


FAIRMOUNT FOLIO

VOLUME 7 2005



PHI ALPHA THETA
GAMMA RHO CHAPTER
WICHITA STATE UNIVERSITY

FAIRMOUNT FOLIO
Journal of History

Volume 7 2005

Published by Wichita State University
Gamma Rho Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta

Editorial Board

Dr. George Dehner
Visiting Assistant Professor of History

Dr. James Duram
Professor of History

Dr. Helen Hundley
Assistant Professor of History

Dr. Ariel Loftus
Associate Professor of History

Editorial Staff

Editor
Nathan Heiman

Review Editor
Dr. Helen Hundley

Supervising Faculty
Dr. Helen Hundley

Layout and Design
Nathan Heiman

Copyright 2005 by Gamma Rho Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta
All Rights Reserved.
Cover etching of Fiske Hall property of WSU.
Printed by ADR.

Table of Contents

<u>John Lowell Rydjord Award</u>	
Volcanoes and Heresies: Historiographical Perspectives on the Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy	
Erin Doom	1
The Suspension of <i>Habeas Corpus</i> During the Civil War: Anomaly or Dangerous Precedent?	
Nathan Heiman	9
The Democratization of Higher Education: An Historical Overview and Prospects for the Future	
Kelli L. Frazier	17
A Hopeless Cause? American Involvement in the Somali Civil War	
Autumn Lawson	27
<u>Douglas Bendell Award</u>	
Drake's Role in the Spanish Invasion of England	
Sara DeCaro	39
<u>Fiske Hall Graduate Paper Award</u>	
Bloodied Kansas: Nazi Retribution in a Kansas POW Camp	
Mark P. Schock	45
<u>Fisk Hall Graduate Seminar Award</u>	
Moses Mendelssohn's Approach to Jewish Integration in Light of His Reconciliation of Traditional Judaism and Enlightenment Rationalism	
Robert J. Clark	57

Editor's Note

Being an editor has been something I have never done before, and I worried about how good of a job I could do when I agreed to do this. The *Folio* is a small journal, relatively unheard of by anyone outside the History Department, but past volumes have been remarkably well-done. Maintaining the quality of the *Folio* that my predecessors had already established was a daunting task, and I will let you the reader judge on how the final copy turned out.

Editing a journal is a learning experience, and I would have been lost had I not been under the tutelage of Dr. Hundley. This issue is the seventh time she has worked with other student editors, and I have had the good fortunes of building off of their efforts. With the advance in technology, the *Folio* has gone from being published in a way that, as Dr. Hundley mentioned, "Gutenberg would be familiar with," to submitting the essays via the Internet to the publishing company. Dr. Hundley held my hand each step, and because of her, I did not stumble.

Before the publishing process could begin, however, it never would have been started without the submissions from the authors. For that, everyone involved in this journal is thankful. The articles were critiqued closely by an editorial board composed of Dr. George Dehner, Dr. James Duram, Dr. Helen Hundley, and Dr. Ariel Loftus. Not only did these four decide which papers would be accepted, they also took time out of their schedules to work with the authors and provide insightful suggestions for improving papers, and I believe that the articles in this volume reflect not only on the authors, but also the editorial board. Those four professors should be lauded in helping make the *Fairmount Folio* a success.

This journal is also proud to publish the papers that were granted awards by the Department of History this year. These papers appear unedited except in format. This year, the Douglas Bendell Award, given for the best paper in the History 300 undergraduate research and writing course during the last school year, was awarded to Sara DeCaro for her study on Sir Francis Drake's role in the Spanish invasion of England. One of our edited papers also is an award winner. Erin Doom's work on the historiography of the iconoclastic controversy won the John Lowell Rydjord Award for the best undergraduate paper. The Department of History also honors its graduates. Mark P. Schock won the Fiske Hall Graduate Award, given for a paper completed during a lecture course, for his research on Nazis in a Kansas POW camp. Finally, the Fiske Hall Graduate Seminar Award was presented to Robert J. Clark for his research into Moses Mendelssohn's approach to Jewish integration. This award is earned for a semester-length research paper as a requirement for a seminar course.

In closing, the Department of History, as well as the Fairmount College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, deserves special praise in support of the *Fairmount Folio*. The faculty and staff went out of their way to assist in this publication, and the college generously funds the project each year.

Thank you to all involved for making Volume Seven of the *Fairmount Folio* a reality.

Nathan Heiman
May 2005

John Lowell Rydjord Award*

**Volcanoes and Heresies: Historiographical Perspectives
on the Byzantine Iconoclastic Controversy**

Erin Doom

INTRODUCTION

“Ever since the dawn of history, when man first became a religious animal and almost simultaneously—give or take a millennium or two—made his first clumsy attempts at adorning the walls of his cave, he has had to face one fundamental question: is art the ally of religion, or its most insidious enemy?”¹ This question, precisely posed by historian John Julius Norwich in his trilogy on the Byzantine Empire, came to the fore in the seventh and eighth centuries during the Byzantine iconoclastic² controversy: Are icons the friend or foe of Christianity?

While this controversy may *prima facie* appear to have been simply a debate over the Christian use of art, the debate is in fact much more multi-faceted. In the same way that innumerable explanations have been offered by historians to explain the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, there have also been a wide range of theories promulgated to explain the rise of imperial iconoclastic policy. The controversy has been debated so much that, according to Byzantine historian J.M. Hussey, “assessments vary from considering it as the most significant event in Byzantine history to regarding it as of almost only peripheral importance.”³ Likewise, art historian Charles Barber notes that the controversy has been

cast as a proto-reformation movement, a personal and idiosyncratic imperial policy, an aspect of a massive institutional reform in Byzantium, an atavistic reaction to the growth in the cult of icons, a foreign aberration in the history of orthodoxy, a debate over the place of the holy in society, a reaction to the collapse of the Late Antique order that shaped early Byzantium, an epistemic crisis, and a continuation of the Christological debates in Byzantine theology.⁴

* This paper, despite being an award paper, was still subjected to the editing process because it was submitted prior to being bestowed with the honor. John Rydjord earned his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees from the Municipal University of Wichita, and spent most of his life in Wichita. Upon his death, his father, John Rydjord, Sr., donated funds for a memorial in his son’s name. Established in 1990, the John Lowell Rydjord Award is given to the best undergraduate paper.

¹ John Julius Norwich, *Byzantium: The Early Centuries* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2001), 354.

² The word iconoclasm comes from the Greek words *eikon*, which means icon or image, and *klastes*, which means breaker. Thus an iconoclast is literally one who breaks icons or images.

³ J.M. Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire* (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1990), 34.

⁴ Charles Barber, *Figure and Likeness: On the Limits of Representation in Byzantine Iconoclasm* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 10.

Over thirty years ago Peter Brown, the renowned historian of Late Antiquity, justifiably concluded that “the Iconoclast controversy is in the grip of a crisis of over-explanation.”⁵

The complexity of determining an ultimate cause to the iconoclastic controversy is compounded even further by the lop-sidedness of available primary sources. The final triumph of the iconophiles (or iconodules⁶) resulted in the destruction of iconoclastic writings, including materials such as imperial decrees, council acts, theological treatises, etc. The only glimpse we have into the iconoclastic perspective comes secondhand from the iconophiles’ polemical writings quoting their iconoclastic opponents for the sole purpose of refuting them.⁷ Thus, Byzantine historian A.A. Vasiliev notes that because the “surviving sources on iconoclasm . . . are biased by hostility to the movement . . . scholars have differed greatly in their estimate of the iconoclastic period.”⁸ It is precisely these diverse “estimates,” this “over-explanation” of the iconoclastic controversy to which I would like to draw attention. What exactly are some of the theories historians have offered to explain the rise of Byzantine iconoclasm?

GEOLOGY

First, dating back to the ninth century in his *Chronicle of Byzantine and Near Eastern History AD 284 - 813*, Theophanes the Confessor (a contemporary of the first period of the iconoclastic controversy) offers a geological explanation as the impetus for the imperial iconoclastic policy instituted by Emperor Leo III. According to Theophanes, in the summer of AD 726,

a vapour as from a fiery furnace boiled up for a few days from the depth of the sea between the islands of Thera and Therasia. As it gradually became thicker and filled with stones because of the heat of the burning fire, all the smoke took on a fiery appearance. Then, on account of the density of the earthy substance, pumice stones as big as hills were thrown up against all of Asia Minor, Lesbos, Abydos,

⁵ Peter Brown, “A Dark-Age Crisis: Aspects of the Iconoclastic Controversy,” *The English Historical Review* 88, No. 346 (1973), eds. J.M. Wallace-Hadrill and J.M. Roberts, 3

⁶ Iconodule comes from the Greek words *eikon* (icon) and *doulos* (servant/slave), meaning “a servant of icons.”

⁷ A.A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire 324 – 1453*, Vol. 1, 2d Eng. ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), 251: “[T]he decree of the iconoclastic council of 753-754 has been preserved in the acts of the Seventh Ecumenical Council, though perhaps not in its complete original form. The decree of the council of 815 has been discovered in one of the treatises of Patriarch Nicephorus, while numerous fragments of iconoclastic literature are found in the polemic and theological treatises of the antagonists of the movement.” Note also Hussey, 36: “the legendary embroidery in iconodule literature was already obscuring the motives and influences behind the controversy . . . Added to this, the comparative paucity of sources and the survival of iconoclast material only in an iconophile setting must inevitably increase the difficulties of fair appraisal.” See also Stephen Gero, *Byzantine Iconoclasm During the Reign of Leo III with Particular Attention to the Oriental Sources* 346, Subsidia Tomus 41 (Louvain: Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, 1973), iv: Gero attempts to balance the picture by focusing upon more obscure Armenian, Georgian, Syriac, and Arabic (Christian and Muslim) sources.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 251.

and coastal Macedonia, so that the entire surface of that sea was filled with floating pumice.⁹

Frustrated and perplexed by the persistent problems of the Empire (e.g. military losses to the Arabs, famines, disease, earthquakes and volcanoes) prior to this eruption, Leo III had already been trying to find a cause for God's wrath. After several failed attempts to appease God (e.g. forced baptism of Byzantine Jews and Montanists in AD 722 and the promulgation of the Greek law code *Ecloga* which enforced Biblical morality) and yet another catastrophe, according to the chronicler Theophanes, Leo concluded that "God was angry because the Byzantines prayed before icons of Christ and the saints, which seemed to violate the Mosaic commandment against worshipping images."¹⁰ Hence, this volcano was a sign from God to the Emperor Leo and assuming "that God's wrath was in his favour instead of being directed against him, he stirred up a more ruthless war on the holy and venerable icons."¹¹ Thus, in the eyes of Theophanes (obviously an iconophile himself), the Byzantine Emperor believed that God was displaying his wrath against the widespread "idolatry" of icon "worship" throughout the Empire, and the responsibility had fallen upon him to remedy this problem. However, despite the fact Theophanes attributes the ultimate cause of the outbreak of iconoclasm to a volcanic eruption, this geological explosion would be a moot point if the Emperor was not indeed religiously minded. Hence, Theophanes' volcanic explanation leads to a second frequently cited explanation for the iconoclastic controversy.

RELIGIOUS REFORM

Sincere religious conviction on the part of the iconoclastic emperors, particularly Leo III, has also been suggested by historians (and implied by Theophanes) as an explanation for the initiation of iconoclastic policies. Paul Lemerle, in *A History of Byzantium*, claims that iconoclasm had religious roots for its rise (alongside political roots, which will be discussed later).¹² Iconoclastic Byzantine Emperors, according to this view, were merely following their religious convictions. They believed God had called them to reform the Church and purify the faith from "what appeared to them as a superstition close to paganism."¹³

Lemerle notes that the worship of images had not been a part of early Christian worship and yet images eventually came to be accepted by the Church for their didactic and edificatory functions.¹⁴ However, the problem, according to Lemerle, was the

⁹ Theophanes the Confessor, *The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor: Byzantine and Near Eastern History AD 284 – 813*, trans. with intro. and commentary by Cyril Mango and Roger Scott (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1997), 559.

¹⁰ Warren Treadgold, *A Concise History of Byzantium* (Houndsmills and New York: Palgrave, 2001), 105.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 559.

¹² Paul Lemerle, *A History of Byzantium*, trans. Antony Matthew (New York: Walker and Company, 1964), 83.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ See also discussion of the heritage of iconoclastic thought dating back to early Christianity connected to Origenism in John Meyendorff, "The Heritage of Hellenic Spiritualism" in *Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends & Doctrinal Themes*, 2d ed. with revisions (New York: Fordham University Press, 1987), 43, and Romilly Jenkins, *Byzantium: The Imperial Centuries AD 610 – 1071*, Medieval Academy Reprints for Teaching 18 (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 76 ff.

extreme evolution of the use of these images: “images were no longer seen as symbols, but rather the sanctity and miraculous power of the persons depicted were also attributed to their representations, and these were offered personal worship.”¹⁵ Hence, the problem the iconoclasts’ fought against, concludes Lemerle, was not so much icons *per se*, but rather “the abuses that this idolatry entailed, and against other similar excesses.”¹⁶ Vasiliev also cites the Frenchman Lombard as an ally of this view. According to Lombard, iconoclasm was a religious reform movement “aimed to arrest ‘the progress of the revival of paganism’ in the form of excessive image-worship, and ‘restore Christianity to its original purity.’”¹⁷

Christoph Schonborn, likewise, attributes the iconoclastic controversy to authentic religious reform on the part of the Emperors. Schonborn, claiming to take the motives articulated by the iconoclasts seriously, and thus determined to allow them to speak for themselves, concludes, “If we read the documents of the period, one fact stands out: Emperor Leo III, the undoubted initiator of the iconoclast movement, declared that he wished to carry out a *religious* reform. Leo wanted to purify the Church, to rid it of idols, that is, of religious images and their veneration.”¹⁸ Schonborn goes on to demonstrate his view by pointing out the symbolic act that Leo III chose to initiate his iconoclastic policy.

In 726, Leo III ordered the removal and destruction of the icon of Christ over the Chalke gate of the imperial palace (a symbol of the protection of Christ over the emperor and thus the empire) and the installation of a cross in its place (a symbol of Christ and triumph).¹⁹ According to Schonborn, “This double gesture shows us Leo III’s intentions:

¹⁵ Lemerle, 83.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Vasiliev, 253.

¹⁸ Christoph Schonborn, “Theological Presuppositions of the Image Controversy” in *Icons: Windows on Eternity—Theology and Spirituality in Colour*, Comp. by Gennadios Limouris (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1990), 87. Schonborn goes on to articulate his changing views on historiography and particularly the way he receives and interprets primary sources: “Now it is an odd characteristic of historiography that it almost always looks for *unavowed* motives supposed to be hidden behind those that are expressed. It will be said, for example, that in reality the Emperor had political, economic, military or some other kind of motives and that the religious motive was merely a pious pretext. I do not agree with that method, common as it is nowadays, because of the claim it makes to understand history better than its protagonists. It claims a superior viewpoint from which it can judge the course of history by revealing the ‘true’ motives which are supposed to have remained as it were ‘repressed’ in the unavowable unconscious of the people of that period. Instead of that almost ‘psychoanalytical’ attitude of the historian, I am increasingly conscious of the need for a different approach to history, less suspicious, less critical even. To put it very simply, what our sources say must be taken seriously; witnesses must be believed. First and foremost we must start from the hypothesis that they are telling the truth or at least that they regard what they are saying to be the truth.” Romilly Jenkins expresses similar sentiments in *Byzantium: The Imperial Centuries AD 610 – 1071*, Medieval Academy Reprints for Teaching 18, (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 76: “Perhaps on the whole it is best to go back to things as they were and as our sources depict them; and to trace what the men of those times thought significant, rather than what we, in our enlightened days, imagine they must have meant by their expressions of belief.”

¹⁹ For an eyewitness description of the Chalke gate, the main gateway to the imperial palace which had been destroyed by a mob during the Nika riots and rebuilt by Justinian, see Procopius, *Buildings*, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, 5th rev. reprint, Loeb Classical Library ed. (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2002), I.x, pp. 85, 87. Additionally, Andrew Louth notes in his seminal work *St. John Damascene that Marie-France Auzepy in “La Destruction de l’icone du Christ de la Chalce par Leon III: propogande ou realite?”*, *Byzantium*, 60, 445-92, has called into question the assumption that an icon of Christ was over the Chalke in 726.

to free the empire from the sin of idolatry and to place it once more under the victorious symbol of Christ, the sign under which the great Constantine had triumphed: *in hoc signo vinces!*"²⁰

RELIGIOUS CULTURAL CONFLICT

Greek Christians vs. Oriental Syrians and Armenians

Theologian and historian John Meyendorff suggests that a conflict between two distinct religious cultures also contributed to the rise of the iconoclastic controversy. According to Meyendorff, "From their pagan past, Greek-speaking Christians had inherited a taste for religious imagery," while, on the other hand, "Eastern Christians, particularly the Syrians and the Armenians, were much less inclined by their cultural past to the use of images."²¹ Meyendorff concludes this idea by noting the significance of the Armenian or Isaurian origins of the iconoclastic emperors, thereby linking the iconoclastic policies of these emperors to their Eastern background. Vasiliev concurs with Meyendorff, noting that all of the iconoclastic emperors were of eastern descent (Leo III was Isaurian / Syrian, Leo V was Armenian, and Michael II and his son Theophilus were born in Phrygia of Asia Minor), and concludes that the birth place of the iconoclastic rulers "cannot be viewed as accidental."²²

But if these emperors' oriental background helped shape their iconoclastic policies, what were the specific factors influencing them? George Ostrogorsky, in his masterful *History of the Byzantine State*, points the way suggesting that the iconoclastic controversy resulted from a lively interaction between old surviving Christological heresies and non-Christian religions like Judaism and Islam.²³

Judaism and Islam

During the seventh-century military onslaughts by the Arabs, the Near East was in the process of being transformed into an Islamic world. After Palestine, Syria and Egypt were finally conquered, the Byzantine Empire and the Islamic world found themselves in continual military and ideological battle.²⁴ With strong ties between Judaism, Christianity and Islam, including many common scriptures (e.g. God is one and thus accusations of polytheism leveled against Christianity by Jews and Muslims), and particularly God's command to make no idols or graven images (Ex. 20:4 - 6), the Islamic world came into sharp conflict with the Byzantine world where imagery and icons had taken on an important role in Christian worship and piety. Thus, these eighth-century eastern-born emperors were merely responding to the charge of idolatry, seeking

²⁰ Ibid., 88.

²¹ Meyendorff, 42.

²² Vasiliev, 254.

²³ George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. Joan Hussey, rev. ed. (New Brunswick and New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969), 161.

²⁴ Meyendorff, 42.

in Meyendorff's words, "to purify Christianity to enable it better to withstand the challenge of Islam."²⁵

Monophysites, Monothelites & Manichaeans

The origins of iconoclasm have also been linked to the Monophysite (Christ has one nature, overemphasizing the divine nature), Monothelite (Christ has one will, overemphasizing the divine will), and Manichaean (purely spiritual and thus disdainful of material world; sometimes known by other names in the Middle Ages such as Paulicians, Bogomils, et al.) heresies. Paul J. Alexander points out in his work on Patriarch Nicephorus that "christological systems emphasizing the divine nature of Christ at the expense of His human nature were apt to lead to the rejection of religious images."²⁶ Thus, the Monophysites, Monothelites and Manichaeans of the orient (e.g. Syrian and Palestine) tended to reject the icon, due to its material nature and emphasis upon the humanity of Christ (both nature and will).

By the eighth century the non-Greek speaking East was mostly Monophysite.²⁷ Thus the iconoclastic emperors of Syrian/Armenian descent would have grown up in a Monophysite atmosphere and would have been familiar, if not sympathetic, to its points. Ostrogorsky points back to the Byzantine reign of Philippicus-Barbanes with his Monophysite and Monothelite tendencies as a foreshadowing of the iconoclastic controversy, for it was Philippicus who revived the Christological disputes once again after the Council of Chalcedon (AD 451).²⁸

POLITICAL

The dynamic growth of monks and monasteries in the Byzantine Empire naturally led to growing wealth and power, so much so that the monks essentially became a state within a state.²⁹ Conscious and nervous of their growing power, the iconoclastic emperors attempted to force them to "disperse and secularize their property," ultimately leading to a conflict between the monks and the emperors, a classic example of the tension between Church and State.³⁰ But some monks, determined to assert their authority as much as possible and despite phases of iconoclastic persecution, refused to grant the emperor the right to make doctrinal decisions.³¹ Nevertheless, ultimately

²⁵ Ibid., 43.

²⁶ Paul J. Alexander, *The Patriarch Nicephorus of Constantinople: Ecclesiastical Policy and Image Worship in the Byzantine Empire*, special ed. for Sandpiper Books Ltd. (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 2001), 44.

²⁷ Ibid., 42.

²⁸ Ostrogorsky, 152 – 153.

²⁹ Lemerle, 84.

³⁰ Ibid., 84.

³¹ John of Damascus, *Three Treatises on the Divine Images*, trans. Andrew Louth (Crestwood: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003), II.12, 68: "It is not for emperors to legislate for the Church. For look what the divine apostle says: 'And God has appointed in the Church first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly pastors and teachers, for the equipment of the saints,' – he did not say emperors – and again 'Obey your leaders and submit to them; for they are keeping watch over your souls, as men who will have to give account.'"

nothing much changed, for the monks eventually received their privileges back and the emperors retained their powers.

PETER BROWN: RESPONSE & TRANSFORMATION

Peter Brown, the renowned historian of late antiquity, systematically and single-handedly demolishes all of the standard explanations for the rise of iconoclasm in his article “*A Dark Age Crisis: Aspects of the Iconoclastic Controversy*.” He notes that “[c]areful study of Byzantine-Arab relations in the eighth century; a re-examination of the Muslim attitude to images in the same century; re-assessment of the position of the Jews in the Byzantine empire—these converging studies have led to the greatest caution in invoking the influence of any non-Christian culture in the genesis of the Iconoclast movement.”³² According to Brown, the iconoclastic controversy was instead a dilemma over the position of the holy in the Byzantine world.³³ Factoring into this debate, however, were many underlying issues,³⁴ including: demoralization of the Byzantine world following seventh century Arab raids;³⁵ Byzantine determination to remove and punish “the root sin of the human race, the deep stain of the error of idolatry;”³⁶ the ability of the iconoclasts to “verbalize their anxiety” by “stat[ing] their case with such irrefutable clarity;”³⁷ “[s]avage disillusionment and contempt for failed gods;”³⁸ the ending of the ancient world in Asia Minor and with it the weakening of the icon due to seventh century Arab invasions;³⁹ and finally the replacement of these weakened icons by the sign of the cross “with its unbroken association with victory over four centuries . . . a more ancient and compact symbol than any Christ-icon could be.”⁴⁰ Concurring with many of Brown’s points, Andrew Louth, noted Byzantine/Patristic scholar, concludes that iconoclasm

can be seen as the last of the religious reactions to the loss of the eastern provinces in the early seventh century . . . iconoclasm is one of a number of measures by which the Byzantines responded to the spectre of defeat, measures that swept away much of the administration and military system they had inherited from the Roman Empire, to replace it with a centralized bureaucracy, permanently located in the capital city, Constantinople, combined with the organization of the rest of the Empire into areas known as ‘themes’, governed by a military commander.⁴¹

³² Peter Brown, “A Dark-Age Crisis: Aspects of the Iconoclastic Controversy,” in *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 87, eds. J.M. Wallace-Hadrill and J.M. Roberts, 1-2.

³³ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 34.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 23.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 24 - 25.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 25.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 25 - 26.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁴¹ Andrew Louth, *St. John Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology*, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 193 - 194.

Thus, according to both Brown and Louth, the iconoclastic controversy was a response to a number of factors, both internal and external, that led to a complete transformation of Byzantine society.

CONCLUSION

Just as one should not single out a single cause for the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, neither should one oversimplify the iconoclastic controversy by singling out one ultimate cause. The number of theories and explanations prompted by the iconoclastic controversy, according to art historian Hans Belting, does not “allow for any monocausal explanation.”⁴² Instead, one must take into consideration a multitude of factors, all simultaneously contributing to this historical phenomenon.⁴³ Hans Belting, in his magisterial history of the image, sums up the numerous iconoclastic explanations when he suggests that the controversial issue of images was often times merely a

surface issue for deeper conflicts existing between church and state, center and provinces, central and marginal groups in Eastern society. The court and the army struggled against the monks along a constantly shifting front. Heretical movements joined the fray . . . Economic factors also influence both the outbreak and the course of the conflict. Finally, the military, which always supports the winning party, was involved in the events from the start.⁴⁴

While factors as diverse as volcanoes and heresies have been articulated by scholars as explanations for the Byzantine iconoclastic controversy, a synthetic panoramic picture provides a better clue to the origins of this debate over the question of whether or not icons are a friend or foe of Christianity.

⁴² Hans Belting, *Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image before the Era of Art*, trans. Edmund Jephcott, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 146.

⁴³ Christoph Shonborn concurs with this opinion in his article “Theological Presuppositions of the Image Controversy” in Gennadios Limouris, comp., *Icons: Windows on Eternity - Theology and Spirituality in Colour*, (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1990), p. 87: “There has been a lot of discussion about the motives of this violent movement which appeared quite suddenly in 726. We must be on our guard against any attempt to explain it by a single cause. History is always a complex fabric, the weave of which is not ‘explained’ when a single thread is picked out.”

⁴⁴ Belting, 146.

The Suspension of *Habeas Corpus* During the Civil War: Anomaly or Dangerous Precedent?

Nathan Heiman

With the American government currently fighting a “new kind of war,” debate concerning the curtailing of civil liberties while the war is being fought is not without historical precedent. Examples include the internment of Japanese-Americans during the Second World War and the arrests of anti-war radicals such as Socialist leader Eugene Debs during the First World War. In those examples, the Supreme Court acquiesced with the policies implemented by the other two branches of the government. During the Civil War, however, the high court ruled against the Lincoln Administration’s most egregious violation of civil liberties: the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*. Regardless of the Supreme Court’s opposition, and the opposition of a large number of private citizens, the writ’s suspension remained in effect throughout the war’s course. The suspension of the writ during the Civil War proves that during a time of war, the Judiciary’s powers are subjugated, particularly, to those of the Executive branch, but also to those of the Legislative body, as well. As scholar Joseph Gambone writes, “During wartime, military leaders have to make fast and drastic decisions; the American judicial system operates too slowly to be effective under such circumstances.”¹

It was a time of great trepidation in America when Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated as the sixteenth President of the United States in 1861. Fearing the Republican platform opposing slavery, several Southern slave states led by South Carolina had already seceded from the Union after Lincoln’s election the previous year. In his inaugural address, Lincoln pledged to abstain from attacking the newly formed Confederacy,² but most everyone feared a civil war, albeit a short one. Those fears were only partially realized: as predicted, war commenced only a month after Lincoln’s ascension into the White House, but, unbeknownst at the time, the war would be prolonged longer than anyone would have guessed.

After the war commenced with the firing on Fort Sumter in April 1861, Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand Union soldiers to report to Washington D.C. to protect the capital, as it was surrounded by the slave-holding states of Virginia (which had seceded) and Maryland (which was still part of the Union despite strong pro-secessionist sentiment). Trouble immediately ensued when secessionists rioted and pelted soldiers switching trains in Baltimore.³ As the riots increased in severity, the critical rail junction at Baltimore was rendered virtually unusable, cutting off Washington from troops traveling from the North. Lincoln, fearing what might happen if the capital city was left unprotected and besieged by Confederate troops, took decisive action on 27 April 1861. Lincoln wrote General Winfield Scott: “If at any point on or in the vicinity of military [rail] line...you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of Habeas

¹ Joseph G. Gambone, “*Ex Parte Milligan*: The Restoration of Judicial Prestige,” *Civil War History* 16, no. 3 (1970): 246.

² Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln: The War Years*, vol. 1 (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1939), 125.

³ William Rehnquist, *All the Laws but One* (New York: Knopf & Co., 1998), 18.

Corpus for the public safety, you . . . are authorized to suspend the writ” between Washington and Philadelphia.⁴

The writ of *habeas corpus* is the right in which a prisoner may petition a court to be released from prison on the grounds that said prisoner was being unlawfully held. One of the foundations of legal freedoms, the writ dates back to England’s Magna Carta in 1215, and is the only personal liberty law in the body of the Constitution, found in Article I, Section IX. However, the clause containing the writ of *habeas corpus* says it “shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.” Fortunately for Lincoln, the Framers had originally intended for the right to be unabridged in all circumstances, but Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania insisted on the provision.⁵ Suspension of the writ would permit summary arrests and allow a prisoner to be held indefinitely without an indictment or judicial hearing to show cause.⁶

With such dire ramifications resulting from the suspension, this drastic action became the source of heated debate. Did the President have the power to suspend such an important protection of liberty? Since the power to suspend the writ resided under the Congressional powers as designated by the Constitution, many asserted that Lincoln was usurping powers. Lincoln countered this charge by claiming that suspension was his responsibility since Congress had been adjourned since his inauguration in March until 4 July.⁷ This alleged usurpation was ironic in that as a member of the House of Representatives in 1848, Lincoln had assailed President James K. Polk for “usurping the powers constitutionally vested in the Congress” as Polk waged war against Mexico.⁸ Nevertheless, Lincoln was cognizant of the precedent he was setting and attempted to curb any abuses of arbitrary arrests by imploring that military officers “use the power sparingly.”⁹

The issue quickly came to a head on 25 May in the Circuit Court of Baltimore with Chief Justice Roger Taney presiding.¹⁰ The case of John Merryman, a prominent man in Maryland imprisoned for his Confederate sympathies, became one of the most important cases of the Civil War. Taney issued a writ of *habeas corpus*, but the commanding officer of Ft. McHenry, where Merryman was being held, refused to comply. After another attempt to retrieve Merryman, Taney ruled in *Ex Parte Merryman* that the captive should be freed, and he denounced both military arrests and the unconstitutional usurpation of power by Lincoln.¹¹ Taney called for President Lincoln “to perform his constitutional duty to enforce the laws” as stated by the Constitution and

⁴ Roy P. Basler, ed., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 4 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 347.

⁵ Webb Garrison, *The Lincoln No One Knows: The Mysterious Man Who Ran the Civil War* (New York: MJF Books, 1993), 102.

⁶ J.G. Randall, *Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln* (Urbana, IL: The University of Illinois Press, 1951), 153.

⁷ David M. Silver, *Lincoln’s Supreme Court* (Urbana, IL: The University of Illinois Press, 1956), 35.

⁸ Alexander J. Groth, *Lincoln: Authoritarian Savior* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996), 119.

⁹ Randall, 121.

¹⁰ It must be remembered that as the issue of *habeas corpus* came before Chief Justice Taney, he was already a villain in the eyes of Northerners for his decision in *Dred Scott v. Sandford* in which he ruled against allowing Scott his freedom from slavery. Because of his opinion for the majority, many in the North accused the Maryland jurist of harboring pro-South sympathies.

¹¹ Silver, 30.

interpreted by the Supreme Court.¹² Building on earlier precedents set by Justices Story and Marshall, Taney ended his opinion saying only Congress could decide whether or not the nation was in such a dire situation as to warrant suspension of the writ for public safety.¹³

Lincoln, who feared the courts because of this very outcome, remained obstinate and ignored Taney's opinion on the suspension of the writ. Attorney General Edward Bates rebutted *Ex Parte Merryman* for the President, taking an extreme and unfounded position, stating that since the three branches were equal, the Executive could not "rightly be subjected to the judiciary" because he was the one strong enough to suppress the rebellion, not the Judiciary.¹⁴ Lincoln remained mute on the controversy until 4 July before a special session of Congress. In front of the men whose power he had allegedly usurped, he justified his actions by saying, "The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted . . . are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"¹⁵ Lincoln then pointed out that "the Constitution itself is silent as to which, or who, is to exercise the power (of suspending the writ)."¹⁶ Since Congress had not been in session at the time of the Baltimore riots, the President did not believe he could wait for the legislators to convene before taking action.¹⁷

The refusal to adhere to *Ex Parte Merryman* vexed Taney. After resigning himself to the fact that the President would not uphold decisions of the Judiciary, he avoided treason cases while on circuit at all costs.¹⁸ So disillusioned was the Chief Justice that he would not allow the district judge on circuit to hear capital cases in Taney's absence, preventing others like Merryman from ever receiving a trial to gain release!¹⁹

Lincoln refused to apologize for his conduct, much less rescind his own orders. The Republican-controlled Congress passed a resolution approving Lincoln's actions during the body's adjournment, but not without strong reservations from Peace Democrats and moderate Republicans.²⁰ Lincoln parlayed the resolution into further extension of the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* beyond Maryland from Washington to Bangor, Maine.²¹ But again, this sparked outrage, as the war was nowhere close to New England, and people questioned how the public safety was threatened. Lincoln ignored the complaints despite increasing concerns that he was becoming a tyrant. As the fury grew more intense, the President relented in the middle of February 1862 and granted blanket amnesty to political prisoners who were no longer considered dangerous.²²

¹² Sandburg, 280.

¹³ Randall, 120.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 124.

¹⁵ Basler, 430.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Silver, 35.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 169.

¹⁹ Rehnquist, 39.

²⁰ Sandburg, 313.

²¹ Basler, 554.

²² Dean Sprague, *Freedom Under Lincoln* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965): 297.

After the proclamation of amnesty, the tempers of Union citizens cooled to an extent. 1862, however, was not a successful year in terms of the Union's progress in the war, and low grumbles in opposition to the war developed into loud complaints to end the fighting. Alarmed, President Lincoln broadened the suspension of the writ throughout the entire Union on 24 September 1862 to include those "discouraging enlistment, resisting the draft, or guilty of any disloyal practice," as well as the already-established criteria of rebels and insurgents.²³ Lincoln's proclamation said that "disloyal persons are not adequately restrained by the ordinary processes of law . . . the Writ of Habeas Corpus is suspended in respect to all persons arrested."²⁴ The timing of this must be considered highly suspect in light of the upcoming midterm elections. Since the war was not popular, Peace Democrats were quickly gaining support. Using the vague language of the proclamation to their advantage, the Republicans and Lincoln retained control of the Congress by jailing anti-war voters in border states, preventing the election of anti-war Democrats.²⁵ Such tactics were also employed in the 1864 election by the President. Saving the nation at the expense of civil liberties might be justified, but to win an election at the expense of civil liberties is simply tyrannical.

With Republicans still in control of the legislative branch, Congress put to rest the issue of the President's constitutional authority to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 was a compromise of sorts—Congress approved the President's power to suspend the writ, but at the same time emphasized that Congress held the power over the writ, and *Congress* temporarily ceded power over it.²⁶ The Act also attempted to appease those concerned about civil liberties, requiring lists of prisoners to be given to district and circuit courts for grand juries to decide if the prisoner in question should remain detained. If the lists were not supplied, then judges could issue writs of *habeas corpus*.²⁷ Despite this latter provision to protect civil liberties to an extent, little changed in practice. The War Department under Secretary Edwin Stanton retained all authority over the releasing of prisoners rather than the Judiciary.²⁸

Despite the passage of the Habeas Corpus Act, the threat of detainment did little to stem anti-war sentiment. The Emancipation Proclamation issued at the first of the year turned many Unionists against the war. Thousands of soldiers deserted in Illinois after refusing to fight for "Negro freedom," and it was feared the Democrat-controlled legislature might defy federal authority and reinstate the writ of *habeas corpus*.²⁹ The governor of Indiana feared the pro-Confederate legislature was going to "acknowledge the Southern Confederacy and to urge the Northwest to break all bonds of law with New England."³⁰ His fear did not materialize, but the legislature did withhold appropriations from the state budget to hinder Indiana's contribution to the war effort.³¹

²³ Randall, 152.

²⁴ Roy P. Basler, ed., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 5 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 437-438.

²⁵ Groth, 132.

²⁶ Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln: The War Years*, vol. 2 (New York: Harcourt & Brace, 1939): 155.

²⁷ Randall, 166.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 167.

²⁹ Sandburg, 157.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*

As 1863 progressed, the populace was disgruntled with the absence of the writ. Lincoln ignored the concerns of unhappy citizens, and on 15 September 1863 Lincoln formally suspended the writ under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863. This proclamation effectually subjected civilians to military rule. Lincoln had no faith in the civil system where “a jury too frequently have [sic] at least one member more ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor.”³² The vague wording of the September 1863 suspension left anyone who voiced opposition to the war vulnerable to military arrest. Nothing short of full support for the cause to save the country was expected. It was only a matter of time before a legal challenge would be made against Lincoln’s fiat. That legal challenge came from a former U.S. representative from Ohio.

General Ambrose Burnside, Ohio military commander, issued General Order No. 38, which stated, “The habit of declaring sympathies with the enemy will no longer be tolerated . . . Persons committing such offenses will be at once arrested.”³³ Clement Vallandigham, a prominent Democrat and former U.S. representative for the state, called for the people to vote Lincoln out of office in a speech in Mt. Vernon, Ohio, and was promptly arrested.³⁴ The arrest sparked protest throughout the country, and even pro-administration newspapers were restrained in their defense of the arrest. Vallandigham appealed for a writ of *habeas corpus* in the District Court of Southern Ohio, but Judge Humphrey Leavitt denied the writ, stating in *Ex Parte Vallandigham* that “where there is no express legislative declaration, the President is guided solely by his own judgment and discretion . . . when the necessity exists, there is a clear justification of the act.”³⁵ Brought before a military tribunal, Vallandigham offered no plea, denying the military’s authority since he was not in the military.³⁶

The longer Vallandigham was detained, the angrier Lincoln’s critics and the meeker his supporters became. Lincoln was being pressured by both Democrats and Republicans to rectify the situation. Lincoln took a peculiar course of action, releasing the prisoner but deporting him behind Confederate lines.³⁷ This was actually an ingenious move by the President. Had he kept Vallandigham under military detention, it is very possible that riots might have broken out in opposition to the holding of Vallandigham and to the suspension of the writ. On the other hand, had Lincoln allowed the writ of *habeas corpus* to be granted, it would have rendered all other martial arrests of civilians invalid, freeing those who were working to undermine the Union cause.

As the tide of the war turned after Gettysburg in 1863, the writ’s suspension remained in effect, but it was not always being adhered to by the lower courts. Judges were issuing writs of *habeas corpus* to those who deserted or dodged the draft, and Lincoln complained, saying the judges were “defeating the draft” by “discharging the drafted men rapidly under *habeas corpus*.”³⁸ Military officers, however, had the

³² Roy P. Basler, ed., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 6 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 264.

³³ Rehnquist, 64.

³⁴ Sandburg, 162.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Silver, 148.

³⁷ Sandburg, 163. Though he was deported, Vallandigham caused so much trouble in the Confederacy, that they secretly smuggled him back into the Union. Even the Southerners he sympathized with did not want him in their presence!

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 444.

authority through the blanket suspension of *habeas corpus* in 1863 to ignore any writs issued by judges, and the officer may call “to his aid any force that may be necessary to make such resistance effectual.”³⁹

The case that would eventually solve the issue of the constitutionality of suspending the writ of *habeas corpus* began in Indiana in 1864. Lambdin Milligan was arrested in October for espousing violence against vague targets and making a speech critical of Lincoln.⁴⁰ Weeks later, Milligan was tried, convicted and sentenced to death, to be carried out the following May. As specified by the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, a grand jury convened in 1865 and failed to indict Milligan on any charges.⁴¹ After an appeal, the opinion of the Supreme Court for *Ex Parte Milligan* was not issued until after the end of the war, making the decision written by Justice David Davis moot but for future applications. Nevertheless, Davis wrote that though the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* during times of crisis is “essential to the safety of every government,”⁴² the Bill of Rights are inviolable at all times and “martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present.”⁴³

The *Milligan* decision posthumously vindicated President Abraham Lincoln’s decision to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* while at the same time criticized the military tribunals used in place of open civilian courts. The number of those who were affected by the writ’s suspension is unknown, but some scholars estimate the number to be in the vicinity of seventy-five hundred individuals who were more often than not “avowed secessionists or...outspoken sympathizers of the Southern cause.”⁴⁴ Indeed, Lincoln himself believed, “I think the time not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many.”⁴⁵ Ultimately, though, *Milligan* saw the Supreme Court reassert itself in defending civil liberties guaranteed to the nation’s citizens by the Constitution.⁴⁶

If the threat to the Republic caused by the Civil War was not reason enough to suspend the writ, then there would never be a just cause to do so. The Framers of the Constitution had the foresight to realize that there could be unforeseen circumstances that would require suspension, and the federal government was certainly within its powers to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* during the rebellion. To what extent, however, would future governments perceive threats to the Republic?

The question of whether or not the President could suspend the power on his own is debatable. The Constitution is silent on which branch can take action. One could argue, as Chief Justice Taney ruled in *Ex Parte Merryman*, that the power resides with the legislative branch since that the clause is found in Article I of the Constitution. On the other hand, Congress was out of session, so one could also argue that Lincoln was within his powers as commander-in-chief to suspend the writ. This question became largely irrelevant after the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, but it continued to linger because

³⁹ Basler, 460.

⁴⁰ Rehnquist, 102.

⁴¹ *Ex Parte Milligan*, 4 Wallace 2, 108 (1866).

⁴² *Ibid.*, 125.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 127.

⁴⁴ Garrison, 105

⁴⁵ Basler, 6:265.

⁴⁶ Gambone, 255.

the Act implied that Congress retained the power over *habeas corpus* and was merely ceding control to the President for the duration of the war.

Perhaps more troubling in this episode of constitutional debate is the nominalization of the Judiciary and the precedent it set for future acts during wartime. While the power to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* is expressly granted, the other rights guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be so easily eviscerated. Whenever judges attempted to curb the authoritarianism that accompanied the writ's suspension, the officers in charge duly ignored such decisions as empowered by the President himself. This is certainly not the first time judicial sovereignty has been ignored. President Andrew Jackson mocked Chief Justice John Marshall after issuing the *Worcester v. Georgia* decision in the 1830s, and the decision was not enforced, much like *Ex Parte Merryman*. The difference between the two, however, is that Jackson ignored a court order in a time of peace. Another precedent, again involving Andrew Jackson when he was a general in the army, saw him suspend *habeas corpus* in New Orleans, but civilian power carried the day as Jackson was held in contempt and fined \$1,000.⁴⁷ No officer was held in contempt or fined during the Civil War.

Though extra powers were conferred on the President, there is no reason to believe that Lincoln would not have adhered to judicial decisions had the war been fought with a foreign enemy. The President had strong reservations in imposing the suspension of *habeas corpus*, saying, "Thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures."⁴⁸ Coupled with his plea for officers to invoke the suspension sparingly, it is apparent that Lincoln had great respect for civil liberties; the grave situation of the war left him with no choice but to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus* so that Southern sympathizers living in the North could be prevented from hindering Union efforts. His disregard for the *Ex Parte Merryman* decision was regrettable, because the checks each branch exercises are designed to prevent the rise of an authoritarian regime. Lincoln chose to interpret the Constitution in such a manner as to grant him the power to suspend the writ, but interpretation is the Judiciary's assigned task, not the Executive's. What is worrisome is that while President Lincoln had no intentions to abuse his powers for personal gain (election practices notwithstanding), that is not to say another person sitting in the Oval Office could not make himself into a tyrant on the premise that the nation's security requires it.

Though the Judiciary had made great strides in gaining equality with the other two branches in the previous seventy years, it suffered a great loss in prestige prior to the war due to the infamous *Dred Scott* decision in 1857.⁴⁹ It is likely, however, that the importance of Supreme Court would have been minimized during the war regardless of any controversial decision as a result of power being centralized. During the Civil War, historian Joseph Gambone writes, "The necessity of politics rather than laws reigned supreme."⁵⁰ This truth established a precedent for future abridgements of civil liberties, and as the United States currently fights another war at the beginning of the twenty-first

⁴⁷ Randall, 145.

⁴⁸ Basler, 6:260.

⁴⁹ Stanley I. Kutler, *Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 11. Kutler argues in his first chapter that while the *Dred Scott* case certainly harmed the Court's prestige, most directed their rage not at the institution itself, but rather the infamous decision. Despite some extremists in Congress, the Supreme Court persevered to remain a viable institution.

⁵⁰ Gambone, 249.

century, the power struggles between the Judiciary and a strong Chief Executive are no less intense than they were in 1861. Perhaps Lincoln's refusal to obey a judicial decision was a key factor in future judges falling in line with administration policies such as those espoused in the First and Second World Wars. Whether this is true or not, the importance of the Judiciary's opinion being heeded during war cannot be overstated—safeguarding civil liberties is an awesome responsibility, and only the courts can prevent the rise of tyranny.

The Democratization of Higher Education: An Historical Overview and Prospects for the Future

Kelli L. Frazier

The United States system of higher education, including colleges and universities, technical/vocational schools and community colleges, is comprised of over four thousand schools with enrollment of almost sixteen million students.¹ “Prestigious and knowledgeable observers have said that this system is ‘the most advanced in the world,’ ‘the envy of the world,’ and ‘the most effective system of higher education the world has ever known.’”² In addition to the primary mission of preparing students for success in their chosen endeavors, these institutions annually produce research and scientific discovery across a broad range of topics. However, there are a growing number of critics who feel that as the number of students increases, programs at all levels of higher education are reducing quality. This paper will examine the development of higher education including landmark legislation, the impact of that legislation in making a college education more accessible to the masses, and the changing attitudes and expectations of students over time. Finally, it examines the system’s prospects for the future which contemporary trends suggest—that a college education has become a commodity rather than an intellectual experience.

There is growing concern that under current operational standards, undergraduate students are being “ripped off.”³ As college tuition and financial aid burdens increase for individual students, these students are not being held to high enough standards necessary for success in their field. Institutions are collecting tuition and allowing students to enter college with minimal preparation but are not providing programs to narrow the obvious basic skills gap. A homogenization is occurring, based on factors bearing little relationship to learning ability and permitting students to achieve above average grades with only minimal effort. According to Zachary Karabell, in his 1998 book entitled *What’s College For?*, “as the United States enters the twenty-first century, a quiet revolution is occurring.” Almost two-thirds of high school graduates now go to college. Of the almost sixteen million students, thirteen million of them are undergraduates. Fifty-five percent of them are women, many of them attending part-time, many of them “mature” students in their thirties and forties.⁴ Karabell takes a strong stance, arguing that higher education is becoming mass education and in the process is being “radically democratized,” resulting in lessened expectations.

As access to education began to change, the numbers and types of students to enter college reflected that change—higher education became available to students of all economic backgrounds. The first important legislation to have an impact upon American colleges and universities occurred after World War II. An initiative by the Truman administration to provide educational opportunities (and just as importantly, prevent unemployment) for soldiers returning to the U.S. led to the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944, which is commonly known as the

¹ Infoplease, <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0908742.html>, March 6, 2005.

² Scarlett, Dr. Mel, as quoted in *The Great Rip-Off in American Education: Undergraduates, Underserved* (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2004), 22.

³ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁴ Zachary Karabell, *What’s College For? The Struggle To Define American Higher Education* (New York: Basic Books, 1998), x-xi.

G.I. Bill. It provided veterans with funding for college tuition, allowing them to seek job training and career paths through universities, creating the modern surge in enrollment that lasted well into the 1950s.⁵

Prior to the G.I. Bill, wider access to higher education and ability to attend college was mostly restricted to those who had the necessary financial resources. While this bill led to significant increases in enrollment, one of the most sweeping pieces of educational legislation in American history was not passed until 1965. The Higher Education Act dramatically changed the ability of the mass general public to consider opportunities in higher education. This was the first federal measure to provide a broad permanent program of financial aid to both public and private colleges as well as to individual college students. The major emphasis of the act was to create a coordinated program to aid the undergraduate student and to cope with the problems created for undergraduate colleges not only by rising enrollments, but also by the rising aspirations of young people from every social class.⁶ As part of the “Great Society” under President Johnson, this act embodied, for the first time, an explicit federal commitment to equalizing college opportunities for needy students. Programs were designed to identify the college-eligible poor and facilitate their access with grants, replacing the contribution their families could not afford to make.⁷

The commitment to needy students manifest in the Higher Education Act was accompanied by a surge of students entering college as the baby-boom population reached maturity, continuing through the 1970s and not leveling off until the 1980s.⁸ The growing number of high school graduates in the post-World War II era is attributable to two distinct influences: the restoration of the family wage, which permitted parents to encourage their children to finish school rather than seek full-time employment, and the shortage of well-paying industrial and service jobs in the late 1950s and 1960s.⁹ The influence of the baby-boom generation entering college cannot be overstated. In the fall of 1957, 2.3 million young people reached the age of eighteen. By 1964, it jumped to 2.8 million, and to 3.8 million by the fall of 1965. While students and their parents were trying to find ways to pay for their education, colleges and universities were scrambling to construct new facilities and recruit new faculty members to deal with this unprecedented growth.¹⁰ But more than just enrollment increases, society began to recognize the important contributions of higher education during World War II. Recognition led to reliance and beliefs that colleges and universities could be instrumental in resolving other national problems.¹¹

As idealistic as the early proponents of higher education were, it quickly became apparent to the general public and most importantly, to students, that a college degree was the gateway to a better life—the better the credential, the better the chances of a good job, career success, and a happy life. Students and parents alike became motivated by this facet of a college degree—more than any other in the 1970s—and this belief continues to the present time. This was reinforced in

⁵ Philip G. Altbach and Robert O. Berdahl, *Higher Education in American Society*, rev. ed. (New York: Prometheus Books, 1987), 109.

⁶ John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy, *Higher Education in Transition: A History of American Colleges and Universities, 1636-1976* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 235-236.

⁷ Altbach, 160.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 109.

⁹ Stanley Aronowitz, *The Knowledge Factory: Dismantling The Corporate University and Creating True Higher Learning* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 113.

¹⁰ Altbach, 111.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 110.

the 1980s by the Reagan administration and their report, *A Nation At Risk*. This report focused mainly on elementary and secondary education, calling for the development of new performance standards at improving the nation's competitive position. Shortly after this report was issued, a series of similar reports were produced focusing on higher education. These reports called for a renewed emphasis on quality, a sharpened focus on institutional missions, and greater attention to student learning.¹²

In his article, "Shock Wave II: An Introduction to the Twenty-First Century," Clark Kerr identifies a key period in the development of higher education. He labels the period from 1940 to 1970 as Shock Wave I, which forced higher education to respond to several powerful forces—the acceptance of responsibility for scientific research and development, universal access for all high school graduates, and the demands of politically restless students—all at once. He identifies it also as a period of unprecedented success: creation of the research university, expansion of the community college (thus increasing access), and a movement of modern American society to organize around technological, information, and service economies.¹³

Although Kerr defines this period as highly successful, it was also fraught with flaws. In 1967, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching formed the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education to look at those problems. The Commission conducted independent investigations into the major issues facing higher education during the rest of the century.¹⁴ The reports were widely read and discussed and had considerable influence on several aspects of higher education in the United States. One of the Commission's major goals was to suggest ways in which everyone who can benefit from attendance at a college or university—and who has the motivation to go—could be guaranteed a place. The Commission believed that by 1976, the economic, curricular, and information barriers to higher education could be eliminated, and that by the year 2000, all barriers should be removed so that ability, motivation, and individual choice would become the only factors that determine college attendance.¹⁵

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education Commission also advocated strong growth of two-year schools. During the 1960s, the junior-college movement created an atmosphere of "open admissions." These colleges were urged by the Commission to adopt an "open door" policy admitting all high school graduates and otherwise qualified individuals. It was believed that these "comprehensive" junior colleges were best matched to such lowered entrance barriers, providing both academic and vocational, transfer and terminal programs.¹⁶

But the Carnegie Commission went one step further, stating that admissions requirements were too detailed. In *Continuity and Discontinuity*, the Commission's report stated that the traditional "college-prep" program in high school had become outdated and that every student could find a place in college, regardless of his or her high school program. It acknowledged that good skills in reading, writing, and mathematics were essential for every high school graduate, but beyond those skills, colleges and universities should not require or suggest a particular course of study in high school unless it is *directly* related to that college's own program. Finally, it stated that students' scores on standardized tests weighed too heavily in college admissions decisions and that too much emphasis was given to these results. The Commission believed that

¹² *Ibid.*, 115.

¹³ Clark Kerr, "Shock Wave II: An Introduction to the Twenty-First Century," ed. Steven Brint, *The Future of the City of Intellect: The Changing American University* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 2.

¹⁴ Scott C. Wren, *The College Student and Higher Education Policy: What Stake? What Purpose?* (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1975), vii.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁶ Brubacher, 260.

relying heavily upon these test scores implied a precision in evaluating students that could not exist, noting,

“The more reliance placed upon a single test taken on a single day, without any other record that might possibly give a different picture of the student’s total performance over years of schooling, the more unfair the process is to the students, the greater the anxiety, and the less comprehensive the picture of the student’s ability.”¹⁷

The interest in evaluation and assessment did not wane in spite of this admonition. In fact, there began to be an increased concern about quality in both college and high school based on these kinds of assessments. In the early 1980s, many states raised admissions requirements for public colleges, hoping to force a higher quality of education in secondary schools. A question of individual talents and abilities was raised around this time in addition to the questions about institutional quality. The decline in the number of persons in that generation (now defined as Generation X) meant that the number of people with high innate talent would drop by the same twenty-three percent that the age cohort decreased. In addition, test scores of developed ability of students leaving high school and headed for college declined on the order of five to ten percent by 1980 since its high point in the early 1960s; they had only inched up slightly in the 1980s. About half of that decline could be attributed to the larger number of persons taking the tests, many of them from groups in society that had not in the past participated in higher education, but test scores dropped for all groups.¹⁸

Today, the SAT or ACT standardized test scores are still the most important factor for colleges and universities regarding admissions of potential students. High SAT scores are imperative for admission to an elite school. But poor performance on the SAT does not close the door to higher education, unlike such tests in other countries. It simply prevents a student from attending colleges like Harvard, Yale, or Berkeley. The federal government has traditionally sponsored the “standardization” of higher education, believing that economic competitiveness and college education are somehow connected. Yet leaders from every sector of American life are concerned about the “cognitive ability” of workers to learn, think, and then act. These skills do not just occur naturally because a person obtains a two-letter suffix following their name. John Smith, B.A., is not necessarily any more capable than John Smith. It is not the degree that provides some sort of magical advantage, but rather it is the skills that the person who receives the degree ought to have acquired.¹⁹

College entrance is the basic issue in an era of “mass” higher education. More than sixty percent of all high school graduates now enter colleges and universities, most of them in public schools. According to Stanley Aronowitz in *The Knowledge Factory*, approximately forty-six percent of those high school graduates have failed one or more sections of placement or admissions tests. He notes that some critics favor restricting all college admissions to those who, in addition to holding a high school diploma or a GED, are able to read and calculate at a tenth- or eleventh-grade level. Additionally, when measured by standardized tests, students should be able to write discursively and grammatically at some length and know how to produce a research paper. Needless to say, these standards would exclude many students past and present, in all

¹⁷ Wren, 5.

¹⁸ Altbach, 132-133.

¹⁹ Karabell, 215-216.

manner of postsecondary institutions. In fact, underlying the controversy is the sometimes tacit argument that college is not for everybody and should not be a “right.”²⁰ This point is reinforced by Zachary Karabell in his book, *What’s College For?*:

“Professors teaching their first class in English composition or introductory history at most colleges in the United States usually come away from the experience dismayed and astonished. ‘They can’t write!’ ‘They can’t read!’ ‘They can’t think!’ These problems might be expected of students whose first language isn’t English, whose cognitive abilities are fine but whose capacity to express these in a foreign tongue are hampered by limited vocabulary or poor syntax. What truly surprises most first-time professors is the number of English-speaking college students who don’t know how to think, read, or write.”²¹

However, not everyone blames the students for their apparent lack of knowledge and writing ability upon college entrance. Some link the educational deficits of many college students to the physical and intellectual conditions in high schools. In many cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Detroit, state-mandated requirements for academic diplomas in languages, sciences, and mathematics cannot be fulfilled because of teacher shortages, the absence of science laboratories, and an antiquated infrastructure. One of the consequences of this lack of preparation by America’s high schools is that many students must devote an increasing portion of their college careers to catching up to what they have failed to learn elsewhere. Even in the three hundred so-called elite universities and colleges, a sizeable minority of students experience difficulty mastering the curriculum because of reading or writing problems, regardless of their scores on standardized tests and high grade point averages.²²

These problems are exacerbated by what many perceive to be false advertising on the part of many colleges and universities. A report by the Boyer Commission in 1995 entitled *Reinventing Undergraduate Education: A Blueprint for America’s Research Universities* identified several criticisms of the college system. Recruitment materials for undergraduates feature glowing descriptions of world-famous scholars, exciting research in splendid facilities and the excellence of the education provided. When students get to campus, they find that they rarely see “world-famous” scholars, except possibly in a very large (several hundred to one thousand or more students) lecture class, and they have little or no contact with exciting research projects. Faculty are likely to give major emphasis and most of their time to research—to the detriment of their teaching of undergraduates. Much of this teaching, especially in the first two years, is done by graduate assistants who usually have little if any teaching experience, and whose primary concerns are their own graduate programs. Finally, how could undergraduates be expected to get an “excellent education” when the professors’ Ph.D. programs provide expertise in ever-narrowing subject areas and highly developed research skills, but rarely any preparation for teaching? The same report further stated that “many students graduate having accumulated whatever number of courses is required, but still lacking a coherent body of knowledge or any inkling as to how one sort of information might relate to another. All too often they graduate without knowing how to think logically, write coherently, or communicate clearly. The

²⁰ Aronowitz, 102-103.

²¹ Karabell, 216.

²² Aronowitz, 105-106.

university has given them too little that will be of real value beyond a credential that will (may) help them get their first jobs.”²³

What are the prospects for the future of higher education in America? A significant factor in considering this question is the economic growth and number of those involved in higher education. At this time, there are approximately sixteen million students enrolled, and today’s college students are different from the students who attended universities in years past. Secondly, enrollment patterns have changed. The majority of students are attending school part-time, and most undergraduates work concurrent to their college attendance. In addition, transfer and dropout rates have risen appreciably. In short, today’s students are more mobile, less tied to a single institution, and college is a less central part of their lives.²⁴

In the late 1960s and 1970s, there was a sense among undergraduates that their world was falling apart. The struggle for civil rights, the Vietnam War, scandals in government, and the threat of nuclear war fueled their dark outlook on the future. Today’s students are less pessimistic, but most are still apprehensive about their futures. The area in which anxiety remains very high is the job market: three out of four students are worried about their job prospects upon graduation. The work-world anxiety is also matched by an increasing concern with obtaining the material rewards of life. The overwhelming majority of college students say it is essential or very important not only to be well off financially, but to be *very* well off. All of this translates into a unique brand of politics for the current generation. It could be characterized as the politics of me—students want a chance to achieve their individual and personal dreams.²⁵ Karabell, in his 1998 book, *What’s College For?* supports these points, verifying that not much has changed since the late 1980s, indeed since much before that. He states,

“Of the hundreds of students I taught at Harvard and Dartmouth, I’m relatively sure that it never occurred to a single one of them not to go to college. Whether they are the product of prep schools or of public high schools, all were high achievers who were told by parents, teachers, college guidance counselors, or their friends that college lay on the other side of their high school diploma. For these select thousands, college is simply the next in a series of stages leading to membership in productive society. For many, undergraduate years are themselves preparatory to some form of graduate school whether in law, business, medicine or academia. For these students, college is just what one does, as automatic as sex, marriage, child rearing, and buying a home.

For millions of others, however, college is a choice. It is not a natural choice, not a choice parents made or friends are making, not a choice available in their country of origin, and it is not a choice without sacrifice – of time, of pride, and most of all, of money, which means that many of these students are working, some at full-time jobs. They take evening classes, one or two at a time, in order to earn their bachelor’s degrees in five or six years. They juggle family, job and school. They have mortgages to pay, and they have decided to spend some of their money to acquire skills, job skills. For these students, college is a commodity.”

²³ Scarlett, 23-25.

²⁴ Altbach, 267.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 268-269.

Karabell goes on to state that in the 1990s alone, the average debt burden for a college student grew from \$8,200 to \$18,800. Considering that most will only earn between \$20,000 and \$30,000 a year upon graduation, those debts are heavy.²⁶

As Karabell points out, the issue for most students is not getting into a college or university, it is staying in—meaning the ability to pay up to do so. And students who view their education as a commodity have an expectation that they are buying a product—their degree. In order to obtain that degree, they have to receive a passing grade, usually a C or above. The result, according to Karabell, is predictable. When students do not receive the grade they need to pass, they often hold the professor and then the administration responsible. Students have been known to march into a dean’s office and demand that a particular teacher be fired for giving grades that are “too low.” They also give poor teacher evaluations for “assigning too much reading.” Although there are no reliable studies on the reading workload of students, anecdotal evidence suggests that students are doing less reading than ever before.²⁷ The customer model has slapped higher education in the face.

In discussing prospects for the future of higher education, Clark Kerr’s essay “Shockwave II” is appropriate. Kerr states that over the next thirty years (2000-2030), an enormous set of powerful forces will lead to extensive changes in higher education. He includes the following among these forces:

- The new electronic technology and prospects for long distance learning;
- The DNA revolution and advancement of research in the biological sciences;
- New demographic realities and the rising numbers of historically disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups;
- Competition for public sector resources, namely funding;
- Competition for students from the For-Profit Sector, i.e. University of Phoenix;
- Responsibility for improving primary and secondary education;
- Globalization of the economy, and
- Contention over models of the university – postmodernist views versus those of the Enlightenment model.²⁸

Kerr goes on to state that “regardless of the institutional setting in which they are found, the part of higher education that will change most will likely be schools of education. They will be placed under enormous pressures from state governments to take more responsibility for the performance of primary and secondary education—to develop new models and new policies for the schools.²⁹ We are already seeing this across the United States with the latest governmental legislation from the Bush II administration called “No Child Left Behind.” Kerr summarizes by saying that it may become increasingly difficult to talk about the future of higher education. There will be many quite different segments, each with its own future. He believes institutions in the different segments will not know or care much about each other and that if segmentation

²⁶ Karabell, 5-6.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

²⁸ Kerr, 2-5.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 10.

continues along the lines he outlines, new classifications of higher education institutions will emerge:

- Research universities
- Professional school universities
- Liberal arts colleges (holistic education)
- Market I colleges (polytechnic)
- Market II colleges (special job advancement)
- Market III colleges (retirees)
- Community colleges³⁰

The challenges facing higher education currently and for the foreseeable future may seem overwhelming, but it has responded to events in the political and social world for hundreds of years, including wars, depressions, pestilence, and the plague. Internal dissensions and the crisis of confidence, as during the Vietnam War and the concurrent student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, are just the more dramatic examples of recent decades.

Today, the “value” of an education is calculated in a more straightforward way: in terms of lifetime dollars and cents potentially to be earned. Both working-class and middle-class parents are now regularly spending or borrowing \$50,000 to \$100,000 per child to give their children the benefits of a college education because they know that without the degrees, their child’s life opportunities will be severely restricted.³¹ More importantly, Karabell states that students also determine the value of their education—they are not passive recipients. They are more aggressive in attempting to shape what goes on in the classroom, what is taught, and how much they will spend. In their efforts—individually and collectively, intentionally and inadvertently—to mold the classroom and the university to meet their needs, they see the diploma as a credential that will lead to a better job.³² In a country attached to notions of advancement based on merit, people perceive education as the path to success. The impressions of a college degree may be self-fulfilling. If one cannot get a good job without college, then college must be what gets one a good job. If the most successful people have graduated from college, then college must be the avenue to success.³³

Beyond the attitudes and perhaps disillusioned beliefs of students, a larger problem is financing for higher education. Colleges and universities, especially in the public sector, have suffered unprecedented budget cuts in the current decade, even as they are being asked to accommodate larger numbers of students (“doing more with less” is the administrative rubric). At the same time, students and parents are being forced to take on a larger proportion of increased educational costs, even as wage levels have stagnated or, for some, declined.³⁴ So, if the country continues on the track it is on, it is going to end up with an educational system that looks a lot like the healthcare system: terrific services for the people who can afford them, and whatever everybody else can cobble together.³⁵

³⁰ Ibid., 10.

³¹ Karabell, vii. Note that these are 1998 dollars.

³² Ibid., 1-2.

³³ Ibid., 214.

³⁴ Michael Berube and Cary Nelson, *Higher Education Under Fire: Politics, Economics, and the Crisis of the Humanities* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 78.

³⁵ Ibid., 165.

Karabell and Scarlett, the most recent of the literature examined here, make two important points. Karabell states,

“The literature on the crisis of American schools is vast. While some suburban schools succeeded brilliantly, public schools in urban and rural areas have not been able to achieve basic goals of student competency. Within the literature, there are substantial disagreements about who or what is responsible for the state of our schools. Fingers are pointed at incompetent teachers, lazy kids, crumbling buildings, corrupt school boards, powerful custodial unions, misguided superintendents, and morally weak parents. Everyone agrees that there is a problem, but consensus about why has proved elusive.”³⁶

In his book, Scarlett talks about the importance of reform and refers to a 1994 Wingspread report to make his point:

“A disturbing and dangerous mismatch exists between what American society needs of higher education and what it is receiving. Nowhere is the mismatch more dangerous than in the quality of undergraduate preparation provided on many campuses. The American imperative for the 21st Century is that society must hold higher education to much higher expectations or risk national decline.

Education is in trouble, and with it our nation’s hopes for the future. America’s ability to compete in a global economy is threatened. The American people’s hopes for a civil, humane society ride on the outcome. The capacity of the United States to shoulder its responsibilities on the world stage is at risk.”³⁷

There are no easy answers as to the future of higher education. Most would agree that wider access to education for the American people (and those immigrants who are increasingly diversifying our society) is imperative and a fundamental right of every citizen. Yet it also appears that not everyone is being equally prepared for college nor can everyone equally afford the costs of a college degree. There is a predominant view that the future of the country rides on those who are able to think critically and have a modern perspective on the nation’s role in a global economy. If a college degree were really the guaranteed path to success and happiness, what person would not want that? In the past, these academic dreams have been fueled by government intervention in the form of equalizing legislation. The question now rapidly falls on the twin issues of preparation and cost.

Can the country provide a higher education for all? The United States is trying mightily; more than any other nation in history. The coming decades will reveal whether the democratization of this important social tool was a successful venture and whether the promise of the current “No Child Left Behind” legislation becomes reality. Only time will tell, but it is probable that the promise of higher education will not lose its allure, no matter the cost or sacrifice.

³⁶ Karabell, 217.

³⁷ Scarlett, 225.

A Hopeless Cause? American Involvement in the Somali Civil War

Autumn Lawson

The continent of Africa has been plagued with violence since the time of European colonization. Once independence was granted to many African countries, the violence worsened as competing warlords engaged in armed struggles for power. It is the citizens of these countries that suffer the most, especially when man-made famines are used to create compliance. Somalia is an example of an African country wrought with civil war that gained the attention and the aid of the international community. The United States had a large role in the humanitarian assistance that went to Somalia, beginning with President George H.W. Bush and ending with President William J. Clinton's administration. Somalia was not enthusiastic in welcoming United Nations assistance, particularly from the United States, which continually underestimated the resolve of the Somalis to take control of their own affairs. While the intentions of the United States in Somalia were based on helping those who could not help themselves, the American political and military leaders failed to gain a sense of the cultural issues valued by the Somali people. The approach used in Somalia by the United States, via the United Nations, was another example of the United States believing it would be able to solve what was ultimately an insolvable problem.

In 1996, United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, "The efforts of the United Nations to end the human suffering in Somalia, foster reconciliation among the warring factions and promote national reconstruction led to one of the most challenging, arduous undertakings in the Organization's 50-year history."¹ The words of Boutros-Ghali could not be more correct. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali involved the United Nations in an unprecedented mission by involving the organization with the Somali civil war. As stated in a *New York Times* article published on 12 January 1992, "The new Secretary General's handling of the Somali crisis . . . will also test his capacity to deal with a well-known handicap affecting much of the United Nations' work and which stems from the strict prohibition in its founding charter against interfering in countries' internal affairs."² In order to understand the events that lead to the involvement of the United Nations, and therefore the United States, one must understand what created the political unrest in Somalia.

Somalia is located on the Gulf of Aden on the east coast of Africa.³ Due to Somalia's location, the country provided a key stop on the shipping route between India and Europe, making it a desirable country for colonization. Somalia was colonized by both Italy and Great Britain, dividing the ruling tribe into two factions. The British combined their piece of Somaliland, as it was then known, with their control of the

¹ Peter D. Little, *Somalia: Economy Without State* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), 1.

² Paul Lewis, "War in Somalia a Major Test for New U.N. Leader," *The New York Times*, 12 January 1992, section A, p. 8.

³ U.S. Department of Commerce, *Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States: Somalia* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988), 3.

Ogaden in Ethiopia. When Ethiopia gained its independence from Britain, the country also gained control of Britain's piece of Somaliland, until the Italians granted Somalia its independence.⁴ Italy granted Somalia independence on 1 July 1960 and both the British Somaliland and the Italian Somalia were reunited.⁵ Unlike most other African countries at the time of independence, Somalia was initially able to put their tribal differences aside and created a multi-party democracy. The Somali government was able to operate for only a short nine years before corruption and inefficiency took over.⁶

On 15 October 1969 the Somali President, Abdirashiid Ali Shermaarke, was assassinated by a member of the Somali police force. Violence erupted in Somalia and on 21 October General Siad Barre led the Somali army in a "bloodless coup," taking control of the government.⁷ General Barre formed an organization called the Supreme Revolutionary Council, or the SRC, to help facilitate the affairs of his rule. "They were seen as heroes," states Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, "who had left the barracks to save the nation."⁸ In the beginning the Barre regime was welcomed. The SRC settled long-debated parliamentary issues and established adult literacy and relief programs for victims of Somalia's reoccurring droughts. Barre also developed his own political ideology, which he called "scientific socialism," which brought the economy and industry under a Marxist-type of control, and outlawed "clan or 'tribal' identities."⁹ However, by the middle of the 1970s, it was becoming increasingly obvious to the Somali people that Barre had no intentions of bringing democracy back to Somalia. Instead, he intended to run the country as a dictatorship. Factions of the SRC began acting as a secret police force, and dissenters to the Barre regime were executed or simply disappeared. "Barre permitted state-sanctioned veneration of the 'Revolution,'" observes Lyons and Samatar, "to be twisted into a cult of personality and sycophantic flattery hitherto unseen in the history of the country."¹⁰

Like most African countries during the independence phase in the mid-twentieth century, Somalia was caught in the middle of the Cold War that waged for decades between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Fearing the implications of the alliance between Ethiopia and the United States, Somalia allied itself with the Soviet Union, from which they gained military training and weapons.¹¹ However, once war broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1970s, and Ethiopia became Communist during the conflict, Somalia quickly cut their ties with the Soviets and allied themselves with the United States.¹² A *New York Times* editorial reminds the American people of this legacy when the anonymous writer states: "For decades, Somalia was a cold-war pawn, aided initially by the Soviet Union and then after 1978 by the U.S. and other Western powers, China and Libya. Tanks, artillery and rocket launchers flowed into an impoverished country. . . . [T]his huge arsenal has fallen into the hands of warring

⁴ Patrick Brogan, *World Conflicts* (Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1998), 97.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 14.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Brogan, 97.

¹² *Ibid.*, 97-98.

factions.”¹³ The end of the Cold War brought a new era of devastation to all of Africa as the world’s two superpowers quickly withdrew their support to the region. Ved P. Nanda observes that: “A major outcome of the end of the Cold War and especially the rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia was the closing of the chapter on superpower intervention and proxy wars on ideological grounds.”¹⁴ It would not be long before the international community would completely ignore the widespread poverty that was to take over Somalia.

Somalia’s economy was always in a state of crisis; however, nothing was bad as it would become once the democratic government created after independence had collapsed. Agriculture is Somalia’s prime source of income. The main crops are sorghum, corn, bananas, mangoes, tomatoes, watermelons, and the raising of livestock such as cattle, camels, sheep, and goats. While there is enormous potential for fishing, oil refineries, and mineral extraction, Somalia has never been in the financial position—or stable enough to set up the infrastructure—to develop these resources. Also, the lack of a well-developed road system and railroads makes the transport of materials for exporting rather difficult. Somalia also suffers from an “inadequate and deteriorating” public utility, health, and education system.¹⁵ All of these factors have contributed to widespread poverty throughout Somalia and also mean that without aid from the international community, Somalia’s hopes for change are slim. In a report published in 1988 by the United States Department of Commerce, it was observed that “[b]arring major mineral discoveries, Somalia will remain one of the world’s poorest countries for the foreseeable future.”¹⁶

Somalia had been receiving economic support from the United States since the 1977 alliance between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. However, by the middle of the 1980s, the United States rapidly began decreasing its support to Somalia. Nanda observes that “[b]y 1988, the U.S. and the European Community, except for Italy, had virtually abandoned Somalia.”¹⁷ This created a compromising position for Barre, who quickly became unable to control the now rampant clan rivalries. Furthermore, he was unable to conceal the extent of his corruption. Barre’s government finally collapsed in January 1991. Ali Mahdi Mohamed was appointed by the United Somali Congress, or the USC, to become Somalia’s interim President while the country began to debate how to handle Barre’s collapse.¹⁸

Ali Mahdi Mohamed belonged to the Hawiye clan, the largest and most powerful in Somalia, and it was also the biggest supporter of the USC. A member of one of the sub-clans within the Hawiye clan, General Mohamed Farah Aideed, was not happy with the USC’s choice of Ali Mahdi Mohamed, believing that he deserved to be leader of Somalia. Aideed, along with those clan members loyal to him, began a violent conflict with Ali Mahdi Mohamed and his supporters, which developed into a devastating civil war in Somalia. The city of Mogadishu was destroyed in the early years of the civil war

¹³ Editorial, “Help Needed for Forsaken Somalia,” *The New York Times*, 9 February 1992, section E, p. 16.

¹⁴ Ved P. Nanda, Thomas F. Muther, Jr., and Amy E. Eckert, “Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda and Liberia – Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law – Part II,” *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 26 (1998): 830.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of Commerce, 3-4.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁷ Ved P. Nanda, Thomas F. Muther Jr. and Amy E. Eckert, 832.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

before the violence spread to the countryside. "The ongoing civil war between the USC factions," observes Nanda, "along with the presence of violent armed gangs in the country, resulted in the collapse of an effective government in Somalia."¹⁹ As if the civil war was not bad enough, Somalia suffered from a devastating drought at the same time. The combined factors of drought and civil war resulted in three hundred thousand deaths in Somalia. The large number of deaths gained the attention of the international community.²⁰

The United Nations (U.N.) Security Council first addressed the situation in Somalia on 23 January 1992 issuing U.N. Resolution 733. Resolution 733 stated that the U.N. Security Council was "[g]ravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in the country and [was] aware of its consequences on [the] stability and peace in the region."²¹ Fearing that the situation in Somalia posed "a threat to international peace and stability," the U.N. called for humanitarian assistance to Somalia and to appoint a "coordinator to oversee the effective delivery of . . . [the] . . . assistance."²² Resolution 733 also called upon the member nations of the U.N. to aid in the humanitarian efforts to Somalia. The United Nations also called for a meeting between Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, and the leaders of the warring factions of Somalia in order to discuss an end to the violence and a lasting peace. The Security Council also wanted a guarantee from the warring factions that they would not impede the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia.²³

Along with Resolution 733, the U.N. invoked Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and enacted an arms embargo on Somalia in the hopes of placing pressure on Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed to end the civil war. Representatives for Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Aideed were invited to New York in February 1992. After engaging in peace talks with U.N. representatives, the two representatives signed a "vague cease-fire."²⁴ Wanting a more defined document, the U.N. sent James Jonah, a special envoy, to Mogadishu, Somalia, to negotiate a more concrete cease-fire agreement. The new agreement was signed on 3 March 1992.²⁵ The U.N. Security Council then enacted Resolution 746 on 17 March 1992 recognizing the cease-fire agreement made on 3 March but warning that the factions had yet to fully comply with the cease-fire. Resolution 746 also recognized that the humanitarian assistance going to Somalia was still being hindered in its efforts to deliver the assistance to the people and asked that Somalis honor the right of the U.N. to provide aid to the region.²⁶

Many critics in the aftermath of the Somalia incident found that the United Nations did not use the opportunity of the cease-fire agreement to their full advantage.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ United Nations Document, *Security Council Resolution 733* (United Nations Security Council Document, 1992).

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Lyons and Samatar, 30.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ United Nations Document, *Security Council Resolution 746* (United Nations Security Council Document, 1992).

Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar quote in their book *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* one critic who observed, "After the cession of hostilities, U.N. senior diplomats floundered in the field, the Security Council dithered, and U.N. relief agencies squandered valuable time."²⁷ On 24 April 1992 the U.N. Security Council enacted Resolution 751, which established United Nations Operation Somalia, or UNOSOM, the official name of the humanitarian relief operation working in Somalia.²⁸ While UNOSOM organized itself in Somalia, the forces of Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed grew increasingly agitated. The cease-fire slowly deteriorated, and any hope of a peace agreement between the two factions dwindled as a result. Demands by both sides increased, as well, which created an impossible situation for UNOSOM.²⁹

The United States general public was made aware of the devastation in Somalia by a *New York Times* article along with photos of starving Somalis.³⁰ Somalia was now in the hearts and minds of many Americans and on the political agendas of many in Congress. Kansas Senator Nancy Kassebaum traveled to Somalia in July and upon her return, she generated much attention on the issue of Somalia along with Senator Paul Simon. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali grew increasingly frustrated with both UNOSOM and the international community's complacent response to Somalia, feeling that more attention was geared toward what he called "the 'rich man's war' in Bosnia."³¹

United States President George H.W. Bush first addressed the situation in Somalia on 13 August 1992 via his press secretary. President Bush authorized aid to Somalia in the form of United States "airlift transport to a [United Nations] guard force and its associated equipment to Somalia."³² This guard force was to consist of five hundred American servicemen who would help the humanitarian workers deliver food and necessary supplies to Somalis in need. President Bush also committed \$76 million to the U.N. efforts in Somalia and promised more would be forthcoming.³³ The guard force provided by the United States, however, was not enough to end the looting and armed resistance to the humanitarian efforts. The U.N., along with the United States, ignored the fundamental problem. As long as the armed bandits and warring tribes were able to enforce their will on the Somali people, the humanitarian efforts would continue to fail, an issue consistently ignored by UNOSOM and the United States.³⁴ Even though President Bush's Press Secretary himself recognized that "armed bands are stealing and hoarding food as well as attacking international relief workers, the primary challenge that the international community faces is the delivery of relief supplies." No steps were made by the United States to find a resolution to this problem.³⁵

²⁷ Lyons and Samatar, 30.

²⁸ United Nations Document, *Security Council Resolution 751* (United Nations Security Council Document, 1992).

²⁹ Lyons and Samatar, 31.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, 32.

³² Public Papers of the Presidents, *George Herbert Walker Bush: Book II – August 1, 1992 to January 20, 1993* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1993), 1354.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Lyons and Samatar, 32.

³⁵ Bush, 2:1360.

Almost a year had passed with no improvement. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali continually pleaded with the Security Council to take a sterner stance in relation to the Somalia situation. Armed Somali forces continued to attack relief supply lines and had embarked on a program of attacking relief workers, as well. The Security Council denounced these actions in Resolution 794, passed on 3 December 1992, calling for additional forces to be sent to Somalia to be used at the discretion of the Secretary-General. Resolution 794 also stated that the people of Somalia were responsible for their "national reconciliation and reconstruction" and the international community was only there to offer humanitarian assistance.³⁶

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali asked the United States to lead the coalition forces in Somalia, to which President Bush agreed. President Bush addressed the American people from the Oval Office on 4 December 1992 in hopes of gaining their support for the Somali cause. Playing upon their sympathies, President Bush opened with the statement: "I want to talk to you today about the tragedy in Somalia and about a mission that can ease suffering and save lives. . . . Already, over a quarter-million people, as many people as live in Buffalo, New York, have died in the Somali famine. In the months ahead 5 times that number, 1 ½ million people, could starve to death."³⁷ President Bush then went on to detail for the American people the amount of relief that had been sent to Somalia, but reported that very little of that relief had reached Somalis due to the looting and armed banditry. President Bush also pointed out the lack of government and order in Somalia. "Imagine 7,000 tons of food aid literally bursting out of a warehouse on a dock in Mogadishu," stated President Bush, "while Somalis starve less than a kilometer away because relief workers cannot run the gauntlet of armed gangs roving the city."³⁸ By painting a picture of the desperateness of the situation in Somalia, President Bush hoped that the American people would understand the need to send in additional American troops. President Bush announced that he had sent a Marine Amphibious Ready Group, the First Marine Expeditionary Force, and the Army Tenth Mountain Division as the initial ground forces to Somalia in response to the Secretary-General's call for aid. President Bush also announced that he had termed the Somalia mission Operation Restore Hope. The President emphasized to the American people that the mission of Operation Restore Hope was purely humanitarian, but he reminded the people of Somalia that any armed resistance to their humanitarian efforts would not be tolerated.³⁹ President Bush ended his address with the statement, "To the people of Somalia I promise this: We do not plan to dictate political outcomes. We respect your sovereignty and independence."⁴⁰ With that the United States was committed, along with the international community, to alleviating the suffering of millions of Somalis and establishing peace in the country.

Operation Restore Hope was a unique mission for the United States. It was the United States' first attempt to combine peacekeeping and military efforts without total armed engagement. President Bush sent thirteen hundred American troops to Somalia on

³⁶ United Nations Document, *Security Council Resolution 794* (United Nations Security Council Document, 1992).

³⁷ Bush, 2:2174.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 2175.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 2175-2176.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 2176.

9 December 1992. Ultimately, twenty-five thousand United States forces would be sent to Somalia under the command of Lieutenant General Robert Johnston.⁴¹ In order to create a “balance” between the military and the political forces involved in Somalia, President Bush appointed Ambassador Robert Oakley as special envoy to the President in Somalia. Oakley had previously served as ambassador to Somalia from 1982 to 1984, giving him previous knowledge of the country.⁴² Due to the United States’ status as the world’s only remaining superpower, the American forces tended to hold more weight with Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed than the U.N. coalition as a whole. Ambassador Oakley continually attempted to reemphasize for the Somali people that the United States was limited in their role and that they were acting merely as agents for the United Nations. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley state in their book entitled *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* that “[e]ven though Oakley repeatedly made clear the limits of the U.S. mandate and stressed the need for Somali cooperation with the United Nations, the Somalis believed that the United States was more likely to make things happen.”⁴³

Many factors contributed to this feeling among the Somalis. The most prominent reason being the ineffectiveness already displayed by the United Nations through UNOSOM. Somalis knew of the U.N.’s humanitarian efforts, but they were also well aware of the U.N.’s inability to bring peace to the country or to deliver the assistance promised. Another leading factor was the rumor spread by Aideed that U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali had lent support to the corrupt Barre regime, creating a great deal of distrust for the U.N among Somalis.⁴⁴

President William Clinton inherited the problems in Somalia with his defeat of the incumbent President Bush in 1992. President Clinton fully supported the efforts that his predecessor had started in Somalia. In his campaign for the presidency, Clinton had continually stated that he wanted the United States to focus more on “humanitarian concerns.”⁴⁵ President Clinton was a proponent of the use of multilateral intervention, rather than a unilateral response more typically favored by the previous presidential administrations in the face of the Cold War. In a book entitled *Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy*, the author William G. Hyland observes, “In April 1993 the new secretary of state said that the Clinton administration would emphasize multilateral peacekeeping and ‘peacemaking.’”⁴⁶ The mission that the United States was undertaking in Somalia was an example that fit Clinton’s agenda.

Even with the efforts of the United States forces in Somalia, food and relief supplies were not reaching the starving Somalis and the attacks on humanitarian aid workers had not subsided. On 26 March 1993 the U.N. Security Council enacted Resolution 814 in which the Security Council recognized “. . . the continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of the

⁴¹ Louis J. Klarevas, “American Public Opinion on Peace Operations: The Case of Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti” (Ph.D. diss., The American University, 1999), 115.

⁴² John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 49-50.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ William G. Hyland, *Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy* (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1999), 54.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

rule of law in Somalia . . .⁴⁷ Resolution 814 called for the continuation of humanitarian assistance, assistance in the refugee problem created by the conflicts in Somalia, and aid in the reestablishment of law and order and government in Somalia.⁴⁸

Forces loyal to Aideed were determined to impede the efforts of UNOSOM and the U.N.'s attempt to enforce Resolution 814. Frustrated by Aideed's continued resistance UNOSOM informed the warlord on 4 June 1993 ". . . that they would be inspecting his weapons depots."⁴⁹ When Pakistani forces, accompanied by American and Italian forces, went to inspect Aideed's weapons the next day, they were met with strong resistance by not only Aideed's forces but also by angry mobs of Somalis who felt as though UNOSOM was not providing what they had promised. Twenty-four Pakistanis were killed in the ambush.⁵⁰

President Clinton addressed the American people regarding the violence incurred on the Pakistani forces, calling it a "cold-blooded ambush."⁵¹ The President went on to reaffirm his commitment to the U.N.'s efforts in Somalia and stated the United States would continue to work towards restoring peace in Somalia. President Clinton also warned that should the United States forces—or any of the forces working in the coalition—come under attack, they would take all necessary measures to defend themselves against the encroaching violence. In an attempt to show the American people that the U.N., with the aid of the United States, was making progress in Somalia, President Clinton asserted that there has been re-growth of crops in Somalia, among other things, and even claimed that "starvation has ended," an assertion which was wholeheartedly false.⁵²

In response to the violence on the Pakistani forces, the United Nations Security Council enacted Resolution 837 on 6 June 1993. Resolution 837 ". . . identified the Somali National Alliance (SNA) forces (i.e., Aideed's forces) as responsible for the 5 June killings and authorized the use of 'all necessary measures' to capture and prosecute those responsible for such attacks."⁵³ Resolution 837 did not scare Aideed's forces, however, and they continued their attacks on humanitarian workers. Beginning on 2 July 1993 Aideed's forces attacked the Italian forces in Somalia, killing four soldiers. In response to the attacks on the Italians, the United States forces launched a raid on Aideed's headquarters on 12 July 1993. The numbers of forces killed in the raid have yet to be determined; some accounts suggest there were as few as twelve and as many as seventy. The International Red Cross claimed that fifty-four Somalis were killed and one hundred sixty-one wounded in the raid. Somalis were outraged by the attack on Aideed. When international journalists came to report on the incident they were attacked by angry mobs of Somalis, with one British journalist killed in the attacks. Somali public opinion about the American forces, and the United Nations mission in general, were irreversibly

⁴⁷ United Nations Document, *Security Council Resolution 814* (United Nations Security Council Document, 1993).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Klarevas, 125.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Public Papers of the Presidents, *William Jefferson Clinton: Book I—January 20 to July 31, 1993* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1994), 839.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 840.

⁵³ Klarevas, 125.

changed by the raid on 12 July.⁵⁴ No longer were the United States forces fighting the armed factions of Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, but now they were up against the entire country of Somalia.

Violence against United States forces in Somalia drastically increased. On 25 September 1993 a mob of Somalis shot down an American Black Hawk helicopter with a rocket propelled grenade. Three American soldiers were killed in the attack, and the pilot and co-pilot were severely injured. The Somali mobs dragged the dead bodies of the American soldiers into the main market of Mogadishu where they were mutilated and laid out for display. Americans were outraged by such an atrocity. Congress convened that same day and pushed President Clinton to change his response toward Somalia. Congress wanted to send a message to Somalia that such actions would not be tolerated.⁵⁵ Later that day President Clinton's press secretary addressed the issue in a press conference, condemning the attack and calling on the American people to remember the mission at hand: humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. Clinton hoped his pleas would persuade the American people to continue supporting the United States' efforts in Somalia. Clinton's press secretary also stated that the American forces involved in Somalia since December 1992 had decreased by eighty percent, leaving only five thousand United States troops in Somalia. The United States involvement in Somalia would continue to decrease as the American public became more aware of the costly nature of their involvement in a country that seemingly no longer wanted their aid.⁵⁶

The deadliest single-day battle the United States had seen since the Vietnam War took place on 3 October 1993. Operating on intelligence that twenty-four of Aideed's high ranking officials would be meeting at Olympia Hotel in the violent Bakara Market in the heart of Mogadishu, leaders of the United States' forces planned a mission to capture the men. The United States believed that the capture of those leaders would help bring an end to the violence and would provide a way of placing pressure on Aideed to surrender. A force of Army Rangers and the elite Delta Force would be deployed to capture the members of Aideed's forces. The initial mission was a success in that the Delta Force was able to extract the members of Aideed's forces. However, a problem arose when the Ranger and Delta Forces attempted to leave the hostile Bakara Market which was now filled with angry mobs of Somalis. As one of the United States' Black Hawk's, the *Super Six One*, was hovering overhead after dropping in a unit of Rangers, it was shot down by the Somali mobs gathering below. The mission quickly spiraled out of control as the American forces attempted to recover their downed men and destroy what was left of the Black Hawk. In their rescue efforts, another Black Hawk, the *Super Six Two*, was shot down. Once the battle was over, eighteen American soldiers were killed and seventy-eight wounded. The Somali casualties were much higher with three hundred killed and another seven hundred wounded.⁵⁷

The pilot of the *Super Six Two*, Michael Durant, was taken hostage by the Somalis. The bodies of the soldiers that had died in the same crash were dragged through the streets by angry mobs of Somalis who cheered with delight at their kill. Television footage of both Durant and the dragging of the dead bodies was played across the United

⁵⁴ Ibid., 127-128.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 130.

⁵⁶ Clinton, 1:1598.

⁵⁷ Klarevas, 132.

States. Americans were horrified; many had never given a second thought to the violence that waged in the far off African country.⁵⁸ The day after the battle, *The New York Times* reported that “[a] still photo showed Somalis watching as the body of an unidentified American was dragged through the streets at the end of the rope.”⁵⁹ The article also detailed the CNN footage of the captured pilot, Michael Durant, describing him as appearing “frightened.”⁶⁰ There was an immediate call for action or some sort of definitive answer from the American government as to what the continuing role would be for the United States in Somalia.

President Clinton addressed the nation on the night of 7 October 1993 from the Oval Office. He began his address much in the same way that President Bush had almost a year ago when he announced Operation Restore Hope. “A year ago, we all watched with horror as Somali children and their families lay dying by the tens of thousands,” stated President Clinton, “dying the slow, agonizing death of starvation, a starvation brought on not only by drought, but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in that country.”⁶¹ President Clinton denounced the actions of the Somali mobs of the 3 October incident, going on to address the questions that were on the minds of every American: what was the mission of the United States toward Somalia going to be now? Many Americans were not willing to engage in, nor be supportive of, an effort of armed intervention in Somalia. President Clinton, however, noted that should the United States withdraw support to Somalia, the other member nations of the United Nations coalition would withdraw their support as well, leaving Somalia to starve. “So now we face a choice. Do we leave when the job gets tough,” observed the President, “or when the job is well done? Do we invite a return of mass suffering, or do we leave in a way that gives the Somalis a decent chance to survive?”⁶² Drawing upon earlier statements made by General Colin Powell, President Clinton urged the American people that the answer was not to give up. Additional American forces were sent to Somalia along with additional armored vehicles to protect the humanitarian workers as well as the coalition forces. However, President Clinton reminded the American people that he was still committed to a 31 March 1994 date for the withdrawal of American troops from Somalia.⁶³ The United States made good on their promise to withdraw troops from Somalia by March 1994. The United Nations only lasted a year longer, withdrawing their support to Somalia in March of 1995 as mandated in Security Council Resolution 954.⁶⁴ Somalia became a lost cause to the United Nations and the international community, an example of a country that was in desperately in need of help, but was unwilling to take it.

The biggest mistake that was made in regards to the Somali conflict by the United States and the United Nations was underestimating the determination and strength of the Somali rebel forces. American forces looked upon the Somali forces as nothing but an

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 132-133.

⁵⁹ R.W. Apple, Jr., “Clinton Sending Reinforcements After Heavy Losses in Somalia,” *The New York Times*, 5 October 1993, section A, p. 8.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Public Papers of the Presidents, *William Jefferson Clinton: Vol. II – August 1 to December 31, 1993* (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1994), 1703.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 1704

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 1704-1705.

⁶⁴ United Nations Document, *Security Council Resolution 954* (United Nations Security Council Document, 1994).

indigenous rebel armed force who would easily succumb to the power of the highly trained, highly organized United States armed forces. The United States, along with the United Nations, needed to recognize first that the Somali people had been fighting their neighbors and themselves for centuries. They were a highly motivated, dangerously armed group of people with nothing to stop them. The Somali people also had the strength of belief in the cause, a power that the American people had themselves over two hundred years ago. At the point when the United States lost the support of the masses of Somalia, their mission failed. The United States should have made regaining Somali support a priority, because no longer did they appear to be acting in the interests of the people. Instead, they appeared to be conquerors with little interest or consideration for the wishes of the Somali people.

The United States should never have withdrawn forces from Somalia after the Bakara Market incident. The message that they delivered to other countries that were facing the same situation as Somalia, was that all they needed to do was kill a few American troops and the United States would withdraw its forces. The United Nations, with the aid of the United States, needed to add to their initiative that they would not withdraw from Somalia until the political crisis was resolved. Administering humanitarian relief is useless if the country remains in a constant state of civil war with a lack of an operating government.

The Somalia intervention had a profound legacy on the United States' further response to humanitarian efforts. Initially, the mission that was employed by the United States in Somalia set a new standard in American intervention in the post-Cold War world. William G. Hyland notes that ". . . Bush's intervention in Somalia contained the seeds of a new doctrine: that Americans would fight for human and moral values, in contrast to the Cold War, when it was willing to fight only for its strategic interests."⁶⁵ Humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping missions were supported by President Clinton who felt that the post-Cold War world demanded such missions. However, the American people quickly felt that the costs of such missions were simply too high for their continued support. The devastating genocide of Rwanda in 1995 went virtually ignored by the United States government. Africa continues to take a back seat to other concerns, while the people of one of the world's most populated continents suffer. The message that the United States sent to Africa at the conclusion of Somalia was that the lives of the western world were more important than the lives of Africans who are continually dying from starvation, disease, and civil war.

⁶⁵ Hyland, 54.

Douglas Bendell Award*

Drake's Role in the Spanish Invasion of England

Sara DeCaro

Opinions regarding Sir Francis Drake are almost never mundane. In the past, the English sentiment towards Drake has been very favorable, and understandably so; Drake was seen as a hero and an explorer. More recent accounts of Drake are much more objective. In Spain, Drake was hated, although it was admitted that he was an interesting historical figure, as well as clever and worthy of respect. Some accounts hesitate to use the word "pirate" to describe Drake, and yet, this is an accurate description of him. The purpose of this paper is to examine this uneasy relationship between Drake and Spain, and England and Spain, at this period in history. Did Drake's piracy on Spanish ships exacerbate conditions more than usual? Were Drake's actions a contributing factor to the attempted Spanish invasion of England in 1588? This question seems to be worthy of some study.

In seeking to understand Drake's motivations in plundering Spanish ships, aside from mere material gain, it would be useful to take some of his experiences with the Spanish into account. By Drake's own admission, his view of the Spanish was a hostile one. This was not, however, entirely unwarranted. Drake's personal feelings toward the Spanish were certainly influenced by the voyage that he participated in with Sir John Hawkins in 1568. This expedition was for the purpose of selling slaves to the settlements in the West Indies, although the Spanish governors in this area were strictly forbidden to trade with the English.¹ In spite of this decree, however, Hawkins says that the Spanish were usually pleased to trade with him, saving one instance in which he claims that the treasurer of Rio de la Hacha placed armed men at the entrances to the town in an attempt to starve the English sailors and force them into abandoning their cargo of slaves on the shore. At this point, Hawkins admits to forcing his way into the town, although he does say that none of the Spanish inhabitants were harmed.²

Feeling that he had done an adequate amount of trading, and also wanting to avoid the stormy season, Hawkins decided to leave the West Indies on the 24th of July. Unfortunately, fierce weather drove Hawkins back toward Mexico and the port of San Juan de Ulua. At this point, Hawkins only wanted to buy supplies for the journey back to England; his problems, however, were to become much more compounded. The inhabitants of the port town were expecting a Spanish fleet, complete with the new Viceroy of New Spain, to arrive soon, and even mistook Hawkins and his companions for this fleet. Hawkins assured the Spanish that he only wanted to trade for supplies, which eased their minds. Hawkins' uneasiness was mounted,

* The Bendell Award is given to the best paper for History 300: Historical Research and Writing. Mr. Bendell, who completed his Bachelor's and Master's degrees at Wichita State, believed this course had a significant impact in his career in the oil business in Kansas, and thus provided funds for this award.

¹ Sir John Hawkins, *The Third Troublesome Voyage Made with the Jesus of Lubeck, the Minion, and Four Other Ships to the Parts of Guinea and the West Indies, in the Years 1567 and 1568*, in *Francis Drake: Privateer*, ed. John Hampden (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1972), 32.

² *Ibid.*, 32-33.

however, especially with the arrival of the anticipated Spanish fleet the next day.³ What happened next was disastrous for both sides.

Don Martin Enriquez, the new Viceroy, agreed to let Hawkins and his men buy supplies in San Juan de Ulua; or, at least, he pretended to. The agreement was even written down and both signed and sealed by Don Enriquez.⁴ However, the Viceroy had no intention of honoring his statement; his own retelling of the incident indicates this.⁵ Initially, Hawkins believed the Viceroy, but he began to grow nervous when the Spanish ships anchored next to his and seemed to be re-arming. Upon inquiry from Hawkins, Don Enriquez insisted that the English had nothing to worry about. Hawkins, still suspicious, sent Robert Barrett, a ship's captain who spoke Spanish, to again inquire of the Viceroy. Don Enriquez, at this point, apparently realized the game was up, and the Spanish acted, killing Hawkins' men who were on shore, and attacked the English ships *Minion* and *Jesus of Lubeck*. According to Hawkins, the suspicions aroused by the Spanish had given him enough time to prepare the *Minion* for an attack, enabling her to escape. The *Jesus*, unfortunately, was attacked by two ships at once and was not able to get free as quickly as the *Minion*, and most of Hawkins' smaller ships, except for the *Judith*, under the command of Francis Drake, were sunk. Hawkins also says that some of the Spanish ships, including the two main warships that had escorted the Spanish fleet, were possibly either sunk or burned.⁶

The *Minion* and the *Judith* were the only two ships from Hawkins' ill-fated voyage to ever return to England again. Many of the men who escaped from San Juan de Ulua did not survive the journey back home, dying of disease and starvation. Some of the Englishmen were left in San Juan de Ulua, while others chose to be put ashore on a different part of the Mexican coast.⁷ Many of these men were forced into slavery or turned over to the Inquisition, with only a few of them ever returning to England.⁸ One can imagine what effect the news of the fate of these men must have had on Drake; he certainly never forgot the behavior of Viceroy Enriquez at San Juan de Ulua. *Sir Francis Drake Revived* describes Drake as "grievously endamaged" by the incident, "not only in the loss of his goods of some value, but also of his kinsmen and friends" as a result of "the falsehood of Don Martin Enriquez. . . ." Drake also must have felt that something was owed to him, as the text goes on to mention "that no recompense could be recovered out of Spain by any of his own means, or by Her Majesty's Letters. . . ."⁹ A letter by one Don Francisco de Zarate to Viceroy Enriquez written in 1579, well over ten years after the incident, mentions that Drake asked Zarate if he is acquainted with Enriquez, to which Zarate replied in the affirmative. Drake then told Zarate that "it would give me a greater joy to come across him than all the gold and silver of the Indies. You would see how the words of gentlemen should be kept."¹⁰ Clearly, the events at San Juan de Ulua had influenced Drake's attitude toward the Spanish, and he kept these opinions for years afterward. It can be argued, then, that

³ *Ibid.*, 33-34.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁵ John Hampden, *Francis Drake, Privateer* (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1972), 40-41.

⁶ Hawkins, 36.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁸ Hampden, 40.

⁹ Philip Nichols and others, *Sir Francis Drake Revived*, in *Francis Drake: Privateer*, ed. John Hampden (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1972), 51.

¹⁰ Francisco de Zarate, Realejo, Nicaragua, to Don Martin Enriquez, Mexico, 16 April 1579, in *New Light on Drake*, ed. Zelia Nuttall (London: Hakluyt Society, 1914), 203.

revenge upon the Spanish was a motivating factor in Drake's piracy toward Spanish ships, perhaps as much as a desire for great wealth.

At this point, the reader should have some understanding of Drake's perception of the Spanish; therefore, the next task at hand is to provide the reader with a better understanding of Spain's attitude toward Drake. During the incident at San Juan de Ulua, Drake was probably unknown to the Spanish. Events had unwittingly been set in motion, however, that were to change this forever. Drake would soon be very famous, or infamous, as the case would be, in Spain and to Phillip II. He was to accomplish this in 1573, in a very daring and lucrative raid on a mule-train on its way to the Panamanian city of Nombre de Dios. Drake had been unsuccessful in previous attempts to take Spanish treasure, one a raid on the actual city of Nombre de Dios, and another on Venta de Chagra.¹¹ He did, however, succeed in frightening the Spanish enough to complain that "disaster is imminent".¹² After a year of failures, Drake was finally to succeed in carrying off a large quantity of Spanish gold and silver in April of 1573, a loss that the Spanish claimed amounted to 100,000 pesos in gold.¹³ While the lives lost and the monetary losses of his subjects must have aggravated King Philip, the fact that Drake and his comrades made off with 18,373 pesos of the king's own money was something that may have seemed even more audacious. Drake's reputation amongst the Spanish was on its way to being well established; meanwhile Drake, now a wealthy man, headed back to England, although news of his exploits in Panama preceded him, and not altogether favorably. Although Drake had no official commission for his actions in the Indies,¹⁴ and the British government could therefore deny any involvement, England and Spain were attempting to put together a peace treaty, and the possibility of Drake having to return his treasure and being brought up on charges of piracy forced him to hide for a couple of years.¹⁵ Again, it is apparent that Drake had angered the Spanish. This raid, however, was only the beginning.

The most celebrated voyage of Drake's career is probably the one that he embarked upon in 1577. This expedition lasted for three years, in which time Drake circumnavigated the globe and possibly explored the Western coast of North America. This was also one of the first times that an English sea captain had sailed through the treacherous straits at the tip of South America that were named for Ferdinand Magellan. Historians have argued about the purpose of Drake's voyage. Zelia Nuttall claims that Drake's circumnavigation was planned, and that Drake was carrying out a scheme for revenge on the Spanish by looking for lands beyond their control in order to colonize them. Plunder, she says, must have been of "secondary importance."¹⁶ Another opinion, put forward by E.G.R. Taylor, says that Drake's expedition was intended to go on to the Moluccas, a chain of islands controlled by Portugal that were famous for spices, or to find the Strait of Anian, the western entrance to the mythical Northwest Passage.¹⁷ A new book by Samuel Bawlf even asserts that Drake was indeed trying to find the Strait of Anian, sailing as far north as present day Vancouver! K.R. Andrews, however, makes the most convincing, as

¹¹ Municipal Council of Panama, to Philip II, Spain, 24 February 1572, in *Documents Concerning English Voyages to the Spanish Main, 1569-1580*, ed. Irene Wright (London: Hakluyt Society, 1932), 48-49.

¹² *Ibid.*, 48.

¹³ Royal Officials of Panama, to Philip II, Spain, 9 May 1573, in *Documents Concerning English Voyages....*, ed. Irene Wright, 68.

¹⁴ Wright, xlv.

¹⁵ Hampden, 107.

¹⁶ Nuttall, xxxiv.

¹⁷ K.R. Andrews, "The Aims of Drake's Expedition of 1577-1580," *The American Historical Review* 73 (February 1968): 724-5.

well as the least fantastic, argument, refuting Nuttall and Taylor and insisting that Drake's voyage was primarily intended for piracy. The Moluccas route was only used when it became dangerous for Drake to take the Strait of Magellan on the return voyage home.¹⁸ John Hampden is in agreement with Andrews. He cites the Draft Plan from the voyage, which is printed in his book *Francis Drake: Privateer*, and points out that it is very succinct in saying that Drake originally intended to return home via the Strait of Magellan. He also reminds us that the voyage was originally intended to last for only thirteen months, stating "there was no question at this stage of his searching for the Northwest Passage, or going to the Moluccas, or sailing round the world."¹⁹ Therefore, Drake clearly meant to sail along the coasts of Chile and Peru, most likely for the purpose of plunder.²⁰

Exactly how much Elizabeth I knew about Drake's motives is also open to discussion. Drake himself claimed that the Queen and he had decided together to get back at Philip for wrongs committed against both of them, and that the way to do this was to rob Spanish ships in the New World. The original draft plan for this voyage, however, indicates that Elizabeth was not one of the original financiers; in fact, it says that Queen should be offered the chance to become involved, and that the voyage's true purpose she be explained to her. Drake's looting of Spanish ships, which was to occur on this voyage, also deviated from the draft plan. This seems to say that Elizabeth did not initially know Drake's intentions. Furthermore, at the time of Drake's voyage, Spain and England were officially "at peace." It does not seem conceivable that Elizabeth would intentionally pick a fight with Spain, especially since she was not known to be willing to take the blame for the actions of her subjects. With this in mind, Drake's suggestion that Elizabeth had instigated his plundering does not seem to be substantiated; only his words that this was the case exist to prove this.²¹

If plunder was indeed what Drake primarily sought, he was certainly able to realize this. Drake did overtake and rob several Spanish ships, including the one belonging to Don Francisco de Zarate, who is mentioned above. However, Drake's biggest prize was undoubtedly the cargo aboard the ship *Nuestra Señora de la Concepcion*, commonly referred to as the *Cacafuego*. The treasure ship's captain, San Juan de Anton, said in a deposition after the ship's robbery by Drake that all the gold and silver coins and bars aboard the ship totaled 362,000 pesos. In addition, the ship was also carrying a large amount of unregistered gold bullion. Anton claimed this bullion was worth about 40,000 pesos, although the actual worth was a great deal more than the figure he quoted.²² Such a valuable prize is certainly remarkable in itself; however, the accounts of the robbery given later are also interesting. Anton stated in his deposition that Drake again mentioned Don Martin Enriquez, telling him that the Viceroy had not upheld his promise to John Hawkins. This, Drake claimed, had cost him seven thousand ducats. Anton also says that Drake "had come to recover this sum and carried an authorization from the Queen so that he could commit robberies for this purpose and all that he took over and above this was for the said Queen."²³

The *Cacafuego*'s clerk, Domingo de Lizarza, said something similar in his deposition. He claimed to have overheard Drake saying "that he had come to rob by command of the Queen

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 727.

¹⁹ Hampden, 117.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 116.

²¹ Andrews, 739-40.

²² Samuel Bawlf, *The Secret Voyage of Sir Francis Drake, 1577-1580* (New York: Walker and Co., 2003), 144.

²³ Gabrielle de Navarette, "Judicial Inquiry Made at Panama. Deposition of San Juan de Anton," in *New Light*, ed. Zelia Nuttall, 173.

of England and carried the arms she had given him and her commission."²⁴ It must be pointed out that we have, as mentioned before, only Drake's declarations to indicate that this was the case. However, King Philip certainly read these depositions; it is not hard to guess his feelings toward Drake and Queen Elizabeth at this time. The robbery of the *Cacafuego* marked the second time that Drake had taken a significant amount of gold and silver from the Spanish, a large piece of which was Philip's own personal income. Both Anton and Lizarza also said that Drake was commissioned by Elizabeth to commit robberies, of which she was also profiting from.

Such statements surely did nothing to help the already shaky relationship of England and Spain. Anton's deposition also describes yet another tirade of Drake's and the grudge he clearly had against Don Enriquez for San Juan de Ulua. Revenge was clearly something that Drake was holding onto, even after he had made back what money he had lost in that incident.

The voyage of 1577, in addition to making Drake famous in England, made him a very wealthy man. A large portion of Drake's spoils undoubtedly went to Elizabeth as well. Drake was also knighted after his return, a move that was meant to be in blatant defiance of Spain.²⁵ Tensions between England and Spain were certainly mounting. The 1580s were a troublesome decade in England. Several plots to murder Elizabeth and replace her with her Roman Catholic cousin, Mary, Queen of Scots, were uncovered. At the same time, Drake led an expedition to the Caribbean, robbing the cities of Santiago, Santo Domingo, and Cartagena. Then, in 1587, Elizabeth finally allowed Mary, Queen of Scots, to be executed for treason. None of these activities improved relations with Spain; in fact, they helped the situation deteriorate even further. War with Spain was inevitable.²⁶

In 1587, Philip was, once again, angered by the escapades of Francis Drake. This incident involved Philip's preparations for war. Drake's orders were to wreak havoc on the Spanish fleet in Cadiz, thus delaying the anticipated invasion of England. In two days, Drake had succeeded in his mission. Thirty-Eight ships were sunk or captured, and Spain's plans for invasion were severely hindered. After two successful days in Cadiz, Drake sailed toward Portugal, which at this time had become a possession of Philip's. Near the Azores, Drake took the ship *San Felipe*, which had a huge cargo of luxury goods in addition to some gold and silver.²⁷ Philip's frustration is apparent, although, writing to his ambassador in France, he downplayed the value of the plunder Drake obtained from the *San Felipe*. A few sentences later, however, he remarked upon the possibility of the Marquis of Santa Cruz encountering Drake, saying that he hoped that the Marquis would "give him what he deserves."²⁸ Philip's bitterness was understandable; Drake had delayed the Spanish invasion until the following year. It seems that Drake suddenly underwent a transformation; he was not merely an extremely daring pirate with an axe to grind. Drake's raid on Cadiz proved him to be an able seaman. In the conflict with Spain that was bound to come soon, Drake would probably be a major figure.²⁹

1588 was, indeed, a fateful year for the English, and, perhaps, for the entire world as we know it. One can only speculate as to what the world have been like if the Spanish fleet had

²⁴ Gabrielle de Navarrete, "Deposition of Domingo de Lizarza, Clerk of the Ship of San Juan de Anton, Taken Prisoner on March 1st", in *New Light*, ed. Zelia Nuttall, 179.

²⁵ Hampden, 244.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 248-9.

²⁷ Bawlf, 226-8.

²⁸ Philip II, Madrid, to Bernardino de Mendoza, Paris, 28 July 1587, in *Calendar of State Papers, Simancas: 1587-1603*, ed. Martin Hume (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1899), 125.

²⁹ Harry Kelsey, *Sir Francis Drake: The Queen's Pirate* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 304.

succeeded in invading England. Much has certainly been made of the success of the English in driving the Armada away. While debates have gone on about smaller, more maneuverable English ships, or the superiority of English seamanship, or bad weather, one thing seems abundantly clear: The Duke of Medina Sidonia was unable to rendezvous with the Duke of Parma. Well over half of Philip's invading army, then, was delayed. Lacking their escort and a harbor to anchor in, Medina Sidonia's fleet was driven against the treacherous coasts of Ireland and Scotland. Consequently, about half of Medina Sidonia's original fleet was able to return back to Spain.³⁰

The defeat of the Spanish Armada was the last high point of Drake's career. None of Drake's final voyages would achieve the results that the previous ones had; in fact, all would end disastrously. A plan to follow the remainder of Medina Sidonia's fleet back to Spain resulted in failure and the deaths of half of Drake's men.³¹ After this, and possibly because of it, Drake seemed to fall out of favor with the Queen. He departed from court and was not heard of in regard to the English Navy for three years.³² This was temporary, however, and in 1594 Drake and John Hawkins planned an expedition to Porto Rico and Panama. Unfortunately for the English, however, the Spanish were ready for them this time, both in San Juan, whose defenses were prepared for the onslaught, and in Nombre de Dios, which had been evacuated. Drake died soon after this of dysentery and was buried at sea.³³

The English view of Drake has, historically speaking, usually been a favorable one, painting him as a conquering hero. The Spanish view has understandably been more hostile, although sometimes tempered with respect and admiration. Regardless of what attitude one has toward Drake and his exploits, it is impossible to deny that he was one of the most charismatic, bold, and fascinating figures in English history. Perhaps the trait of Drake's that is most relevant here is his confidence. There never seemed to be any doubt in Drake's mind as to whether or not he is doing the right thing. His motivations for his actions never seemed to come under scrutiny by Drake himself. Drake certainly revenged himself upon Don Martin Enriquez several times over, yet he never seems to have a twinge of conscience over the amount of money he had stolen from Spain. His monetary losses were surely repaid, and yet he continued to raid Spanish ships and take whatever he could.

The audacity of Drake's actions were undoubtedly a constant source of irritation to the Spanish. Did his hotheadedness and bold exploits anger Philip II enough to start a war? While there were other considerations going on, one cannot help but wonder if other corsairs would have been as persistent and as daring as Drake. Such qualities enabled him to carry off some huge quantities of Spanish plunder. The religious clash between England and Spain was certainly a large deciding factor in the political relationship between the two countries, but Drake's "singeing of the king's beard" could have been the straw that broke the camel's back. While it was not, perhaps, the single most important factor in England and Spain's deteriorating relationship, it may have been just enough to tip the scales. Either way, a character as vivid as Drake is worth examining; whether you are for or against him, you cannot deny his appeal and the sheer fascination of his story.

³⁰ Bawlf, 229-31.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 236.

³² *Ibid.*, 236-7.

³³ *Ibid.*, 249-50.

Fiske Hall Graduate Paper Award*

**Bloodied Kansas:
Nazi Retribution in a Kansas POW Camp**

Mark P. Schock

Fear! Raw, naked, animal fear! Kameraden! Kameraden! Help! Help! Someone, please! Anyone, please? Faces, a blur of faces. Some sneer. Some laugh! Others look down, look away. Run! Where? The gate, they will help. They must help! No! Where are they going? This can't happen, not here! Blows--fists, boots, hammer-like blows!

Exhaustion. Silence. Acceptance. And finally...darkness.

In Nazi-occupied Europe this scenario played out for thousands of victims. But this wasn't Europe. This tragedy occurred in the United States, in Kansas. The victim was Captain Felix Tropschuh, *Afrika Korps* veteran, and a prisoner of war under the charge of the U.S. Army. His tormentors were his fellow prisoners and his ordeal was endured right under the noses of his American captors and under conditions existing with American acquiescence.

Captain Tropschuh had arrived at the newly constructed prisoner of war camp in Kansas with the first battle-hardened *Afrika Korps* veterans in July 1943.¹ Officially named the Alien Internment Camp, Concordia, Kansas, the camp was known to the local civilian population and the American military personnel stationed there as simply Camp Concordia.²

The United States had agreed to construct POW camps on its soil at the request of the British. By August 1942 the British were holding more than 250,000 German and Italian prisoners. Quite simply, the British were running out of facilities to securely hold these men under humane conditions.³

The first POW camps in the U.S. were located on unused areas of existing military bases and federal property such as abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camps. These were last used during the Great Depression to house workers engaged in federal construction projects.⁴

As more and more enemy prisoners flooded America's shores, the government was forced to look for more locations. Fear of escape and sabotage prompted that the new camps be located out of range of large population centers, shipyards and war production facilities. As a result of these concerns more than 80 percent of the 155 base

*Named after the building which houses the Department of History, the Fisk Hall Graduate Paper Award is given to the best paper by a graduate student in a non-seminar course.

¹ Lowell A. May, *Camp Concordia: German POWs in the Midwest* (Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1995), 21.

² May, *xiv*.

³ David Fiedler, *The Enemy Among Us: POWs in Missouri During World War II* (Saint Louis, Missouri: Missouri Historical Society Press: Distributed by University of Missouri Press, 2003), 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

camps eventually opened were located in the South or Midwest.⁵ By the end of the war there were 371,683 German, 51,156 Italian, and 5,413 Japanese prisoners held on American soil.⁶

Over 500 branch camps would eventually be built to supplement the base camps.⁷ In 1943 Camp Concordia was allocated three branch camps located at Hays and Peabody, Kansas, and at Hebron, Nebraska.⁸ In February and April 1944 four more branch camps were added to Camp Concordia's complement. These camps were located at Remer, Bena, Deer River and Owatonna, Minnesota.⁹ Many of Rommel's *Afrika Korps* veterans, those who stayed in line anyway, would call these camps home until October 1945.¹⁰

Camp Concordia, located in Cloud County in north central Kansas, was one of the new base camps. The camp property covered 640 acres, or a one square-mile section of farmland. The camp proper, however, utilized only 157 acres with a barbed-wire perimeter spotted with guard towers.¹¹ The camps square corners allowed for evenly placed streets named for American military heroes, such as Grant, Lee and MacArthur. The name Eisenhower was conspicuous in its absence.¹² The prisoner population at Camp Concordia would reach 4,027 by November 1943.¹³

The History of Camp Concordia from Site Survey to Deactivation is a compilation of reports submitted by the camp's assistant executive officer, Captain Karl C. Teufel, before the camp's deactivation. In one report he described the prison population as follows:

For the most part, they were members of the crack German Afrika Korps, which had fought under Rommel and had nearly won the North African Campaign. Eleventh hour Allied reinforcements in men and materials had prevented that eventuality, but not until clear superiority in both phases of power had been brought to bear. No better German soldiers existed anywhere, and these men came to this country still proud of their accomplishments, still assured of the coming victory of National Socialism over the rest of the World, still confident and arrogant in their own strength, and fully prepared to make things as difficult for their custodians as safely possible. There were a thousand Officers among them, ranging from second lieutenants to Colonels (two of whom were later promoted to General rank), and hence some of Hitler's best military brains were here also.¹⁴

⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶ *May.*, xiv.

⁷ Arnold Krammer, introduction to *Nazi Prisoners of War in America* (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), xiv.

⁸ *May.*, 137.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 137-39.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 86.

¹¹ Lowell A. May, author of *Camp Concordia: German POWs in the Midwest*, e-mail interview by author, Concordia, Kansas, 29 November 2004.

¹² Patrick O'Brien, Thomas D. Isern, and R. Daniel Lumley, "Stalag Sunflower: German Prisoners of War," *Kansas History*, Autumn 1984, 184.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁴ Captain Karl C. Teufel, ed., "The History of Camp Concordia from Site Survey to Deactivation" (Washington D.C.: National Archives, Record Group 389, box 1612, unpubl., 1945, Kansas State Historical Society, microfilm #LM 322, Topeka, Kansas), 39.

The American personnel, on the other hand, were fresh from basic training. The confidence and arrogance of the German veterans intimidated many of the American soldiers who the Germans considered to be bumbling amateurs.¹⁵ In a 2003 telephone interview, former prisoner Horst Kuhnke asked author Lowell May, “Do you know (1970’s television show) *Hogan’s Heroes*? That was Camp Concordia.”¹⁶

It was not until late 1944 when the original American personnel were replaced by returning American combat veterans that the prisoners began to respect their guards. The prisoners could tell the combat veterans by the decorations on their uniforms and would go so far as to step off the sidewalks to demonstrate their respect.¹⁷

While the impression the American personnel may have made on the prisoners was less than satisfactory, the prisoners’ initial impression of the grounds was generally favorable. Frederick Ethhofen, a twenty-four-year-old second lieutenant at the time, recalled that everything was neat and orderly, but there were no flowers, bushes or trees.¹⁸ Another young lieutenant, Axel Bauer, also noticed the lack of landscaping, but remembered Concordia as an appreciable upgrade from their temporary holding areas on the edge of the Sahara.¹⁹ Some prisoners were disappointed to learn that roaming Indians and vast herds of buffalo no longer populated the American West.²⁰ The Kansas heat was not yet a problem for men so recently arrived from the deserts of the North Africa.

Within weeks of the first prisoners’ arrival, the routine of Camp Concordia seemed to be set. The prisoners were free to continue to wear their German uniforms complete with insignia of rank while within the confines of the camp. Prisoners working outside the camp, mostly on neighboring farms, were issued either denim work clothes or American World War I era uniforms dyed blue with the letters PW stenciled on the legs, back, sleeves and rear.²¹ The prisoners could even purchase new German uniforms made by American companies.²²

Healthy enlisted prisoners were required to work. Non-commissioned officers could only work in supervisory positions, and while officers could not be forced to work they could volunteer. All prisoners were paid for their work and their pay could be spent in the camp canteen, to order newspapers, books, or magazines or be saved for future use.²³ To the American soldiers and civilians who strolled the camp in the course of their

¹⁵ Lowell A. May, author of *Camp Concordia: German POWs in the Midwest*, interview by author, 22 November 2004.

¹⁶ Horst Kuhnke, Stuttgart, Germany, telephone interview by Lowell May, Concordia, Kansas, 13 September 2003, POW Camp Concordia 1943-45: An Oral History, a project of the POW Camp Concordia Preservation Society and the Kansas Humanities Council, transcript in hand of Cloud County Community College library.

¹⁷ May, interview 29 November 2004.

¹⁸ Frederick C. Ethhofen, Elizaville, New York, telephone interview by Lowell May, Concordia, Kansas, 22 August 2003, POW Camp Concordia 1943-45: An Oral History, a project of the POW Camp Concordia Preservation Society and the Kansas Humanities Council, transcript in hand of Cloud County Community College library.

¹⁹ Axel Bauer, Icking, Germany, telephone interview by Lowell May, Concordia, Kansas, 28 August 2003, POW Camp Concordia 1943-45: An Oral History, a project of the POW Camp Concordia Preservation Society and the Kansas Humanities Council, transcript in hand of Cloud County Community College library.

²⁰ O’Brien, 183.

²¹ May, 21.

²² May, interview 22 November 2004.

²³ May, 26.

daily duties the German prisoners appeared a bit arrogant, to be sure, but otherwise militarily efficient, courteous and content with their situation.

If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, the hell of Captain Tropschuh's last hours, and those of at least one other Concordia prisoner, was at least partially paved with American good intentions. Concerned for the safety of the more than 90,000 American prisoners being held in German POW camps, the U.S. War Department committed itself to strict compliance with every article of the Geneva Convention. Since it was the Nazi regime that held these Americans it naturally followed that it was the German prisoners with strong Nazi leanings that the Americans did their best to keep happy.²⁴

Recognizing the situation, the most ideologically dedicated Nazis in the camps were emboldened to assume the leadership positions among the prisoners. They also realized that the Americans' primary concern was to keep the prisoners and their camps peaceful. As long as the Nazis didn't cause trouble for the Americans, the Americans were content to meet almost any request the Nazis put forth.

On September 23, 1943, the Americans agreed to one such request. Article 76 of the Geneva Convention allows for the honorable burial of any prisoner who dies in captivity. Cognizant of this article the Nazi prisoners petitioned the U.S. War Department to allow for the casket of any German prisoner who died in U.S. custody to be draped with the swastika banner. Not only did the War Department agree to this request, it also told all POW camp commanders to allow for the display of small pictures of Nazi leaders, flags and emblems on the prisoners' bunks or lockers.²⁵

As the Nazi war machine struggled to hold its gains in Eastern Europe, it tightened its hold on Western Europe and impressed hundreds of thousands to work in war production and on fortifications, thereby separating thousands of families. The Americans, again trying to ensure humane treatment of American prisoners in Nazi hands, were helping to reunite family members among the German prisoners.

Germany was drafting men and boys from fourteen to sixty-five into the Wehrmacht. This meant that the prisoners held in America often had relatives being held in other camps in this country. Fathers, sons and brothers could request transfer to other camps within the country in order to reunite family members. The only requirement was that the prisoners pay for their own transportation from the funds they earned while working in America.²⁶

Compared to the conditions their comrades were experiencing on the battlefronts, life for the prisoners at Concordia was quite comfortable. The prisoners enjoyed an open-air stage, paid for in part by the Vatican, a movie theater, a library, and soccer fields.²⁷ They were allowed to choose from an extensive curriculum of college courses, authorized by the University of Kansas, to earn college credit in courses taught by

²⁴ Krammer, 153.

²⁵ Ibid., 154.

²⁶ Glenn Thompson, *Prisoners on the Plains: German POWs in America* (Holdrege, Nebraska: Phelps County Historical Society, 1993), 141.

²⁷ Author Lowell May says that the soccer fields were the instrument of the Concordia prisoners only known effort to injure the American war effort. When the prisoners discovered that the Americans were supplying them with more flour than was necessary for their needs, they used the excess flour to chalk the soccer fields rather than return it to the Americans.

German officers who had been doctors, lawyers or college faculty members before the war.²⁸

The prisoners also constructed a number of social club buildings that they called casinos. Here they could purchase 3.2 beer, entertain friends, and celebrate birthdays and holidays. The buildings were constructed from scrap, but were furnished with handmade furniture and paintings created by the many talented artists interned at the camp.²⁹

To the American personnel at Camp Concordia it appeared that their German charges had decided to make the most of their situation and were content to sit out the war and the dying throes of National Socialism on the sidelines. A series of tragic events, beginning in the last months of 1943 would shatter this facade.

On Monday morning, August 9, 1943, Capt. Gustav Dormann, a native of Wilhelmshaven, Germany, was found hanging in the officer's compound. The decorated *Afrika Korps* veteran's death appeared to be a suicide. Funeral services were conducted by a German chaplain and German officers acted as pallbearers.³⁰ The Captain left no suicide note and the motives behind his suicide were never learned. Local newspapers would later suggest his death was politically motivated, but no credible evidence was ever found to back up that assertion.³¹ Later events would suggest that the fact that his fellow prisoners attended the Captain's funeral gave credence to the conclusion that this first prisoner death at least, was a suicide.

No sooner had the excitement surrounding Capt. Dormann's death subsided, when another incident shocked the camp. The soccer fields were located adjacent to the camp perimeter, and a dead-line was established within fifteen feet of the perimeter fence. On October 16, 1943, as the prisoners were playing soccer, prisoner Corp. Adolf Huebner was shot and killed by a guard while retrieving a soccer ball that had been kicked across the dead-line.³²

The immediate response of the prisoners to the shooting was shouting and the singing of German military songs, but they did not riot.³³ The Germans believed the shooting to be an act of murder and refused to work for three days. They marked the spot of Huebner's death with a cross bearing the words, "This cross marks the spot where Adolf Huebner was murdered by Americans."³⁴

A court-martial was convened to formally investigate the incident.³⁵ The inquiry revealed that Corporal Huebner had repeatedly crossed the dead-line during the soccer match and had been repeatedly warned. Either out of arrogance or confidence in the Americans lack of resolve, Huebner ignored the calls to "halt." The guard who fired the fatal shot was cleared of all charges, but was nonetheless transferred out of Concordia, and the dead-line was abolished.³⁶

²⁸ Teufel, 29-30.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 29.

³⁰ *Kansas* (Concordia, Kansas) 12 August 1943.

³¹ Teufel, 34.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ May, 31.

³⁴ O'Brien, 186.

³⁵ An ironic note to this incident is that former Concordia guard Robert H. Brumleve told author Lowell May that the guard in question was the poorest shot at the camp. The other guards were shocked that he had fired at all and further shocked that the shot had hit the prisoner.

³⁶ O'Brien, 186.

It appears that the Nazis used the emotions stirred up by the Huebner incident to further assert their power over the prison population. It is quite possible that they used their influence to temper the prisoners' response. They needed to remain "sheep" in the eyes of the Americans, while acting as "wolves" among their comrades. The actual number of ardent Nazis among the prisoners is in dispute. In his report, Capt. Teufel divided the prison population in this manner:

- (A) Opponents of Nazism, who here, as in Germany, were more or less forced to remain in the background;
- (B) A great mass of by nature politically indifferent people who, however, had been very strongly propagandized; and
- (C) The so-called "active" Nazis, who were subdivided into three types—stubborn militarists who considered Nazism a convenient idea to inspire people to fight, unscrupulous demagogues with personal motivations, and the intolerant, bossy type of individual who loves authority.³⁷

He estimated that no more than five percent fell into the anti-Nazi grouping. He believed that only fifteen to twenty percent were pro-Nazi, with five percent of these holding positions of authority within the camp in 1943. The rest of the prisoners were doing their best to stay out of trouble with either the Nazis or the Americans.³⁸

By contrast, Arnold Krammer in his work, *Nazi Prisoners of War in America*, reports that American studies late in the war determined that approximately forty percent of the prisoners held in America were pro-Nazi, with eight to ten percent of these being fanatic and the other thirty percent of this number being deeply sympathetic. A more important factor in the atmosphere of the camps was the fact that many of those who were not Nazis, were nonetheless German nationalists. Many of these were deeply loyal to Hitler and confident in ultimate German victory without feeling any particular loyalty to the Nazi party.³⁹

Still indulging the Geneva Convention, the Americans allowed the prisoners to appoint their own leadership at the camps. This led to the most ardent Nazis holding the positions of power.⁴⁰ At Camp Concordia these people used their positions to influence and coerce the entire prisoner population.

The prisoners had their own German language newspaper, *Neue Stacheldraht Nachrichten* (*New Barbed Wire Nightly News*). According to the printer of the paper, Karl Gassmann, the initials NS in the newspaper's name were meant to symbolize National Socialism. A German Jewish immigrant from Frankfurt censored the paper for the Americans.⁴¹ The fact that the paper was censored did not prevent the Nazis from using its pages to give their opinions on the conduct of the war.

³⁷ Teufel, 56.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Krammer, 149.

⁴⁰ Teufel, 56.

⁴¹ Karl Gassmann, Schweinfurt, Germany, to Cloud County Historical Museum, Concordia, Kansas, 27 July 1994, transcript in the hand of Cloud County Historical Museum, Camp Concordia room, Concordia, Kansas.

The December 24, 1944 issue of *Neue Stacheldraht Nachrichten* calls upon the prisoners to engage in activities to rebuild their physical strength and mental toughness in order to continue the struggle against the Allies. An article reprinted from the Associated Press, London, exaggerates the impact of the V-2 rocket on English morale. The newspaper went on to criticize the Allied bombing campaign on German cities for the loss of German civilian lives and property.⁴²

Nazi propaganda was necessary to counteract what the prisoners had witnessed with their own eyes. Before their surrender, the *Afrika Korps* had listened to German radio reports that American cities were themselves the target of German bombers. They had seen no evidence of bomb damage in all their travel from the East Coast to Kansas.⁴³

The newspaper, however, was the most benign effort at manipulation employed by the Nazis. Prisoner Frederick Ethhofen remembered that the Nazis threatened to punish the prisoners' families in Germany for any word or act of disloyalty. Wounded and sick prisoners were frequently repatriated to Germany and the Nazis warned that these prisoners would relay any charges of disloyalty to the proper agencies in Germany.⁴⁴

Franz Kramer related that the Nazi officers possessed a clandestine short-wave radio with which they received news and orders direct from Germany. The prisoners would be notified that they were to assemble at an appointed location and time to be briefed on the information received via this radio. Any absences from these sessions were viewed as signs of disloyalty.⁴⁵

Within days of Corporal Huebner's death, perhaps taking advantage of the nationalistic fervor engendered by the killing, the Nazis extracted the ultimate penalty for perceived disloyalty in the German ranks. Captain Tropschuh would be the first victim known to pay with his life for crossing the Nazi "dead-line." To make matters worse, the Americans were warned of what was going to happen, and whether out of disbelief or feelings of guilt over the Huebner shooting, failed to do anything to prevent the murder. At first they even failed, or refused, to acknowledge the truth of what had transpired after the deed was done.

Captain Tropschuh's ordeal began with the theft of his diary. The captain had confided to his diary his distaste for Hitler and the Nazi regime. A roommate had discovered the contents of the diary, stolen it, and turned it over to the German camp commander. The commander, whose official title at the camp was Senior German Spokesman, Colonel Alfred Koester, ordered all the prisoners to assemble in the camp's main square on the morning of October 18, 1943.⁴⁶

The colonel read from the diary to the assembled prisoners and accused Tropschuh of treason. As the charge was leveled, the terrified officer ran for the camp's gate in a desperate attempt at escape. A guard truck was passing the gate as the captain approached. The Americans slowed for an instant, then sped away. The fugitive was soon surrounded by the pursuing Nazis, severely beaten, and dragged away.⁴⁷

⁴² *Neue Stacheldraht Nachrichten* (Camp Concordia, Kansas), 24 December 1944, translation notes by Sigi Horton. (Kansas State Historical Society, microfilm #1691, Topeka, Kansas.)

⁴³ May, interview 22 November 2004.

⁴⁴ Ethhofen, interview 22 August 2003.

⁴⁵ Kramer, letter.

⁴⁶ Bauer, interview 28 August 2003.

⁴⁷ Lynn Ermann. "Learning Freedom in Captivity," *The Washington Post Magazine*, 18 January 2004, 18.

Lt. Wolf Dieter Zander, a secret anti-Nazi, managed to gain an audience with the American camp commander, Col. John A. Sterling, and begged him to remove Tropschuh from the prison compound, but the American failed to grasp the seriousness of the situation. "We have Republicans and Democrats and we don't kill each other," he told the incredulous Zander.⁴⁸

The following night, Koester presided over a Geheim-Gericht (Secret-Court) and Tropschuh was sentenced to death for the crime of treason to the German Reich.⁴⁹ The *Concordia (Kans.) Kansan*, citing sources from the U.S. Seventh Service Command investigation conducted weeks after the incident, reported that Tropschuh was given a rope and chair with which to hang himself. This was necessary, as there was no pistol available to perform the traditional suicide for a disgraced German officer.⁵⁰ Ethhofen, however, stated that an Austrian lieutenant named Rauch acted as executioner.⁵¹

When Captain Tropschuh was not present for roll call the next day American guards found his body still hanging. The local newspapers reported the death as the camp's second suicide.⁵² The *Clyde (Kans.) Republican* even reported the presence of a suicide note in which the captain expressed his intention to take his own life.⁵³ The camp authorities also initially accepted the illusion of suicide. They appear even to have placed no significance to the fact that the prisoners refused, en masse, to attend Tropschuh's funeral and Koester insisted that the captain be buried outside the boundary of the cemetery holding the remains of Captain Dormann and Corporal Huebner.⁵⁴

At this distance we can only speculate at the reasoning initially adopted by the American camp commander, Col. John A. Sterling. In his report, Captain Teufel commented. "Perhaps the Colonel was too kindly a man, perhaps he had no real interest in his assignment, or perhaps he was not backed by an efficient staff, but, in any case, things were shortly out of hand at Concordia. The Germans seem to have seized the initiative from the beginning."⁵⁵

It may be that the colonel believed that Tropschuh had indeed hung himself after being only beaten by his fellow Germans. He may have believed that the German captain had other problems unrelated to Nazi harassment. The *Kansan* reported that Tropschuh's hospital records indicated he "was suffering from a chronic disease of such a nature as to cause despondency."⁵⁶ He may have seen the entire incident as a German internal matter best left in their hands, or he may have simply been in over his head and existing in a state of denial. Whatever the case, an American internal problem would soon overwhelm the colonel and end his Concordia career.

On Saturday night, October 23, 1943, a long simmering feud between two American captains erupted in gunfire at the camp's American officer's club. Captain Joseph R. King, transportation officer and president of the officers' mess and Captain

⁴⁸ Ermann, 19-20.

⁴⁹ Bauer, interview 28 August 2003.

⁵⁰ *Kansan*, 13 January 1944.

⁵¹ Ethhofen, interview 22 August 2003.

⁵² *Kansan*, 21 October 1943, *Clyde Republican* (Clyde, Kansas), 21 October 1943.

⁵³ *Clyde Republican*, 21 October 1943.

⁵⁴ *Concordia Blade-Empire*, 14 January 1944.

⁵⁵ Teufel, 39-40.

⁵⁶ *Kansan*, 21 October 1943.

David Roberts, a World War I veteran of the British Army, and Camp Concordia's mess officer, had long quarreled over the operation of the club.⁵⁷

Captain King's eighteen-year-old daughter, Betty, joined in an argument between her mother and Captain Roberts. Roberts, who had had a few drinks over the course of the evening, bristled at the interruption and ordered her to be quiet. When Mrs. King came to her daughter's defense, Robert's drew his service revolver. The wife of the camp's commander, Mrs. John Sterling, stepped between Roberts and the Kings and was shot in the abdomen when Roberts fired. A scuffle ensued and Roberts managed to fire three more times before being overpowered. Luckily the three wild shots struck no one. Mrs. Sterling was rushed to the Concordia hospital and Roberts was confined in the camp's hospital for mental evaluation.⁵⁸

Mrs. Sterling recovered from her wound and testified at Robert's ensuing court-martial. Perhaps some insight into both her and her husband's mindset can be deduced from the fact that she testified in Robert's defense, claiming that an officer should not be challenged by a seventeen-year-old girl (*sic*). "He was not drunk, but justly angry," she testified.⁵⁹

To again quote the Teufel report; "The resulting publicity was the straw that broke the camel's back in higher Headquarters, and it was immediately indicated that there would be some changes made. Colonel Sterling and a goodly portion of his staff were done at Concordia. The Colonel was relieved as of 12 December 1943, although his successor was on the ground on 24 November."⁶⁰

Lieutenant Colonel Lester Vocke was a regular army officer known for discipline and efficiency. His personality and booming voice immediately made their impression on the camp staff. He left no mistake that he had been sent to the camp with the full authority and intention to instill order in both his American and German charges.⁶¹ The American personnel were impressed. A new tragedy would demonstrate that the Nazis were not.

On January 11, 1944, an Austrian private named Franz Kettner committed suicide by slashing his wrists with a razor blade.⁶² According to the statements of other German prisoners, Kettner had publicly denounced Hitler while interned at the branch camp in Peabody, Kansas, in the fall of 1943. Nazi retaliation was immediate and he pleaded with the American guards at Peabody to be transferred back to Concordia.⁶³

On his return to Concordia, Kettner was kept in protective custody in the American guardhouse while arrangements were made to transfer him to a different POW camp unofficially designated as "anti-Nazi." Since Captain Tropschuh's death, eight other prisoners had been transferred after convincing the new camp administration that their lives were in danger because of their anti-Nazi sympathies.⁶⁴

⁵⁷ *Kansan*, 28 October 1943.

⁵⁸ *Clyde Republican*, 28 October 1943.

⁵⁹ *Concordia Blade-Empire*, 7 January 1944.

⁶⁰ Teufel, 40.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

⁶² *Kansan*, 13 January 1944.

⁶³ *Clyde Republican*, 20 January 1944.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

Kettner was a veteran of both Stalingrad and North Africa.⁶⁵ He was also a Catholic from the Tyrol.⁶⁶ Tyrolean Catholics had been vocal and demonstrative in their resistance to the Nazi curtailment of their religious freedom, actually increasing church attendance and sometimes even winning the support of their local Nazi elite.⁶⁷ After the German defeat at Stalingrad, Nazi officials reported a resurgence of Austrian patriotism and a marked increase of anti-Nazi graffiti in the Tyrol.⁶⁸ Had Kettner received news from home, or read of events in his homeland in the American newspapers available to the prisoners? We will never know.

What we do know is that Private Kettner left a suicide note to his wife and fourteen-year-old son, closing with the words, "Long live Austria."⁶⁹ Why did he take his own life? Did the horrors of Stalingrad, of North Africa, of his situation at Camp Concordia, combine to extinguish his will to live? Or did he believe his death would spare his family from Nazi retribution for his treason? Whatever his motivation, the desperation of his final act would spark a firestorm.

State and local newspapers announced Kettner's death with sensational headlines. Quickly linking the Tropschuh suicide to Kettner's, the print media recognized what Sterling had not. "War Captives Live in Terror of Nazi Wrath," trumpeted the *Wichita Beacon*, revealing that Seventh Services Command had launched an investigation. The article also noted that, as in the case of Tropschuh, the prisoners refused to participate in Kettner's funeral.⁷⁰ Unlike Colonel Sterling, Colonel Volke refused the German demand that Kettner be buried outside the cemetery boundary. Private Kettner was buried within the cemetery margin with full military honors rendered by American personnel.⁷¹

The story was too big for Kansas and in March 1944 the *Kansan* reported that the Camp Concordia incidents had appeared in a "very complete story" in the *London Daily Mail* newspaper. The same issue of the *Kansan* reported that American enlisted men in New Guinea were both "amused and irked" at the attention generated by the camp's incidents.⁷²

Col. G. S. Pierce conducted the Seventh Services Command investigation. Although Colonel Pierce could find no definitive proof that the two victims were actually murdered, he believed that the two men were coerced and bullied into their final act.⁷³ Forty-four German officers were transferred out of the camp by February 1945.⁷⁴ Included in this group was the Senior German Spokesman, Colonel Koester.⁷⁵ These men were taken to a camp at Alva, Oklahoma, reserved for hard-core Nazis.⁷⁶

⁶⁵ *Concordia Blade-Empire*, 11 January 1944.

⁶⁶ *Kansan*, 13 January 1944.

⁶⁷ Evan Burr Bukey, *Hitler's Austria: Popular Sentiment in the Nazi Era 1938-1945* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 165.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 192.

⁶⁹ *Clyde Republican*, 20 January 1944.

⁷⁰ *Wichita Beacon*, 13 January 1944.

⁷¹ Teufel, 35.

⁷² *Kansan*, 16 March 1944.

⁷³ *New York Herald Tribune*, 6 July 1944.

⁷⁴ *Concordia Blade-Empire*, 28 February 1945.

⁷⁵ Al Purdy, Concordia, Kansas, to Cloud County Historical Museum, Concordia, Kansas, 22 October 1995, transcript in hand of Cloud County Historical Museum, Camp Concordia folder, Concordia, Kansas.

⁷⁶ *Concordia Blade-Empire*, 28 February 1945.

Colonel Eduard Waltenberger replaced Koester and earned the respect of both the Americans and the prisoners.⁷⁷ By October 1944 *Colliers* magazine was reporting that the camp once known as the nation's worst now rated as one of the best.⁷⁸ The magazine gave most of the credit for the turnabout to Colonel Volke and his no nonsense attitude. They quoted his blueprint for success in dealing with prisoners of war. "You don't bargain with them. You tell them. And they respect you for it. I am not a missionary. I am a soldier."⁷⁹

The Nazi influence was never totally eradicated at Camp Concordia. In April 1945, just days before the Nazi Fuhrer took his own life and his Third Reich collapsed in surrender, over 100 prisoners were caught celebrating Hitler's birthday. The prisoners had asked for, and been denied, permission for this celebration.⁸⁰ As they well knew, the regime that had cost them, their comrades, and their homeland so much was disappearing in death and destruction but they could not refrain from reasserting their loyalty.

It is an all too common misperception that the average German soldier was only "doing his duty" in World War II and bore little if any loyalty to Hitler or his regime. This idea does not stand up under close scrutiny. As historian Stephen Fritz points out in his book, *Frontsoldaten*:

As Hegel long ago pointed out, men will fight to defend ideas much more readily than material interests, an insight given renewed validity by an examination of the behavior of the average *Landser*. From the German perspective, World War II . . . was the ultimate ideological war . . . the staying power of the average German soldier, his sense of seriousness and purpose—which often went beyond sacrifice, courage, and resolution to fanaticism—depended in large measure on the conviction that National Socialist Germany had redeemed the failures of World War I . . . he committed unspeakable acts of aggression and destruction, at the same time being consumed himself, both physically and spiritually, by the machine of war.⁸¹

The machine of war consumed all of Camp Concordia's dead. No doubt it also consumed the spirit of many of the camp's survivors. In 1995 the city of Concordia hosted a reunion for the camp. As part of the celebration Lowell May drove six of the visiting Germans to Fort Riley to visit the graves of those who had died there. The graves had been removed to Fort Riley after Camp Concordia was closed.

Mr. May had purchased small bouquets so that the Germans could lay them on the graves. As Willi Lelle knelt to place his bouquet on the grave of Captain Tropschuh he

⁷⁷ May, 31.

⁷⁸ It must be noted that Camp Concordia was certainly not the only POW camp to experience instances of Nazi terrorism. The *Concordia Blade - Empire* reported on March 3, 1995, that murders were also reported at Camp Hearne, Texas; Papago Park, Arizona; Camp Chaffee, Arkansas; Camp Gordon, Georgia; and Tonkawa, Oklahoma.

⁷⁹ *Colliers*, 14 October 1944, cited in Teufel, 80.

⁸⁰ May, 71.

⁸¹ Stephen G. Fritz, *Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 9-10.

broke down and wept. As Mr. Lille was helped to his feet, he cried out, "He was my friend."⁸²

Had the specter of Felix Tropschuh haunted Willi Lille for those fifty-plus years? Not one of the captain's comrades had attended his funeral. Not one of Franz Kettner's comrades stepped forth to honor his death. The questions of guilt and innocence, of complicity and participation in the deaths of these men can only be answered in the hearts of the men who survived being consumed by the machine of war.

⁸² May, interview 28 November 2004.

Fiske Hall Graduate Seminar Award*

**Moses Mendelssohn's Approach to Jewish Integration
in Light of His Reconciliation of Traditional Judaism
and Enlightenment Rationalism**

Robert J. Clark

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the eighteenth century, European Jews lived in separate communal structures at the discretion of their host countries.¹ A very few found places of influence and wealth as “court Jews” and lived as aristocrats, but their acceptance in society was limited, subject to official approval, and came at a price.² There had always been opportunities for Jews to integrate into European society, albeit not without complication, via assimilation and conversion.³ But the ability to enter the social order *as Jews* and find a place to belong without rejecting their heritage and religion proved elusive. The emergence of modern Europe posed a threat to individuals of many religious traditions, not just Jews. The rise of Enlightenment rationalism struck at the foundation of all revealed religion. But Jews, being outside the ‘Christian’ consensus, faced especially difficult obstacles in navigating the currents of contemporary thought if they sought to integrate into European society. The first Jew to achieve success in large measure in this endeavor was Moses Mendelssohn.

As a Jew living in Germany, Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) stands at a pivotal point in the history of Jewish emancipation in Europe. There were Jews before him who had access to the corridors of power in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, but Mendelssohn represents the first to be socially accepted to a significant extent within enlightened German culture without converting. He not only conformed to the culture of the German Enlightenment in many ways, but also helped shape the culture through his philosophical contributions. At the same time, Mendelssohn refused to turn away from traditional Judaism. He attempted to become a full-fledged member of society during the emergence of modern Europe, while remaining a proponent of Judaism as a revealed religion. Moreover, he sought to use his place of influence to encourage Jewish acculturation in Germany and to speak on behalf of the emancipation of Jewish people. Mendelssohn’s approach to Jewish integration, however, was primarily social and individual, in keeping with how he reconciled traditional Judaism and the German Enlightenment.

* The Fiske Hall Graduate Seminar Award is given to the graduate student with the best paper in a seminar course.

¹ See Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto. The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770-1870*, Modern Jewish History Series (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973; Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998); especially chapter II, “Ghetto Times.”

² *Ibid.* 15: “The court Jew became a ubiquitous figure in German principalities after the middle of the seventeenth century.”

³ *Ibid.* 105: “For the individual Jew, of course, there always remained one way of extricating himself from the Jewish predicament – by joining one of the Christian churches.”

MENDELSSOHN'S PUBLIC PROMINENCE

The traditional mentality of the European Jews prior to Mendelssohn's time included a kind of resignation to the incompatibility of Jewish learning and 'worldly' philosophy. This resignation contributed to Jewish cultural isolation. Alfred Jospé describes the conundrum in which a Jew found himself if he wished to enter the culture of the non-Jewish world: "The Jew could gain access to the culture of the world only by rebelling against the traditional repudiation of all mundane wisdom."⁴ It is just at this point that Mendelssohn broke the mold. He not only acquired modern German culture, but did so by means of his understanding of and contributions to the philosophy that shaped that culture. In his monumental biographical study, Alexander Altmann focuses as much on Mendelssohn's philosophy and his answers to contemporary critics as he does on the details of the events and influences of his life. Altmann states with appropriate admiration that, "Considering the state of degradation in which the Jewish population lived in eighteenth-century Germany . . . Mendelssohn's rise to fame and his acceptance into the republic of letters was an amazing feat of personal achievement."⁵ The amazing feature of Mendelssohn's achievement is that he accomplished it as an avowedly traditional Jew.

Mendelssohn has been rightly described as a rabbinic scholar, but he made his reputation in non-Jewish intellectual circles as a literary critic and philosopher. With regard to 'mundane wisdom' he was largely self-taught. He studied modern and classical languages along with mathematics, logic, and philosophy with the help of tutors while he was still a student in the yeshiva at Berlin. Later, with the help of both Gotthold Lessing and the Berlin publisher, Friedrich Nicolai, he was accepted into the inner circle of the Berlin Aufklärung. His essays, reviews, and translations earned him tremendous status among German intellectuals. According to Altmann, "The work that would establish Mendelssohn's world-wide renown and win him the title 'the German Socrates' was the dialogue [*Phaedon*], which was published in 1767."⁶ In this work, he presented Socratic wisdom from the mouth of the ancient philosopher, but in the language of the Enlightenment, that is in his own words as a modern philosopher. The work drew both praise and criticism, but was on the whole popular in intellectual circles. It demonstrates Mendelssohn's unique ability as a Jew to be comfortable in the realm of both classical and enlightened philosophy, not to mention languages. David Sorkin remarks, "What is ironic is that Mendelssohn was known and revered as much for the quality of his prose as for his thought."⁷

The favorable comparison made by Lessing between the quintessential German poet, Goethe, and Mendelssohn is a mark of the esteem in which he was held. "[Lessing] told Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi that once Goethe regained his reason, he would be hardly more than an ordinary man. At the very same time he said of Mendelssohn that he was the most lucid thinker, the most excellent philosopher, and the best literary critic of the century."⁸ While this is admittedly the opinion of an ally against a philosophical opponent, it represents nonetheless the

⁴ Alfred Jospé, Introduction to *Moses Mendelssohn, Selections from His Writings*. The Jewish Heritage Classics Series, ed. and trans. by Eva Jospé (New York: The Viking Press, 1975), p. 8.

⁵ Alexander Altmann, *Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study* (University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1973), p. 194.

⁶ *Ibid.* 140.

⁷ David Sorkin, *Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), p. xx.

⁸ Altmann 73 cf. Jeffrey S. Librett, *The Rhetoric of Cultural Dialogue: Jews and Germans from Moses Mendelssohn to Richard Wagner and Beyond*, Cultural Memory in the Present Series (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 28. Librett describes Jacobi as "the irrationalist-empiricist opponent of Lessing and Mendelssohn."

standing that ‘Moses of Dessau’ was able to attain in eighteenth century Berlin. According to Sorkin, “Mendelssohn consequently became a landmark on Berlin’s cultural landscape.”⁹

MEDELSSOHN’S ENVIRONMENT OF TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS

Mendelssohn’s achievement could not have been possible without an environment that fostered some degree of religious toleration. Europe was dominantly ‘Christian’ in both thought and symbol in the eighteenth century, and Germany was no exception. As noted above, Jews lived under the protection of local authorities who permitted them residence. The Reformation, the devastation of the Thirty Years War, and most recently the rise of Enlightenment thinking had gone a long way, however, to loosening the grip of institutional Christianity on society. In the intellectual milieu of the German Enlightenment, Mendelssohn found sufficient toleration to achieve an unprecedented level of personal integration as a Jew.

Fritz Bamberger explains the intellectual roots of Enlightenment tolerance:

The philosophy of those [enlightened] men was rooted in their belief in the sovereignty of reason, that is to say, in the view that man can autonomously develop all notions of truth . . . for leading a rational and happy life. This fundamental capacity, possessed by all men, makes the demand for tolerance self-evident, and the fact that . . . man can arrive at a universal religion, through his own rather than through revealed ideas, makes the problem of particular religions, and of membership in them, irrelevant from the perspective of philosophy.¹⁰

Intellectuals of the German Enlightenment (especially in Berlin) formed a kind of social elite that prided itself in open-minded if spirited debate. They created socio-literary or socio-philosophic clubs (both formal and informal) and met in homes, coffeehouses, salons, and for some of Mendelssohn’s closest friends, an inspiring garden in a private residence.¹¹ In such a climate, Mendelssohn’s personable qualities enabled him to intermingle with his non-Jewish and even converted counterparts quite amiably. “It was this friendly, civilized tolerance of diversity that enabled Mendelssohn to feel at home and relaxed in the world of German letters.”¹² He not only possessed an exceptional intellect as a philosopher, but was a sensitive social being as well. This combination seems incongruous with the common stereotype of those making up an intelligentsia, but Mendelssohn’s sociability served him well in gaining acceptance among the German *literati*.

In fact, Mendelssohn was a model of toleration himself. He believed that “knowledge that promotes virtue and does not contradict the laws of nature or deny God’s being is to be respected” regardless of the source (whether Christian, Jewish, or otherwise).¹³ He demonstrated this practically on numerous occasions. Two examples will suffice. In his autobiographical notes, Mendelssohn’s close friend Nicolai recalls the “happy relations” the former enjoyed with one Friedrich Gabriel Resewitz, describing them as “intimate friends.” Altmann points out, “The

⁹ Sorkin xx.

¹⁰ Fritz Bamberger, “Mendelssohn’s Concept of Judaism,” in *Studies in Jewish Thought, An Anthology of German Jewish Scholarship*, ed. Alfred Jospe (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), p. 346.

¹¹ Altmann 66, 74 cf. Katz 56.

¹² Altmann 199.

¹³ Sorkin 59.

fact that Resewitz was the son of a baptized Jew apparently did not bother Mendelssohn.¹⁴ On a different level, Mendelssohn was known to express both objectivity and leniency with regard to those who evidenced obvious hostility toward the Jewish community. An example would be his repudiation of attacks against Olaf Gerhard Tychsen in a dispute over a collection of Hebrew manuscripts of the Bible in 1774. Mendelssohn validated Tychsen's critical review of the collection even though he knew well that only five years before the critic had sought punitive action by the state against the Jews of Altona for alleged "complicity in the defamation of Christian holidays."¹⁵

Mendelssohn, however, could not have been entirely at home in German society. Integration requires both individual efforts and acceptance (social) of which Mendelssohn is a fine example, and public efforts and acceptance (legal) of which he could not make the effect he desired. The majority of his life was lived in Berlin under the rule of Frederick the Great. This monarch "made Berlin the capital of the German Enlightenment" but had an "attitude toward the Jews [that] was anything but enlightened."¹⁶ When in 1771, Berlin's most famous Jew was recommended for membership as a philosopher by the Royal Academy, the King vetoed the appointment for no other reason than anti-Jewish sentiment. The Academy later omitted Mendelssohn from a replacement list of three names submitted. The post remained vacant for twelve years.¹⁷ Like other Jews in Germany, Mendelssohn had to appeal, sometimes through personal relationships with Gentiles like Thomas Abbt, for freedom of movement and settlement. He was constantly aware of his legal limitations as a Jew. When Johann Lavater publicly challenged him to either refute the superior rationality of Christianity or convert, he felt compelled to seek the Berlin consistory's permission before replying. Again, Altmann summarizes: "Well he knew that the liberal spirit was still a tender plant, that it had not really succeeded in detheologizing the intellectual atmosphere even of the Enlightenment."¹⁸

MENDELSSOHN'S RECONCILIATION OF TRADITIONAL JUDAISM & ENLIGHTENMENT RATIONALISM

The public challenge of Lavater in 1769 presented Mendelssohn with a dilemma. To this point, he had studiously avoided any direct expression of his religious convictions in German. Sorkin describes Mendelssohn's compartmentalization of philosophy in German and religion in Hebrew as "public dualism." This, he accurately states, "was the offspring of his parlous position as a Jew" and was not uncommon, since "[f]or centuries European Jews had maintained a clear division of language and style between apologetic works for non-Jews and those for fellow Jews."¹⁹ To break his silence now risked going beyond the limits of Enlightenment toleration, while refusing to answer Lavater would suggest that he was unable to defend himself.

Mendelssohn's reply was judicious, restrained and philosophical, rather than polemic. Briefly summarized, he framed his answer to Lavater in the categories of natural (rational) religion and Enlightenment toleration. He affirmed his personal commitment to Judaism as a revealed religion for the Jews, yet evaluated it in light of the principles of natural religion rather than comparison with Christianity. In this way, he maintained the sufficiency of reason without

¹⁴ Altmann 80-81.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 286-87.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 16 cf. Michael A. Meyer, *The Origins of the Modern Jew, Jewish Identity and European Culture in Germany, 1749-1824* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967), p. 23.

¹⁷ Altmann, 264-65.

¹⁸ Altmann 199 cf. Sorkin 29.

¹⁹ For this analysis of Mendelssohn's reply to Lavater, see Sorkin 26-28.

discarding the legitimacy of revelation. He argued that philosophy was indifferent to revealed or 'positive' religion. As to Lavater's challenge itself, Mendelssohn argued for the inherent tolerance found in Judaism in that it "possessed no conversionary impulse." Thus, he skirted the question of Christianity's superiority, affirmed the rationality of Judaism, and turned the tables on Lavater to admonish him to enlightened tolerance. Having observed the exchange, Nicolai wrote in a letter to Lavater: "You wished that he not remain a Jew; he had no objection to your remaining a Christian." Nicolai's comment is representative of the general response from enlightened intellectuals. Lavater's public challenge had provoked a reaction against his perceived intolerance and discourtesy regardless of the merits of his case. For Mendelssohn, the outcome was as good as could be expected, considering the tight spot in which the challenge had placed him at first. Still, the debate had taken its toll, physically and psychologically. As a result, Mendelssohn began a phase of life in which "grew the desire to serve his people" and during which he articulated more clearly his views on philosophy and religion.²⁰ He wrote an essay in Hebrew on the immortality of the soul in 1769. In the 1770s & 1780s, he translated and commented on a number of books of the Hebrew Bible, including the Pentateuch, and translated into German with an introduction a defense of the Jews originally composed in Latin in the 17th century. In 1783, he published *Jerusalem, or On Religious Power and Judaism* in German. This was the most complete expression of his views on Judaism and rationalism.

It should be noted that pressure to convert was not incongruous with enlightened times. As Jospé concludes, "It was inevitable that the Jew began to question the value and meaningfulness of traditional Judaism" in a climate of optimistic and at times extreme rationalism.²¹ Mendelssohn's seemingly complete concurrence with the philosophy of rationalism quite naturally invited Christian rationalists to expect him to eventually convert.²² Yet, this was never an option for the Jewish philosopher. Rather, "Mendelssohn was one of those rare human beings who find it possible to combine a nearly all-embracing intellectual liberalism with an uncompromising religious traditionalism."²³ The attempt to understand these "two faces" of Mendelssohn has set the parameters for much of the historiography on his life.²⁴ Only a basic description of his reconciliation of the two is possible and needed here to lay a foundation for analyzing the social nature of his approach to Jewish integration.

First, one must recognize that Mendelssohn's commitment to traditional Judaism was unwavering. Throughout his career as a philosopher, he continued to write in Hebrew and publish hymns and sermons for use in Jewish synagogues. These were not entirely divorced from the German realm in which he moved. For example, when Prussia became embroiled in military conflict with Austria and Saxony, Mendelssohn composed in Hebrew and then translated into German a special prayer to be used daily by the Jews of Berlin.²⁵ Later that year, he wrote a sermon delivered by another and then translated it, too. It is considered the earliest known specimen of modern Jewish preaching in the German language. As early as 1755 he used his short-lived Hebrew weekly *Kohelet Mussar* (Preacher of Morals) to deplore the abandonment of Hebrew among Jews. Altmann notes, "It was characteristic of his loyalty to Jewish tradition that he advocated a return to biblical Hebrew precisely at the moment at which he had become a

²⁰ Altmann 268.

²¹ A. Jospé, *Selections* 10.

²² Alexander Altmann, Introduction to *Jerusalem, or On Religious Power and Judaism* by Moses Mendelssohn, Allan Arkush, trans. (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1983), p. 6.

²³ E. Jospé, *Selections* vii cf. A. Eisen, *Rethinking Modern Judaism: Ritual, Commandment, Community* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 42. Eisen implies the struggle it entailed for Mendelssohn "to ensure space [for himself] in the modern world."

²⁴ Sorkin xvii.

²⁵ Altmann, *Biographical Study* 67 cf. Meyer 24.

full-fledged member of the circle of German literati.²⁶ Another example of Mendelssohn's convictions with regard to traditionalism is his fervor for strict adherence to the Masoretic text of the Hebrew Bible. This, asserts Sorkin, "testifies to the conservative nature of his exegesis."²⁷ Moreover, Mendelssohn stood "in principled opposition to the mainstream Enlightenment view of the Bible" when he defended all forms of traditional Jewish interpretation (hermeneutical methods).²⁸ His competence in and reliance on medieval Jewish exegesis marks him as a traditional Jew, and the Jewish community of his day accepted his standing among them. A testimony to this acceptance by the Jewish community of Berlin was the honor paid him in 1771 when he was made eligible for the honorary position of *parnass* (elder) by suspending in his case the strict rules governing the election of communal dignitaries.²⁹ The reluctance of later traditional Jews to embrace Mendelssohn as a historical representative of their position stands in contrast to his ability to personally ingratiate himself to contemporary traditionalists.

Second, one must accept that Mendelssohn saw no incompatibility between traditional Judaism and German Enlightenment philosophy.³⁰ There are a number of ways in which he reconciled the two. Mendelssohn thought that the ideas of a universal religion, in keeping with philosophy, could be found in Judaism, too. By recognizing such, Mendelssohn distinguished between religion and Judaism. "He equates Judaism with law, and demonstrates that Judaism's legislation, which is its essence, does not concern truths or convictions."³¹ Eternal truths are, on the contrary, the stock and trade of reason. "This [Sinaitic] revelation, he points out adds nothing to the sum total of natural religion insofar as truths are concerned." As a result, no conflict exists between revelation and reason. Revelation "is of a practical nature, is *Halakhah*, ordinances for conduct, not mysteries of the faith."³² This line of argument spawned numerous debates about Mendelssohn's meaning and accuracy. Regardless of one's view of the merits of this argument, Mendelssohn's view is essential for a proper understanding of his approach to Jewish integration. "The distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge here is of cardinal importance since it lays the foundation for universal belief in God."³³ Such universal belief is an important tenet in Mendelssohn's basis for Jewish integration into Europe's Christian society. There could be mutual respect and acceptance socially because "revealed laws" were only "binding upon the Jews" and Judaism recognized those who were "pious among the Gentiles."³⁴ Whereas Maimonides restricted this description only to those who acknowledged the Hebrew Scriptures, Mendelssohn disagreed. Natural religion based upon reason "sufficed for the ultimate happiness of all men."³⁵

This is not to say that Mendelssohn had any doubts concerning the reality of Hebrew revelation or of the significance of the expectations of the Mosaic Law. In spite of the attacks of contemporary historical-critical views of the Bible, Mendelssohn held that belief requires certainty, and he found such certainty in "the historical facts of the Exodus, the public revelation at Sinai, and the chosenness of Israel."³⁶ As Altmann puts it, "Mendelssohn's cast of mind was

²⁶ Altmann, *Biographical Study* 87-88 cf. 18.

²⁷ Sorkin 43.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 38 cf. 66, 77.

²⁹ Altmann, *Biographical Study* 272.

³⁰ Bamberger 347 cf. Sorkin 9. Librett agrees: "[...] in some of his earliest works in German . . . Mendelssohn attempts to demonstrate . . . that Judaism is compatible with rational spirit." Librett 31.

³¹ Bamberger 356.

³² Altmann, *Jerusalem* 19.

³³ Sorkin 59.

³⁴ Altmann, *Biographical Study* 294 cf. Meyer 38.

³⁵ Altmann 200.

³⁶ Sorkin 79.

strictly conservative, and he had no intention of twisting *Halakhah* to suit modern ideas.³⁷ For Mendelssohn, revealed wisdom surpassed and complimented philosophy. “He asserted that without Torah and tradition we are ‘like a blind man in the dark.’”³⁸ In other words, he saw limits to the usefulness of theoretical reason. Human philosophy presupposed divine revelation and thus depended on God; therefore, revelation demonstrated the limits of philosophy.

On the other hand, he depended upon his reason to guide him in determining which practical conduct is genuinely required by revelation. For example, Mendelssohn interceded on behalf of the Altona Jewish community in 1769 concerning the tradition of early burial that conflicted with enlightened practice and was thus threatened with abolishment by Duke Friedrich. While he successfully argued the case with the duke by showing that early burial could coincide with the dictates of reason, providing a medical certificate of death was obtained first, he also privately confronted the community leaders about the practice.³⁹ His dedication to Enlightenment philosophy caused him to sincerely question the conscientiousness of early burial. Moreover, he felt that a case could be made in Jewish tradition for delaying burial in obedience to a political sovereign’s edict. This points to one more important aspect of his reconciliation of Judaism and enlightened philosophy that applies to his approach to integration (and eventual emancipation). Revelation, while binding upon the individual Jew, did not apply to non-Jews. Thus, Mendelssohn’s acceptance of Hebrew revelation did not prevent him from building social bridges to non-Jews who did not follow Jewish regulations. Nor did he expect gentile governments among whom the Jewish ‘nation’ resided to conform to the standards of Hebrew revelation. Torah was utterly irrelevant to political matters as a result of the Jews’ dispersion. In declaring this, he was ‘privatizing’ Judaism as a religious tradition and denying any threat that Jews might be construed to pose to the state. “He thus renounced any presumption to Jewish political leadership, let alone sovereignty.”⁴⁰ Such a position on Hebrew revelation removed a potentially serious obstacle to Jewish emancipation.

MENDELSSOHN’S SOCIAL APPROACH TO INTEGRATION

Much has been made of the religion versus philosophy question in Mendelssohn’s reconciliation of revelation and reason, but not enough of its impact on his individual, social approach to validating his convictions as a conservative, traditional Jew. Even a cursory reading of Altmann’s biography of Mendelssohn yields the unmistakable impression that this man was very relationally oriented. But beyond mere personality, he obtained, refined, and defended his ideas in the context of intense and usually affectionate personal relationships. The extent of his emotional attachment to non-Jewish intellectual compatriots can be measured in the degree of loss he felt at the parting of their company, whether this be Lessing’s departure from Berlin or the “untimely death” of his friend, Abbt.⁴¹ Another measure is the way in which he handled the bitter disappointment of missing out on being appointed to membership in the Royal Academy in Berlin. His public response indicated that the most important thing to Mendelssohn was that the intellectual elite, with many of whom he had established personal as well as professional relationships, had elected him. His personal fulfillment in the knowledge of this acceptance was great.

³⁷ Altmann, *Biographical Study* 293.

³⁸ Sorkin 19 cf. 8.

³⁹ Altmann, *Biographical Study* 287-90. Compare Mendelssohn’s similar arguments put to the Mecklenburg-Schwerin community. Sorkin 95-98.

⁴⁰ Sorkin 96.

⁴¹ Altmann, *Biographical Study* 139-140.

Non-Jews also acknowledged his winsome personality. Altmann suggests that despite the remarkable acceptance afforded him as a Jew, “the practice of absolute tolerance vis-à-vis this outstanding and amiable man demanded no great effort.”⁴² In fact, following Mendelssohn’s departure from Königsberg after a brief visit in 1777 a “farewell greeting” was published in the local gazette describing him as “a profound philosopher” with “a good and noble heart capable of friendship and open to all gentle sentiments associated with it.”⁴³ As one reviews his successes and challenges in adopting German culture, a pattern emerges that indicates an individual, social approach to integration, based upon tolerance and virtue.

Mendelssohn did not draw back from expressing his Jewishness in what could be a very hostile environment for Jews. For example, “he did not hesitate to refer to his observance of Jewish laws and customs” when relating to non-Jews, “but he did so with grace and, sometimes with a light touch of humor so as to avoid any embarrassment.”⁴⁴ Embarrassment, that is, of non-Jewish Germans who would regard Jewish distinctiveness with discomfort. In this way Mendelssohn utilized his social skills to make a place for himself as a Jew in German society. He handled conflict with similar deftness socially. Upon hearing that he had won the Royal Academy’s prize for his essay in 1763 (Kant took a close second), Mendelssohn penned a letter to his friend, Abbt, who also competed for the prize with arguments contrary to Mendelssohn’s on the same subject and lost. In it he wrote, “We have to settle the dispute between ourselves. If I fail to convince you it will be sufficient proof that my arguments lack the evidence desired.”⁴⁵ This shows a remarkable sensitivity to his friend in the midst of the victory of his own ideas. In the discussion with leaders of the Altona Jewish community on the advisability of resisting change in burial traditions, Mendelssohn was rebuked sharply by a prominent Talmudic scholar (Rabbi Jacob Emden). Following an exchange of letters on the subject in which neither side convinced the other, Mendelssohn had succeeded in maintaining his “personal relationship” with his opponent. It was subsequently clear that the earlier disagreement had left no hard feelings.⁴⁶ Likewise, commenting on Mendelssohn’s letter of reply to the Crown Prince of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel in 1770, Michael Meyer concludes that he “succeeded in expressing his true point of view [critiquing Christianity] without antagonizing the prince. Thereafter the friendship between them continued and even grew stronger.”⁴⁷ Again, Mendelssohn’s social approach to bridging the gap between Judaism and enlightened German culture proved effective.

The social element in Mendelssohn’s personal integration with German culture was in keeping with his reconciliation of religion and philosophy. That man is a social being is actually an important theme of his commentary on the Pentateuch. Mendelssohn also emphasized man’s freedom in his writings. “Freedom required man to act ethically, which meant to strive for perfection in imitation of God.”⁴⁸ This is significant, because Mendelssohn also held that “In solitude man can fulfill his obligations neither to God nor to his fellowmen; sociability is essential to the development of the faculties [...]”⁴⁹ His application of this principle was involved in his efforts to speak to the ‘Jewish question.’ He gave a glimpse into his approach to Jewish integration when he wrote, “I hoped to refute the contempt in which the Jews are held not through polemics but through virtue.”⁵⁰ The impact of virtue is only efficacious on a personal,

⁴² Ibid. 195.

⁴³ Cited in Altmann, *Biographical Study* 307.

⁴⁴ Ibid. 195.

⁴⁵ Quoted in Ibid. 117.

⁴⁶ Ibid. 292.

⁴⁷ Meyer 36-37.

⁴⁸ Sorkin 10 cf. 61.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 121.

⁵⁰ Mendelssohn, cited in Ibid. 26.

relational level. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Mendelssohn intended the display of personal virtue to be a method by which other Jews might seek to become full-fledged members of European society. Meyer argues that Mendelssohn wanted to prove most of all that “a Jew could be virtuous.”⁵¹

MENDELSSOHN'S ADVOCACY FOR JEWS AND JEWISH EMANCIPATION

Understanding that Mendelssohn's approach to integration was social rather than programmatic helps explain why this great model of Jewish integration entered the broader debate about the place of Jews in society only reluctantly. Bamberger observes, “Until Lavater's attempt to convert him, apologetic considerations . . . play no role in his writings.”⁵² The general politicization of German life in the 1770s and 1780s was instrumental in drawing Mendelssohn to contribute to the political debate concerning Jewish rights. Before this, his efforts had been limited to periodic advocacy on behalf of Jewish communities before Gentile rulers and to attempts to persuade Jews to end their cultural isolation and enter modernity.

Mention has already been made of Jewish communities that sought Mendelssohn's aid in legal disputes.⁵³ He did so using Enlightenment ideas. In this sense, “Mendelssohn's ability to intercede was unprecedented, since it rested on his prominence as a philosopher and a man of letters. The authority he brought to his office was intellectual and moral, and from the start he employed Enlightenment categories.”⁵⁴ More significant, however, was his attempt to close the divide between modern German culture and the Jewish ghetto. In his Hebrew writings (obviously directed toward a Jewish audience), Mendelssohn sought “to make the culture of the modern world accessible and acceptable to the Jews.”⁵⁵

One way in which Mendelssohn worked toward that end was by encouraging Jews to use proper Hebrew and proper German rather than Yiddish, which made them appear to fit the negative European stereotype of Jews. “The Judeo-German jargon symbolized for Mendelssohn . . . that foreignness and illegitimacy which is the sad mark of the pariah.”⁵⁶ He rightly determined that language was critical to the acquisition of culture, and he applied that to both the reform of traditional Jewish culture (Hebrew) and the adoption of modern European culture (German). He also sought to use his writings to introduce Jews to philosophy. This required a more delicate approach than he employed in exhorting the study of language, for he had to suit his methods to his audience in order to succeed. Among his earliest attempts to inform Jewish readers was the Hebrew weekly, *Kohelet Mussar*. “This example . . . demonstrates how Mendelssohn transformed the genre to suit his own purposes: whereas the German moral weekly purveyed natural philosophy, Mendelssohn used this forum to offer a revealed, if entirely reasonable, Judaism.”⁵⁷ One can see the subtlety and restraint with which he began to introduce philosophic ideas to a traditional Jewish readership. Later he used the traditional Jewish format of commentary to convey Enlightenment ideas. These he placed alongside new translations of the Bible into German for new Jewish-German readers. This had the additional import of

⁵¹ Meyer 18 cf. 39: Meyer recognizes Mendelssohn's intention of setting an example when he says that the Lavater affair “forced him to realize the insufficiency of merely setting an example.”

⁵² Bamberger 345 cf. Sorkin 46.

⁵³ To the previous examples could be added his appeal to the king “asking exemption from a duty [billeting] that had become irksome to many Berlin residents.” Altmann 158.

⁵⁴ Sorkin 95. See also Eisen 42 and Altmann, *Essays in Jewish Intellectual History* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1981), pp. 155ff.

⁵⁵ A. Jospé, *Selections* 3.

⁵⁶ Meyer 44.

⁵⁷ Sorkin 16.

reintroducing the study of the Bible into traditional Jewish scholarship. “Mendelssohn felt a new translation was needed to lead his people back to the sources of their inspiration, to reacquaint them with the Bible’s moral vision, and challenge them with its ethical demands in order to help elevate their moral tone and spiritual level.”⁵⁸ This does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Mendelssohn advocated a “regeneration for rights” strategy of emancipation. His primary concern throughout most of his life was that Jews be accepted socially on the basis of individual virtue, not that they be accepted legally in reward for some corporate transformation. That strategy came only later and the idea of such an approach was clearly rejected by Mendelssohn and contrary to his approach to integration.⁵⁹

Notwithstanding his efforts to convey Enlightenment ideas to Jewish readers, Mendelssohn never published a specifically philosophical work in the Hebrew language during his lifetime. In 1767 he expressed the need for such a work in a letter to Raphael Levi, but the question at hand involved translating his *Phaedon* and Mendelssohn believed “it would no longer be intelligible in a Hebrew version.”⁶⁰ Two years later he wrote a philosophical treatise in Hebrew on the immortality of the soul. *The Book of the Soul* (*Sefer HaNefesh*) is made up of “two systematic expositions” in contrast to his other works in Hebrew that take the form of commentary.⁶¹ Though he had opportunity, Mendelssohn did not submit it for publication. It may be significant that Mendelssohn’s only “direct philosophical exposition” in Hebrew was withheld from publication until after his death. Could it be evidence that Mendelssohn was reluctant to interject philosophy into Judaism too directly? Sorkin notes the importance of this work, calling it “the exception [to commentary as the standard Jewish form employed by Mendelssohn] that proves the rule.” Why was it withheld by the author? It could be construed as evidence of insincerity in Mendelssohn’s commitment to traditional Judaism – that his general use of commentary was only a ploy to introduce to traditional Jews a destructive rationalism for which he had truest affinity. But this is untenable. It might also be suggested that the author’s reluctance to publish sprung from fear of antagonizing Jewish conservatives, among whose number he wished to be counted. This is possible, but again unlikely. He often displayed a willingness to risk the disdain of traditionalists for the sake of advancing Judaism into the modern world as a reasonable religion.⁶² Rather, Mendelssohn’s decision to delay publication seems to have resulted from a wise assessment of the book’s Jewish ‘audience’ and the most acceptable and effective means to his goal. He proceeded as a social being rather than as an ideologue, sensitive to the feelings of others rather than focused on his agenda alone. This explanation is confirmed by Sorkin:

However appropriate Mendelssohn thought the contents were for his fellow Jews, the form of the works assumed an audience for philosophy in Hebrew which simply did not exist in the 1760s. Whatever Mendelssohn’s reasons for withholding *The*

⁵⁸ A. Jospe, *Selections* 15 cf. Sorkin 33: “From as early as the sixteenth century the Bible had disappeared as an independent subject from the curriculum of baroque Judaism [...]”

⁵⁹ Altmann, *Essays* 163-64: “...Mendelssohn saw no incompatibility between civil admission and the preservation of the Jews’ separate identity as a nation.” See also Sorkin 149-50. Meyer seems to present an opposing view, but without convincing argument. Meyer 46.

⁶⁰ Altmann, *Biographical Study* 179.

⁶¹ See Sorkin 15-22.

⁶² E.g. Mendelssohn is warned by Emden that if he persists in defending a change in burial tradition he will suffer “derision” from the Jewish community. Altmann, *Biographical Study* 292-93.

Book of the Soul from publication, then, the fact that he did so fully accorded with the pattern of his published work in Hebrew.⁶³

Eventually, Mendelssohn did contribute to the political debate concerning Jewish rights. When he did so, it was with characteristic influence. Sorkin represents the majority opinion that it was Mendelssohn's realization of the "promise of a new relationship with the absolutist state" that brought him into the discussion on emancipation and "away from his original agenda of intellectual renewal of Judaism."⁶⁴ While this undoubtedly contributed to his shift into the broader public arena, it seems an insufficient explanation. Mendelssohn did directly advocate the acceptance of Jews in society and the granting of rights in *Jerusalem*, but even here his views were not expressed voluntarily, as it were, and he stopped short of direct argument in favor of emancipation.⁶⁵ On the contrary, both the impulse and the structure of his work were in response to a pamphlet by August Cranz. In it, Cranz challenged Mendelssohn, once again, to convert or state his views in defense of Judaism. Thus, one sees that Mendelssohn's approach was motivated by *relational* concerns.⁶⁶ He used the opportunity to articulate a case for a radical change in the relationship between Jews and the state. Again, there are indications that his focus on renewal without departing from traditional Judaism was a factor in his work. Librett notes that between 1770 and 1830 German Jews experienced a virtual epidemic of conversions. The highest rate of increase came during the time that Mendelssohn wrote his *Jerusalem*. With insightful analysis, he concludes: "if Mendelssohn argues in *Jerusalem* both that orthodox [sic] Judaism is utterly compatible with rationality and that Jews should not have the right to excommunicate other Jews, then he is clearly countering tendencies toward assimilation and conversion [...]."⁶⁷ In other words, Mendelssohn may not have seen his move into the political debate as such a stark contrast to his earlier agenda of affecting "inner liberation through cultural integration."⁶⁸ By denying Judaism's traditional right to excommunicate he sought to address two needs without sacrificing either his commitment to Judaism or modern philosophy. His affirmation of powers to the state served to entice approval of Jewish emancipation without the demand of conversion. His affirmation of individual rights served to encourage integration without having to deny Judaism through radical assimilation.

CONCLUSION

Mendelssohn's attempt to synthesize the worlds of traditional Judaism and Enlightenment rationalism is illustrative of Jewish efforts to deal with the convergence of their religion and the Enlightenment as they sought to enter modern society. Coming from an extremely traditional and marginalized segment of society, their path was especially difficult. His monumental efforts to both pull and push for Jewish entry into modernity and their limited effectiveness in securing true integration for Jews other than himself serve as a measure of the degree of this difficulty.⁶⁹

⁶³ Sorkin 24.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.* 146.

⁶⁵ Altmann, *Essays* 159: "While leaving no doubt that he considered discrimination . . . to be void of all legality, he was content to state his view without pleading the case of civil admission. It was an attitude worthy of a philosopher."

⁶⁶ Librett 32 cf. Sorkin 120.

⁶⁷ Librett 44-45.

⁶⁸ A. Jospé, *Selections* 3.

⁶⁹ Eisen 48. Mendelssohn's efforts were unsuccessful according to Eisen's analysis of "Jewish practice in all the theories of modernity" throughout the 19th century and "to a remarkable and disturbing degree" in 20th century theories.

Nevertheless, Mendelssohn's model of integration should not be viewed as obsolete. On the contrary, his individual and social approach to integration, while maintaining a strong anchor in traditional Judaism was the only 'reasonable' path for proponents of revealed religion. Legal emancipation cannot precede social integration, lest the progress of integration be stunted and suffer along a difficult path. This is exactly the pattern that emerged for Jews on the continent in contrast to the experience of English Jewry.⁷⁰ And, whatever the criticism of an individual social approach to integration, every critic must overcome one tremendous defense of Mendelssohn's method: his own amazing success.⁷¹

⁷⁰ See Todd M. Endelman, *The Jews of Georgian England, 1714-1830; Tradition and Change in a Liberal Society* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999).

⁷¹ Sorkin 149: "Mendelssohn was not only German Jewry's 'patron saint' but also the 'ideal figure' of its subculture" (cf. A. Jospe, *Selections* 5).