. Himself a native of those northern lands, he received word of the barbaric acts of devastation with great pain, and sought to offer reasons for such an improbable conclusion to the history of a venerable religious institution which began with Aidan in the seventh century:

> . . . the pagans desecrated the sanctuaries of God, and poured out the blood of saints around the altar, laid waste the house of our hope, trampled on the bodies of saints in the temple of God, like dung in the street. . . . Either this is the beginning of greater tribulation, or else the sins of the inhabitants have called it upon them. Truly it has not happened by chance, but is a sign that it was well merited by someone. But now, you who are left, stand manfully, fight bravely, defend the camp of God. . . . If anything ought to be corrected in your Grace's habits, correct it quickly. . . . Do not glory in the vanity of raiment; this is not a glory to the priests and servants of God, but a disgrace. Do not in drunkenness blot out the words of your prayers. Do not go out after luxuries of the flesh and worldly avarice, but continue steadfastly in the service of God and in the discipline of the regular life, that the most holy fathers, who begot you, may not cease to be your protectors.[1]

It could not have happened by chance, because nothing in the Christian world of the early Middle Ages happened by chance alone, but was "a sign that it was well merited by someone." Alcuin interprets the attack as God's punishment for the laxity of His people – the suggested remedy is order and true monastic discipline, so that the saints-protectors who stood so firm during the early years of the establishment would not cease to shield the servants of God from danger.

Whether the attacks were brought about by the sins of the inhabitants or not, they were certainly the beginning of much greater tribulation. The closing decade of the eighth century merely foreshadowed events of the ninth and tenth, when the prayer "From the fury of the Norsemen, Lord, deliver us" echoed throughout a ravaged Europe. Alcuin, dying in

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[1] Alcuin, "Letter of Alcuin to the monks of Lindisfarne" in *English Historical Documents*, ed. David C. Douglas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 778.

804, did not live long enough to witness the exodus of the monks of Lindisfarne with the relics of their patron saint in 875. He did notice, however, adverse changes taking place late in the eighth century in the religious centers of Northumbria including Lindisfarne, "a place more venerable than all in Britain," a place whose influence on Northumbria and England encompassed the domains of art, religion, and politics.[2]

"In the year of our Lord 565," Bede writes, "there came from Ireland to Britain a priest and abbot named Columba, a true monk in life no less than habit."[3] The exact reason for Columba's leaving Ireland is unknown both to the author of *The Ecclesiastical History of the English People* and to modern scholars. Most probably he and his twelve companions departed from Ireland as voluntary exiles setting out on a *peregrinatio pro deo*, pilgrimage or exile in the name of God, a practice common among the Irish monks as a form of penance for private sins or a response to a higher calling.[4] Iona, then known as Hy, an island in the Hebrides about five kilometers long and two-and-a-half wide, became the abode of the wandering Irishmen. Soon, a circle of huts arose around a larger hut which housed the abbot of the new monastery, Columba. A modest refectory, scriptorium, guesthouse, and other structures were built later as the community expanded, for the island began to attract novices from among the Irish, Britons, and Saxons, and eventually became a center of Irish missionary activity in the north of Britain.[5]

Late in 633, King Oswald, upon assuming the throne of Northumbria, decided that "the whole race under his rule should be filled with the grace of the Christian faith." He appealed to the monks of Iona, requesting a "bishop by whose teaching and ministry the English race over whom he ruled might learn the privileges of faith in our Lord and receive the sacraments."[6] Oswald's gesture did not mark the first time Christianity made its way to Northumbria – Paulinus, the energetic Archbishop of York, succeeded in baptizing King Edwin of Northumbria in 627 – but the course of events during the momentous years 632-633 resulted in the collapse of the Canterbury-appointed archbishopric. During those years Cadwallon of Gwynwed, aided by Penda, the pagan king of Mercia, overran Edwin's realm. The king of Northumbria died in the battle of Hatfield; his widow, daughter Eanflæd, other remaining family members, and Paulinus fled to the kingdom of Kent. Only Paulinus'

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[2]Alcuin, "Letter of Alcuin to Ethelred, King of Northumbria (793, after 8 June)" ibid.,776.

[3]Bede, *Bede's Ecclesiastical History of the English People*, ed. Bertram Colgrave and R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), iii. 4 (222-3).

[4]Columba, known also as Columcille (Colum Cille –"Column of the Church") was born in 521 into a princely Irish family. According to his biographer Adamnan, after copying a passage of Jerome's text of the Scriptures without permission, Columba refused to return the copy to its source, and a battle between clans ensued. Later, Columba was enjoined by his soul-friend (confessor) to convert "to Christ as many souls as the number slain in the battle." John T. McNeill, *The Celtic Churches, A History: A.D. 200 to 1200* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 89.

[5]Ibid., 92-3.

[6]Bede, iii. 3 (219).

Map of the British Isles marking locations relevant to the early history of Lindisfarne

deacon James remained, and although he did play a role at the council of Whitby in 663, his missionary activity following King Edwin's demise was not decisive for the setting up of Christianity in Northumbria.[7]

The territories north of the river Humber fell, briefly, under the control of Cadwallon, but soon:

> Oswald's army overpowered and annihilated its enemy,
>   leaving the battlefield behind it in rivers of blood
> until the wicked Cadwallon himself fell, paying the price
>   for his treachery, dying amid the massacre of his men,
>   and yielding a brilliant victory to that splendid king.[8]

The victorious Oswald's choice of Iona as the source of the Christian religion, by which his newly acquired kingdom and people "might learn the privileges of faith in our Lord," did not come as a surprise to those who knew him. He and his brother Oswiu, as the heirs to the throne of Bernicia, had been forced to leave their homeland when their uncle Edwin, member of the rival Northumbrian house of Deira, became king. In 617, the boy princes followed the Roman military road behind the Antonine wall, arriving at Columba's island. Their stay at the isle in the Hebrides proved a formative experience for the boys, especially Oswald, whose piety "was to leave its stamp on his eight-year reign."[9]

Thus, late in 634, more than a year after his rising to the throne, the king of Northumbria received a delegate from the Iona community, Aidan. Aidan, the future bishop-abbot of Lindisfarne, was not the first Irishman to attempt to "minister the word of faith" to Oswald and his people. Bede writes of "another man of harsher disposition" who returned back to his monastery, having found the Northumbrians "intractable, obstinate, and uncivilized." After some deliberation, the monks of Iona agreed that Aidan "was worthy to be made a bishop and that he was the man to send to instruct those ignorant unbelievers,"[10] and kindly dispatched the goodly monk among the heathen subjects of their former guest, Oswald. The choice turned out to be of great benefit to the Northumbrians:

> Aidan taught the clergy many lessons about the conduct of their lives but above all
> he left them a most salutary example of abstinence and self-control; and the best

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[7]Richard Humble, *The Fall of Saxon England* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 21; Bede, ii. 20 (203-4); F. M. Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 116.

[8] Alcuin, *The Bishops, Kings, and Saints of York*, edited and translated by Peter Godman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 27.

[9]Gareth W. Dunleavy, *Colum's Other Island* (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1960), 16.

[10]Stenton, 118; Bede, iii. 5 (229).

recommendation of his teaching to all was that he taught them no other way of life than that which he himself practised among his fellows.[11]

Aidan's strength of character, humility, behavior that set example to others, as well as his relentless pursuit of learning, earned him great respect from the king and the inhabitants of Northumbria, and after Oswald's grant to him of the island of Lindisfarne in the North Sea across from the royal fort of Bamburgh, the monastery established thereon grew to reflect the energy and zeal of its founder.

An insular sanctuary like Aidan's former home, Lindisfarne was accessible from the mainland on foot two times a day during low tide. There, on open sea yet within sight and reach of the "bustling hive of industry" of Bamburgh, Aidan and his followers, aided by royal and noble donations, lay the ground for an establishment whose influence on Northumbria would reach far beyond religious issues.[12]   The Iona-generated conversion proved more lasting than the earlier one sponsored by Canterbury. While Paulinus' mission practically ended with the Archbishop's flight to Kent, "the conversion of Northumbria" by Aidan and his followers "was no merely nominal acceptance of beliefs and rites but the leavening of life and the adoption of a new culture." This would become apparent after 641, the year of the battle of Maserfield, when Oswald died while fighting against King Penda. The results of Aidan's mission held firm in Northumbria, and "by 663, the revised date of the Synod of Whitby, what was by far the greater part of England, a stretch of territory greater than the whole of Ireland, had become permanently Christian under the influence of the Celtic mission and was being served by preachers and bishops trained under Irish teachers at Lindisfarne."[13]

The Celtic forms of monasticism and Christianity, which exerted their sway in northern England through Lindisfarne, presented an almost irreproachable model of behavior for the Northumbrians, and a challenge to the Benedictine monks. Bede, praising Aidan's zeal, implied that the Celtic monks' asceticism inspired respect among the laity and clergy alike. While the continental Benedictine order and its *Rule* did place emphasis on "self-renunciation, prayer, and physical work," it strove to maintain a degree of moderation, even in the renouncement of the world.[14] This was not the case with the Irish monks. Not only

[11]Ibid., 227.

[12] Richard Fletcher, *The Barbarian Conversion* (New York: Henry Holt, 1997), 163.

[13]McNeill, 108; Although some historians consider 664 to be the year of the Synod of Whitby, in this essay I have followed the dating used by F. M. Stenton, i.e. 663. His explanation of the dating of the council is on page 129 of his *Anglo-Saxon England*. According to the *Dictionary of the Middle Ages* it was held "in September or October 663 (possibly 664)." Joseph R. Streyer, ed. *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol.12 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989), 626.

[14]"We are therefore now about to institute a school for the service of God, in which we hope nothing harsh nor burdensome will be ordained." Saint Benedict, *The Rule of St. Benedict*, translated by Cardinal Gasquet (New York: Cooper Square, 1966); 6. Irish monks accepted the Benedictine Rule only as the Roman observance of Christianity began to spread after the Council of Whitby. Stenton, 159.

was fasting a frequent exercise; some monasteries permitted their members to have only one meal a day, and the nightly hours, interrupted by religious services, were "passed in condition of studied discomfort."[15]   But the practice of asceticism did not end with an exacting observance of dietary and regimen regulations.   An Irish monk confessed his transgressive deeds and thoughts to an *anmchara,* a 'soul-friend,' and determined his penance – "medicine for the soul" – according to an elaborate system, later documented in the Penitential Books.   Depending on the severity of the offense, the sinner could spend time immersed in ice-cold water, or recite psalms, especially long psalms, the one-hundred-and-seventy-six-verse-long Psalm 119, for instance, up to seven times, while standing with his arms stretched out.[16]   Finally, there was the *peregrinatio,* mentioned earlier in connection with Columba.   Irish and, later, British *peregrini* like Columban (Columbanus) introduced Irish learning and enthusiasm for self-renunciation to the continental Western Europe.

Irish monasteries were renowned for their learning.   Novices and scholars from England and the continent found the Celtic monastic houses replete with rare manuscripts which, along with scribes and artists, "were exchanged freely."   Members of Hibernian *familiae* revealed an acquaintance with the writings of a number of the Church Fathers, Virgil, Horace, Juvenal, and with the expositions of the liberal arts by Martianus Capella and Boethius, but the principal emphasis lay on the study of the Scripture.   Irish monks-exegetes began their studies by acquiring knowledge of Latin, until they could read fragments of the works of classical Roman authors and the Latin Fathers; only then were they allowed to commence their biblical studies.   Because of Ireland's isolation from the continent, a peculiar form of Latin characterized by exotic words and obstruse sentences, the so-called 'Hesperic style,' developed in the Celtic monasteries.[17]

Irish scribes adapted the Classical Mediterranean script to produce the 'half uncial,' and a pointed minuscule script.   Illuminators, exhibiting Coptic and Syrian influence in their work, created such masterpieces as the *Cathach of St. Columba,* the *Book of Durrow,* and the *Book of Kells,* whose maze-like successions of patterns distinguish Celtic art in Ireland, Britain, and in the Celtic foundations in mainland Europe.[18]   Finally, monks-stonemasons,

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[15]McNeill, 82.

[16]Evans, 81; McNeill, 83; John McNeill adds: "That vivacious Celts in large numbers subjected themselves to these inconveniences remains something of a wonder. It is a lesson in the possibilities of human nature under the impulses of devotion." Ibid.

[17]Dunleavy, 33, 120-134.

[18]The approximate date of the making of the *Book of Durrow* is 650-700; the *Book of Kells* was finished around 800.   Ibid, 125; The *Cathach,* "traditionally, if improbably associated with the hand of Columba himself," dates to about 600.   Carol L. Neuman de Vegvar, *The Northumbrian Renaissance* (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Press, 1987), 75-8.

at first carving patterns and symbols into simple stone slabs, produced free-standing crosses, more than thirty of which are still standing in Ireland.[19]

Unostentatious like its zealous, resolute inhabitants, a Celtic monastery was often but an isolated assembly of huts surrounded by a wall. Irish ecclesiastical organization adjusted itself to the division of the island's inhabitants into clans. Thus, monasteries honored allegiance to the tribes of their founders; and since Ireland, unlike the continent, boasted no traditional urban centers, an Irish bishop would either live in a monastery under the authority of the local abbot, or the function of bishop would be held by the abbot himself. Celtic Christianity, moreover, differed from the Roman practice in its tonsure, its manner of consecrating bishops, its lack of common, binding rules, and, perhaps most importantly, in its way of computing the date of Easter. The Celts used an older method of determining Easter based on a Jewish tradition of an eighty-four-year-unit, at the expiration of which the cycle of Easters, measured in full-moons, would commence again. In the first quarter of the sixth century, the Roman church adopted a new schedule of cycles worked out by Dionysius Exiguus. As a result of this measure the Celtic and Roman Easter dates ran asynchronously, which added yet another reason for the Romans to suspect the strange, excess-prone, stubbornly individualistic Hibernian monks.[20]

Established as a daughterhouse of Iona (monastery founded by the members of the motherhouse of Iona), Lindisfarne displayed most of the characteristics of an Irish monastery, even as a center of learning, albeit on a somewhat limited scale. Despite generous gifts to the monastery, Lindisfarne remained modest in appearance and size. Instead of embellishing the buildings, Aidan used most of the acquired wealth to buy the freedom of slaves whom he educated. Even his Iona-raised successor Finan, intending to build a church "suitable for an episcopal see," chose the simple "Irish method, [constructing] not of stone but of hewn oak, thatching it with reeds."[21] Through the missionary activity of the monks of Lindisfarne, Celtic learning, discipline, and austerity diffused throughout Northumbria and beyond. Direct Lindisfarne influence can be identified in the origins of the foundations of Lastingham, Whitby, Ripon, Tynemouth, Gilling, Coldingham, Melrose, Barrow, and Crayke; Celtic elements can be also discerned at Glastonbury, Abingdon, and Malmesbury. Within twenty years, Sir Frank Stenton wrote, Aidan and his followers had re-established Christianity in the north. This Celtic version of Christianity, aided by royal

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[19]McNeill, 128; The crosses marked places of burial, preaching, or churchyards. "The origins of the standing stone crosses of England and Ireland are obscure and controversial." The evolution of Irish stone-carving arrived "fairly late in Irish art. A purely Irish origin of the stone cross is unlikely, as development in England is roughly simultaneous, if not earlier." de Vegvar, 153-4.

[20]Evans, 79; McNeill, 110-111; The Celtic monks shaved the hair above the forehead, leaving a line from one ear to the other, behind which hair was allowed to grow. Scholars suggest Druidic origin for the shape of Celtic tonsure. The Roman tonsure, on the other hand, left a band of hair around the head reminiscent of the crown of thorns. McNeill, 114; Bertram Colgrave, trans., *Two Lives of Saint Cuthbert* (NY: Greenwood Press, 1969), 316.

[21]Dunleavy, 18; ibid., 38; Bede, iii. 25 (295).

grants to Aidan and his successors, resulted in the institution of an entire network of monastic foundations.[22]

The supremacy of Lindisfarne as the chief monastic center and the only bishopric in Northumbria did not remain unchallenged. King Oswald was defeated and killed by Penda at Maserfeld in 641.   His brother Oswiu, having reunited Northumbria and avenged Oswald's death by killing Penda in battle in 654, became the overlord not only of Northumbria, but also, for more than a year, of the newly conquered territories of Mercia and South Anglia.[23] Fulfilling a vow he had made before the battle, King Oswiu founded twelve monasteries, and consigned his barely-one-year-old daughter Ælfflæd to a nunnery. About ten years later, however, events forced Oswiu to think of the Church as much more than a mere receptacle for endowments. During his reign and Finian's episcopacy, as Bede's *Ecclesiastical History* records, "there arose a great and active controversy about the keeping of Easter." Oswiu's wife Eanflæd, daughter of the Northumbrian King Edwin, who received her education in Kent, observed Easter as a Roman Christian. Oswiu, who still remembered the years spent with his brother at Iona, remained faithful to Celtic observance. Because of the inconsistencies between the Celtic and the Roman setting of the date of the ceremony, "it sometimes happened that Easter was celebrated twice in the same year, so that the king had finished the fast and was keeping Easter Sunday, while the queen and her people were still in Lent and observing Palm Sunday."   Needless to say, such aberrations caused concern at Oswiu's court. When Colman replaced Finan as bishop of Lindisfarne in 661, the situation became even more strained, and the points of contention between the Irish and the Romans grew to include tonsure "and other ecclesiastical matters." At last, "it was decided to hold a council to settle the dispute at a monastery called *Streanæshealth* (Whitby)."[24]

Queen Eanflæd and her allies were only a part of the pro-Roman party at Lindisfarne and Northumbria, a group whose persistent growth can be traced back to Finan's episcopate.[25] James, the deacon who continued his missionary work in the north after Paulinus' flight, too, supported the Roman claims in the controversy, while Hilda (the abbess of Whitby), Cedd (the bishop of the East Saxons), and Colman stood on the side of the Irish.   But the most vocal participant of the council was probably Wilfrid, whose opening words on behalf of the Romans immediately outlined the real problem:

[22]Dunleavy, 23-25; Stenton, 118; Rosemary Cramp, "The Artistic Influence of Lindisfarne within Northumbria," in *St Cuthbert, His Cult and His Community to AD 1200*, eds. Gerald Bonner et al. (Wolfeboro, NH: Boydell Press, 1989), 213.

[23]Stenton, 82-4; Yorke, 78.

[24]Bede, iii. 25 (295-7); ibid., 299; Translator's footnote: "The difference could be as much as a month, as happened in 631 when the Roman Easter fell on 24 March and the Celtic Easter on 21 April."

[25]Godfrey, 114.

> The Easter we keep is the same as we have seen universally celebrated in Rome, where the apostles St. Peter and St. Paul lived, taught, suffered, and were buried. We also found it in use everywhere in Italy and Gaul when we travelled through these countries for the purpose of study and prayer. We learned that it was observed at one at the same time in Africa, Asia, Egypt, Greece, and throughout the whole world, wherever the Church of Christ is scattered, amid various nations and languages. The only exceptions are these men and their accomplices in obstinacy, I mean the Picts and the Britons, who in these, the two remotest islands of the Ocean and only in some parts of them, foolishly attempt to fight against the whole world.[26]

Not a word about the intrinsic validity of either of the Easter calculation methods found its way to the oration; the argument rested solely on the authority of the two saints, and on the urgent need for conformity within the Church. Although Bishop Colman of Lindisfarne retorted to Wilfrid's provocative challenge with a reference to St. John's respect for the older tradition, he could not compete with him. The impassioned defender of the Roman Church pointed out that a close observance of the Jewish calendrics was no longer necessary, because St. Peter himself initiated a new precedent by celebrating Easter only on Sundays, and, moreover, because even "all the successors of St. John in Asia since his death and also the whole church throughout the world have followed this [new] observance."[27] Wilfrid's presentation being over, Colman kept his silence and King Oswiu, preferring not to contradict and anger Heaven's doorkeeper, acquiesced to abandon his former views. The council was adjourned.

Ultimately, as the tone of Wilfrid's speeches suggests, the principal issue at Whitby was that of Rome-imposed homogeneity versus Celtic individualism. Wilfrid, whom the "omnipotent God filled . . . with light from Heaven / that he might drive from the land foul shades of ignorance," was representative of a new generation of Northumbrian Christians. Born in 634, he visited Rome in 654, received a papal blessing, and became acquainted with the "true and untainted" ecclesiastical rules. Wilfrid and his Northumbrian-born sojourner Benedict Baducing (Biscop) were impressed by the splendor of Rome's ceremonies and architecture – so unlike the dour severity of Iona and Lindisfarne crouching at the remote limits of the earth – and became ardent supporters of unification of the Church. These men did not acquire their education in an atmosphere suffused with respect for Aidan's Celtic heritage, and looked up to Rome as their model of ideal Christian practice. After receiving land from King Ecgfrith, and founding the twin monasteries of Monkwearmouth (674) and Jarrow (681), Benedict Biscop would become the main agent in the dissemination of Benedictine Rule in Northumbria.[28]

[26] Bede, iii, 25 (301).

[27] Ibid., 303.

[28] McNeill, 109; Alcuin 1982, 49; Godfrey, 113-116; Ibid., 154-5; de Vegvar, 112; Stenton, 184.

Realizing "that his teachings were rejected and his principles despised," Colman requested that Eata of Melrose become the new abbot, and left Lindisfarne with those who refused to subscribe to the authority of Rome.   After returning briefly to Colman's motherhouse on Iona, the group which included all the Irish whom he had brought together at the island of Lindisfarne, and about thirty Englishmen, proceeded to settle on the Island of the White Heifer, Innisbofine, off the western coast of Connacht in Ireland. Unfortunately, Colman's new monastery did not enjoy peace for long. The Celts, inveterate wanderers that they were, preferred to roam about the countryside, especially during the busiest days of the harvest in the summer, and a conflict soon developed between the industrious Englishmen and their less industrious but no less hungry brethren of Hibernian origin. Colman was forced to seek another place, moving the English monks from the island to a place known as *Muig éo* or Mayo. There, Bede writes in an encomium of his assiduous countrymen, the monks adopted a better Rule – probably the Rule of St. Benedict – and could be seen still, involved in honest hard work to support themselves.[29]

Colman's separation from the Lindisfarne community did not presage an Irish exodus from Northumbria. Not only Irish monks and scholars, but the spirit of asceticism and penitential discipline – accompanied, perhaps, by that need for roaming which Bede frowned upon – endured, eventually embedding itself in the English version of Roman Christianity. In practical terms, however, the situation at Lindisfarne after Whitby changed rather dramatically. By the end of 663, after the brief episcopate of Tuda, the see of Northumbria split as Wilfrid became bishop at his monastery of Ripon, and Ceadda – brother of the East Saxon Bishop Cedd who took part in the Synod of Whitby – was assigned to the see of York.[30]

Not long after the Synod of 663 an eclipse of the sun appeared, and was followed by a sudden pestilence which stormed through England and Ireland, killing Tuda of Northumbria, and Deusdedit, the archbishop of Canterbury. Wigheart, a priest chosen to replace Deusdedit, died en route to his consecration in Rome. The papal office had to decide on a candidate to fill the vacancy in England at a difficult time, for the epidemic brought about a marked decrease in the numbers of the faithful. Finally, in 668, Theodore of Tarsus was consecrated archbishop of Canterbury, and in the following year, accompanied by Wilfrid of Ripon, and an African-born monk, Hadrian, he arrived in Kent. Theodore's subsequent visit to Northumbria resulted in his appointment of Ceadda as the bishop of Mercia, and in the reunification of the see of Northumbria under Wilfrid.[31]

In 670, Oswiu's son and heir, Ecgfrith, the man who aided Benedict Biscop's monastic establishments at Monkwearmouth and Jarrow, became king of Northumbria. By this time the Roman ecclesiastical structure of England under the leadership of Theodore had

[29]Bede iii. 26 (309); ibid., iv. 4 (347-9).

[30]Stenton, 123-5.

[31]Bede, iii. 27 (311-312); ibid., iv. 1 (329-337); Stenton, 130-5.

recovered to such an extent from the panic and relapse into paganism which accompanied the blightful years before, that in 672 a council was held in Hertford. Theodore's high position caused him to become involved also in numerous purely secular matters and conflicts, mainly due to the close relationship between the ruling families of England and the clergy.   In 677, Theodore deposed Wilfrid from his Northumbrian bishopric, apparently because the latter cleric's incessant encouraging of Ecgfrith's wife to join a monastic order did not please her husband. Thus, the see of Northumbria was divided again, this time into three episcopates: Deira, with its seat in Whitby; Bernicia, centered alternatively on the monasteries of Hexham and Lindisfarne; and Lindsey. Eata, the abbot of Lindisfarne chosen earlier by Aidan, became the bishop of Bernicia, and was succeeded in 684 by Cuthbert, a solitary monk of Lindisfarne.[32]

The period between 685 and 750 at Lindisfarne has been described as one distinguished by an eagerness to assimilate the new culture introduced at the Synod of Whitby. It bore witness to the reign of King Aldfrith, and the two-year-long episcopate of Cuthbert, the monk-solitary who occupied the island of the Inner Farne. Aldfrith, who succeeded Ecgfrith in 685/6, had spent some time prior to his reign at Iona, and his naturally inquisitive mind found much early inspiration among the Irish monks. The king's interest in learning foreshadowed a more extensive movement of intellectual and artistic revival, known as the 'Northumbrian Renaissance,' which began to surface after his death in 705.[33]

Bishop Cuthbert's "works of virtue, like those of the apostles, became an ornament to his episcopal rank." A pupil of the Irish monk Eata at Melrose, the obedient and devoted Cuthbert deservedly rose to the position of the prior of the monastery, and like his predecessors began to campaign against pagan idolatry with which his lay flock responded to times of ill fortune. Still later, as Bede's account continues, Eata "transferred him to the island of Lindisfarne so that there also, by his authority as prior, he might teach the brothers how to keep the Rule and illustrate it by his own behavior." As Cuthbert "grew in merit" he adopted a solitary way of life at the Inner Farne, where his new appointment found him in 684. During his brief episcopacy, the Celtic spirit still held its sway at Lindisfarne, although as bishop Cuthbert accepted Roman Easter, and respected the Rule of St Benedict. But the most fascinating events, which ultimately made an authentic saint out of Cuthbert, occurred after his death:

[32]Stenton, 135-140; The participants at the council of Hertford agreed on points reaffirming the common observance of Easter, and ending of monks' wandering "from place to place, that is, from monastery to monastery" unless accompanied by a letter written by their abbot. Bede, iv. 5 (349-355).

[33]Carl Nordenfalk, *Celtic and Anglo-Saxon Painting* (New York: George Braziller, 1977), 9; Rosemary Cramp divides the history of early medieval Lindisfarne into three phases: 1. 635-685, when the Irish element dominated, 2. 685-750, and 3. 750-875, period marking the end of the peaceful coexistence between the monastery and the secular rulers. Cramp, 216.

. . . the divine providence wished to show still further in what glory Saint Cuthbert lived after his death . . . so He put it into the heart of the brothers, eleven years after his burial, to take his bones – which they expected to find quite dry, the rest of the body, as is usual with the dead, having decayed away and turned to dust – and to put them in a new coffin in the same place but above the floor, so that they might be worthily displayed. . . . They did so and, opening the grave, they found the body intact and whole as if it were still alive, the joints of the limbs flexible and much more like a sleeping than a dead man.[34]

The frightened monks of Lindisfarne reported the miracle of the incorruption of Cuthbert's flesh to their abbot who joyfully received part of the Saint's clothes, kissing them with great affection.

Cuthbert's body was promptly transferred to a new, elaborately carved coffin, and placed on the sanctuary's floor. Numerous miracles of healing ensued almost immediately afterwards. The cult which grew with an unexpected rapidity after Cuthbert's death was accompanied by a creative response at Lindisfarne and Northumbria. Between 699 and 704, an anonymous *Life* of the Saint appeared, to be followed by Bede's compositions in prose (c. 704) and poetry (before c. 721).[35]

Lindsfarne in the early eighth century was no longer the modest abode of its founder from Iona. Its wealth grew with donations from kings and noblemen, and the enshrinement of St. Cuthbert was executed with a sumptuousness befitting a royal court, rather than a monastic house.[36] The *Lindisfarne Gospels*, a work associated with the early stages of the cult of St. Cuthbert, and written sometime before 721, bear witness to a monastic house with extraordinary resources. Dedicated to Saint Cuthbert, this splendid manuscript, perhaps the most well-known among the extant Celtic books, was written and illuminated by a single artist who clearly worked within the tradition of insular calligraphy represented by the *Book of Durrow*. Although the colophon assigns the manuscript's authorship to Bishop Eadfrith (698-721), it is probable that an unknown, extraordinarily gifted monk, unburdened by administrative duties, completed the work and used the bishop's name as a gesture of respect and humility. But regardless of its authorship, the *Lindisfarne Gospels* exemplifies

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[34] Bede, iv, 30 (443-4).

[35] Ibid., iv. 27-30 (431-445); Colgrave, 131-139; D. P. Kirby, "The Genesis of a Cult: Cuthbert of Farne and Ecclesiastical Politics in the Late Seventh and Early Eighth Centuries." *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 46 (1995).

[36] Even before the miracle of incorruption of the flesh, Cuthbert "was honored like an emperor." His body was wrapped in a precious cloth, dressed in a white dalmatic, a chasuble of silk *purpura*, and interred in a stone sarcophagus. A cross, made of gold and garnets, adorned his chest. Alan Thacker "Lindisfarne and the Origins of the Cult of St Cuthbert" in *St Cuthbert, His Cult and His Community to AD 1200*, eds. Gerald Bonner et al. (Wolfeboro, NH: Boydell Press, 1989), 103-109; Peter Hunter Blair, *Northumbria in the Days of Bede* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), 132-5.

Lindisfarne's ambiguous position: "loyal to Rome in dogma and practice after Whitby, but essentially Celtic in spirit."[37]

The initial close relationship of Aidan's isle with monasteries throughout Northumbria left its traces in the preservation and development of the insular half-uncial in the scriptoria of the monastic houses which gradually superseded Lindisfarne in importance. Another significant manuscript, the *Codex Amiatinus*, is the work of seven scribes and one illuminator of the joint monasteries of Jarrow-Wearmouth; and other manuscripts, such as the *Echternach Gospels*, the *Durham Gospels*, and the *Book of Chad* whose precise authorship and date is a matter of debate, testify to the vigor of Celtic art in Northumbria years after Rome's right opinion triumphed.[38]

Despite the artistic perfection of the *Lindisfarne Gospels*, the monastery itself gradually lost the preeminent position it enjoyed in Northumbria in the middle of the seventh century. Benedict Biscop's twin houses of Jarrow and Wearmouth gained ascendancy as their founder, collecting manuscripts during his travels to the continent and Rome, prepared the ground for a substantial library. Biscop's Benedictine foundations were no longer built in the simple and haphazard fashion of Celtic monasteries; the new, imposing edifices followed the axial orientation of the major local church, and revealed their builders' skills through their intricate decoration. When Biscop's successor, Ceolfrith, died in 716, the book collection at Jarrow boasted nearly six hundred volumes, an amazing number for the period. It was this very library that allowed the Venerable Bede to collect material for his works, a detailed list of which marks the last pages of his *Ecclesiastical History*.[39]

In 735, the year of Bede's death, the see of York was elevated to metropolitan status, and during the archepiscopate of Egbert supplanted Biscop's Jarrow as "the home of English letters."[40] Egbert was a pupil of Bede, and his new school at York remained faithful to the life's work of the monk-scholar who spent most of his life at Jarrow. Alcuin, who was placed in charge of York's library in 767, left us an account of its inventory in his long poem *The Bishops, Kings, and Saints of York*. Although rich in patristic and Christian works, the collection of books at York was somewhat weak in classical texts. The seven liberal arts which were taught there relied on Cassiodorus and Boethius, not on Martianus Capella whose *Marriage of Mercury and Philology* was popular among the Irish scholars. In its selective

[37]de Vegvar, 170-1; Thacker, 105; Michelle P. Brown, "The Lindisfarne Scriptorium," in *St Cuthbert, His Cult and His Community to AD 1200*, eds. Gerald Bonner et al. (Wolfeboro, NH: Boydell Press, 1989), 151-163.

[38]Brown, 55.

[39]de Vegvar, 113-119; Godfrey, 206; Bede, v. 24 (561-571); Bede's work *De Temporum Ratione* popularized in England the counting of years from the Incarnation, which was developed by Dionysius Exiguus in the sixth century; Bede's other writings included commentaries on the Scriptures and on the writings of the Fathers of the Church, lives of saints, as well as works dealing with mathematics and history.

[40]C. J. B. Gaskoin, *Alcuin: His Life and Work* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966), 33-36.

approach to learning, the school of York marked a definite move away from the liberal attitude of the Celtic foundations of an earlier era.[41]

The fact that of the fifteen kings who ruled the Northumbrian lands in the eighth century, five were murdered and six were deposed and exiled, suggests a certain degree of instability in the region. Save for the reign of King Ceolwulf, who temporarily halted the process of decline, Northumbria weakened throughout the century. Its southern neighbor Mercia emerged as a superior kingdom in the area, producing the first "prototype king of England" in the person of Offa.[42] Northumbrian clergy and monks apparently succumbed to the general feeling of insecurity, as some of the thirty canons adopted at the Council of Clovenshoo in 747 reminded them not to indulge in excessive drinking, to remember their vocation, maintain discipline, and improve the standards of education and learning. Bede, writing about two decades earlier, hinted at the laxity of the monastic discipline when he described the impeccable virtue of Aidan, contrasting it with "modern slothfulness." Even at Lindisfarne things were no longer the same after King Ceolwulf ended his successful reign in 737 by abdicating, joining the monastic community, and introducing the *familia* to the drinking of wine and beer.[43]

Then, in 793:

> . . . terrible portents appeared over Northumbria, and miserably frightened the inhabitants: these were exceptional flashes of lightning, and fiery dragons were seen flying in the air. A great famine soon followed these signs; and a little after that in the same year on 8 January the barrying of the heathen miserably destroyed God's church in Lindisfarne by rapine and slaughter.[44]

The Church of Saint Peter and Saint Paul was desecrated; the standing crosses of Lindisfarne, crosses which echoed the rhythm of Celtic decorative patterns of Iona, were thrown to the ground; the altar was spattered with the blood of monks; and manuscripts like the *Lindisfarne Gospels* were ripped from their expensive bindings and destroyed.

The 'heathen' who reached the northeastern coast of England in 793 were Norwegians who marked the first wave of Viking invaders and raiders. Among the theories explaining the sudden migration of the Vikings in paths radiating from the Scandinavian peninsula,

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[41]Stenton, 188; Gaskoin, 36.

[42]Yorke, 86-8; Stenton, 91-3; Humble, 25.

[43]Godfrey, 260-4; Gaskoin, 45; Bede, iii. 5 (227); "Ceolwulf, thinking it beneath the dignity of a Christian to be immersed in earthly things, abdicated the throne after a reign of eight years, and assumed the monastic habit at Lindisfarne." William of Malmesbury, *Chronicle of the Kings of England*, trans. J. A. Giles (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1847), 61.

[44] The editor of the present edition provides the following footnote: "The Ides of January, probably a mistake for the Ides of June (8 June) which is the date given by Simeon of Durham." G. N. Garmonsway, trans., ed., *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1953), 55-57.

some emphasize overpopulation, internal dissensions, tensions between the social classes, or foreign pressure; others point at the role of the climate in the creation of an impetus for the mass exodus. Most probably, as Johannes Brøndsted suggests, the attraction of loot and the potential for lucrative trade were among the chief attractions of the oversea enterprise.[45]

Exposed on an undefended island, and made wealthy by the donations stimulated by the cult of St. Cuthbert, Lindisfarne projected like a bait into the North Sea, ready to be taken by warriors ignorant of Hesperic Latin and thoroughly uninterested in the practice of Christian holiness. Alcuin, who had just returned to the continent from England where he was involved in a disputation against image-worship, responded to the horrifying news with a series of letters. "Truly it has not happened by chance," he writes to the Lindisfarne *familia*, "but is a sign that it was well merited by someone." He was well aware of the decline of discipline and learning in his native Northumbria, and interpreted the sudden attack as God's warning.[46] As the attack on Jarrow the following year showed, the Norsemen were interested in loot rather than prophesy, but the Norwegian raids did indeed prove to be a "warning."

Although the Norsemen proceeded to lay waste the Irish foundations on Iona and the Isle of Man, Northumbria remained untouched until the Danes embarked on their conquest in the ninth century. Despite severe damage, Lindisfarne did not immediately cease to exist. It received land grants in the ninth century, its community having resumed a semblance of normal existence. But the steady decline that preceded the raids, combined with the loss of manuscripts, made Aidan's monastery but a shadow of its former presence.[47] Finally, in 875, under the threat of attacks from Denmark, the community departed altogether, taking with them the relics of Cuthbert, and the illuminated manuscript which would later become known as the *Lindisfarne Gospels*.

[45]Johannes Brøndsted, *The Vikings*, trans. Kalle Skov (Baltimore: Penguin, 1965), 31-39.

[46]Although three Viking ships landed in Dorset in 789, the Northumbrians did not expect an attack. Sawyer, 210-1.

[47]Cramp, 214.

THE STARVATION MYTH: THE U.S. BLOCKADE OF JAPAN IN WORLD WAR II

CHRISTOPHER CLARY

At 8:16 a.m., on August 6, 1945, the world changed. Fifty-seconds earlier, the *Enola Gay* had dropped an atomic bomb, "Little Boy", from 31,600 feet above Hiroshima, Japan. The world was ushered into the nuclear age. After seeing the "initial burst and 'ball of fire,'" co-pilot Robert Lewis questioned aloud, "My God, what have we done?"[1] Lewis, nearly six miles above the devastation, was responding to the pyrotechnic display. He could only imagine the very real damage the bomb had caused. While disagreements exist concerning the exact figures, it is undeniable that the bomb and its radioactive effects killed at least 70,000 people.[2]

Though he was one of the first to see its effects, Lewis was not the first to question the decision to use the atomic bomb nor would he be the last. The decision still sits at the center of one of the most debated historical (as well as historiographic) questions. The focus on this episode is justified. This singular event divides the Twentieth Century in numerous ways, but perhaps most relevantly it ends a hot and bloody war, and marks the beginning of a colder conflict. And since we examine the event in the year 2000, we must try to avoid the biases of the post-Cold War era. This paper tries to focus on two different realities: the first is what actually, really happened, the true state of affairs, then secondly the perceptions of that actuality.

The historical field relating to Truman's decision is broad, and it would be impossible to fairly cover all of the issues of relevance. There are numerous topics of contention: Did fear of the Soviet Union affect the decision to use the atomic device? How many casualties would an invasion of Japan have caused? Did racism contribute to the decision? Was the decision made to justify the two-billion-dollar expenditure on the Manhattan Project? Was the decision made because of the sheer unthinking momentum of a bureaucratic juggernaut? Was Japan ready to surrender? Did the United States *believe* that Japan was ready to surrender? How did all of these factors come to play in the ultimate decision to use the atomic bomb?

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[1] W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II: The Pacific-Matterhorn to Wagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 5: 716-717

[2] The Japanese estimated 71,000 dead and missing, the Strategic Bombing Survey estimated 70,000 to 80,000 dead, while the British mission to Japan estimated between 70,000 and 90,000 were killed.

While a number of the above motivations have been used to varying degrees to show that the decision to drop the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was made for non-military reasons, the issue of Japanese surrender appears to be the crucial piece of the revisionist argument. This thesis varies from author to author, but there is general agreement on the core issues. When viewed from a distance, the thesis appears impervious to criticism. Closer examination reveals its flaws.

The revisionist thesis, presented first by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and later modified and expanded by Gar Alperowitz, argues that the United States persisted needlessly with its policy of unconditional surrender. This continuation was partially the fault of a failed understanding of the Japanese culture and, in particular, the position of the emperor in that society. Further, the United States had to use the bomb to justify its cost. The decision was also motivated by atomic diplomacy: the use of the bomb as a tool to intimidate the U.S.S.R. and gain concessions in the post-war world. The United States' strategic bombing campaign, when combined with the increasing control of the sea lanes had largely destroyed the Japanese war economy. Despite the fact that the Japanese viewed the unconditional surrender policy as national annihilation, that nation's leadership was so assured of a military defeat that they were quickly seeking peace. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan would have been a tremendous blow to morale, and probably would have caused immediate Japanese capitulation. Further, even if invasion were a necessity, and the revisionist consensus concludes that it was not, such an invasion would have caused only a relatively small number of casualties. From these premises, the revisionists conclude that the decision to use the bomb was not made out of military necessity, and that Japan would most likely have surrendered by November 1, 1945, and surely would have surrendered by December 31, 1945 *even if the bomb had not been used.*[3]

These arguments, however, are not internally consistent. The revisionists' must conclude that Truman was full of contradictions: he was power-hungry, deceptive, ignorant, simplistic, hate-filled, compassionate, heavily influenced by his advisors, while being weakly influenced by his advisors. The argument that Truman, and his Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, were both ignorant and Machiavellian is, in my opinion, untenable and largely spurious. And though it would be easier to attack this straw man of the opponent rather than the facts of history, the reality also supports a more traditionalist view: Japan was not ready to surrender, they would not have done so in the immediate future, and the decision to use the atomic bomb was made on military grounds.

Thus, the issue of Japanese surrender is at the forefront. Why would the Japanese surrender? The answer, as it is normally presented, is that Japan's war economy had collapsed and she could no longer continue resisting because her people were near starvation. The statistics for this are nebulous, and there is very little support for this in the testimony

More recent estimates conclude that up to 200,000 may have died as a result of the atomic bomb. See Dennis Wainstock, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 86.

[3] These precise and arbitrary dates were presented by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey [henceforth USSBS], *Japan's Struggle to End the War* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), 13.

of captured Japanese leaders after the war. In actuality the statistics seem to show that prior to the very end of 1945, things were going fairly well for Japanese agriculture. Even in 1945, when every perceivable stress had been placed on the Japanese, the situation was such that they probably could have sustained themselves for another six months to a year. By arguing that Japan was not on the verge of mass starvation, the cornerstone of the revisionist argument is removed. Starvation was the motivation for their scenario, and without it, the scenario as a whole seems significantly less likely.

The revisionists have built their persuasive argument around the assertion that a joint sea and air blockade caused the collapse of the Japanese war economy. In particular, they argue that there was a dire food shortage that would have quickly caused mass starvation. They also claim that the food shortage led to a loss of morale and absenteeism. This critical loss was exacerbated by the strategic bombing and the gradual collapse of the war economy caused by an increasing deficiency of raw materials and the destruction of factories. This collapse of the national economy, particularly mass starvation, would have forced even the Japanese hard-liners to capitulate. This theory is best articulated, ironically, by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey and its Vice-Chairman, Paul H. Nitze.

The USSBS was to evaluate the effects of strategic bombing. It was established pursuant to a directive of President Roosevelt to "conduct an impartial and expert study on the effects of aerial attack" on Germany and Japan, "to establish a basis for evaluating the importance and potentialities of air power as an instrument of military strategy for planning the future development of United States armed forces."[4] This mandate gave the USSBS broad goals. When Truman gave his specific instructions to the Pacific War survey, he broadened the mandate further by including naval as well as air corps personnel. Also, the inclusion of post-war planning into the objectives, helped lead to the occurrence of "mission creep." The USSBS attempted to evaluate events that were only tangentially related to their core subject: the unique impact of atomic bombs, investigate why the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, and why they ultimately surrendered.[5]

Nitze ultimately played a significant role in the USSBS reports concerning the war in the Pacific. The USSBS was chaired by Franklin D'Olier, president of the Prudential Insurance Company, and Nitze was one of several people under D'Olier who went on to have prestigious careers. However, D'Olier had difficulty persuading survey employees to transfer to the Pacific, and of the civilian directors, only Nitze was willing to take a major responsibility for the Pacific Survey.[6] Nitze's conclusions *prior* to making his "impartial and objective study" are therefore very important in understanding the ultimate conclusions reached by the USSBS.

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[4] USSBS, *The Effects of Air Attacks on Japanese Urban Economy* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), iii.

[5] Robert Newman, *Truman and the Hiroshima Cult* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), 34-5.

[6] Ibid., 33, 35.

In June 1945, Nitze met with the Joint Target Group to discuss his view of the effect of strategic bombing upon Japan. His arguments then are evident in the findings he presented a year later. He argued that by attacking the essential lines of transportation they could isolate Japanese islands from one another and hence fragment the base of Japanese operations. The "interdiction of the lines of transportation would be sufficiently effective... that the bombing of urban industrial areas would not be necessary." Nitze concluded along with Fred Searles that Japan would surrender in matter of months; Nitze predicted that Japan would capitulate by November 1945. However, the Joint Chiefs did not concur with Nitze and Searles estimate and felt invasion was still necessary for surrender. That in turn would prompt Truman to choose to use the atomic bomb.[7]

Nitze's account contains numerous important facts, but three should be noted specifically. He had already formulated the basic conclusion to the USSBS before he surveyed the facts. The date of November 1945 for capitulation is also indicative. After thirteen months of research, Nitze concludes that Japan would have surrendered if the atomic bomb had not been dropped most likely by the 1 November 1945.[8] Second, Nitze's views were not necessarily in accord with other military advisors, namely the Joint Chiefs. And, as a peripheral issue, Truman's decision was made in accord with his military advisors' belief that bombing and a blockade alone would not cause capitulation.

It seems difficult to believe that Nitze's data was precise enough to warrant a date by which the Japanese would probably have surrendered. And when examining the data used by the USSBS, it is frequently inconclusive, and certainly does not merit such an emphatic statement as the conclusion explicitly stated in two of the three reports issued by the Survey that, "certainly prior to December 31, 1945, and in all probability prior to November 1, 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."[9]

To support this conclusion, Nitze points to the continuing air-sea encirclement of Japan. The "blockade was having an effect. People were starving in Japan.... They couldn't even ship between islands. They would soon run out of food. This would cause the Emperor to work for peace." This would force the Japanese to surrender; "even the military don't like to see all their people starve to death."[10]

However, this conclusion does not correspond necessarily to the data in the USSBS reports. In particular, the Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division produced a lengthy report in January 1947, titled *The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization*

[7] Paul H. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 36-7, quoted in Newman, *Truman and the Hiroshima Cult*, 34.

[8] USSBS, *Japan's Struggle*, 13

[9] Ibid.; idem, *Summary Report (Pacific War)* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), 26.

of Manpower.   The blockade was having serious difficulty in cutting off Japanese food supplies.   While the islands were largely dependent on imports for many raw materials, surprisingly they were largely self-sustaining agriculturally: "from 1931 to 1940 19 percent of Japan's food supply, on a caloric basis, was imported."   This would increase to 20 percent by 1941, but then would gradually decline to only 9 percent.[11]   It is important to note that even if the embargo completely stopped all importation of food, it would have affected only one-fifth of the Japanese food supply.   The removal of 10 percent of a former source for food imports is a significant hardship, but there is no evidence to indicate that people were dying in Japan of starvation, or that such mass starvation would have happened before the end of 1946.

A close examination of food imports shows why the blockade was unable to cut the island nation off entirely from its foreign supplies.   First, it must be noted that Japan depended only on imports of certain crops, namely rice (17% of which was imported), soybeans (21%), sugar (84%), wheat (21%), and other grains and beans (37%).   It received these crops from various sources.   "Rice was imported principally from Korea and Formosa [present-day Taiwan], sugar from Formosa and the Netherlands Indies [present-day Indonesia], wheat from Australia, Canada, and the United States, and soybeans and other grains and beans from Manchuria."[12]

Clearly, once the Greater East Asian War began, Japan lost almost all of its wheat imports from Anglo-American countries, but all of its other imports were with occupied territories across the Sea of Japan.   Rice imports, as a percentage of total production, decreased throughout the war, partially due to poor harvests in Korea.   Sugar production tapered off as well.   However, for soybeans along with other grains and beans, Japan was able to maintain the same percentage of imports throughout the war.

The Sea of Japan was largely insulated from the enclosing Allied "ring of steel," and hence imports continued.   B-29s mined the harbors of western Japan with mines, while some submarines were able to sneak into the Sea of Japan.   The effects of the mining were ultimately crippling.   During the last five months of the war, B-29s flew 1,528 mining sorties and planted 12,053 mines.   Half of the shipping tonnage lost during this period was lost to mines.   Still, neither the Straits of Tsushima in the south nor the La Perouse Straits in the north had been breached by surface vessels.[13]

The evidence, however, even taking into account the mining, is not conclusive.   Despite the growing loss of shipping; and the consistent loss of supplies, raw materials, and fertilizers; the crop for 1944 had by almost all measures increased over that of the previous

[10] Newman, 37.

[11] USSBS, *The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization of Manpower* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), 2.

[12] Ibid.

year. First, per acre yield of almost all crops seemed to be improving. Wheat, naked barley, and barley all showed marked improvements in 1944. Rice, while still continuing a per acre yield decline that began in 1942, seemed to be moving towards stabilization or recovery. This decline was not, however, a sign the United States' campaign was taking a toll on Japanese agriculture, but was a random fluctuation.   The USSBS survey has difficulty explaining away this fact, mentioning: "It is significant to note... that rice yields were maintained at prewar levels. The cause of this phenomenon was primarily the precedence given rice in the factors of production, especially with respect to fertilizer."[14] This type of note is typical. The USSBS presents what would seem to be generally favorable data, and tries to mitigate that data with some exception explaining why the data is not truly representative of the situation. Although that is clearly true at certain points, the USSBS documents seem to go to great lengths to reach their conclusion.

The Survey found a trend towards both decreased arable land and cultivated acreage, and placed causality on numerous things, but mostly on a "progressively tighter farm labor situation." It concluded that it was very likely that the trend, which became pronounced in 1943, continued at an accelerated pace until the end of the war. However, these trends, which would seem to decrease productivity, clearly do not. One explanation could be that only the most fertile fields were cultivated when there was less manpower available; however, there is no evidence presented in the reports that demonstrates this.

The USSBS summarizes, "The decline in Japanese agricultural production between 1941 and 1945 was considerably influenced by a shortage of able-bodied farm labor." Specifically, "This manpower shortage contributed to the reduction of land under cultivation... and resulted in the use of less efficient farm labor, mainly women and older members of the farming households. The decline in labor efficiency along with the restricted use of chemical fertilizers were mainly responsible for reducing the per-acre yields of land under cultivation."[15] However, we can note that there was *no decline in efficiency* evident in any of the data presented in the USSBS report. In fact, the available data seem to imply that, despite an increase of "less efficient labor," productivity actually increased in 1944.[16] The USSBS conclusions are at odds with the data used to determine them.

The biggest factor affecting production seems not to be the strategic bombing or the blockade, which were having a significant impact, but the weather: "Exceptional weather conditions adversely affected production in 1941 and 1945 while favorable weather

[13] John Ray Skates, *The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994), 44, 49-50.

[14] USSBS, *Standard of Living*, 6-7.

[15] Ibid., 9.

[16] While clearly the manpower shortage was not felt as intensely until 1945, in 1944 there were already the beginnings of a reorientation of manpower in agriculture, with a three percent decrease for men in the labor force when compared to the 1940 statistic. See USSBS, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy*, 31.

conditions were especially beneficial only in 1942.... The 1945 rice crop, however, was a disastrous failure and the 1945 spring crops were also below normal, due to unusually poor weather during the growing seasons."[17]

Hence, it is only in 1945, that production decreases in principal foods are really noticeable: rice, wheat, barley, naked barley and fruits all experienced a significant decrease in tonnage. Although there was an increase in the production of soybeans, sweet potatoes, potatoes, and other vegetables in 1945, the caloric level of those crops underwent a substantial decrease compared to the year before.[18]

Agricultural production from 1941 to 1945, then, ultimately showed a decline in both food imports and domestic production. The situation was soon becoming dire, but it still is not evident from the data available that surrender would have occurred before the end of 1945. First, the ration system, despite its inefficiencies, was providing staples to the Japanese people at a level determined by gender and type of labor. Further, the military's rations were only beginning to be reduced by the end of the war. Until 1945, the military enjoyed a complete daily ration, and it would be simplistic to argue that by mid-1945 they would be unable to fight. Also, scavenging was proving to be an adequate means of augmenting caloric intake for both the military and the public. One such campaign was put forth by the Board of Technology. In the first week of July, it announced that it would begin processing 150 million acorns as a supplement to the basic staple ration. This came at the same time that the Japanese government began a program to manufacture starch from potato vines and other plants.[19] If the war had continued, no doubt further alternative methods would have extended the food capacity for additional months. As a whole, the domestic food production oscillated during the war, and only markedly declined in 1945, hence causing the new initiatives. According to the USSBS, holding the 1931-40 average as 100 for an index value, in 1941 the index value was 91, for 1942 it was 102, for 1943 it was 94, for 1944 it was 93, and finally for 1945 it dropped to 74.[20]

The Survey also points out repeatedly that such a figure is biased by an overabundance of staple carbohydrates and not enough supplementary foods, and this caused a qualitative paucity of the Japanese diet.[21] However, more recent scholarship seems to suggest that the Japanese diet was more balanced than originally thought. T. R. H. Haven notes that in 1945 the Japanese people "took in just 1,793 calories a day... yet even then the amount of protein

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[17] USSBS, *Standard of Living,* 3.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Gar Alperovitz, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 22.

[20] USSBS, *Standard of Living,* 2.

[21] Ibid., 19.

people were eating held up reasonably well." And by way of summary, he adds, "To the very end people managed to find food, however sparse or untasty."[22]

There can be no doubt, the food situation was worsening. D. D. Wainstock summarizes the situation well in a recent work that argues for a revisionist thesis. He asserts, "Before Pearl Harbor, the average caloric intake of the Japanese people was about 2,000 calories per day as against 3,400 in the United States. By the summer of 1945, it was about 1,680." He explains further, "In reality, on the average, the Japanese consumed 10 percent less than the Germans ate during the worst period of World War I under the British blockade. The average Japanese had only one small bowl of watered soup for breakfast and some pickles, and a piece of fish and a few vegetables for lunch. Supper was mostly a repetition of breakfast."[23]

Wainstock's quote is insightful for a number of reasons. First, it must be noted that comparatively the Japanese were used to a lower per day calorie intake than the Western nations. Secondly, the description of the average meal was more or less the description of the average meal throughout the 1930s as well, though the meal in 1945 was smaller. Thirdly, the reference to the British blockade is interesting, because it must be noted that ultimately further military action was required to bring about an armistice with the Germans in the First World War. Finally, though, Wainstock produces a third figure for the average calorie intake in 1945. It is apparent that the evidence varies, and the range that these figures provide is from the USSBS's low figure of 1480, Wainstock's estimate of 1640, and T. R. H. Haven's estimate of 1793. These figures, when further analyzed, lead to several different calculations of consumption versus the pre-war norm. The range is from USSBS's 74 percent, Wainstock's 84 percent, and Haven's 89.65 percent. If Haven's 89.65 percent is correct, it is very near indeed to the USSBS's estimate of the Japanese diet in 1941 (91 percent), when no one in Japan felt that mass starvation was even a remote threat, and no one felt that their "meager" diet was sufficient reason to give up hope.[24] If nothing else, this range in statistics provides evidence of a general lack of consensus over the true state of affairs in Japan in mid-1945.

Whatever the actual proportion, Japan was able to maintain its food distribution because of the centralization of the process. All imported food goods and domestic products were distributed through the ration system. Near the end of the war, the Japanese government had to reduce levels of rice in the staple ration, largely because of the abysmal 1945 crop. An increase in potatoes and sweet potatoes allowed the substitution of one

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[22] Thomas R. H. Havens, *Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two* (New York: Norton, 1978), 130-2, quoted in Newman, 38.

[23] Wainstock, 12.

[24] It is possible that the USSBS estimates are generally conservative and/or Haven is generally liberal and the comparison between Haven and USSBS is not valid. However, both documents are drawing from similar sources to extrapolate caloric intake and both are using 2,000 calories per day as the basis, so it would seem that the comparison is justified.

carbohydrate for another, though clearly not in equal caloric levels to the past.[25] In what seems to be desperation on the part of the reporters, the survey concludes:

> The adulteration of the staple rice ration with substitute foods, such as barley and potatoes, unquestionably had an adverse psychological effect on the Japanese consumer. Although he could obtain virtually the same amount of calories from the adulterated ration, he would not be as satisfied with it, just as an American would feel dissatisfied at obtaining his proteins from cheese or soybeans instead of from meat. Such dissatisfaction would unquestionably affect the morale of a worker and tend to lower his efficiency.[26]

It seems impossible to believe that a populace, whose morale had not been destroyed by daily bombing, would succumb to defeatism because they were not satisfied by the way their food tasted.[27] Any morale decrease would probably have been very small, although it could have been a minor factor in any cumulative decrease in Japanese morale. Even if the increasingly small ration affected morale, whether it was barley, potatoes, or rice, it probably did not have any statistically noticeable effect, and the USSBS presents only one anecdote from a minor staff officer to support the claim.[28]

Also, it must be noted that while the Japanese government was rationing it was also storing food for emergency shortages in the future. Though the unprecedentedly poor rice crop of 1945 was ominous, it can be assumed that government storage of foodstuffs were sufficient to at least sustain the population of Japan until mid-1946. The crop was being harvested in 1945, even if it was low in quantity, and the USSBS estimates the stock on hand of rice was 133,000 tons, or a 10-day supply.[29] If this figure is correct, the poor harvest would have caused severe shocks to the Japanese ration system, and the starvation issue would have loomed large for the first time. Even if the USSBS estimate is valid, these

[25] At the beginning of the war, the domestic rice production was 10,146,000 metric tons. Domestic production of the two classes of potato was 4,528,000 metric tons. Thus, the ratio was about 10:4.5. The 1945 figure is substantially different. The rice crop, largely because of poor weather, was low at 6,600,000, while the potato crop was substantially larger at 7,970,000. This ratio is 10:12. USSBS, *Standard of Living*, 3.

[26] Ibid., 103.

[27] Referring to morale decreases caused by the bombing, Toyoda Soemu, a member of the Supreme War Guidance Council in 1945, stated, "The effect on the people's morale was not as great as we had feared.... There was no idea that we must give up the war to avoid even a single additional day of bombing." USSBS, Naval Analysis Division, *Interrogations of Japanese Officials* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1946), 2: 323.

[28] USSBS, *Standard of Living*, 103.

[29] Ibid., 16.

first shocks would not have signified the collapse of the Japanese agricultural economy, and still it seems unlikely that mass starvation would have occurred at this point. However, with that said, several reports seem to point to larger reserves of rice.

Yoshida Shigeru, prime minister from 1946-47, observed that while food was short during the postwar occupation, the Japanese relied on "the food stored in different parts of the country during the war—stocks that most fortunately proved to be far more abundant than was expected."[30] A similar observation was made by Herbert Passin, a member of the U.S. occupation forces: "During the last year or so of the war, the Japanese military had stored away several years' supply of food, clothing, raw materials, equipment, and funds in its arsenals, caves, and other hiding places."[31]

Surrender by starvation is a very unsure thing. To place a specific date on such an event as agricultural collapse would be mistaken. Some people surely did starve. There were instances where Japanese soldiers on islands cut off from supply accepted starvation rather than surrender. The Japanese people were in a deteriorated physical state, which made them more susceptible to diseases caused or exacerbated by malnutrition.[32] However, when taking an objective view of the data, mass starvation was not in the immediate future for Japan at mid-1945. Malnutrition, while becoming a problem, had not reached an unbearable state for Japan's people or their war economy. Those factors, then, cannot be viewed as serious motivations for their ultimate decision to surrender. The fact that Nitze and the USSBS concluded that starvation was near, point to their willingness to ignore facts that seem to discredit their "surrender thesis."

If the evidence does not seem to match the thesis, that appears to imply a bias on the part of the researcher. Evidence suggests that Nitze was heavily influenced by his fellow naval and aerial officers on the Pacific survey team. The USSBS report favored the role played by the Navy and the Army Air Force. Surprisingly enough, it is the Navy and Army Air Force (AAF) staff that wrote the USSBS. Its conclusions heavily favor the roles that the Navy and the AAF sought. The Navy felt that its embargo had had a crippling effect on Japan, and that the blockade could have succeeded without any help from ground forces (an invasion), foreign assistance (Russian intervention), or new elaborate weapons programs (the atomic bomb). The Navy had always assumed that a blockade alone would not be sufficient, but that strategic bombing (perhaps with their own bomber force) would be necessary to achieve capitulation.[33]

The AAF was happy to oblige its new role. Since World War I aerial strategists had been pursuing three objectives:

[30] Newman, 38.

[31] Herbert Passin, "The Occupation: Some Reflections," in Carol Gluck and Stephen Graubard, eds., *Showa: The Japan of Hirohito* (New York: Norton, 1992), 111, quoted in Newman, 38.

[32] USSBS, *Standard of Living*, 100-2.

Above all, air officers sought independence for air power and parity with the army and the navy. They chafed at the ground support mission, and they wanted recognition for an independent, war-winning role for airpower—strategic bombing. Finally, they wanted to develop a long-range heavy bomber [the B-29] to carry out that mission.[34]

The USSBS supported these roles and doctrines, not necessarily intentionally favoring the portion of the military that wrote the survey, but more realistically because those personnel saw the world through the light of their field. Thus, the USSBS' conclusion "that certainly prior to December 31, 1945, and in all probability prior to November 1, 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated" must be understood in this context.[35] Simply put, the authors of the report had both certain biases and agendas that appear in the report's conclusions.

In actuality, there is little evidence to support the contention that these actions alone would have caused surrender, though they clearly were taking a toll on Japan's war economy. And despite the Survey's claim that it reached the opinion "based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved," the facts do not seem to be conclusive, and the surviving Japanese leaders seem to be emphatic that surrender was not imminent prior to August 6.

R. P. Newman has done a thorough survey of the interrogations and concludes:

Early surrender? With no atom bombs, no Russians, no invasion? Careful inspection of the "testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved"—even that incomplete sample available to the USSBS during its two short months in 1945— shows only [Marquis] Kido [Koichi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal] supporting Nitze, everyone else [including more than twenty other high level officials] stating that Japan would have fought on indefinitely. When would Japan have surrendered without the bomb and the Russians? The *only* credible answer is that given by Robert Butow when Freeman Dyson asked him about it: "The Japanese leaders themselves do not know the answer to that question."[36]

Two further criticisms may be leveled at the USSBS report. First, there was a good deal of infighting between the AAF and the Navy staff of the USSBS, which brings into question

[33] Skates, 44.

[34] Ibid., 45.

[35] USSBS, *Japan's Struggle*, 13.

[36] Newman, 51; Butow quoted in, Newman, 51.

the credibility and veracity of the report, and made consensus difficult. It seems that Nitze favored the AAF when it conflicted with the Navy's presentation of facts, much to the Navy's chagrin.[37] An extreme example is Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie's criticisms of the report, in particular the portion submitted by survey member Maj. Gen. Orvil Anderson of the AAF. These are the brutal criticisms of the top naval officer on the Pacific survey of the top air force officer. "The volume presents a completely inaccurate and entirely biased account of our war with Japan which is of absolutely no historical value, consistently misrepresents facts, and indeed, often ignores facts and employs falsehoods." He does not stop there, "From this light treatment of the Pacific war, the authors have arrived at a series of biased conclusions which...impose a threat to our future security."[38]

The final criticism that can be leveled at the USSBS is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not feel that the blockade, at the levels of 1945, would have been sufficient to force Japan's surrender. In particular, the Joint Chiefs were wary of expanding the blockade, either as preparation to the invasion or as the sole alllied strategy. The JCS chose not to pursue these options for a number of reasons. Intensifying the blockade would require moving troops to the west of Japan, along Formosa, and the Chinese coast, etc. General Douglas MacArthur, Commander Southwest Pacific Army, argued against such a plan, explaining that "peripheral operations would tie up a great part of the American resources in the Pacific so that Japan could be invaded only after redeployment from Europe. Lodgments on the China coast carried the danger of drawing American forces into 'heavy involvement' on the Asian mainland and perhaps of postponing the invasion of Japan into 1947." He argued that a series of these operations, "prior to the delivery of the main attack would result in greater loss of life." Commenting on bombing and blockade alone, he felt "such a strategy would 'prolong the war indefinitely,' and it assumed that the Japanese could be subdued by air power alone 'in spite of its demonstrated failure in Europe.'"[39]

While MacArthur had his own army biases, it should be noted that both General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief, Pacific fleet and commander in chief, Pacific Ocean Areas (CINC-PAC and CINC-POA), agreed with MacArthur's thesis that blockade alone would not be sufficient. As such, the JCS did not support a continuation of the blockade, because they felt that it would be insufficient to cause Japan's unconditional surrender.

After examining the preponderance of evidence, it appears that this portion of the revisionist argument has been refuted. Japan was not about to experience mass starvation in mid-1945, so that had little perceivable effect on the decision to surrender. It would seem

[37] Newman, 55.

[38] Ofstie quoted in Newman, 52.

[39] Message, MacArthur to Marshall, 20 April 1945, Historical Record Index Cards, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Army, Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD, quoted in Skates, 53.

that from the Japanese could have maintained themselves for another year, which would have made the end of the war a costly process indeed for the Allies and the Japanese themselves. It is perhaps safe to say that initially, without examining other crucial issues, the decision to drop the atomic bomb does not appear inconsistent with the Japanese agricultural situation. That situation, in fact, appears to support such a drastic decision as a means to significantly shorten a conflict that did not appear about to end in the immediate future.

Finally, the USSBS itself is severely called into question. Its central thesis is unsubstantiated and as the report *The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Utilization of Manpower* shows, the USSBS took ambiguous data and produced conclusions favorable to those presenting the report, namely air force and naval officers. Interdepartmental conflict severely limited the ability to build consensus out of the data, which is why at times the reports seemed disjointed and contradictory. The available evidence at hand destroys the myth that has been central to our thinking about the Japanese surrender. The revision of the revisionists has begun.

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL APPROACHES
TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

KRIS DUDA

Beginning in 1789, the French Revolution can be seen as a series of revolts against the oppressive social and political conditions in France. Within a span of less than ten years, France had radically transformed itself. The French king was beheaded by the masses, while the monarchy was replaced by a republic; wars were declared between France and many of the other countries in Europe; and reforms were initiated which were to transform the lives of many. Because of its importance in modern history, historians have grappled with many different aspects of the Revolution, ranging from its causes, its influence, and how its overall significance is to be measured. While most historians do not deny the significance of the French Revolution, the adoption of different historiographical perspectives has had a major impact on how they understand it.

One well-known interpretation of the Revolution is the Marxist interpretation. Karl Marx never wrote a book specifically on the French Revolution; nonetheless, his conception of history has had a profound effect on the interpretation of the event. Leading this Marxist interpretation of the revolution is historian Albert Soboul in his book *The French Revolution of 1787-1799: From the Storming of the Bastille to Napoleon*[1]. Soboul gives a straightforward, orthodox Marxist interpretation of the event, harnessing almost all of Marx's key concepts and ideas.

Most important among Marx's views on history is the claim that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."[2] This sort of a picture of history ultimately provides the framework for Soboul's analysis of the French Revolution. He not only borrows the idea of class struggles, but employs the exact same distinction Marx makes between the nobility and the bourgeoisie. According to Soboul's interpretation, the nobility enjoyed many privileges that they had inherited from their feudal ancestors. In addition to taxing the peasantry, the nobles possessed the sole right to hunt and fish, had monopolies on wine pressing and bread baking ovens, charged the peasants money for receiving justice, and maintained several other rights restricted solely for their own benefit. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie were the well-to-do middle class. Consisting primarily of artisans, merchants,

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[1] Albert Soboul, *The French Revolution 1787-1799: From the Storming of the Bastille to Napoleon* (New York: Random House, 1975), 7.

[2] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (1893; reprint, New York: Norton, 1988), 55.

lawyers, and officials, they lacked the legal rights and high social standing of the nobility, but often managed to maintain comfortable—sometimes even very rich—lifestyles. Because of increasing economic growth in France as well as the rest of Europe, the middle class grew to a considerable size (about 2.3 million) and thus was comprised of over five times as many people as the nobility. Given the long-standing dominance of the nobility and the rise of the bourgeoisie, it is no surprise that tensions would arise between these two classes.

Soboul finds two main kinds of causes of the conflict between the nobility and the bourgeoisie: political and economic. In feudal times, there was a vast gap between the rich nobility and the poor peasants. Later this gap was greatly narrowed as a wealthy middle class emerged. Along with this shrinking gap, a new philosophy that declared equality between people as well as freedom from oppression spread through the Enlightenment, and these ideas gained much popularity with the educated bourgeoisie. Middle class individuals, despite their growing numbers and influence, found themselves being treated as inferior both legally and socially. It was such inequality, in part, that spurned the masses to revolt: "If the French Revolution was the most outstanding bourgeois revolution ever, overshadowing all preceding revolutions through the dramatic nature of its class struggle, it owes it both to the obstinacy of the aristocray, which remained firmly attached to its feudal privileges and rejected all concessions, and to the passionate opposition of the popular masses to any form of privilege or class distinction."[3]

According to Soboul, the economic forces behind the Revolution were even more dramatic. Given Soboul's Marxist leanings, there should be nothing startling in this interpretation, for it was Marx who emphasized the power of economic forces to produce social upheavals: "At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or—what is but a legal expression for the same thing—with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution."[4] Soboul directly applies this Marxist tenet to the French Revolution, finding the idea to be at the very root of the Revolution. He criticizes other historians for avoiding what he considers to be the "very essence of the question: that the Revolution is to be explained in the last analysis by a contradiction between the social basis of the economy and the character of the productive forces."[5] Soboul applies this notion in his depiction of the tensions between the nobility and the bourgeoisie. He claims that the means of production of bourgeois power originated in early feudal society, but as the bourgeoisie grew it became more and more hampered by what it called the "feudal" laws of the nobility. So, the "revolutionary bourgeoisie pursued the aim of destroying the old system of production and exchange, which was incompatible with the

[3] Soboul, *French Revolution*, 7.

[4] Karl Marx, "Preface to a Critique of Political Economy," *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: Norton, 1978), 4.

[5] Soboul, *French Revolution*, 21.

expansion of its capitalist businesses, with quite as much relentlessness as they had employed in destroying the aristocracy."[6]

Of course, merely being an example of a class struggle is not enough to give the French Revolution its significant place in history, for, according to Marx and Soboul, all of history from ancient times to the present is fraught with class struggles. What makes the French Revolution unique for Soboul is that it represents a significant economic and political turning point at which the bourgeoisie finally became victorious over the nobility. Soboul thinks that this victory thus makes the Revolution the "classic model of bourgeois revolution,"[7] and consists of not only a shift in political power from the hands of one social class to another, but also marks a distinctive transformation in the economic structure of society. Viewed from this economic perspective, the victory of the bourgeoisie was a very important transition from feudalism to capitalism: "Carried through by the bourgeoisie, the Revolution destroyed the old system of production,"[8] ensuring "the autonomy of the capitalist mode of production and distribution: a classically revolutionary transformation."[9] Thus, for Soboul, the French Revolution was nothing less than "the culmination of a long economic and social evolution which has made the bourgeoisie the master of the world."[10]

The Marxist interpretation seems to have much explanatory force, and, indeed, had been considered the orthodox interpretation of the French Revolution up until the 1960s. However, there have been criticisms against this approach as well as other historiographical methods that shed a new light on the French Revolution. One of the forerunners of this movement is Alfred Cobban in his book *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution*[11]. Cobban is a social historian, and much of his approach to interpreting the Revolution is a direct reaction against Marxist historians like Soboul. It is thus useful to attend to these criticisms as they help to show not only what aspects shape Cobban's interpretation, but also what considerations he thinks should *not* play a role in historical accounts of the Revolution.

For Cobban, the problem with Marxist historians is that they give more allegiance to the theory itself than they do to the actual historical evidence. Cobban goes as far as to say that such a theory "has now assumed some of the characteristics of a religious belief."[12] Cobban's point is that Marxist historians are entrenched in an ideology which already predetermines how the history will turn out, and this makes for nothing but bad history

[6] Ibid., 556.

[7] Ibid., 3.

[8] Ibid., 553.

[9] Ibid., 9.

[10] Soboul, *French Revolution*, 21.

[11] Alfred Cobban, *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution* (Great Britain: Cambridge Press, 1964), 10.

[12] Ibid., 10-11.

writing, in which the historians put "almost too much meaning back into it [history], when they reduce the greatest happening in modern history to the deterministic operations of an historical law."[13]Cobban sums up his critique of the supposed laws of the Marxist theory: " If they are not dogmatic assertions about the course of history, they are either platitudes, or else, to be made to fit the facts, they have to be subject to more and more qualifications until in the end they are applicable only to a single case. General sociology is thus no answer to the need for some theoretical element, other than inherited stereotypes, in our history."[14]

Given his criticisms of Marxist historians like Soboul, how does Cobban think history should be done, and how does this affect his understanding of the French Revolution? It should be clear by now that he wants to do away with theoretical apparatuses, especially Marxism, and instead look to the facts themselves. Which facts are these? Cobban does not deny that much insight can be gained from political and economic history—his objection is that Marxist historians are so predisposed to giving priority to political and economic facts that they overlook more important social factors that underlie the political and economic spheres of activity. Giving consideration to these social factors sheds new light on the French Revolution: "However, behind the political regime there is always the social structure, which is in a sense more fundamental and is certainly much more difficult to change. Once we begin to investigate this social background to the revolution, it is borne in on us how little notice ordinary political history has taken of it, and indeed how little we really know of the actual pattern of eighteenth-century French society and the impact on it of the revolution."[15]

It is interesting to note that while capitalism and the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the nobility play important explanatory roles in Soboul's Marxist interpretation, Cobban, in his entire interpretation of the Revolution, almost never appeals to such ideas or concepts—except to show their inadequacy when used by the Marxists. It is for this reason that looking at the French Revolution from Cobban's perspective makes it seem like a completely different revolution altogether. This becomes especially clear when we look at how Cobban explains the conflict that caused the Revolution. In regard to the Revolution, Cobban claims that "since the population of France in the eighteenth century was overwhelmingly rural, one might expect some of these fundamental conflicts to have their roots in rural society."[16] Indeed, rather than seeing the Revolution as a conflict between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, Cobban claims that the cause of the Revolution ultimately comes down to a conflict between poor rural societies and the urban societies that were trying to control them. Cobban reinforces this claim by drawing on several examples from the Revolution as well as events that preceded it. He points out that "in parts of France, for example Lot and Dordogne, local peasant uprisings continued into 1790 and 1791. In the

[13] Ibid., 9.

[14] Ibid., 14.

[15] Cobban, *Social Interpretation*, 162.

[16] Ibid., 91.

Lot, in April 1791, they were no longer directed against the nobles, but against the property of the bourgeios."[17]

How does Cobban explain the peasants' contempt for the bourgeoisie? First of all, the "peasantry was not unaware of the fact that the dues, rights, rents, tithes, services, payments in money and kinds, which they felt to be such a grievance, were often owned, and even more often collected, by the bourgeois."[18] In addition, the rural population was victim to unequal taxation, their needs were considered secondary to those living in the towns, and their forest and food supplies were exhausted by the demands of the urban population[19]. Furthermore, "behind all this was the fact that the towns, as the residence of the 'classe propreitaire,' were the centers of land ownership. They drained wealth from the surrounding countryside."[20] It is for these reasons that the hostility of the rural peasantry erupted toward the urban populace.

Of course, if Cobban is right that the Revolution was, for the most part, a peasant revolt, then one cannot help but to wonder why Soboul's Marxist account seems to leave the peasants completely out of the picture and instead just describes the Revolution as a class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the nobility. Actually, Soboul is well aware that peasants had revolted; however, he sees the peasants as working with the bourgeoisie to overthrow the nobility. This is clear when he says that it is "necessary to underline clearly that the fundamental objectives of the peasant movement coincided with the ends of bourgeois revolution: the destruction of the feudal relations of production."[21]Because he sees the peasantry as working toward the same goals as the bourgeoisie, Soboul thinks of the peasants as just an extension of the bourgeoisie, calling them the "rural bourgeoisie."

This is unacceptable to Cobban. As we have already seen, Cobban goes at lengths to argue that, contrary to what Soboul says, the peasantry and the bourgeoisie did not cooperate with each other. In fact, Cobban interprets the Revolution as a conflict between the two social groups. According to Cobban's findings, the bourgeoisie had more in common with the nobility than they did with the peasantry. Both the nobility and the bourgeoisie were mostly rich urban folk. It was these two who, together, exploited the rural peasantry, making the revolution "a triumph for the conservative, propertied, land-owning classes, large and small."[22]

According to Cobban, the concept of the "rural bourgeoisie" was invented by Marxist historians just so that they would have some way to account for the peasantry in the class

[17] Ibid., 93.

[18] Ibid., 93.

[19] Cobban, *Social Interpretation*, 96, 100, 104.

[20] Ibid., 101.

[21] Soboul, *French Revolution*, 23.

[22] Ibid., 170.

struggle between the nobility and the bourgeoisie: "If the account of the rural bourgeoisie . . . seems somewhat confused, I fear this was unavoidable. With the best will in the world it is impossible to reduce the varying definitions or descriptions of the rural bourgeoisie to sense or consistency. One can only conclude that the idea was invented to fit the requirements of a theory, and to provide the counterpart in the countryside of the urban 'bourgeoisie' and so to explain how peasants also could constitute a bourgeoisie which could join in the overthrow of feudalism."[23] In other words, if the peasantry were not united with the bourgeoisie, as Cobban claims, then this would pose a serious problem for the Marxists since the idea that the Revolution was a class struggle between the nobility and the bourgeoisie would no longer be accurate. So, according to Cobban, the Marxists, to sidestep the problem, have to pretend that the peasantry (the rural bourgeoisie) was really united with the bourgeoisie. Cobban sees this as bad scholarship and considers the invention of the concept of the "rural bourgeoisie" to be a prime example of how Marxist historians like Soboul tend to distort historical actualities in order to meet the demands of their theory.

Cobban's criticisms of Soboul seem pretty devastating, but in all fairness to Soboul, Cobban's own theory is not completely purged of theory. Cobban too uses his own set of concepts to interpret the Revolution: he relies on being able to draw a sharp distinction between the rich and the poor, as well as the urban and the rural populace. In fact, to a certain extent, Cobban's analysis of the Revolution is parallel to Soboul's in that the whole idea of a class struggle is central for both of them—Cobban just sees the struggle in terms of the rich versus the poor rather than the bourgeoisie versus the nobility.

The deeper dividing issue between the two historians seems to be how to prioritize the different approaches to history. Both Soboul and Cobban agree that much insight can be gained from other historical approaches, but Soboul gives priority to economic/political history while Cobban emphasizes his own brand of social history. We have seen how each approach portrays the Revolution in a different light; perhaps both approaches can be used concurrently, in order to do develop a more comprehensive portrait of the French Revolution in all its complexity and splendor. This may be the only way to do justice to the marvel which both historians hail as the most significant event in modern history.

Cobban and Soboul were concerned mainly with the causes of the French Revolution, but another point of interest is the scope of the Revolution's influence. While some historians may view the Revolution as primarily an episode in the history of France, others perceive its importance as extending throughout the rest of Europe. One historian who opts for the latter view is Georges Lefebvre.

Lefebvre "was internationally known as the greatest authority on the French Revolution."[24] He has many similarities with both Soboul and Cobban, oftentimes combining the best of both of them. Like Soboul, he sees much of the Revolution as a revolt of the bourgeoisie against the nobility, yet he agrees with Cobban that later many peasants

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[23] Cobban, *Social Interpretation*, 109.

[24] Paul Beik, Foreword to *The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793*, by Georges Lefebvre (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), ix.

had turned against the bourgeoisie. Despite his affinities with Cobban and Soboul, Lefebvre stands out because he has an especially prevalent tendency to look at the French Revolution from the perspective of world history. This tendency is so strong that he views the Revolution from what can only be considered a universalist perspective of history.

For Lefebvre, the "French Revolution denotes one step in the destiny of the Western world."[25] He illustrates this universalist perspective in many different ways. Perhaps the most obvious way is through the subjects he writes about while trying to discuss the French Revolution. Half of his history of the Revolution is devoted not directly to the French Revolution itself, or even to France, but to different aspects of European history as a whole. He thoroughly discusses topics such as European expansion, the European economy, European society, European thought, and social conflicts among the different countries all throughout Europe. It is as if he could not begin to explain the French Revolution without discussing its place in the history of Europe, showing how France is intimately connected with the course of European affairs in general. Indeed, it is natural for him to do this since he sees France in the 18th century as not being much different from other countries. After briefly decribing the French Revolution, he claims that not much "sets France apart from Europe. All European states were formed similarly, at the expense of the lords, and all were sooner or later dominated by the rising bourgeoisie."[26] This passage gives an example of Lefebvre's universalist tendencies, showing how he sees the Revolution from within the context of all of Europe and compares it to revolutions in other countries.

Lefebvre's discussion of the French Revolution is almost always in terms of its impact on other countries. This topic is given much treatment since the Revolution affected the countries of Europe in so many different ways. Lefebvre especially stresses how rulers of other countries were threatened by its influence: "in the beginning it was the international influence of the Revolution that most disturbed foreign rulers. They lost no time in denouncing the 'clubists" propaganda and blamed the French government for tolerating or even encouraging such publicity. Actually, revolutionary ferment spread spontaneously for months, much as the Enlightenment had moved across Europe earlier in the century."[27] It is obvious why the Revolution threatened foreign rulers: if people in other countries were too influenced by it, there was a chance that uprisings against the rulers would sprout up all over Europe. Indicating how the Revolution influenced rulers throughout the world, Lefebvre emphasizes the event's world-historical nature.

Lefebvre also points out that the Revolution not only influenced the fears and hopes of people across Europe, but also had a major impact on European economies: "As always, the war altered the course of international trade. It also interfered with the rise of capitalism on the Continent. Nevertheless England derived appreciable profit from the conflict, and

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[25] Georges Lefebvre, *The French Revolution from its Origins to 1793* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), xviii.

[26] Lefebvre, *French Revolution from its Origins*, xvii.

[27] Ibid., 179.

extended her empire. European expansion, however, was hindered. The shock to the colonial system increased as Latin America moved towards emancipation, and France even abolished slavery."[28] This shows how the French Revolution impacted the West on many levels, affecting numerous aspects such as trade, expansion, and the abolition of slavery. In all these ways, the influence of this great event was so poweful that "from 1789 to 1815, the history of countries of European cultures to a large extent determined by this great event."[29]

So far, we have seen Lefebvre's account of the influence of the Revolution primarily within the 18th century on the countries of Europe; however, Lefebvre also thinks that the Revolution has had a spiritual significance which extends well beyond the 18th century: "Consequently the great majority of the earth's population lived and died without suspecting that in one corner of the world, in France, a revolution had occurred which was to leave a spiritual legacy to their descendants."[30] Lefebvre describes this legacy as the "conquest of equality of rights,"[31] and it is very important to his interpretation of the event, for "in the larger perspective of world history, this is the significant originality of the Revolution of 1789."[32]

Lefebvre, as a universalist, sees the Revolution as a truly world-historical event, discussing it in the context of Europe as a whole and stressing how its impact extends beyond the 18th century and throughout all of Europe. He does not think that this universalist perspective is a distortion of the event since even most of the French involved in the Revolution saw it from a universalist perspective as well: "The French people believed that their existence would improve, that their children, if not they themselves, would live in more favorable circumstances; they even hoped that other people would live so, and all, becoming free and equal, would be forever reconciled. Peace would then regenerate a world freed from oppression and poverty. The mythic character of the French Revolution unfolded. A cause so noble awoke an ardour that the need for sacrifice extinguished in many, but moved others to feats of heroism and spread through the world."[33] Given the universal significance of this great event, it is no wonder that Lefebvre claims that its "name is still a watchword for mankind."[34]

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[28] Georges Lefebvre, *The French Revolution from 1793 to 1799* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 347.

[29] Lefebvre, *French Revolution from its Origins*, xviii.

[30] Ibid., 18.

[31] Ibid., 113.

[32] Ibid., 91.

[33] Ibid., 149.

[34] Lefebvre, *French Revolution from 1793*, 360.

In contrast to Lefebvre's universalist perspective, Thomas Carlyle, in his book *The French Revolution*[35], takes the opposite approach to understanding the significance of the Revolution. For Carlyle, the significance of the Revolution is not measured in terms of how it impacted the rest of the world, but comes from how it was experienced by those who actually participated in it. It is for this reason that his approach to history more like a form of psychological history.

Unlike most historians, who write detached scholarly descriptions that try to explain the French Revolution, Carlyle's purpose is to actually make the reader experience what the participants in the Revolution experienced. This means that he emphasizes the dramatic and emotional aspects of the event more than anything else. Because of this, he does not seem too interested in analyzing why the Revolution happened nor does he delve into complicated political or economic analyses. He finds the Revolution's significance in the overwhelming sense of intensity and passion that it gave to the participants in the event. This becomes clear in many passages when Carlyle attempts to define it. He describes it as "the Madness that dwells in the hearts of men"[36] which "bursts up from the infinite Deep, and rages uncontrollable, immeasurable, enveloping a world; in phasis after phasis of fever-frenzy."[37]

Carlyle's style of writing is perhaps as unique as his intention to create an emotional atmosphere for the reader. It is interesting how he adjusts the form of his book so that it is most apt to produce the desired effect. A sample passage describing the attack on the Bastille (an armory) better illustrates this point: "Blood flows; the aliment of new madness. The wounded are carried into the house of the Rue Cerisaie; the dying leave their last mandate not to yield till the accursed Stronghold fall. And yet, alas, how fall? The walls are so thick!"[38] Notice how this passage, like the rest of his book, is written in a narrative form in the present tense, which chimes perfectly with the purpose of immersing the reader into the experience, for it makes it seem as if the events are unfolding at the very same time the book is being read. Like the actual participants in the Revolution, the reader does not know what will happen next, making it easier for the reader to feel the same sense of fear and/or exhaltation: "Where will this end? In the Abyss, one may prophesy; whither all Delusions are, at all moments, traveling; where this Delusion has now arrived."[39]

Like most other narratives, Carlyle's history focuses on specific historical individuals and uses them much like characters in a story. He greatly dramatizes these characters, often portraying them either as heroes or villains. For example, one of Carlyle's "heroes" is Mirabeau, a brilliant Count who tried to halt the Revolution when it began getting too violent: "New Mirabeaus one hears not of: the wild kindred, as we said, is gone out with this

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[35] Thomas Carlyle, *The French Revolution* (1837; reprint, New York: Random House, 1934).

[36]Ibid., 669.

[37] Ibid., 167.

[38] Ibid., 153.

[39] Ibid., 180.

its greatest. . . . The chosen Last of the Mirabeaus is gone; the chosen man of France is gone. It was he who shook old France from its basis; and, as if with his single hand, has held it toppling there, still unfallen. What things depended on that one man! He is as a ship suddenly shivered on sunk rocks: much swims on the waste water, far from help."[40]

The great historian von Ranke once said that history was a combination between poetry (the recreation of events) and philosophy (a science that collected facts). Carlyle obviously emphasizes the former aspect over the latter, yet one should not be deceived by his narrative style of writing into thinking that his book is a work of fiction. He rigorously studied the historical evidence and only portrays in his book actual people and events that occurred. It seems as if he does dramatize and exaggerate a bit, but, given his purpose, such a writing style is reasonable. After all, wasn't the French Revolution a very dramatic and emotional event for those who experienced it? Perhaps Carlyle's style of writing history was idiosyncratic to his contemporaries, but that is only because he was trying to explore an aspect of the Revolution which few had given serious treatment. He made the style of his writing conform to its content, making a highly readable history that is sure to keep the reader's attention.

So, we see that different historiographical perspectives guide the development of many different interpretations of the French Revolution. Soboul, with his Marxist interpretation, ultimately sees the Revolution as a class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the nobility. Its significance for him lies in the fact that it both marked a radical shift in power as a result of the class struggle within France, and that it was important economically as capitalism had finally overturned the feudal system of the nobility. Cobban, on the other hand, is a social historian who claims that Soboul's interpretation is biased in that it tries to distort historical facts to make them conform to Marxist theory. Cobban insists that historians should not give so much priority to political and economic history, but should instead pay heed to the powerful social forces in French history. Following this approach, according to Cobban, will allow historians to see that the Revolution was really a revolt of the peasants against both the bourgeiosie and the nobility, making the Revolution a struggle between the poor rural folk and the rich urban populace. Historians with different perspectives on history tend to be interested in different aspects of the Revolution. Aside from the Revolution's causes, some historians are interested in the question of whether the event is to be seen as a world-historical event or not. Lefebvre sees the event from what can only be considered a universalist perspective, tracing its significance throughout all of Europe well beyond the 18th century. Carlyle, on the other hand, emphasizes the point that to be truly understood, the Revolution must be experienced as the participants experienced it. Writing a narrative in the present tense, he tries to recreate in his readers such experiences. One may feel overwhelmed by so many different perspectives on the Revolution. Such a variety of interpretations shows the French Revolution to be an inexhaustible wellspring for a whole range of alternate visions, establishing it as a truly great historical event.

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[40] Carlyle, *French Revolution*, 346.

VICTORY AT ST. MIHIEL
HELEN HUND

Few battles in military history can be judged both tactical and strategic successes. The World War I Battle of St. Mihiel is one of these. Its success can be attributed to many reasons: the excellence of the battle plan, the leadership of the generals and field commanders, the enthusiasm of the American doughboys, and the lack of German will to hold the salient. But above all, its success depended on the great cooperation within the newly-instituted American Chief-of-Staff command, and within the recently-formed Allied command, both of which allowed for the powerful massing of troops and materials needed to defeat a determined enemy fighting a total war. Cooperation produced the massive army which formed for the first time at St. Mihiel - an army "nearly four times as large as Grant's Army of the Potomac at its maximum strength, three times Napoleon's Grand Army at Leipzig, nearly twice the German army at Sedan in 1870, and much larger than either the Japanese or Russian armies at Mukden, the largest on record before 1914."[1]

On 24 July 1918, the commanders-in-chief of the Allied armies - General John J. Pershing, General Henri Petain, and Field Marshal Douglas Haig - met at the headquarters of Marshal Ferdinand Foch in Bombon. Marshal Foch proposed new offensives to be initiated by the Allied forces in the Great War. "The moment has come to abandon the general defensive attitude forced upon us until now by numerical inferiority and to pass to the offensive."[2]

Allied morale was higher than it had been for many months. The German spring offensives had been blunted, and fresh troops continued to arrive from the U.S. The three commanders, however, had serious misgivings concerning offensive action against the German Western Front at this time because of the condition of their national armies:

> Field-Marshal Haig: The British Army, entirely disorganized by the events of March and April, is still far from being reestablished.
> General Petain: The French Army, after four years of war and the severest trials, is at present worn out, bled white, anemic.

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[1] David Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 106.

[2] Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, trans. Bentley Mott (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1931), 370.

The Battle of St. Mihiel

General Pershing: The American Army asks nothing better than to fight, but it has not yet been formed.[3]

General Foch assured them that the proper coordination of forces would render the objectives practical. A series of operations of limited extent could be rapidly executed along the Western Front, preventing the Germans from using their reserves to advantage and denying them time to rebuild depleted units. American troops would be responsible for carrying out the St. Mihiel offensive, which would return control of the Paris-Avricourt railroad to the French and permit a later, larger offensive between the Meuse and Moselle.

Pershing had sought a larger offensive in the St. Mihiel area, one which would have continued westward to include the town of Metz. He was pleased nonetheless with the Allied plan. The action forced the creation of the American First Army, and therefore the return of most American divisions from the English and French armies. The already depleted French and English armies regretted the loss of American troops. Field Marshal Haig was especially disturbed by the removal of American troops and privately expressed his dismay: "What will history say regarding this action of the Americans leaving the British zone of operations when *the decisive battle* [Amiens] of the war is at its height, and the decision still in doubt!"[4]

Pershing had fought an often acrimonious battle in order to retain command of his own troops. He had pressed for the formation of a distinctly American army from the start, for two reasons. His official instructions from Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, required him to maintain "the forces of the United States [as] a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved." In addition, Pershing and his advisors considered the demoralized French and English armies to be caught in a hopelessly stalled trench war; they were not fighting to win, but fighting not to lose. Only by taking the offensive, and implementing maneuver warfare, could victory be achieved. Pershing believed in the "cult of the rifle" and open-field warfare; that is, the infantryman with his rifle and bayonet fighting *outside* the trenches.[5]

The American First Army, consisting of fourteen divisions, was officially formed 10 August 1918, and Pershing officially assumed command 30 August. The "battle of command" had been successfully fought, and now Pershing had to solve other grave problems: untrained troops, a troubled Service of Supply, and a serious lack of artillery, tanks, and aviation.The French provided immediate aid in all categories, but especially in equipment. Foch provided ninety-nine batteries of French 75's, fifty batteries of heavy

[3] Ibid., 373.

[4] Douglas Haig, The Private Papers of Douglas Haig: 1914-1919, ed. Robert Blake (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952), 323.

[5] John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, vol. 1 (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931), 38; James J. Cooke, Pershing and his Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), 33, 13.

howitzers, and twenty-one squadrons of aircraft. He also provided two artillery staffs, because the Americans had only one. Throughout the war, Pershing would depend heavily on the Allied High Command to provide whatever he lacked, despite his insistence on the independence of the American army.[6]

The American First Army's objective, the St. Mihiel salient - *L'Hernie* to the French - was a triangular bulge which protruded into Allied lines twenty miles southeast of Verdun. The town of St. Mihiel was located at the apex of the triangle. Along the west were the heights of the Meuse River, and along the south ran flat, swampy land which became hilly as it approached the Moselle River. Along the base of the salient, the Germans had built the Michel Position (or *Michel Stellung*) - twenty miles of modern defensive fortifications incorporated into the rugged terrain. This was a "veritable field fortress" with "elaborate systems of trenches, barbed-wire entanglements, concrete shelters and machine-gun emplacements." These fortifications were arranged in two lines, the first better fortified, the second one, five miles back, less so.[7]

Both sides had considered this a quiet area along the Western Front since 1915, when the Germans had repulsed the French attempt to retrieve it. Many American soldiers began their war service here in the Toul, or "Old Home" Sector, for it was a safe area to initiate "green" troops. Although the Germans had held the salient since 1914, they were now manning it thinly, with probably no more than 23,000 troops. Two divisions had been pulled out for the spring offensive, and were not replaced. Of the remaining nine weak divisions, seven divisions each held seven and a half miles of front, with the other two divisions in reserve.

Against these weak forces, Pershing planned to send eighteen divisions, consisting of almost a half a million men, to attack the 23,000 German soldiers. The American divisions each had a rifle strength of 13,000; the 2nd, 5th, and 42nd Divisions each had five riflemen for every yard of their division's front. The American concentration of force was great. The problem Pershing now faced was how to move this concentration into place without alerting the enemy. Petain had suggested a ruse, whereby the Germans would be convinced that an attack would occur far to the southeast, at Belfort on the Moselle River. Pershing gladly adopted the plan, and sent the unsuspecting Omar Bundy with his VI Corps, along with staff officers from six other divisions, to prepare details for an attack in the Belfort area. Bundy probably realized his part in the eventual St. Mihiel battle, as he noticed tanks moving ostentatiously in his area and heard the great load of nonsensical radio messages flooding the airwaves. His liaison with headquarters, Arthur Conger, added a none-too-subtle flourish to the subterfuge: he typed out the Belfort battle plan in his hotel room, threw the carbon in the trashcan and went out for a walk. When he returned, the carbon was gone.[8]

[6] Trask, 101.

[7] Ibid., 102.

However, the objective of surprise ultimately failed, and the enemy sent three additional divisions into the St. Mihiel area. Pershing expressed his dismay at the lack of security: "Unfortunately, both the French and the Americans have talked, and it now seems certain that the enemy is aware of the approaching attack." The best security in the world could not have concealed the massive quantities of troops and materials flooding the Allied area surrounding the salient, and the inexperience of hundreds of staff officers also aggravated the problem of security. Each staff officer, feeling that his part in the battle was momentous, disobeyed orders forbidding battlefield visitation. The roads leading to the battlefield from headquarters were congested with officers who wished to personally view the ground over which their troops were to fight. Inexperience also complicated seemingly simple orders. Officers in charge of the movement of supplies and munitions to the area were ordered to conceal these goods; inspectors would then check the location and concealment methods. One inspector required a supply officer to "conceal" his ammunition dump with paulins, even though only white paulins were available. This huge target was soon bombed by the enemy, and the American First Army lost its largest single supply of munitions.[9] Eddie Rickenbacker summarized the security problem:

> Every taxi driver or waiter in Paris could have told one just where the Americans were concentrating... The number of guns, the number of troops and just where they were located, how many aeroplanes we had...were discussed by every man on the streets.[8]

The Germans had indeed noticed much movement in front of General Max von Gallwitz's army group, between St. Mihiel and the Moselle. As early as the end of August, an American offensive was expected. Although General Headquarters had reinforced the sector with three additional divisions, Quartermaster-General Erich von Ludendorff recommended the evacuation of the salient. Local commanders, however, were optimistic about their strength, and General Headquarters was reluctant to evacuate the sector because of the industrial areas lying behind it. Therefore, orders to withdraw behind the Michel Position were not given until 8 September. Only advance guards were to remain in the most forward trenches. Lieutenant General Georg Fuchs, commander of the majority of German troops in the sector, ordered the withdrawal of heavy artillery pieces and the destruction of buildings, bridges, roads and water supplies in preparation for abandoning the salient. The German army was doing precisely what Marshal Foch had earlier predicted to General Pershing: "The Germans would fall back from St. Mihiel at the first sign..." of an Allied assault.[9]

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[8] Meirion and Susie Harries, The Last Days of Innocence (New York: Random House, 1997), 340.

[9] Pershing, Experiences, vol. 2, 249; George C. Marshall, Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1917-1918 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), 131.

[8] Harries, 341.

When the Americans received reports of German withdrawal, they sought to use Fuchs' situation to their advantage, but they had to act quickly. Pershing called a staff meeting on the evening of 11 September to discuss the possibility of carrying out the attack the next day. General William "Billy" Mitchell, was surprised that some of the "Old fossils" were hesitant to exploit the situation of the German army:

> Our Chief Engineer recommended that we delay the attack because there had been considerable rain. This, he said, had held up our light railways used for getting up artillery ammunition. The question of adequate water for some of the troops would be difficult and a thousand and one things which could not be done were mentioned.[10]

Meanwhile, First Army headquarters had been revising Pershing's original - and larger - August Plan, producing the September Plan for the attack on St. Mihiel. (See map.) General George Marshall and Colonel Walter Grant had devoted themselves exclusively to the September Plan since 30 August. Their work was constantly interrupted by field commanders seeking "minor" changes that they believed would simplify their troops' battlefield orders. Their requests seemed entirely reasonable to them, but they did not realize the complications caused by even the most minute alteration. The massive concentration of troops imposed a rigidity on all formations, that the officers were unaccustomed to from their earlier military experiences. Changes were often made, but they came from above and not from below. When Marshal Foch and General Pershing decided on a minor change of order, that "inch at the top became a mile at the bottom."[11]

The battle plan, suggested by Pershing and detailed by Marshall and Grant, met the objective of simplicity. A first assault would be made on the south face of the salient, and a secondary against the west face. Holding attacks and raids would also be made against the nose of the salient to hold the enemy in place, Major General Joseph Dickman's IV Corps (89th, 42nd, and 1st Divisions) was assigned the principal attack against the south face. To the right of the IV Corps, Major General Hunter Liggett's I Corps (82nd, 90th, 5th, and 2nd Divisions) would make a supporting attack. The V Corps under Major General George H. Cameron (26th, part of the 4th, and the French 15th Colonial Divisions) was assigned to strike eastward across the heights of the Meuse. Then it was to link with Dickman's troops, cutting off the defending German units. The French 11 Colonial Corps would advance northeasterly, in order to support the attack on its right and left flanks. The reserve consisted of three divisions: the 35th, 80th, and 91st Divisions. A total of 550,000

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[9] Trask, 104; Erich von Ludendorff, Ludendorff's Own Story, August 1914-November 1918, vol. 1 (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1919), 361.

German sources disagree concerning who ordered the withdrawal and when. Fuchs maintains that he ordered the withdrawal without waiting for superior orders.

[10] Harries, 341.

[11] Marshall, 134.

American and 110,000 French Troops were to attack 23,000 German and Austrian troops in the salient. The Allied troops would have over 3,000 artillery weapons at their disposal - most of which were contributed by the French, and 1500 aircraft - most of which were contributed by the British and French.[12]

The greater part of the St. Mihiel salient was surrounded by dense entanglements of barbwire. The staff had thought that these could be crushed by heavy tanks. However, on 28 August General Haig withdrew his promise of supplying heavy British tanks for the St. Mihiel battle. The staff now faced a serious problem. The troops attacking from the south would need fifty-five breaches in the seven-mile front - eight gaps per mile. The staff estimated that army gunners would need 1600 rounds of ammunition to make sufficient gaps in the wire which was sixty-six yards deep. It would not be possible to bring a sufficient amount of ammunition to the front in the short time remaining, and the bombardment would require eighteen hours - totally destroying any sense of surprise. Pershing's surprise attack would become a battle of attrition.

Three proposals for dealing with the wire were considered: first, to precede the infantry advance by eighteen hours of artillery fire, second, to precede the infantry advance by five hours of artillery fire, which would not destroy the wire, but would demoralize the enemy and inspire our troops, and third, to launch an infantry attack without any prior bombardment. For a time, the last proposal was the most popular with the greatest number of the staff. Grant and Marshall were horrified. The experience of recent Allied battles had demonstrated the great butcher's bill for sending troops into wire entanglements. In the end, Pershing decided on four hours of preliminary bombardment on the southern face of the salient, and seven hours on the western side.

The final drafts of the special instructions, or annexes, to the battle order for the engineer troops, supply services, signal communications, intelligence service, control of road traffic, handling of prisoners, and others, were prepared by Grant and Marshall after receiving them from the various Chiefs of Services. Hospitalization for 50,000 casualties - the standard number for an operation of this size - was prepared.

A heavy rain fell throughout the night of the eleventh. The artillery preparation began at 0100 on 12 September. The 2,971 guns of the American First Army opened in unison. "The enemy's attack struck...by surprise," stated the official German report later. Because their intelligence had predicted an offensive on the fifteenth, the American attack caught German artillery on the road, and some companies had already installed themselves behind the Michel Position. However, the remaining Germans did not immediately abandon their salient. At 0420, Fuchs informed higher command that "the evacuation would not be begun as there were no compelling reasons for such action at that time."[13]

The infantry on the south face advanced at 0500, behind the rolling barrage of 267 light tanks commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George C. Patton, Jr. The weather was

[12] Trask, 106.

[13] Harries, 343; Ibid.

clearing, and the heavy fog which had covered the Woevre plain was giving way to brilliant sunlight. The Southern Force - all divisions of I Corps, and the 42nd and 89th Divisions of IV Corps - pivoted on the Moselle River. These six divisions swung to the right in a twelve-mile arc toward the town of Vigneulles. The First Division of IV Corps, on the left of the other six divisions, advanced northwest to meet up with troops of V Corps while protecting the left flank of its own IV Corps. The Western Force moved at 0800, giving the Southern three hours head start. The 26th Division met up with the First Division of IV Corps. The Fourth Division, northernmost of the Western Force, remained in place. To its right was the French 15th Division, which moved to the edge of the heights of the Meuse in order to protect the left flank of the 26th. The Central Force, the French 11 Colonial Corps, followed the retreating enemy. All divisions advanced with little difficulty, supported by an aerial division of 1400 British, French and American planes under the command of Colonel William Mitchell.

General Pershing, along with Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, watched the action from the old fort of Gironville on a height to the south. The general's plan was executed with perfection that day. By nightfall, the American divisions heading toward Vigneulles were only ten miles apart. The only difficulty had been the poor conditions of the roads, which slowed the arrival of the horse carts and the trucks bringing ammunition and rations to the front. The next few days would be spent mopping up and securing the salient.

General Pershing was relieved to see the rapid progress of the troops across the barbwire entanglements. After the battle he would learn of the methods employed by the troops in dealing with these barriers. Special pioneer detachments and engineers had been sent to accompany the first wave of troops and cut the wire with long Bangalore torpedoes and wire cutters. The troops, however, became impatient with the slow progress, and merely stepped over the wire. Some regiments even brought along their own chicken wire to lay over the barbwire, forming a "carpet" that allowed a line of troops to quickly walk over the wire, The cutting of the gaps took almost the entire day, but these gaps remained a necessity for the passage of artillery, trains and reinforcements. So amazing was the soldiers' passage that few believed it. Marshal Petain believed the story, and sent about 800 incredulous French officers and noncommissioned officers to see how the American soldiers had crossed an area previously considered impassable. When the officers saw the evidence on the ground, they believed - and commented that the American soldiers were aided by the enormous size of their feet.[14]

Meanwhile, General Fuchs had recognized that his forces were in danger of being cut off. At 1200, he ordered the retreat of the Mihiel Group to the Schroeter Position, but then quickly decided to send them all the way back to the Michel Position without making a stand at the Schroeter. At 0400 on 13 September, Fuchs had completed the retreat. Shortly after, the first elements of the First Division of IV Corps and the 26th Division of V Corps met at Vigneulles. Fortunately for the Germans, Pershing had given his field commanders very little decision-making power. Therefore, when the commanders could have pushed

[14] Marshall, 147.

ahead more quickly, they did not; and Pershing, for his part, was unable to get his orders through to the commanders when he realized an early junction could be made at Vigneulles. This delay allowed thousands of Germans to escape capture.

By the afternoon of 13 September, the Americans had reached all their objectives: the First Army had seized the Paris-Avricourt railway and straightened out the enemy line. Pershing reported the capture of almost 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns, 752 machine guns, and large amounts of light material. American casualties totaled 7,000 for those first two days, but 3,000 more casualties would occur during the consolidation of the salient after 13 September. Casualties were 40,000 less than headquarters expected. All activities in the area ceased after 16 September, because the First Army had to move quickly to be in position for the Meuse-Argonne battle, which was to begin on 26 September.

Ludendorff and von Gallwitz, however, thought the Americans would continue the attack, and wished to reinforce the ranks. But when von Gallwitz asked Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg for reinforcements on 17 September, the latter angrily replied, "I am not willing to admit that one American division is worth two German. Whenever commanders and troops have been determined to hold their position and the artillery has been well organized, even weak German divisions have repulsed the mass attacks of American divisions and inflicted especially heavy casualties on the enemy."[15]

Some of Pershing's staff believed that the St. Mihiel offensive should have been extended to Metz, in spite of the commitment of troops to the Meuse-Argonne sector. This was also Pershing's original plan before the Allied command truncated it. George Marshall, although opposed to further attacks because of Foch's orders, nonetheless believed an assault on Metz would have been successful. "[T]here is no doubt in my mind but that we could have reached the outskirts of Metz by the afternoon of the 13th, and quite probably could have captured the city on the 14th, as the enemy was incapable of bringing up reserves in sufficient number and formation to offer an adequate resistance."[16]

The evening of the thirteenth, a meeting was held at headquarters to decide whether the attack should be resumed, and a move made toward Metz. Marshall and Grant issued a statement opposing the action: the assault had lost its momentum, and the enemy had been given time to regroup his scattered forces. American forces had stopped short of the Hindenburg Line, and out of range of the heavy artillery of the permanent fortifications of Metz. Twelve additional hours would be necessary to draw up plans and deliver them to the front, providing the enemy with even more time to reinforce his position. At this time, an assault on Metz would be extremely difficult and would produce heavy casualties. Furthermore, American troops would be unable to reach their assigned positions for the Meuse-Argonne offensive in time. Pershing decided to follow the original plan. Stabilization

[15] James H. Hallas, Squandered Victory: The American First Army at St. Mihiel (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995), 222.

[16] Marshall, 146.

of the front proceeded quickly, and the troops intended for the Meuse-Argonne were sent on their way.[17]

Could Metz have been assaulted successfully? Pershing and Marshall believed so; others believed not. Everyone agrees that St. Mihiel was a tactical victory, but was it a strategic loss? Could a successful Metz offensive have ended the war earlier, and could it have prevented the 120,000 Meuse-Argonne casualties? The strategic value of a successful Metz offensive rests on three subarguments: the value of the railway line behind the Meuse-Argonne front versus the value of the railway line behind Metz; the real strength of the Michel Position and Metz, and above all, the American army's ability to carry out the massive Metz operation on its own.[18]

The first two arguments depend on the third: the American Army's ability to successfully assault Metz, and then successfully take the Longuyon-Sedan railway line and the Briey Iron Basin - both twenty miles beyond Metz. This is not an objective the American Army could have achieved, for two reasons. First, the American Army depended heavily on both British and French materials and manpower. Would Foch, Petain and Haig have committed their supplies to the Metz offensive? No. They strongly disagreed with Pershing's inclusion of Metz in his St. Mihiel offensive. The cooperation and coordination of materials and manpower by Foch, Petain, Haig and Pershing produced the success of St. Mihiel. Second, the recently-formed American Army consisted of a great number of partially-trained, inexperienced troops. They were not ready for a major offensive against a position the enemy was determined to hold. St. Mihiel had been an excellent training ground for these troops, because the Germans had already decided to withdraw from the salient. For that reason, the battle has been referred to as "the Americans relieving the Germans."[19] General Hunter Liggett cites the inexperience of the troops and other reasons to support his belief that a Metz assault would not have been successful:

> The possibility of taking Metz and the rest of it, had the battle been fought on the original plan, existed, in my opinion, only on the supposition that our army was a well-oiled, fully coordinated machine, which it was not as yet. If all the divisions had been battle-tempered and battle disciplined as were the First, Second and Forty-Second, which again they were not, it might have been worth while to make the attempt, despite the facts that the rainy season had begun and that an advance would bring our right under the guns of Metz, our left under the Meuse heights north of Verdun.[20]

[17] Ibid.

[18] Hallas, 260-5. Hallas, in general, makes the three subarguments. I have added "on its own," to emphasize the fact that the AEF most certainly did need the Allied arms, staff and training to carry out this offensive.

[19] Willard Klunder, American Military History 525 Class Notes: April 1, 1999.

The American Army's ability to take Metz, thus depended on its ability to supply its own troops and to provide more training for its troops - and as General Liggett has also mentioned - its ability to overcome the problems of the rainy season and terrain. Could the American Army have accomplished this in such a short time without the cooperation and coordination of the Allied forces? No. The St. Mihiel offensive, in its limited but cooperative form, did most certainly offer both a military and moral strategic advantage: the German threat to the rear of the Meuse-Argonne offensive was eliminated, and more importantly, the morale of the war-weary Allies was dramatically increased. As Pershing himself maintained: "The St. Mihiel victory probably did more than any single operation of the war to encourage the tired Allies. After years of doubt and despair, of suffering and loss, it brought them assurance of the final defeat of an enemy whose armies had seemed well-nigh invincible."[21]

[20] Hallas, 263.

[21] Pershing, vol. 2, 273.

EARL WARREN'S LAST CIVICS LESSON: POWELL V. MCCORMACK

Eric Owens

The legal opinions of Earl Warren were not such as to see the development of a well-grounded constitutional theory clearly established over the course of a judicial career. Typically, they present the basic facts of a case, usually within an ethical, rather than a legal, framework.[1] Warren's last opinion delivered on the Court, *Powell v. McCormack*,[2] can in that sense be viewed as an archetype opinion.

Powell v. McCormack raised issues related to Article 1 of the Constitution that had not previously been clearly defined by the courts. Section 2 states that "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." What the Constitution does not say is whether these restrictions are exclusive, or whether the provisions of section 5, clauses 1 and 2 outweigh them.[3]

Many Congressmen have asserted that each house possesses the power to exclude a member-elect for a reason not expressed in the Constitution. Prior to the decision to exclude Powell, this had been done successfully only three times since the politically charged atmosphere in which the post-Civil War Congress refused to seat Southern Congressmen elected under President Lincoln's "soft" Reconstruction plan. In 1870, B. F. Whittemore was excluded following his victory in a special election. He had previously held the seat but resigned to escape expulsion for selling appointments to West Point. In 1900, Brigham Roberts, a representative-elect from Utah, was excluded for practicing polygamy. The last exclusion to occur was that of Victor Berger in 1919, following his conviction for violation of sedition laws.[4]

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[1]   G. Edward White, "Earl Warren's Influence on the Warren Court", in *The Warren Court in Historical and Political Perspective*, Mark Tushnet, ed. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 37-50.

[2]   395 U.S. 486 (1969).

[3]   Article 1, section 5, clause 1 states that "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members. . . ." Article 1, Section 5, clause 2 states that "Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member."

[4]   Kent M. Weeks, *Adam Clayton Powell and the Supreme Court* (New York: Dunellen, 1971), 15-16.

Prior to *Powell*, no challenges to the congressional actions of exclusion had ever been brought into court, and such a challenge would have to surmount two hurdles. One was Article 1, Section 6, clause 1 of the Constitution, which provided that "The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place." Many believed this clause barred a suit against the Congress or its members to challenge an exclusion.[5]

The second hurdle was the "political questions" doctrine, which holds that there are certain constitutional questions which are inherently non-justiciable. This doctrine traces its origins to *Marbury v. Madison*,[6] where Chief Justice Marshall wrote:

> The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.[7]

In the 1946 decision *Colegreve v. Green*[8], Felix Frankfurter wrote that the issue involved (redistricting of Illinois congressional districts) was "of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination."[9] This remained the opinion of the Court until 1962.

Frankfurter's *Colegreve* precedent was set aside in the landmark 1962 case *Baker v. Carr*[10], which ordered the redistricting of the state legislature of Tennessee. More importantly for future cases of a political nature, Justice Brennan's majority opinion provided a specific, rather narrow definition of the "political questions" doctrine.

> It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a

[5] Ibid., 16.

[6] 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).

[7] 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) at 170.

[8] 328 U.S. 549 (1946).

[9] Ibid. at 552.

[10] 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.[11]

Many Congressmen and lawyers believed that a challenge to an exclusion would contain one or more of these criteria, especially that positing a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" to the legislature, due to the "judicial qualifications" clause of Article 1, section 5, clause 1, of the Constitution.[12]   However, those who held this view tended to ignore Brennan's remark in the *Baker* opinion that the "political questions" doctrine would not apply if it conflicted with the Court's role of constitutional interpreter.

Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.[13]

The *Powell* case traces its origins back to the original Congressional investigations into the conduct of the controversial Harlem Democrat. Powell had been chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee since 1961, and by 1966 he was drawing fire from members of the committee. Their three major grievances against the chairman was that he had used his position to stall legislation, misused committee funds, and had capriciously fired members of the committee staff. On September 22, 1966, the committee voted overwhelmingly to reduce Powell's power by reducing his procedural weapons and his control over committee staff, as well as more direct supervision over committee funds.[14]

Powell had spent much of the 1960s entangled in a court case against Mrs. Esther James, an elderly resident of his district. On March 6, 1960, as a last-minute substitute for the snow-bound Senator Hubert Humphrey on the New York television show "Between the Lines," Powell called James a "bag woman" (a graft collector for corrupt police). James sued Powell for defamation, and in 1963 won a judgment of $11,500 in compensatory damages

[11]   Ibid. at 217.

[12]   Weeks, 17.

[13]   369 U.S. at 211.

[14]   Weeks, 4-5.

and $200,000 in punitive damages. The verdict was decreased on appeal, but, in 1965, after James alleged that Powell had illegally transferred property to avoid paying the judgment, she was awarded $575,000 plus costs, though that amount was reduced on appeal as well. By the end of 1966, it was estimated that the unpaid judgment amounted to some $164,000.[15]

Far more harmful to Powell than these civil judgments were the various contempt citations issued to him for his refusal to attend court sessions.[16] At least three separate civil contempt citations were issued against him in 1966 as well as two arrest orders. Since the arrest orders could not be served on Sundays, Powell returned to New York three times a month to preach at his Abyssinian Baptist Church, and absented himself from the state at other times. On November 28, 1966, however, an arrest order was issued against him that could be executed on any day of the week, and Powell stayed out of the state entirely.[17]

On October 5, 1966, the Committee on House Administration designated the Special Subcommittee on Contracts, chaired by Wayne Hays, to conduct an investigation of Powell's committee. By the time that hearings began on December 19, the controversy accelerated markedly. Editorials across the nation began to call for varying degrees of punishment for Powell, and, as early as November 30, at least one member of Congress, Lionel Van Deerlin, suggested that Powell would be excluded from the forthcoming 90th Congress, to which he had just been re-elected. The Hays subcommittee concluded that Powell had misused public travel funds for personal purposes, including the travel of certain female members of his staff, and furthermore had added his wife to his staff's payroll despite the fact that she had performed no staff duties and, in fact, had been living in Puerto Rico. The Hays subcommittee, however, had completed its work too late for Powell to be sanctioned by the 89th Congress, though its report did lead the Democratic Caucus to remove Powell from his chairmanship prior to the 90th Congress.[18]

On January 10, 1967, the opening day of the 90th Congress, a resolution was adopted sending the Powell matter to a special committee appointed by the Speaker, and denying Powell his seat, though not his salary, until the committee completed its investigation.[19] The committee's report, issued in late February, concluded that Powell should be seated, though he should also be censured, fined, and divested of seniority, and also noted that if Powell were excluded or expelled, it would raise constitutional issues which the Supreme

[15] Ibid., 6-8.

[16] In fact, Powell claimed that the various litigation that James instigated against him raised important constitutional questions under the congressional immunities clause, though the Supreme Court denied certiorari to his claim in 1965. See Weeks, 7-8, and Powell v. James, 379 U.S. 966 (1965).

[17] Weeks, 8-11.

[18] Ibid., 19-32.

[19] Ibid., 44-46.

Court would have the right to review.[20] However, the committee's proposal was rejected by the full House on March 1, which then proceeded by a vote of 307-116 to exclude Powell.[21]

One aspect of the House debate that is particularly interesting is the complete absence of consideration of the Supreme Court's decision in *Bond v. Floyd*,[22] which was decided on December 5, 1966--less than three months before Congress voted to exclude Powell.[23] The case arose over the Georgia House of Representatives' decision not to give the oath of office to Julian Bond, a civil rights activist who had previously worked with the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, due to statements he had made against the war in Vietnam. The state argued that Bond could not sincerely abide by the oath to uphold the state and federal constitutions in light of his statements opposing the war. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Warren, the Court unanimously ruled that "the oath gives it [the state of Georgia] no interest in limiting its legislators' capacity to discuss their views of local or national policy. The manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative government requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to express their views on issues of policy."[24] While the *Bond* case did raise different issues than the circumstances surrounding Adam Clayton Powell, one could argue that the Georgia House's finding not to seat Bond could be considered an extra-constitutional requirement imposed by the legislature, which could indicate the Court's willingness to decide in Powell's favor if the case were to reach that level.

Powell quickly challenged the House's action in court, the first time that an exclusion by the House of Representatives had been challenged in court. On April 7, Judge George L. Hart, Jr., of the district court for the District of Columbia, dismissed Powell's complaint without consideration of the merits on separation of powers grounds.[25] On February 28, 1968, the three-judge court of appeals for the District of Columbia likewise rejected Powell's complaint in three separate opinions, on differing grounds. Judge Warren E. Burger ruled that the case was nonjusticiable on the fourth of the six criteria enunciated by Brennan in *Baker*, that of "the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government."[26] Judge Carl McGowan ruled that there was no imperative exigency for judicial inquiry, while Judge

[20] Ibid., 77-79.

[21] Ibid., 94, 101.

[22] 385 U.S. 116 (1966).

[23] Powell's attorneys did attempt to draw the attention of the special committee charged with investigating whether to seat Powell, but there is no indication that the decision was considered. See Weeks, 61-62.

[24] 385 U.S. at 135-36.

[25] Weeks, 122.

[26] 369 U.S. at 217.

Harold Leventhal ruled that even if the procedure used to exclude Powell might have been improper, the court should decline to entertain an action based on a procedural defect.[27]

On November 18, 1968, some six weeks after the 90th Congress had adjourned and after Powell had been reelected, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on *Powell v. McCormack*. This vote indicated that at least four justices had felt that there were special and important reasons for review and that the issues raised were of sufficient public importance to merit their consideration. At issue is the timing of the Court's decision. The Court had waited almost six months since the petition was first filed, yet in another six weeks the court would know whether Powell would be seated by the 91st Congress. There seemed to be a strong possibility that he would be sworn in, and he had indicated his willingness to take his seat even if denied his seniority. The most impelling question, his right to sit in Congress, would in all likelihood be settled, so the Court could have easily avoided the issues posed by the case. The Court's action tended to suggest that it welcomed the opportunity to deal with the merits of the case, for, if after hearing argument, it were to rule that the case was not justiciable because of the separation of powers doctrine, it could have achieved the same effect simply by allowing the lower court decision to stand. The case presented the court with the opportunity to deal with the merits of the case--the constitutionality of the exclusion--without risking a direct confrontation with Congress.[28]

The scheduling of the case would seem to indicate that Warren wanted the *Powell* case dealt with as soon as possible. One practical reason for this could be the status of his retirement. His intention to retire had been announced in June, 1968, with no fixed date set for the retirement. President Johnson nominated Associate Justice Abe Fortas to succeed Warren, but the nomination had become bogged down in the Senate due to allegations of political cronyism due to Fortas' close relationship with Johnson, as well as allegations of financial impropriety due to Fortas' acceptance of $15,000 for a series of law school seminars at American University in Washington. The Senate filibustered Fortas' nomination, and in October Fortas asked that it be withdrawn. After Nixon's election in November, Warren agreed to finish the Court's term before Nixon appointed his successor.[29]

Thus, one could surmise that Warren felt some urgency to resolve *Powell* before the end of the term. Of particular interest with regard to *Powell* and Warren's retirement was Nixon's selection of Warren E. Burger, the Court of Appeals Judge who had ruled against Powell, as Warren's successor. Warren allegedly predicted Burger's nomination in advance.[30] Warren had originally scheduled the case for argument in February, 1969, but

[27] Weeks, 146-152.

[28] Ibid., 162-63.

[29] G. Edward White, *Earl Warren: A Public Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 307-313.

[30] Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, *The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), 11.

all of the other justices, except William O. Douglas, wanted the case delayed at least until March, and Harlan and Fortas wanted to postpone indefinitely. Warren finally agreed to schedule the case for April with the understanding that it must be argued then.[31]

In oral arguments before the Court on April 21, 1969, the justices grilled Bruce Bromley, the attorney representing the House of Representatives, when he argued that, due to the speech and debate clause, an excluded Congressman could not have judicial remedy even if the Congress' action was clearly unconstitutional, and that the case was moot due to the end of the 90th Congress and Powell's seating in the 91st Congress, calling Powell's claim for back salary "completely *de minimis*."[32] Bromley was harangued continually by the justices in the oral arguments, with even the conservative Justice Harlan, who might have been expected to disagree on separation-of-powers grounds, acknowledging that the counsel for the House's "basic argument is simply untenable."[33]

On June 16, 1969, Chief Justice Warren delivered his majority opinion in *Powell v. McCormack*,[34] which determined that Powell was "entitled to a declaratory judgment that he was unlawfully excluded from the 90th Congress."[35]

Counsel for the House of Representatives had based their arguments on five points, which Warren refuted point by point. Those arguments were: that the case was moot since the 90th Congress had ended and Powell was seated in the 91st Congress; the Speech or Debate clause precluded judicial review; the power to exclude is supported by the expulsion power of Article 1, section 5, clause 2; the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the litigation; and that the litigation was not justiciable since it involved a political question.[36]

Attorneys for the House argued that, due to the end of the 90th Congress, Powell's subsequent seating in the 91st Congress, and the House of Representatives' status as not being a continuing body, the case was moot. Powell's attorneys responded that three issues still existed that made the it a "case or controversy" within the meaning of Article 3, section 2:[37] that Powell was unconstitutionally deprived of his seniority, that the resolution of the

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[31]   Bernard Schwartz, *Super Chief: Earl Warren and His Supreme Court--A Judicial Biography*, unabridged ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1983), 758.

[32]   Weeks, 179-188.

[33]   Schwartz, 759.

[34]   395 U.S. 486 (1969).

[35]   Ibid. at 489.

[36]   Ibid. at 486-87.

[37]   "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority. . . .In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. . . ."

91st Congress fining Powell $25,000 is a continuance of allegedly unconstitutional exclusion,[38] and that Powell should be entitled to the salary withheld after his exclusion from the 90th Congress. Warren's decision stated that Powell's claim for salary remained viable and that it was not necessary to rule on whether the other points were moot.[39]

Attorneys for the House also argued that the 1926 decision *Alejandrino v. Quezon*[40] had rendered Powell's salary claim moot. Alejandrino was an appointed Senator of the Philippine Islands, which at that time was an American colony. He was suspended by the Philippine Senate for one year and denied all privileges of the office. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the suspension had expired and the Court dismissed the claim as moot. The court characterized Alejandrino's salary claims as incidental and said that since he did not set out who the official or set of officials was against whom the mandamus should be issued, the entire case was dismissed as moot. Attorneys for the House had argued that since Powell's salary claims were also incidental, *Powell* should likewise be dismissed as moot. Warren's opinion disagreed, however, noting that the difference between Alejandrino's claims and Powell's was that Powell's complaint directly named the person responsible for the payment of congressional salaries and asked for mandamus and an injunction against that person.[41] Furthermore, Powell had requested declaratory relief, a form not available at the time of *Alejandrino*[42]

Attorneys for the House had further argued against the use of *Bond* as a precedent. They had argued first that the mootness of Powell's primary claim, that of being seated in the House, had made his secondary claim, his claim for back salary, not worthy of judicial consideration. Warren's opinion cited *Bond* as rejecting the theory that the mootness of the primary claim necessarily made the secondary claims moot. Attorneys for the House had argued that the differences between *Bond* and the present controversy--namely, that Powell had, unlike Bond, been seated by the time the case reached the Court, and that the legislative session in question for Powell had, unlike Bond, ended—were such that *Bond* should not be used as a precedent. Warren's opinion noted, however, that the attorneys had not adequately stated why *Bond* should not be used as a precedent, since in that case they had likewise relied on the salary claim to hold that the case was not moot.[43]

Attorneys for both sides argued that previous Court decisions on the Speech or Debate

[38] H. R. Res. No. 2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 Cong. Rec. H21 (daily ed., January 3, 1969).

[39] 395 U.S. at 495-96.

[40] 271 U.S. 528 (1926).

[41] 395 U.S. at 497-498.

[42] See Ibid. at 499, n. 12, for a discussion of how federal courts were not empowered to make declaratory judgments until 1934.

[43] Ibid. at 499-500. It was on mootness grounds that Justice Stewart dissented in the case. See Ibid. at 559-573.

clause of the Constitution provided support for their positions.[44]   One issue raised was whether those who participated in the exclusion of Powell were acting in the sphere of legislative activity. If so, since Powell was seeking neither damages nor criminal prosecution, then did this lift the bar of the clause. Also, if a lawsuit may not be maintained against a Congressman, then are those who merely work for the House protected by the clause. Warren's opinion found it to necessary to deal with only the last of these three issues. The court had articulated as early as 1881 in *Kilbourn v. Thompson*[45] that, although action may be barred against Congressmen due to Article 1, section 6, legislative employees who participate in unconstitutional activities are responsible for their acts. Further, simply because House employees are acting pursuant to express orders of that body does not bar judicial review of the underlying legislative decision. Thus, Warren ruled that Powell's petition would be dismissed against the named Congressman, but the complaint against the House Clerk, Doorkeeper, and Sergeant-at-Arms could be continued.[46]

The next issue argued by attorneys for the House was that the vote to exclude Powell should be construed as an expulsion under Article 1, section 5, clause 2 of the constitution. They asserted that the House can expel a member for any reason whatsoever, and that since the vote by which Powell was denied his seat resulted in over a two-thirds majority, it should be regarded as an expulsion. Warren's opinion ruled that the actions of Speaker of the House John McCormack in the course of the debate clearly indicated that a simply majority would be all that was needed to deny Powell his seat, and that the fact that the vote happened to be over two-thirds was irrelevant. "Had the amendment been . . . to expel Powell, a two-thirds vote would have been constitutionally required. The Speaker ruled that the House was voting to exclude Powell, and we will not speculate what the result might have been if Powell had been seated and expulsion proceedings subsequently instituted."[47] Warren went on to note that the difference between exclusion and expulsion was substantial, since the House had countless times previously refused to discipline a member for conduct in a prior Congress, a precedent that it failed to follow in Powell's circumstances. Finally, he noted that, based on what Congressional support existed for the committee's report recommending a fine, censure, and loss of seniority, it was unlikely that a two-third majority could have been mustered to expel Powell if McCormack had made it explicitly clear that it was a vote of expulsion.[48]

Warren then proceeded in the opinion to the issue of jurisdiction, stating that, unlike the District Court's opinion, the courts did have subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

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[44]   Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); and Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).

[45]   103 U.S. 168 (1881).

[46]   395 U.S. at 501-506

[47]   Ibid. at 508.

[48]   Ibid. at 506-512.

Warren stated that the case is one arising under the Constitution within the meaning of Article 3, since petitioners' claims "will be sustained if the Constitution . . . [is] given one construction and will be defeated if it [is] given another," in the language of the standard opinion on the issue in the 1946 case *Bell v. Hood*.[49]

Finally, Warren's opinion tackled the issue of justiciability. Counsel for the House argued that it was impossible for a federal court to mold effective relief. Warren responded that since Powell sought only a declaratory judgment, the case in terms of the general criteria of justiciability, the case was justiciable.[50]

The more specific justiciability issue associated with the "political question" doctrine was much more complicated. The House claimed that Article 1, section 5 gave the House a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment," as per the guidelines established in *Baker*, to determine Powell's qualifications, and therefore the case was nonjusticiable. Powell's attorneys argued, and the Court agreed, "that the Constitution provides that an elected representative may be denied his seat only if the House finds he does not meet one of the standing qualification expressly prescribed by the Constitution."[51] Warren wrote that whether there is a "'textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a co-ordinate political department' of government and what is the scope of such commitment are questions we must resolve for the first time in this case."[52] After all, the Court had also ruled in *Baker* that it was expressly the Court's responsibility to decide such a "delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation."[53]

Warren's opinion then goes into a lengthy analysis of the historical precedents involved in the ability of a legislature to exclude a member. Attorneys for the House had insisted the qualifications set forth in the Constitution were not were not meant to limit legislative power to exclude or expel at will, but merely to establish certain incompacities which could only be overcome with an Amendment to the Constitution. This was because the ability of a legislature to judge the qualifications of its members was commonly accepted by 1787. Powell's attorneys, however, cited the Constitutional debates as well as the writings of Hamilton and Madison to argue that it was not the framers' intent to empower the legislature to set additional qualifications than those in Article 1, section 5. The Court ultimately accepted Powell's arguments, noting that powers cited by the House's attorneys had been renounced by the British House of Commons and at least one state legislature by 1787.[54]

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[49] 327 U.S. 678 (1946). Quote from 327 U.S. at 685. Analysis of Warren's opinion from 395 U.S. at 512-514.

[50] 395 U.S. at 516-518.

[51] Ibid. at 520.

[52] Ibid. at 521.

[53] Ibid. at 518-521. Quote from 369 U.S. at 211.

[54] 395 U.S. at 521-549.

Thus, Warren's opinion concluded that "the House was without power to exclude him from its membership."[55] The Court ordered that the issue of Powell's back pay be remanded to the District Court, though only the employees of the House rather than the Congressmen would remain in the suit.[56]

Warren described the *Powell* case in some detail in his memoirs. Though much of what Warren says there is similar to what can be found in the opinion, there are some aspects that are particularly unique. Warren makes it clear that he has no sympathy for Powell, calling him "flamboyant, abrasive, and insolent." Yet Warren more forcefully points out that, compared with the House's own precedents, its punishment of Powell was extremely severe, and that it was possibly due to racial considerations.

> Although other members of Congress have been charged with corruption in the courts and even convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, the House traditionally has permitted them to go unscathed as congressmen, even to the extent of permitting them to retain committee chairmanships and control vital legislation.[57]

Warren biographer Bernard Schwartz provides further evidence that Warren intensely disliked Powell, even though he believed that the facts of the case required a decision in his favor.

> Warren was personally appalled by Powell's misconduct. He considered the flamboyant Congressman a disgrace both to his race and his office. But the law, as he saw it, was clear. Congress had asserted an unreviewable power to deny an elected Congressman his seat, even though he met all the qualifications for membership listed in the Constitution.[58]

Warren has been quoted elsewhere on the *Powell* case that "it was perfectly clear. There was no other way to decide it. Anybody could see that."[59]

The *Powell* opinion is typical of Warren's judicial thought and jurisprudence in several ways. First, like many of the important decisions of the Warren Court, it epitomizes Warren's skill at consensus building. This skill, of course, is most obvious in *Brown v. Board*

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[55] Ibid. at 550.

[56] Ibid. at 550.

[57] Chief Justice Earl Warren, *The Memoirs of Earl Warren* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977), 317-318.

[58] Schwartz, 757-758.

[59] Woodward and Armstrong, 25.

of Education.[60] In *Powell*, at the time that Warren agreed to delay the hearing of the case until April, one of Warren's reasons for doing so was that no majority existed on the case. Yet by the time the 7-1 decision was handed down in June, all of the brethren, including Justice Stewart, who dissented on mootness, agreed with Warren's basic approach. Justice Fortas said that he had worked out a theory by which the House's action was a legal expulsion, but agreed to go along; Justice Harlan refused to take the separation-of-powers grounds that many expected him to take; and Justice Black was finally persuaded to sign on after Warren removed language about the relationship between declaratory judgments and injunctions, which the court was expecting to address in the near future.[61] Thus, there is no denying that Warren exhibited a great deal of influence on the other justices to come to what he perceived to be the obvious decision.

Another characteristic of Warren's legal opinions, and that of his Court, is that it put him once again squarely into a "political thicket." The editors of the *UCLA Law Review* wrote shortly after the *Powell* decision, "that it frequently decided cases which other Courts might well have avoided was a hallmark of the Warren Court. *Powell v. McCormack* was such a case." While most observers considered the controversy dead, "the Chief Justice caught everyone by surprise and thrust the Supreme Court smack dab into the middle of the proverbial political thicket."[62]

A third characteristic of Warren seen in *Powell* is his empowering of the Supreme Court. In this case it was done by further strengthening the scope of judicial review and further weakening of the "political questions" doctrine. Archibald Cox wrote a year prior to the *Powell* decision that:

> . . . prior to 1960, however, the Court had rarely been concerned with the electoral or legislative process. During the 1960's the Warren Court turned the corner. The justices have now ruled, in constitutional terms, upon eligibility to vote, the apportionment of representatives, and even a State legislature's refusal to seat a successful candidate for office.[63]

Furthermore, to Cox it seemed clear that "a majority of the present justices conceive it to be one of the self-conscious functions of constitutional adjudication to secure at least

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[60] 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

[61] Schwartz, 758-760. Though Fortas participated in oral arguments, by the time the decision was handed down, he had resigned due to ethical considerations over money he had received from (and eventually returned to) Louis Wolfson, a financier convicted of securities violations. Hence the 7-1 majority. The cases Black referred to were decided by the court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).

[62] "For the Record", *UCLA Law Review* 17 (November 1969): ix.

[63] Archibald Cox, *The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 114.

some of the basic democratic elements in the political process." Cox also noted that it was speculative to see how far the trend would carry, but that the litigation involving Adam Clayton Powell could provide a clue.[64] After the *Powell* decision, scholars debated the implications of the decision in terms of judicial review and the "political questions" doctrine. Some speculated that there were no decisions that Congress or the President could make that were insulated from judicial review, since *Powell* gave the Court an almost limitless review power to interpret the Constitution.[65]   Other scholars have cited *Powell* and later cases to show how the Court has "repudiated the notion that the principle of separation of powers is nonjusticiable. Although . . . the political question doctrine was [not] entirely gone, its significance was small and declining. . . ."[66] To many, it was the political question doctrine, not judicial review, that was in jeopardy, as there might not be any constitutional issue to which the *Powell* Court's reasoning would not apply.[67]

Another characteristic of Warren's legal thought present in *Powell* that can be traced to *Brown* is his utter disregard for the concept of enforcement. One biographer of Warren wrote that "the question of enforcement had never troubled him.   From the *Brown* desegregation decision to the Reapportionment Cases, he had always felt that the Justices' duty was only to decide the cases before them as they thought the Constitution required."[68] When one of his law clerks questioned him about enforcement in a case involving the Army, citing Andrew Jackson's famous challenge to Justice Marshall to let him enforce his law, Warren retorted, "if they don't do this, they've destroyed the whole republic, and they aren't going to do that. So you don't even have to worry about whether they are going to do it or not--*they're going to do it!*"[69] Ultimately, however, in this case Warren was wrong; despite the continued litigation, Powell never did receive his back pay.[70]

A final characteristic of Warren's judicial thought that is clearly evident in *Powell* is how Warren elevates morality to a higher role in Supreme Court decision-making and reduces the role of technical proficiency. Warren did not have an expressed judicial axiom beyond the acute and consistent query, "Is it fair?"[71] Yet Warren's sense of judicial fairness and morality is perhaps the most overriding characteristic of his decisions.   For Warren,

[64] Ibid.

[65] White, *Earl Warren*, 314.

[66] Robert F. Nagel, "Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine", *The University of Chicago Law Review* 56 (Spring 1989): 649-650.

[67] Ibid., 647.

[68] Schwartz, 759.

[69] Schwartz, 759. Emphasis is Schwartz's.

[70] Weeks, 241.

[71] Ed Cray, *Chief Justice: A Biography of Earl Warren* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 531.

"convictions controlled the technical details; details never controlled convictions."[72] One can hardly argue that the *Powell* opinion was technically proficient, as it seemed to raise more questions than it answered. In fact, it symbolized a frequent criticism of Warren's thought of stating a clear principle in one case and taking it back in a subsequent case.[73] Many observers at the time perceived that *Powell* violated the criteria of nonjusticability as stated in *Baker*.

The *Powell* decision was announced just one week prior to Warren's handing the Chief Justiceship over to Warren Burger, and, as one scholar has described it, the decision served as Warren's "final civics lesson."[74] The lesson is not atypical in Warren's judicial thought, as it further empowered the Court's ability to address constitutional questions, provided further evidence of Warren's consensus building skills, and embroiled the Court in a "political thicket" where it had become increasingly comfortable. Yet the decision had some of Warren's typical "defects" as well, in that it was virtually unenforceable, and its technical blemishes raised as many if not more questions than it answered. The decision has not lived in the infamy of some of Warren's more famous opinions, such as *Brown*, *Reynolds v. Sims*,[75] and *Miranda v. Arizona*.[76] Yet it is likely as typical, or more typical, than any of them.

Regardless of whatever criticism may yet exist of Warren, it does seem apparent that liberal historians have and will continue to take a liking to him. A contemporary of Warren and his Court wrote that he was convinced that the Court "was in keeping with the mainstream of American history--a bit progressive but also moderate, a bit humane but not sentimental, a bit idealistic but seldom doctrinaire, and in the long run essentially pragmatic--in short, in keeping with the true genius of our institutions."[77] Warren's critics would likely take issue with this idea, but a more recent biographer described Warren in a way that even his critics would have to concede. "Any estimate of Warren's career will mark him as one of the seminal figures not only of his own time, but of the years that followed his death. . . ."[78]

[72] White, "Earl Warren's Influence", 47.

[73] Ibid., 39.

[74] White, *Earl Warren*, 314.

[75] 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

[76] 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

[77] Cox, 133-134.

[78] Cray, 531.

REVIEWS

Stephen F. Austin: Empresario of Texas. By Gregg Cantrell. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. Pp. xiv, 493. $29.95.)

Gregg Cantrell, professor of history at Hardin-Simmoms University, has written an intriguing and intelligent biography of the "Father of Texas", Stephen Fuller Austin. This is the first major retelling of Austin's life in over seventy years, and it departs significantly from these earlier works.   While previous biographies centered on Austin's career and accomplishments, this book concentrates on his personal life, personality, and character.

Stephen F. Austin's life began in Virginia in 1793, he spent his youth in Missouri, and attended preparatory school and college in the east. He returned to Missouri in 1810, and subsequently moved to Arkansas and New Orleans. Meanwhile, his father, Moses Austin, had procured from the Mexican government a land grant and authorization to settle three hundred families in Texas. Moses died before he could start the settlement, so Stephen took over the venture and brought the first settlers to Texas in 1821. Austin wanted to remain aloof from national political struggles, but that became difficult in the following years. Finally, when the Mexican government instituted policies that were increasingly detrimental to Texas, Austin sided with those settlers who were agitating for an independent Texas. He ran for president of Texas in 1836, but was defeated by Sam Houston. Austin died a few months later.

Cantrell paints a portrait of a complex, enigmatic loner, fraught with dualities and prejudices. Austin was also a man torn between an obsession with personal success and his feelings of obligation towards others. For example, Austin peopled his Texas colony with proslavery southerners and was himself a slave owner. Yet he condemned slavery as a curse and inconsistent with a free, liberal republic. He also allowed free blacks as colonists and granted them land on the same basis as whites. In addition, Austin professed a commitment to Jacksonian democratic ideals, but his elitism and paternalism often demonstrated a disdain for his colonists of lower social status.

In this book, Cantrell primarily makes thorough use of the Stephen F. Austin Papers, and Mexican government documents. His secondary sources consist of works by both traditional Turnerians and by revisionist New Western Historians. Cantrell synthesizes these two competing schools of thought to avoid depicting Austin as neither a Turnerian self-reliant, altruistic hero nor a grasping, profit-driven villain of the New Western History.

This is an ambitious book and, for the most part, Cantrell accomplishes his objective of fusing a psychological analysis with a historical study of Stephen F. Austin. Additionally, Cantrell successfully combines much new information with critically reexamined older material. This book provides enough new insights as to prove a valuable resource to scholars and, at the same time, is interesting enough to be enjoyed by a general audience.

Holly Wright

Dr. Seuss Goes to War: The World War II Editorial Cartoons of *Theodor Seuss Geisel.* By
   Richard H. Minear. (New York: The New Press, 1999. Pp. 240. $25.00.)

Famed author Dr. Seuss (a.k.a. Theodor Geisel) is known and loved for his whimsical
children's stories such as *The Cat in the Hat* and *Fox in Socks*. Serious students of Seuss might
be aware of his tendency to include profound moral commentary in his deceptively simple
tales such as in *The Sneetches* (racial tolerance), *The Lorax* (environmental responsibility), and
The Butter Battle Book (nuclear war). Few of Dr. Seuss' many fans, however, are aware of Ted
Geisel's stint (1941-1943) as a World War II political cartoonist for New York's left wing
newspaper, *PM*. This ignorance is exactly what Richard M. Minear, Professor of History at
the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, aims to change through his book, *Dr. Seuss Goes
to War: The World War II Editorial Cartoons of Theodor Seuss Geisel.*

Fortunately, throughout Minear's book, Dr. Seuss and his cartoons remain the star
attraction. As in his later children's books, Dr. Seuss is a master manipulator of fantasy and
humor in his war time cartoons, and, incidentally, also manages to build a solid and
convincing case for his views against isolationism and American apathy prior to Pearl
Harbor. In short, Dr. Seuss does what Dr. Seuss does best. He entertains while at the same
time causing the reader to think. The America First Committee is transformed to ostriches
with their heads in the sand, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt is elected an honorary
member of the Society of Red Tape Cutters.

An added bonus for the modern reader is the chance to visit with some old friends, as
many of Dr. Seuss' characters in his children's classics originated in his cartoons. *Yertle the
Turtle* as Adolf Hitler and *The Cat in the Hat* as the United States make appearances in the
cartoons, as well as Horton from *Horton Hears a Who*. Dr. Seuss' genius, therefore, is
evident throughout *Dr. Seuss Goes to War.*

Less effective, however, is Richard Minear's contribution to the book. Analysis of the
cartoons and their contribution to history is superficial. Frequently, the commentary only
describes the cartoons- an unnecessary activity because Seuss' drawings are clear and self-
explanatory. The reader could have learned almost as much from a simple picture book of
Seuss' drawings, which, after all, would have been more in the Seussean tradition.

Minear, a highly respected expert on the Japanese during World War II, did tentatively
venture into history to explain some of Seuss' images. He demonstrates, for example, that
the cartoonist frequently seemed to be one step ahead of history. One cartoon pictured Jews
hanging in trees long before widespread recognition of the Nazi death camps. Yet, Minear
goes too far in some speculations. He notes that Seuss was of German descent, and
theorizes that this was a possible reason for the artist's less then viscous portrayal of Adolf
Hitler. This theory does not ring true, however, upon even a superficial examination of the
vast amount of anti-German Seuss material.

A topic that Minear touched on, but would benefit from much more careful analysis, is
Dr. Seuss' portrayal of various groups during the war. Geisel, an outspoken advocate for
civil rights on behalf of African Americans and Jews, is "oblivious of his own racist treatment
of Japanese and Japanese Americans." Minear maintains that it is disturbing to realize that

the Dr. Seuss who drew these cartoons is "the same Dr. Seuss we celebrate today for his imagination and tolerance and breadth of vision." Yet, he does not make any attempt at significant analysis for the reasons behind Dr. Seuss' actions. Of course, American attitudes toward Japanese Americans during the war were much harsher than toward German Americans. Is it so unbelievable that Dr. Seuss was the same way? Minear does not seem to know or care. A comparison with other political cartoonists of the day would have been a welcome discussion in regard to this subject.

Other more practical issues also made *Dr. Seuss Goes to War* a disappointment. The organization of the book is poor. The reader is forced to flip erratically between pages and text to view cartoons at the appropriate times, and, more significantly, at least four easily noticeable mistakes occur in the book. Some cartoons and dates are carelessly mislabeled so that the cartoon the reader is reading about does not match the one viewed.

Reading *Dr. Seuss Goes to War: The World War II Editorial Cartoons of Theodor Seuss Geisel* is, therefore, a frustrating experience. The reader is intrigued and entertained by the cartoons. There is a lot to learn from them, both about Dr. Seuss and about the war in general. Richard Minear's commentary, however, does not add significantly to the joy or to the learning experience. Perhaps he simply ventured too far from his area of expertise. "Dr. Seuss," Minear maintained, was "an innovator [who was] always pushing the envelope." Unfortunately, *Dr. Seuss Goes to War* does not match up to the good doctor's standards.

Julie Courtwright

Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government. By Karl-Friedrich Walling. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. Pp. xii, 356. $40.00.)

War and free government have rarely coexisted for long over the course of human history. The United States seems, to date, to be the exception to this trend. In his noteworthy new book, *Republican Empire: Alexander Hamilton on War and Free Government*, Karl-Friedrich Walling gives primary credit for this achievement to the Founding Fathers in general, and Alexander Hamilton in particular. Walling argues that the traditional "militarist" interpretation of Hamilton, which generally sees Hamilton as a threat to American liberty during the founding era, is simplistic and short-sighted.

Many of Hamilton's contemporaries, including Jefferson, Madison, and Adams, saw Hamilton as a potential tyrant, bent on dictatorship at home and conquest abroad, and these perceptions have infiltrated the views of many modern historians. Walling, in contrast, sees Hamilton as a soldier-statesman who deserved to be trusted with the defense of his adopted country. For Walling, the unparalleled ability of the United States to combine tremendous strength and freedom owes much to the strategic sobriety of Alexander Hamilton. Contrary to the utopian vision of Thomas Jefferson and many of his allies, Hamilton understood that war was a fact of international life, and that the survival of the infant republic depended on developing and maintaining the potential to make war.

But Hamilton was not a mere militaristic state-builder. He was an 18th century liberal and therefore always understood the necessity of remaining within the bounds established by the Constitution. His goal was to establish a republican regime both fit for war and safe for liberty.   To do so, Hamilton believed it was necessary to create a "republican empire," something that most of his contemporaries considered an oxymoron. The prevailing political tradition held that republics and empires were incompatible. Republics were free but short-lived because of instability arising from the presence of factions. Empires were secure, but security was achieved at the cost of freedom. It was Machiavelli who suggested that security required republics to transform themselves into empires, as Rome had done.   Hamilton agreed, but unlike the Florentine, he sought to achieve this transformation by consent rather than force or fraud. Such a republican empire, in the form of a powerful indissoluble Union, would keep war at a distance, thus avoiding the militarization that had led to the downfall of earlier free governments.

The most glaring problem with this book is that Walling's attempts to balance history and historiography fail. Walling devotes so much effort to addressing the arguments of earlier historians that he seems to lose focus at times on his subject.   If more of the historiographical debates in this work were confined to the endnotes, the reader would have a clearer view of Hamilton's political philosophy.   What remains is a highly complex intellectual history whose immediate impact will be limited to specialists. Nonetheless, one would hope that this book is fully appreciated by Hamilton's biographers, as it deserves to lead to a more objective and more discerning view of Hamilton's place among the Revolutionary generation.

Eric Owens

A New History of India. 6th edition. By Stanley Wolpert. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. ix, 450. $49.95.)

On May 11, 1998, the newly constituted government of India, headed by the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), detonated a nuclear device at Pokhran. The same site had been used twenty-four years earlier when Indira Gandhi had done the same thing This time, the world was aghast for a multitude of reasons.   This device was detonated to further India's program of nuclear weaponization, whereas Indira's program was for peaceful purposes. Secondly, the decision was made by a Hindu-nationalist party, rather than the secular Congress party. Finally, this nuclear detonation essentially forced the government of Pakistan to respond two weeks later with its own detonation and weaponization. Overnight, "South Asia has thus achieved the dreaded distinction of becoming the world's most perilous region of potential nuclear conflict in the twenty-first century." (454) A region that still has not resolved long-festering Indo-Pak tensions over Kashmir, that are only exacerbated by religious differences.

Stanley Wolpert's sixth edition of his *New History of India* updates his work to cover the Pokhran II tests and the BJP's rise to power. Wolpert is one of the foremost historians on India, having written numerous books and articles on the country and currently teaching at the University of California in Los Angeles. He is able to navigate more than four thousand years of history in a relatively short and readable volume. The book follows a simple chronological organization, with topical subdivisions. All the while he develops his thematic focus on the complex interplay in India between continuity and change on one hand, and unification and fragmentation on the other. Only rarely does the book's organization hamper its readability. Towards the end of the text, the fact that this work has been through six editions is evident in a slightly disjointed feel to the last two chapters, which have had to be thoroughly revised to cover recent events.

This book is designed as an introduction. It is not for the specialist; it does not delve extensively into any issue, topic, or time period, but rather serves as an overview of Indian history. Wolpert also does not provide extensive citation, which can prove frustrating for certain quotations and conclusions. Further, Wolpert's focus is clearly on modern India. He covers the first 3,900 years of Indian history in half of the book, while he saves the last half for post-1905 India. While the early history is adequate, it is the greatest weakness of the book. Most of the research for this portion was done during the writing of the first edition, and the sources have not been updated to include the most recent historiographic debates.

Wolpert manages to control his biases relatively well, especially for a historian dealing with contemporary issues. Only his coverage of the premiership of Inder K. Gujral is questionable. Wolpert developed a friendship with the former prime minister, and at one point in the work describes him as "India's greatest statesman and one of its few incorruptible political leaders... a true Indian patriot." (448) While this conclusion is defensible, it may appear to some as evidence of bias .

Although the work generally objective in its survey of Indian history, that does not mean that Wolpert is not passionate about it. It is evident that he is deeply concerned about trends in India, particularly the poor administration by various governments, the de-secularization and potential for fragmentation of the country, and the ominous geopolitical trends on the subcontinent. The last few chapters are intertwined with reflections that Wolpert has on the country he has studied for the last fifty-years. These reflections shine through with sagacity, tempered by distress, and they stand as inspired testimony to Wolpert's half-century of work on this country. Despite the above criticisms, the work is frequently brilliant and almost undoubtedly the best introduction available on modern India.

Chris Clary