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

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LETTER FROM THE FACULTY EDITOR

AFTER A DECADE OF SERVING AS THE FACULTY EDITOR OF *THE FAIRMOUNT FOLIO* I HAVE HAD THE DISTINCT PLEASURE OF WORKING WITH OVER 45 EXCELLENT STUDENTS, AS AUTHORS AND EDITORS. IT HAS NOT BEEN EASY FOR THEM TO GET THEIR WORK PUBLISHED. THE SUBMITTED PAPERS WERE WRITTEN AS PART OF GRADUATE SEMINARS, AN UNDERGRADUATE WRITING COURSE AND A NUMBER OF UPPER DIVISION COURSES. AS PART OF THE PROCESS THE PAPERS WERE JUDGED BY A FACULTY EDITORIAL BOARD, JUST AS MANY SCHOLARLY HISTORY JOURNALS CHOOSE WHICH PAPERS TO PUBLISH. OUR EDITORIAL BOARDS WERE COMPOSED USUALLY OF THREE FACULTY MEMBERS AND A STUDENT. THE PROCESS IS STRENUOUS RESULTING IN A VERY COMPETITIVE PROCESS.

OFTEN, AS IN THIS VOLUME SOME ARTICLES HAVE A BANNER INDICATING THEY HAVE WON AWARDS. THE FINAL TWO ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE ARE HERE AS A RESULT OF HAVING BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE HISTORY FACULTY FOR CONSIDERATION FOR A NUMBER OF PAPER AWARDS GIVEN BY THE DEPARTMENT. WHILE THESE PAPERS HAVE NOT GONE THROUGH *THE FAIRMOUNT FOLIO* BOARD, OR EDITING, THEY FACED SERIOUS COMPETITION TO EARN THEIR AWARDS. OFTEN, AS IN THE CASE OF MARK SCHOCK'S ARTICLE, AFTER HIS PAPER HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCEPTED, HE SUBMITTED IT TO THE AWARD COMMITTEE AND WON.

THIS YEAR AS PART OF A REALIZATION OF THE INCREASING COMPLEXITY OF OUR TECHNICAL PROCESS I HAVE EDITED THE VOLUME ALONE. IN 1996 VOLUME ONE OF *THE FAIRMOUNT FOLIO* WAS TYPESET, AND INVOLVED A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF RUNNNING TO KINKOS. OVER THIS DECADE COMPUTERS, NEW MICROSOFT PROGRAMS, AND THE WEB HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED, YET THEY LEFT BEHIND A MYRIAD OF PROGRAMS REFLECTING MINOR ADJUSTMENTS TO THEIR SYSTEMS. IN THIS VOLUME I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DEVELOP POLICIES AND CHOOSE A NEW STRUCTURE WHICH WILL STREAMLINE THE ARDUOUS TASK OF PULLING TOGETHER FROM SIX TO TWELVE PAPERS PREPARED WITH MINUTELY DIFFERENT SOFTWARE. NEEDLESS TO SAY, DESPITE ALL ATTEMPTS SOME TECHNICAL GLICH'S WILL REMAIN. OF COURSE, ANY MISTAKES OF THIS SORT ARE MINE.

ENJOY AN EXCEPTIONALLY RICH VOLUME OF WORK.

DR. HELEN HUNDLEY
FACULTY EDITOR

FISKE HALL GRADUATE PAPER AWARD

CATHOLICISM'S MILITANT PIONEERS TO NORTH AMERICA

THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY JESUITS OF NEW FRANCE

BY
MARK P. SCHOCK

It is a romantic image endemic to the American psyche. Men possessed of an almost superhuman will to fulfill their mission. Superbly trained and motivated, physically and mentally prepared to overcome any obstacle and pay any price, including the "ultimate price" to accomplish the seemingly impossible. For a good many Americans that image is clothed in military uniform or pioneer buckskin. Outmanned and outgunned, they fight to the bitter end. But perhaps the members of the first such organization in Euro-American history were not soldiers or embattled Indian fighters at all. Yet, given the military background and early pretensions of their founder it is not surprising that they approached their mission in a military fashion. Not warriors, in fact unarmed, these men were Roman Catholic priests, members of the elite Society of Jesus, the Jesuits of New France.

These Jesuits served a foreign enemy regime, France.[1] They served a religion, Roman Catholicism, which was anathema to Britain and British North America. Despite the feelings of their British colonial contemporaries, many historians have bestowed upon these men, sometimes grudgingly, a certain level of respect. They earned this respect for their dedication, courage and sacrifice, if not always for their methods and motives, the masters they served, or the end results of their labors.

Nineteenth century American historian Francis Parkman, no proponent of French Canada or the Catholic Church, described their mission thus: "From their hovel on the St. Charles, they surveyed a field of labor whose vastness might tire the wings of thought itself; a scene repellent and appalling, darkened with omens of peril and woe."[2] Parkman described their devotion to their mission in these terms. "One great aim engrossed their lives. "For the greater glory of God"—*ad majorem Dei gloriam*—they would act or wait, dare, suffer, or die, yet all in unquestioning subjection to the authority of the Superiors, in whom they recognized the agents of Divine authority itself."[3]

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[1] Francis Parkman, France and England in North America, vol. 1, The Jesuits in North America, The Library of America Series (Boston: Little, Brown, 1880; reprint, New York: Penguin Books, 1983), 576 (page citations are to the reprint edition). Not all of the Jesuits in New France were French-born. At least one, Francisco Giuseppe Bressani, was Italian having been born in Rome.

[2] Ibid., 406.

[3] Ibid., 407.

The modern-day Canadian historian W. J. Eccles described these men and their mission in this fashion: "These men ... had only one aim, to save the souls of the Indians by converting them to Christianity. To this end they lived among them, learned their languages, devoted themselves completely, and on occasion sacrificed their lives."[4]

College of William and Mary ethnohistorian, James Axtell, explained their impact on early America in this way. "If diseases were the shock troops of the invasion of America, Christian missionaries were its commandoes, disguised in feminine black robes as members of a Peace Corps. ... Perhaps the best ... were the Jesuits. By history and design, the Society of Jesus was destined to change the American world. It was a fraternity designed for war, the greatest engine of social change."[5]

In their book, *Colonial America in an Atlantic World*, American historians T. H. Breen and Timothy Hall also chose a military metaphor to describe these men. "The Jesuits became effective foot soldiers in the campaign to reform the Church and restore people to the Catholic fold. The Jesuit "Black Robes" ... spurred a powerful new thrust of missionary outreach to the Americas, Africa, and Asia."[6]

Though not soldiers, these dedicated men were indeed the product of military-style training and discipline. The Society of Jesus was founded by a Spanish-Basque former soldier named Ignatius Loyola.[7] Born Inigo Lopez de Loyola, probably in 1491, in the Basque province of Guipuzcoa at Loyola castle,[8] Loyola was reared to tales of his family's martial glory. His grandfather, father and older brother had fought in the *Reconquista*.[9] His eldest brother had equipped and sailed a ship on Columbus's second expedition to the New World in 1493. Three years later, this same brother perished during the Spanish conquest of the Kingdom of Naples.[10] It seems only natural that Ignatius would dream of attaining his own measure of military glory. He would say of himself: '... above all he loved exercises in the use of arms, drawn by an immense desire to acquire vain honour...'[11]

As events, fate, or as he himself believed God would have it, Ignatius was not destined to achieve immortal martial glory. At the tender age of seven he received the clerical tonsure and with the help of familial influence was appointed as a page to Juan Velasquez de Cuellar,[12] the Treasurer of Castile. From there he rose to the position of gentleman-retainer to the Viceroy of Navarre,[13] the Duke of Najera, Don Antonio Manrique de Lava.[14]

His training for these positions undoubtedly included horsemanship and the use of arms. Court retainers of this period were expected to be proficient with a sword and to practice the 'affairs of honour.' This did not however make Ignatius a professional soldier.[15] Still, his

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[4] William John Eccles, The Canadian Frontier: 1534-1760, Histories of the American Frontier Series (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969; reprint, Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1999), 2 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

[5] James Axtell, Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 155.

[6] T. H. Breen and Timothy Hall, Colonial America in an Atlantic World: A Story of Creative Interaction (New York: Pearson Education, Inc., 2004), 21.

[7] Ibid.

[8] David Mitchell, The Jesuits: A History (London: Macdonald Futura Publishers, 1980; reprint, New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1981), 23 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

[9] Soldier (Jesuit Conference: Society of Jesus USA, accessed 20 November 2006); available from http://www.jesuit.org/

[10] Mitchell, 24.

[11] J. C. H. Aveling, The Jesuits (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1981), 62-63.

[12] Martin P. Harney, The Jesuits in History: The Society of Jesus Through Four Centuries (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1962), 27.

[13] Aveling, 60.

[14] Harney, 27.

[15] Ibid., 63.

service to Navarre would eventually lead to the battlefield. In 1521 he was wounded at the Battle of Pamplona and his spiritual conversion began.[16]

Ignatius' wound left him with a permanent limp and led him to search for a new direction for his life. During his long recovery he read and reflected on *The Golden Legend*, a book on the lives of the saints, and the *Life of Christ*, by the German Carthusian monk Ludolph. In *Life of Christ* he read that Christ was the true Liege Lord who beseeched his followers to serve as "holy knights" in the struggle against the Prince of Darkness, Satan.[17]

Humbled by his physical pain and deformity, Ignatius experienced remorse for his past sins and received a vision of the Virgin and Child. He made a personal vow of loyalty and chastity and contemplated a future as a monk. He traveled to the Benedictine Abbey at Montserrat in Catalonia, confessed his sins and adopted the dress of a penitent pilgrim.[18]

This proved to be the beginning of a long period of education and spiritual formation. He realized that his court training had left him with little technical knowledge and his search for this learning led him from basic education at the High School in Barcelona to universities in Spain and France. As he gained worldly knowledge he never lost sight of his true calling, the saving of souls. As he traversed Europe he preached openly and begged alms. His zeal and pilgrim dress drew the attention of the religious authorities and on more than one occasion, he was imprisoned out of fear that his teachings were just one more manifestation of the amateur unorthodox fervor that swept across Europe following the Reformation.[19]

He experimented with different monastic orders but failed to find the satisfaction he yearned for. It was during this period that he wrote his *Spiritual Exercises* which would become a cornerstone of Jesuit training and teaching. As he drew attention and opposition, he also began to draw his own group of loyal followers. He decided to take his *Exercises* and his idea for a new priestly order to the one man who could sanction his plans, the pope in Rome.[20]

Despite opposition from preexisting orders, especially the Dominicans[21], Ignatius' new Society of Jesus was sanctioned by Pope Julius III[22] in 1540 in a papal bull entitled *Regimini militantis Ecclesiae*, "which accurately reflected its pugnacious stance toward the Protestant Reformation and international "paganism.""[23] The bull referred to the members of the new order as *militare deo* or soldiers of God.[24]

> Thus was born an order about which the Austrian historian Egon Friedel wrote: They were the most brilliant courtiers, the sternest ascetics, the most self-sacrificing missionaries and the sharpest traders, the most devoted footmen and the shrewdest statesmen, the wisest confessors and the greatest impresarios, the most gifted physicians and the most skillful assassins. They built churches and factories, proved theorems in mathematics and stated propositions in church dogmatics, worked to suppress the freedom of enquiry and made a host of scientific discoveries. They were—in the broadest possible sense of the term—truly capable of anything.[25]

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[16] Jacqueline Peterson, Sacred Encounters: Father DeSmet and the Indians of the Rocky Mountain West (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 43.

[17] Mitchell, 27.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., 30-32.

[20] 33.

[21] 37.

[22] Carole Blackburn, Harvest of Souls: The Jesuit Missions and Colonialism in North America, 1632-1650, McGill-Queen's Native and Northern Series, ed. Bruce G. Trigger. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 123.

[23] Axtell, 155-156.

[24] Blackburn, 123.

[25] Manfred Barthel, The Jesuits: History and Legend of The Society of Jesus, trans. Mark Howson (Federal Republic of Germany: Econ Verlag GmbH, 1982; reprint, New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1984), 10 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

Loyola drafted *Constitutions* to complement the *Spiritual Exercises* for the regulation of the society which promoted the image of the Jesuits as soldiers of God at war with the forces of Satan.[26] The *Exercises* mandated month-long retreats for initiates and yearly retreats for the duration of a Jesuit priest's career. The retreats involved meditations, including the Two Standards, wherein "the supreme commander of the good people is Christ our Lord; ... the leader of the enemy is Lucifer."[27] These two opposing principals dispersed their followers throughout the whole world to do battle for souls.[28]

The Jesuits of New France reflected this imagery in their annual correspondence to the superior of the Jesuit mission in New France. These letters, known as *Relations*, were the product of a directive originally issued by Loyola.[29] The superior in Quebec edited the letters, added his own report in the form of an introduction, and forwarded it on to the order provincial in Paris. The provincial performed a final edit before sending the document on to the printer. These exciting firsthand accounts of the triumphs and travails of the missionaries enjoyed a wide audience among the educated devout and no doubt prompted their financial support for the mission effort.[30] The *Relations* further served as illustrations of the moral lessons learned in the missionary field.[31]

The Jesuit Paul Le Jeune wrote in his first *Relation* from New France, "it is my opinion that I come here like the pioneers, who go ahead to dig the trenches; after that come brave soldiers, who besiege and take the place."[32] Further *Relations* beseeched their readers to pray for the priests as they fought "the combats and battles we have to give and sustain every day, in order to establish in this country a Sovereign other than he who, since all ages, had tyrannically usurped the empire of God and of Jesus Christ".[33] Their training and labors were "the arms necessary for war"[34] and their sermons and instructions were the "batteries"[35] that would ultimately "destroy the empire of Satan, and shall unfurl the banner of Jesus Christ in these regions."[36]

Although sanctioned by the Pope in 1540 the Jesuit order maintained no official presence in France until 1556. A small number of young Jesuits, dressed as laymen, attended the university in Paris beginning in 1540 and the order held the support of King Henry II and the Cardinal of Lorraine. Still, Gallican-leaning members of the French *Parlement*, the educational establishment, and powerful members of the French clergy viewed the papal bull authorizing the society as a violation of French sovereignty and openly condemned the Jesuit order.[37]

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[26] Parkman, 408.

[27] Ignatius Loyola, Ignatius of Loyola: Spiritual Exercises and Selected Works, The Classics of Western Spirituality, ed. George E. Ganss, S. J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 154, also referenced in Parkman, 124.

[28] Ibid., 155.

[29] Joseph P. Donnelly, S. J., Thwaites' Jesuit Relations: Errata and Addenda (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1967), 1-2.

[30] William John Eccles, The French in North America 1500-1783, 3rd ed. New American Nation Series (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1998), 42-43.

[31] Jose Antonio Brandao, Your Fyre Shall Burn No More: Iroquois Policy Toward New France and Its Native Allies to 1701 Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 136.

[32] Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, vol. 5, Le Juenes Relation, 1632, by Paul Le Juene, S. J. (New York: Pageant Book Company, 1959), 21, also referenced in Blackburn, 124.

[33] Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, vol. 17, Le Juenes Relation, 1639, by Paul Le Juene, S. J. (New York: Pageant Book Company, 1959), 215, also referenced in Blackburn, 124.

[34] Ibid., 9, again referenced in Blackburn, 124.

[35] Ibid., 115, Blackburn, 124.

[36] Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, vol. 14, Le Juenes Relation, 1638, by Paul Le Juene, S. J. (New York: Pageant Book Company, 1959), 127, also referenced in Blackburn, 124.

[37] Harney, 86.

Loyola appealed to the rest of Catholic Europe to gather support for an official presence in France. An impressive array of Catholic luminaries pledged their support and the Gallican opposition finally relented in 1555. The first Jesuit college in France was founded at Billom by Guillaume du Prat the following year.[38]

France entered the European competition for the conquest of the Americas at a relatively late date. Cortes had already completed the Spanish conquest of Mexico before French and Italian bankers financed the Florentine navigator Giovanni da Verrazano's 1524 voyage along the North American coast. It was 1534 before Jacques Cartier, a Breton sea captain, embarked on the first of his voyages in the service of France. By this date, Spain's Pizarro had conquered Peru.[39]

The Jesuit community viewed the European invasion of the Americas as a golden opportunity to win souls from Satan. They viewed the North American continent and its population as abandoned and lost, ripe for conversion and salvation at Catholic European hands.[40] Like the Spanish conquistadors, Spanish priests beat their French counterparts to the punch in the competition for Native American converts. Priests accompanying Ponce de Leon's Florida expedition celebrated the first Catholic Mass within the present boundaries of the United States in 1521. The first Spanish Indian mission on modern American soil, San Miguel de Guandape, was founded by the Dominican priest Antonio Montesino in 1526 just north of the present-day location of Charleston, South Carolina.[41]

This great era of European exploration and expansion, not only in the Americas but Asia and Africa as well, was also viewed by the various Catholic orders as a golden opportunity to replenish the losses incurred from Protestant heresy. The Society of Jesus pursued foreign missionary opportunities from its very infancy. In 1540 Loyola designated four of his original ten Jesuits as foreign missionaries.[42] The Jesuits launched their foreign missionary effort in 1541 when Francis Xavier sailed from Lisbon for Goa.[43]

By the time the first French Jesuits set foot in North America the order had gained a reputation for educational excellence. Loyola himself had come late to the academic world. He viewed teaching as a mundane affair and an obstacle to what he termed "apostolic poverty."[44] None the less, by the time of the death in 1615 of Claudio Aquaviva one of Loyola's successors to the position of Jesuit General, the Jesuit educational system had become the envy of Europe.[45]

The system had nearly doubled under Aquaviva and included eight complete universities, thirty Academies or small universities, more than 400 colleges (Grammar schools), a dozen seminaries, as well as various Jesuit societies whose membership boasted many of Europe's brightest minds. The Jesuits counted among their members the theologians Bellarmine and Lessius, the historians; Sirmond, Petau, Labbe and Rosweyde, the moralist, Sanchez, and the philosopher, Suarez. The Jesuit training school for mathematicians and astronomers in Rome provided instructors for colleges across Europe. Jesuit schools were located in every Catholic state in Europe from the Russian border to Sicily except the Republic of Venice.[46]

The curriculum at these schools would likely not pass the inspection of modern secular scholars. Only those subjects and opinions that held the full endorsement of the Catholic Church were included. "Intellectual curiosity and independent-mindedness, rarely at a premium in any educational system, were strongly discouraged in the colleges. A great deal was forbidden; very

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[38] Ibid., 87.

[39] Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 12.

[40] Blackburn, 15.

[41] Margaret and Stephen Bunson, Faith in the Wilderness: The Story of the Catholic Indian Missions (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor Publishing Division, 2000), 25.

[42] Mitchell, 75.

[43] Harney 93.

[44] Aveling, 117.

[45] Ibid., 215.

[46] Ibid.

little was allowed."[47] Still, Axtell contends that, "Man for man, the Jesuits were the best and most rigorously trained minds in Europe."[48] Axtell points to their "formidable education in logic, languages, and the arts of verbal argument and persuasion."[49] The Jesuits brought their order's commitment to education with them to New France. In 1635, a year before Harvard was founded in the English colonies; the Jesuits opened their college in Quebec. For the next 124 years this college provided the Canadian colonists with an education equal to that of any offered in France.[50]

The first French priest to arrive in New France was not a missionary. This first priest was sent to minister to the Catholics among the French traders at Port Royal in Acadia. Not all of the Frenchmen at Port Royal were Catholic, some were Huguenot and they too were supplied with a clergyman. It appears that these two unfortunate souls spent most of their time and energy battling each other until both perished due to scurvy. Their parishioners deposited their respective remains in a common grave so the two clerics could continue their bickering post mortem.[51]

The first French missionary to New France was not a Jesuit, but rather a secular priest named Jesse Flesche. Within a few short weeks of his arrival at Port Royal in 1610, Flesche had baptized more than 80 of the nearby Micmacs. The good father, totally ignorant of the Micmac language, had provided his converts with the briefest of instruction with the aid of an interpreter.[52] Just how much of their new faith these first Micmac Catholics truly comprehended can only be guessed at. It's a good bet that this interpreter was among those who had buried Flesche's predecessor, and the good people of Port Royal had already given example of their sense of humor with the interment of their first two pastors. Whatever their level of comprehension, these Micmacs were the first fruits of France's evangelization effort in New France.[53]

As Flesche labored in the mission field, his sovereign Henri IV was assassinated in France. The queen mother, Marie de Medici, took up the torch for the continuation of the missionary effort. With the able assistance of Madame de Guerchville, she insisted that the Jesuits be introduced into the Port Royal trading station. The man responsible for the post, Jean de Biencourt, Sieur de Poutrincourt, loathed the order, but he was in desperate need of funds to stay in operation. The Jesuits agreed to fund the post's operation and Poutrincourt relented. Thus two Jesuit priests were dispatched to Port Royal. Poutrincourt in France, and his son, Charles de Biencourt at Port Royal, continuously harassed the Jesuits and leveled baseless allegations against them. Eventually Madame de Guercheville withdrew her support and the priests returned to France.

Madame de Guerchville had not however given up on mission work. In 1613 she provided funds and a ship for a new mission on the Penobscot River. The ship never reached the Penobscot and the mission was instead established at Saint-Sauveur across from Mont Desert Island.

The mission at Saint-Sauveur proved to be short-lived. Alarmed by the presence of a French settlement in territory disputed between France and England, Samuel Argall of Virginia with sixty soldiers, sailed from Massachusetts on the fourteen-gun *Treasurer* and launched a surprise attack on Saint-Sauveur. Taken completely unaware, the French were quickly defeated. Two Frenchmen were killed and four wounded.[54] One of the dead was the first representative of the French Jesuits to die violently in New France, the lay brother, Gilbert du Thet.[55] The Jesuits would not return to New France until 1625.[56]

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[47] Barthel, 115.
[48] Axtell, 156.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Eccles, The French in North America 1500-1783, 44.
[51] Ibid., 17. footnote
[52] Ibid., 17.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid., 18.
[55] Bunson, 52.
[56] Eccles, The French in North America, 28.

The Argall raid was the opening shot of an armed struggle between the French and English colonies that would continue off and on for a century and a half. Even when their mother countries were at peace, the colonists would continue their struggle. "Much blood would be shed and many gallant deeds would be performed (and many black and terrible deeds as well) on both sides before the struggle came to an end when Wolfe captured Quebec."[57]

In 1614 the Estates General at Paris provided 1,500 livres to fund four Recollects missionaries at Quebec.[58] Unlike the Jesuits, the Recollects, sometimes known as the Franciscans of the Strict Observance, were virtually penniless and depended upon charity for even their daily sustenance.[59]

Soon after their arrival at Quebec two of the Recollects left for the Indian mission field with little knowledge of Indian culture and practically no knowledge of Indian languages. Jean d'Olbeau journeyed to Tadoussac to minister to the Montagnais and Joseph Le Caron left for Huronia.[60] Father Le Caron spent only one winter with the Hurons before returning to Quebec in 1616. He returned to Huronia in 1623 with two companions Father Nicolas Viel and Brother Gabriel Sagard and established their mission at the Huron village of Quienonascaran. The Recollects' efforts bore little fruit. In this first decade of the French missionary push there were never more than four missionaries in the field at one time and less than fifty Indians accepted baptism, nearly all at the point of death.[61]

In 1625 the Society of Jesus returned to New France. Five Jesuits arrived in that year and three more the next year. They immediately ran into problems with the Huguenots who controlled the French port of La Rochelle. The Huguenots were particularly hostile to the Jesuits above all the Catholic orders and refused to ship their supplies. The bitter conflict between Catholics and Huguenots in France had spilled over to the French possessions in the New World. The Huguenots had no intention in aiding the Catholic effort to evangelize and convert the inhabitants of the New World. The Huguenots' resistance to the missionary effort led eventually to an order from Cardinal Richelieu, the King's first minister, barring them from New France.[62]

At Richelieu's direction, the Company of New France, frequently called the Company of One Hundred Associates, "was formed to develop and exploit the resources of New France, establish self-sufficient agricultural settlements, and foster missionary activity."[63] The Company got off to a disastrous start as its convoy of 400 new settlers was bottled up and captured in the St. Lawrence River by an English and Huguenot privateering fleet. France and England had gone to war shortly before the company's fleet had sailed. Without the new settlers and the supplies carried aboard the fleet, the struggling colony of New France was forced to surrender.[64]

In 1632 Louis XIII of France and Charles I of England signed the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. The treaty returned all the French possessions in North America captured by the English to France.[65] Forty French laymen and three Jesuits returned to Quebec in 1632.[66] The next year Samuel de Champlain, who had led the colony at the time of its surrender, now serving as both the King's and the Company of New France's governor, returned with three ships of supplies, soldiers and workmen, some with their families. Even with the arrival of Champlain's fleet the French population at Quebec counted barely one hundred souls.[67]

Despite the terms of the Saint-Germain treaty, France's hold on the colony was still tenuous. While settlers poured into the English colonies to the south, Quebec's population would

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[57] Thomas B. Costain, The White and the Gold: The French Regime in Canada (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954), 113.

[58] Eccles, 27.

[59] Costain, 87.

[60] Ibid., 87-88.

[61] Eccles, The Canadian F rontier, 26.

[62] Eccles, The French in North America, 28-29.

[63] Ibid., 29-30.

[64] Ibid., 30-31.

[65] Ibid., 32.

[66] Ibid., 35.

[67] Ibid., 36.

only increase to approximately 2,500 people in the next thirty years.[68] Further hindering the colony's security was the dire need for cash. The French court was embroiled in The Thirty Years' War in Europe and was thus disinclined to spend money on distant New France. The money necessary to keep the colony afloat was supplied by private enterprise, mainly the fur trade, and the Catholic Church.[69] The colony was not to receive any funds from France's royal treasury until 1663.[70]

The most pressing threat however, was that of death at the hands of the Iroquois. Compulsory military service was absolutely necessary for physical survival. Although most of the colonists were probably ignorant of firearms before their arrival in New France, they quickly became experts at the very guerilla warfare practiced by their foe. This type of warfare was desperate and bloody to the extreme, as death in combat was infinitely preferable to death by torture as a captive. No quarter was asked, and none was given. Between 1633 and 1700 New France benefited from fewer than fifteen years of peace. "This military tradition early became one of the dominant features of the emerging Canadian society."[71]

Upon the Jesuits return in 1632 the situation on the ground in New France could aptly be described in this fashion: A small European population; mostly male, strapped for cash, threatened by powerful and fierce enemies, dependent on the fur trade, trained in the military arts and operating on a constant war footing. One other vitally important facet of the colony's existence must be noted. This was that if private enterprise and the Church, who were after all footing the bill for the colony, were to see a return on their investment both needed the cooperation of the Indians. The fur trade needed the Indians as partners, suppliers, and customers. The Church needed their immortal souls.[72] Before too long the colony itself would depend upon them as auxiliary troops in the North American theater of the European wars of empire.[73]

This was the nature of New France when the Jesuit effort to fulfill their mission as stated in the charter of the Company of New France finally achieved a level of success. The company's associates and directors had boldly written into their charter that they were committed to establishing in Canada, "a New Jerusalem, blessed by God and made up of citizens destined for heaven." These "citizens" included any Indians who converted to Catholicism. Any practicing Catholic Indian was to enjoy all the rights and privileges of French citizenship.[74]

With the aid of Jean de Lauson, the company's intendant, the Jesuits lobbied Richelieu to obtain a monopoly on New France's mission field. Richelieu's Capuchin adviser, Father Joseph, managed to secure the eastern coast for his order, but the Jesuits succeeded in acquiring exclusive rights to the environs of the St. Lawrence River. The Recollects were locked out, and the Jesuits would hold their monopoly on the St. Lawrence until 1657.[75]

Free from competition, the Jesuits took to their task with all the fervor and dedication their order was famous for. When a party of Hurons journeyed to Quebec in 1633 to resume trade with the returned French the Jesuits endeavored to have three of their priests join them on their return to Huronia. Champlain informed the Huron traders that acceptance of the priests presence in Huronia was necessary for the renewal of the French-Huron trade alliance. The Hurons managed to resist this initial Jesuit thrust, but relented the following year. In 1634, three Jesuit priests, Jean de Brebeuf, Antoine Daniel, and Ambroise Davost, joined the Hurons on their trip home from Quebec. From the next sixteen years Huronia would be the focal point of the Jesuit effort in New France. By 1648, there were eighteen Jesuit priests and as many as forty-six

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[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Blackburn, 27-28.
[71] Eccles, 40-41.
[72] Ibid., 36.
[73] Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 6.
[74] Eccles, The French in North America, 43.
[75] Blackburn, 30-31.

lay assistants residing in Huronia. The main Jesuit base was established at a European-styled fortified residence at Sainte-Marie.[76]

The lay assistants were known as *donnes*. The *donnes* worked without payment and toiled under restrictive conditions. The Jesuits provided these volunteers with food, clothing and shelter and ministered to them in sickness and old age. The *donnes* agreed to obey the mission superior, practice celibacy and relinquish their material possessions.[77]

The priests that the Society of Jesus dispatched to the missions of New France were on average thirty-four years old and had spent half of their lives in Jesuit colleges or universities.[78] In contrast to the Recollects, who had plunged into the Indian villages totally ignorant of the Indians' languages, the Jesuits followed the instructions given them by Loyola's *Constitutions.* "Indian, would be proper for those about to go among the Indians."[79] The first Jesuit Indian mission veterans prepared grammars, dictionaries and phrase books in the Indian languages for their successors. Some would even use these manuals to begin their language instruction in France before sailing for Canada.[80] Still, the Indian languages were so totally different from the French dialects, or Latin, of their previous experience that mastery of these languages was elusive. Even Father Jean de Brebeuf, who had been especially selected to work among the Hurons because of his linguistic talents, needed nine years to learn their language and compose a grammar.[81]

After acquiring at least some basic knowledge of the language of the people he was to minister to, the new Jesuit missionary was set to make the arduous, not to mention perilous, journey to the Indian's home country. If he had any sense at all he had also prepared himself physically for what would surely be the biggest physical challenge to his life so far. Prior to Father Paul Le Jeune's journey to the Montagnais homeland in 1633 his native companions warned him, "we shall be sometimes two days, sometimes three, without eating, for lack of food; take courage, *chichine*, let thy soul be strong to endure suffering and hardship; keep thyself from being sad, otherwise thou wilt be sick."[82]

The Montagnais were not exaggerating in the least. The trip to the Indians homeland was often hundreds of miles in length through trackless wilderness with most of the journey accomplished by canoe along New France's best highways, the rivers. Eccles described the missionary's journey with these words:

> Sitting cross-legged all day in a canoe wielding a paddle was agony for unaccustomed muscles. Stumbling across a portage in a cassock with a heavy load amid a cloud of mosquitoes and black flies was bad enough, but the Indians, too, showed no mercy. If the monks failed to keep up, they were left behind. Sleeping on the bare ground in all weather and ... in smoke-filled, drafty, flea-ridden bark lodges, racked their aching bodies.[83]

The physical exertions of the journey were bad enough, but danger in the form of Iroquois raiders also lurked in the forests and along the rivers. The motivation behind the Iroquois raids on such parties varied from acts of war, to revenge, to the acquisition of plunder

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[76] Ibid, 38-39.

[77] Bruce Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660 (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), 575.

[78] James Axtell, The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 75.

[79] Ignatius Loyola, Ignatius of Loyola: Spiritual Exercises and Selected Works, The Classics of Western Spirituality, ed. George E. Ganss, S. J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 299, also referenced in Axtell, The Invasion Within, 81.

[80] Ibid., 82.

[81] Olive Patricia Dickason, Canada's First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times, The Civilization of the American Indian Series, vol. 208. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 127.

[82] Ibid., 103.

[83] Eccles, The French in North America, 27-28.

and captives. On August 3, 1642, Mohawks attacked a party of Huron converts escorting Father Isaac Jogues and two *donnes*, Goupil and Couture to Huronia.[84] In addition to capturing the priest, the Mohawks confiscated firearms and eight thousand livres worth of other trade goods and supplies.[85] Jogues was horribly tortured by his captors. His ordeal presented an opportunity to display the courage that Jogues and his companions became renowned for, and more importantly to put that courage prominently before a people who held courage above all other virtues. "When gentle fathers endured the most hideous torments as stoically as the most hardened warrior, the Indians knew they were pitted against men of uncommon spirit.[86] The mutilated Jogues survived his torture and with the aid of Dutch traders was smuggled to Albany, made his way back to France, and eventually returned to Canada.[87]

If the destination was Huronia, the missionary would usually find himself in a village of around two thousand souls. The village was normally situated atop a hill and surrounded by up to three palisades as high as twenty-five feet for defensive purposes. The dwellings, called longhouses, were located inside the palisades and were shaped roughly like modern Quonset huts. These were constructed of supple branches lashed together with twisted elm bark and sided with sheets of either elm or birch bark.[88]

Quite often the priests encountered other Frenchmen, besides their brother priests and their *donnes* at the villages. These fellow Europeans were not of much help to the missionaries, nor their labors. These were the fur traders, mostly younger men who preferred Indian morality to that preached by the Jesuits. Their actions, especially their sexual liaisons with Indian women and their fondness for brandy, seemed to the Indians to give the lie to the Black Robe's preaching of the superiority of Christian mores to their own.[89]

Unscrupulous traders could realize huge profits by plying the Indians with rum. The battle between the Church and the trading interests over the use of brandy in the fur trade was a constant struggle.[90] The missionaries also sought to change the mobile lifestyle as practiced by many native peoples. They believed that a more stationary existence would make the job of conversion much easier. This idea too, clashed with the designs of the fur interests. The traders needed the Indians to continue to roam in search of furs. As much as they needed converts to accomplish their aims, the Jesuits also realized that New France needed the fur trade to survive economically. This dichotomy remained an unresolved truth of the colony's existence.[91]

The first French settlers in New France came to the misconception that the Indians possessed no religion of their own. The Indians had no church buildings, hymnals, statues or vestments; none of the trappings that Europeans associated with religion. How could they have any religion without these necessities?[92] The Jesuits soon came to the understanding that the Indians' religious beliefs were imbedded into every aspect of their cultural and daily life. Every object, animate and inanimate alike, possessed a spirit. They also had their own priests, the shamans.[93]

The shamans had to be supplanted in order for the missionaries to succeed. The Jesuits set out to prove that the shamans' supposed powers were nothing more than chicanery. They also sought to replace the shamans' practice of service for profit with a willingness to offer their own brand of social and religious services free of payment.[94] Though forbidden to carry weapons the Jesuits were well armed to engage in verbal combat with their Indian clerical counterparts. [95] In a

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[84] Costain, 148.
[85] Brandao, 55-56.
[86] Axtell, 86.
[87] Costain, 149.
[88] Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 28.
[89] Eccles, The French in North America, 46.
[90] Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 57.
[91] Dickason, 127.
[92] Eccles, The French in North America, 47.
[93] Ibid., 47-48.
[94] Axtell, 93.
[95] Axtell, Beyond 1492, 156.

land where the spoken word was extremely powerful, their Jesuit education and training served them well. Nearly all of the Jesuits sent to New France had served in Europe as debate coaches and professors of rhetoric.[96]

Guided by the *Constitutions*, the Jesuits realized that the best strategy for winning converts lay in converting the tribal leaders. "The more universal the good is, the more it is divine. Therefore preference ought to be given to those persons and places which, through their own improvement, become a cause which can spread the good accomplished to many others who are under their influence or take guidance from them."[97]

The colony's government aided in this strategy; converted Indians were given preference in gifts and councils.[98] The government also adopted a policy of supplying only converts with firearms.[99] The fur interests also favored the Christian Indians. As converts were legally considered to be French citizens, they were paid for their furs accordingly. Frenchmen received a much higher price for their furs than did non-Christians. Half of the Hurons employed in the 1648 fur fleet were either preparing for baptism or had already converted, this at a time when only 15 per cent of the Huron population was Christian.[100]

How genuine were such conversions? How much of their new faith did the converts truly comprehend? Once again guided by the *Constitutions* the Jesuits sought to adjust conversion to the cultural realities of their intended converts. "Their anthropology was based on a supple brand of cultural relativism and their ministry on Christ's admonition to "be all things to all men in order to win all."'[101] The Jesuits chose not to interfere with Indian customs where those customs did not interfere directly with Christian values. As it was, the missionaries' efforts created internal strife within the tribes as some converted and others resisted conversion.[102]

Some historians believe that many of the Indian converts practiced their new religion when in the missionaries' presence and reverted to their old customs once back in their own dwellings. Some Indians may simply have added Christian personages and beliefs to the belief system they had held before conversion. "For the Montagnais, the Christian God resembled their Atahocan. In their view, there was plenty of room in the cosmos for both sets of spiritual beings, each with its own requirements at the appropriate times and places."[103]

There were certainly some Indians who simply saw the Christian and French way as the wave of the future and decided to ride the wave.[104] There were undoubtedly also "true believers." There were those who adopted the new religion at some point, only to abandon it later. And just as certainly there were those who resisted any and all of the Jesuits' entreaties. As the Huron confederacy crumbled from under Iroquois assault, some of these apostates and holdouts would exact their revenge against the "would be saviors" of their immortal souls.

The Iroquois wars against the French and their Indian allies in the seventeenth century have been termed the "Beaver Wars" by many historians. This interpretation of Iroquois motives identifies domination of the fur trade as the root cause of these conflicts.[105] Newer interpretations have seen the wars as being fueled by more traditional motives; honor, revenge, control of hunting grounds, and to replace population losses.[106] Whatever their motives, there is no doubt that these wars spelled doom to the Jesuit missions of Huronia, and grisly death to a number of the Jesuits themselves.

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[96] Axtell, The Invasion Within, 87.

[97] Ignatius Loyola, Ignatius of Loyola: Spiritual Exercises and Selected Works, The Classics of Western Spirituality, ed. George E. Ganss, S. J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1991), 308, also referenced in Axtell, The Invasion Within, 77.

[98] Dickason, 133.

[99] Ibid., 134.

[100] Ibid, 133.

[101] Axtell, 77.

[102] Dickason, 133.

[103] Ibid., 134.

[104] Ibid., 133.

[105] Brandao, 3.

[106] Ibid, back cover.

Beginning in 1642, Huron villages and fur fleets were victimized by Iroquois raiding parties.[107] It will be recalled that Father Isaac Jogues was captured in one of these early raids. The Italian-born Jesuit, Francisco Bressani, was taken captive in a similar raid in April 1644.[108]
In 1646 the Seneca, the Huron's closest Iroquois neighbors, joined forces with the Mohawks to wage total war against the Huron confederacy.[109]

In 1648, Father Antoine Daniel became the first Jesuit to die violently in Huronia when he was killed during the Iroquois assault on the village of Teanoastaiae.[110] Most of the Huron warriors were absent at the time of the assault. Terrified women and children fled before the onrushing Iroquois, but Father Daniel remained in the village administering baptism to the wounded and dying before being cut down.[111]

Fathers Jean de Brebeuf and Gabriel Lalemant were taken captive during an assault on the village of Saint-Louis in 1649.[112] Both men were gruesomely tortured to death amid the ruins of Saint-Louis. Some of the Iroquois warriors who tortured Brebeuf and Lalement were Hurons who had been captured and then adopted by the Iroquois. Familiar with Catholic ritual from the Jesuit preaching in their former homeland, they improvised the torture of their Jesuit prisoners accordingly. Mocking Christian baptism, they poured boiling water over the tethered prisoners' heads and imitating a rosary they placed a string of fire-heated hatchet blades around Brebeuf's neck.[113] Fathers Charles Garnier and Noel Chabanel would also die by Iroquois hands in 1649.[114] Once the Huron defeat was judged inevitable the Jesuit residence at Sainte-Marie was abandoned and burned to keep it from being sacrilegiously violated by the Iroquois.[115]

The deaths of these men were dutifully portrayed in the *Relations* as martyrdoms. "Death by torture and the possibility of being eaten by the enemy during the enactment of cultural practices which the Jesuits found ... as the manifestation of savagery and lawlessness – was transformed into one of the most significant and triumphant acts of Christianity."[116] Trained to a strict discipline and total obedience to a higher mission, the Jesuits could proclaim to Indian adherents. "Know, my brethren, that people like us do not fear death. Why should they fear it? They believe in God; they honor, love, and obey him; and they are assured of eternal happiness in heaven after our death."[117] Many of these men believed that only martyrdom would assure the success of their mission to New France. The "Blood of the Martyrs" was to be "the seed and germ of Christians."[118]

Whether these priests died as martyrs or as casualties of war the fate of Huronia was sealed by the winter of 1650. Those who had not been killed or captured took refuge on Christian Island in Georgian Bay. The surviving Jesuits joined their charges on the island. After starvation claimed many over the winter, the remnants of the once powerful Huron confederacy fled to the Ile d'Orleans at Quebec or scattered among the Neutral and Erie nations.[119] There was one

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[107] Blackburn, 39.

[108] Brandao, 56.

[109] Blackburn, 39.

[110] Ibid., 65.

[111] Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 54.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Ibid., 66-67.

[114] Canadian Martyrs and Huronia (Canadian Writers: Athabasca University); available from http://www.athabascau.ca/writers/martyrs.html, 2 December 2006.

[115] Blackburn, 40.

[116] Ibid, 66.

[117] Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, vol. 52, Relation of 1668-69 (New York: Pageant Book Company, 1959), 177, also referenced in Axtell, The Invasion Within, 86.

[118] Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, vol. 34, Relation of 1648-49 (New York: Pageant Book Company, 1959), 227, also referenced in Blackburn, 65.

[119] Ibid., 40.

consolation for the Jesuits, by their count nearly 1300 Hurons had received baptism in the year before the destruction of the Huron missions.[120]

The Jesuits would continue to maintain a presence among the Huron at Quebec and with the Montagnais along the St. Lawrence, but the focus of their energies now shifted to the Great Lakes tribes and even on to their enemies, the Iroquois.[121] Father Charles Garnier chose to see the destruction of Huronia as part of God's plan to force the order to expand their mission to encompass new peoples.[122] Another Jesuit posited that, "We are only at the entrance of a land which on the side of the west, as far as China, is full of Nations more populous than the Huron."[123]

During a temporary pause in the hostilities in 1645, the tragically courageous Isaac Jogues volunteered to return to the land of his former captors and tormentors, the Mohawks.[124] Jogues came to the Mohawks both as an ambassador for the government of New France and as a missionary. The new mission he was to establish was to be called the Mission of the Martyrs.[125] While trying to forge a peace agreement with the Mohawks, Jogues made the mistake of also trying to arrange a separate peace settlement with the Onondagas irrespective of Mohawk designs.[126]

Jogues returned to New France, but left a small black box in the Mohawk village. Shortly after his departure disease struck the Mohawks and their crops. Warned of the "power" of the Jesuits by their Huron captives, the Mohawks suspected that Jogues had bewitched them with the box in order to allow the French to continue their negotiations with the Onondagas without Mohawk interference. When Jogues attempted to return to the Mohawk country in October 1646[127] a party of Mohawks ambushed him and his companion, a *donne* named LaLande, along the trail.[128] Taken to the raiders' village, both men were severely beaten. Strips of flesh were cut from the priests back before he was finally killed by a tomahawk blow to the brain. The lifeless body was then beheaded. LaLande suffered the same fate the next day.[129] This mode of death was that reserved in Mohawk culture for sorcerers, not war captives.[130]

This inauspicious beginning of the Jesuit mission to the Iroquois did not presage the mission's future. There would be other fits and starts. Peace and the Jesuits returned to Iroquoia in 1653. Then war resumed once again in 1658 and the Jesuits serving the Onondaga barely escaped with their lives.[131]

By 1665 New France's very existence was threatened by the Iroquois. To not only meet the immediate threat, but to hopefully put an end to any future Iroquois threat the first French regular troops to serve in Canada set sail from New Rochelle on April 19, 1665.[132] In three campaigns these French regulars succeeded in forcing the Mohawks to sue for peace. The other four Iroquois nations, threatened by Algonquian nations to the west, soon asked for peace with New France also.[133]

The Jesuits returned once again to the Iroquois mission field. The Jesuit effort among the Iroquois would eventually lead to the migration of many Iroquois converts from Iroquoia to Christian Indian settlements around Montreal. The Mohawk nation provided the majority of these

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[120] Eccles, 54.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid., 55.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Brandao, 102.
[125] Costain, 149.
[126] Brandao, 102-103.
[127] Ibid., 103.
[128] Costain, 150.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Brandao, 103.
[131] Eccles, 56.
[132] Jack Verney, The Good Regiment: The Carignan-Salieres Regiment in Canada, 1665-1668 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 3.
[133] Eccles, 62-64.

emigrants. By 1679 nearly two-thirds of the tribe had moved to the Montreal area.[134] This Mohawk émigré population would produce the most famous of Native American converts to Catholicism, Blessed Kateri Tekakwitha, known to millions of American and Canadian Catholics, Indian and non-Indian, as the "Lily of the Mohawks." It is an ironic twist of fate that Kateri's name is more widely known today than the names of the missionaries who first brought her new faith to her homeland.

The Jesuit's did indeed travel west in search of new souls to save for Christ. Jesuit priests would spread the word of their God to Hudson Bay, the Great Lakes, and on the Mississippi from its source to its mouth.[135]

The final judgment on the nature of the Jesuit impact on North America is still to be argued and written. It is a debate that began with Poutrincourt, continues today and will continue tomorrow. Someone once said that, "The road to hell is paved with good intentions." Some modern historians believe that the Jesuits of New France laid the first paving stones on that road for the Indian nations that they came into contact with. Eccles wrote:

> This marked the beginning of the great missionary drive of the Counter Reformation French clergy to persuade the nomadic hunters of a vast continent to change their entire way of life, abandon their ancient customs, values, and religious beliefs, and live according to the precepts of a sophisticated European religion ill-adapted to their temperament and their needs. The efforts of these men of God, who sincerely believed that their ministrations were essential to save the Indians from an eternity of torment after death, to procure for them the bliss of a seventeenth-century Europeans concept of heaven were to contribute unwittingly to the final destruction of the North American Indian.[136]

But even as Eccles places blame for the result, he also exonerates the intentions of the missionaries and honors them with the label of "men of God." Axtell too finds reason for reproach. "In the Indians new world, colonial—particularly Jesuit—rule meant an acute loss of autonomy in virtually every facet of life."[137] But he also finds that the Jesuits did accomplish some good for their Indian charges. "On the other hand, it is obvious that those Indians who survived the dislocations and devastation ... also benefited from the Jesuit regimes. ... the natives received from the Jesuits and their missions crucial new intellectual powers of explanation and control for coping with those novelties. ... mission Indians gained at least a temporary measure of safety and protection from grasping miners, debauching traders, and trigger-happy settlers."[138]

It is nearly impossible for most of us reared in modern secular societies to come to grips with the mindset of the seventeenth-century Jesuit. We can not understand the level of commitment and devotion necessary to risk, let alone seek martyrdom in the course of a mission in a distant foreign land, among a foreign people. We can state, with confidence, that they truly believed that they were traveling the road to their heaven. Unfortunately the closest example of such a level of dedication to religion evident in our world today appears as a direct contradiction to the seventeenth century Jesuit model. Modern religious zealots are indeed willing to sacrifice their own lives, but all too often in an attempt to kill or maim as many innocent people as possible.

This modern bastardization of religious devotion and zeal should not however be allowed to tarnish the memory or image of these brave men. Their dedication and sacrifice freely offered in pursuit of a mission aimed at the salvation, as they understood it, of Native American souls remains unquestioned. This alone should reserve for them a place in our collective psyche alongside the pantheon of heroes in military uniform or pioneer buckskin for the black cassock uniform of the Black Robes.

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[134] Dickason, 131.

[135] Blackburn, 41.

[136] Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 26.

[137] Axtell, Beyond 1492, 168.

[138] Ibid.

HOW THE COWS CAME HOME...AS DINNER: THE ECONOMIC SURVIVAL OF THE OSAGE INDIANS CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT THEIR GRASS LEASING BUSINESS IN THE 1870s AND 1880s

Athena Stephanopoulos

It was a sad song they sang that year as they trampled, grudgingly, out of their Kansas homelands. But this unhappiness was understandable since, for the Osage Nation, the last century was a harrowing history that included ceding nearly eight million acres of their sacred land to the haughty, relentless United States government. Even after their removal from the Sunflower state was completed by the early 1870s, newly appointed Indian agent Cyrus Beede remarked that the Osages were still not "ready to give up their war dance and . . . scalping knife;"[1] as if stealing their property was supposed to transform them into more evolved, more 'civilized' human beings.

But in the process of negotiations between Osages and the federal government, the tribe finally recognized that the survival of their people depended on mastering certain concepts of American politics and using them to their advantage. This was just the first scene in those treaties to remove the Osages from Kansas. Despite intimidation from the government, upon realizing that Congress would eventually obtain their Kansas lands, the Osages decided to accept withdrawal in exchange for certain stipulations. They submitted three overlying guidelines for the sale: to pay the tribe for their land, build railroads on it which could benefit the Osage economy in the future (the government believed it would be through agriculture), and allow them to remain physically close to their Kansas homeland. Thankfully Congress accepted the agreement and paid the tribe a handsome $1.25 per acre for their region. The transaction allowed the Osages to finance land directly across the border in northern Oklahoma territory for their new home.[2]

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[1] George Rainey, *The Cherokee Strip* (Guthrie, Ok.: Co-Operative Publishing Co., 1933), 30; T.F. Morrison. *The Osage Treaty of 1865: An Address by Hon. T.F. Morrison of Chanute, Kansas* (St. Paul, Ks.: St. Paul Journal, 1925), 1-8; Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Cyrus Beede, to the Secretary of the Interior, 1876.* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1876), 54; In contrast to this 1876 incident, the first formally recorded engagement between the Osages and the U.S. government was found on a beautiful silver medal with the face of then President Thomas Jefferson on one side and two hands clasped on the other side with the word "Friendship" over the engraving. It was dated 1800. Ponca City Chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution, *The Last Run: Kay County, Oklahoma, 1893* (Ponca City, Ok.: The Courier Printing Co., 1939), 344.

[2]Louis F. Burns, *A History of the Osage People* (Tuscaloosa, Al.: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 368; What is fascinating about this exchange is that decades before the Osages were pushed off of their Kansas lands, they had lived in the northern half of Oklahoma territory freely. In 1803, when President Thomas Jefferson made the unforeseen Louisiana Purchase from France, the Osages, autochronous to the Midwest, still claimed all lands north of the Canadian River in Oklahoma while the neighboring Quapaw tribe claimed such land south of the river. About fifteen years after these Indian assertions came the Treaties of 1818 and 1825 which relinquished Osage entitlement to the region in exchange for desperately needed cash, merchandise and a plot of land near their claim in southern Kansas. The Quapaws did the same in their 1818, 1820 and 1830 treaties with the government, thereby giving the United States whole ownership of what was later known as the Cherokee Strip. These treaties coerced the Osages into

Yet this sale, too, was an arduous task for the Osages since available land in northern Oklahoma was now in the possession of the Cherokee Nation-- a tribe known for its politically savvy nature when dealing with the capitalistic American government. For the Osages this translated into endless negotiations with the Cherokee over what amount of money was appropriate to sell each acre of land. Researched survey papers of the desired prairies determined its value to be anywhere from twenty-one cents to nearly three-quarters of a dollar per acre. Not surprisingly, in 1873 President Grant involved himself in the matter and sold the Osages 1,470,559 acres of land for the hefty price of seventy cents an acre.[3] At the same time, approximately eight and a half million dollars was to be put in the U.S. Treasury for the Osage Nation after the sale of their Kansas lands with an interest rate of five percent.[4] In the pursuit of mending old wounds, the Osages also bought a section of land adjacent to their reservation for the Kaw tribe to payback without government pressure.[5] The Kaws originally were part of the Osage Nation, though disputes, probably over

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abandoning all rights to their lands in Oklahoma Territory, instead living on a Kansas reservation about one quarter of its size. Three years after the last agreement was signed, the government yielded former Osage lands to the Cherokees. Clear negotiations for the removal of the tribe back to Oklahoma were not in progress until the Osages' Treaty of 1865. George Rainey, *The Cherokee Strip*, 30; Morrison, 1-8; Irene Strum Lefebvre, *Cherokee Strip in Transition: A Documentary by Irene Strum Lefebvre* (Enid, Ok.: Cherokee Strip Booster Club, 1992), 22; "Kansas Railroads: Official Statement Showing the Increased Mileage has been Underrated," *Vinita (Indian) Chieftain* (Vinita, OK), 16 February 1881; Beguilingly, nearly one century later, the terms and specifications of the Osage Treaty of 1865 were still being disputed. On August 13, 1954 the Indian Claims Commission awarded the Osages almost one million dollars that should have been given to them in 1865 (3 344). In September of that year the Commission again heard from the Osage Nation, only to be asked for additional funds rightfully the tribe's in exchange for the "deduction of 25, 843.92 acres" of Osage land ceded to the U.S. government. Though they were "glad" (3 345) to investigate the Osages' petition, both Associate Commissioners Louis J. O'Marr and William M. Holt "overrule[d] the petitioner's motion" (3 351) on September 27, suddenly crushing any hope the Osages had of being paid for the territory Washington pilfered from them. *The Osage Nation of Indians v. The United States of America,* September 27, 1954," *Indian Claims Commission Decisions, vol. 3, doc. 9* (Boulder, Co.: Native American Rights Fund, Inc., n.d.), 3 344-3 351; The Osages' Treaty of 1868 had even more of an impact on government-Indian relations than the Treaty of 1865. The 1868 treaty sparked a heated debate in the House of Representatives over the benefit of turning over Osage-Kansas lands to a railroad corporation instead of making the area public domain. Such opposition led the House to completely halt United States-Amerindian treaty making from 1871 forward. Francis Paul Prucha, ed., *Documents of United States Indian Policy*, 3rd ed. (Lincoln, Ne.: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 113-114.

[3] Other than remaining near their ancient homeland, another contributing factor as to why the Osages chose to bid for land on the Cherokee Strip was because since the Treaty of July 19, 1866, the Cherokee Nation had made a formal declaration of having no problem with other 'friendly' Indians settling on the Strip west of the ninety-sixth meridian so long as legal stipulations were met. Rainey, *The Cherokee Strip,* 41,75; Burns, *A History of the Osage People,* 342-343.

[4] When Osage ranching flourished, money from the accruement of this interest rate coupled with grazing fees paid for by cattlemen afforded the Osages about $200 in annual per capita income until the discovery of oil on their land at the turn of the century. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs. *The Osage People and their Trust Property—A Field Report of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Anadarko Area Office, Osage Agency,* 83rd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1953), iv.

[5] It is quite correct for the reader to be suspicious of the Osages' ability to actually own their own land while still representing themselves as an Indian nation and not a community of individual Americans negotiating with certain wards of the government (the Cherokees). But upon closer examination, the Osages' control of their land appears to be valid. As Burns notes,

decisions to go to war, separated the groups long before this removal process. The word "Kaw" in the Osage language translates to *coward.* In the end, total purchase price for the Osages was a strapping $1,029,041.30—quite the sum for any tribe to be given by the government.[6]

Perhaps the reason why the Osages assisted their Kaw acquaintances is because of their own long and negative experience with the U.S. government concerning Indian relations, specifically Indian removal. Garrick Alan Bailey's *Changes in Osage Social Organization: 1673-1906* speaks to the fact that the Osages recently had experienced the subjective power held in Washington in 1859, when the tribe found themselves impoverished once their steady stream of annuity payments from prior treaties finally ran out; Congress failed to renew them in the wake of the slavery debate before the Civil War. When treaties were created with the Amerindians just after interstate combat ceased in America, the Osages, like many other tribal nations, had no choice but to move according to Congress's demands in 1865 in order to receive food and shelter they desperately required. Simultaneously, post-Civil War reconstruction sparked throngs of white settlers to pour into Kansas borders, even on lands that the government supposedly designated as wholly the Osages'. Reports from the Office of Indian Affairs state how "for every one [settler] leaving five come in," indicating that even the small effort made by federal troops to assist the Osages' territorial situation was fruitless at best. Marred with such an atrocious event in their memories, it would be much more plausible to question why the Osages would have turned a blind eye and not aided the Kaws in obtaining land since negative consequences were an accepted reality when dealing with the American government.[7]

To support the Osages' positive treatment of their fellow Kaw tribe, it must be said that poor Indian-United States relations were the norm since the presidency of Andrew Jackson. Following Jackson's Indian Removal Treaty of 1830, the Five Civilized Tribes, including the Cherokees now in Oklahoma Territory, were forced to cede their sacred southern lands east of the Mississippi River and settle in barren lands west of that divide. For the Cherokees, the policy was so damaging that it climaxed in 1838 with the Trail of Tears in which the nation was forced, at bayonet

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"since the Cherokee title [to their lands in Oklahoma] was recognized by the United States in the unratified Treaty of 1868 and to the sale to the Osages, we must assume the title was legitimate. Insofar as the Osage title to the present reservation is concerned, it is as sound as the United States and over a century of occupation can make it. The Osages hold possession in fee simple from the United States' support of the Cherokee title. This fee simple document is held in trust by the United States government," Burns, *A History of the Osage People*, 342; much the same argument is reiterated in William T. Hagan, *Taking Indian Lands: The Cherokee (Jerome) Commission: 1889-1893* (Norman: OK, University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 93-95, and is also found in Jeffrey Burton, *Indian Territory and the United States, 1866-1906: Courts, Government, and the Movement for Oklahoma Statehood* (Norman, Ok.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), who states that "Since the Osage lands were patented to the tribe, . . . sovereignty was not an issue" 111; Concerning the land the Osages possessed in Kansas that was sold to the government, it, too, appears to be a solid agreement: "When Congress in the 1860s granted to the state of Kansas for railroad purposes a tract that included some land the Osages still held by right of occupancy, the Court found the Osages' land implicitly exempted from the grant. 'The perpetual right of occupancy, with the correlative obligation of the government to enforce it, negatives the idea that Congress, even in the absence of any positive stipulation to protect the Osages, intended to grant their lands.' A majority of the justices held. 'For all practical purposes, they owned it.' . . . . as a legal matter, the only way the government could acquire the Indians' land was to purchase it," Stuart Banner, *How the Indians Lost their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier* (Cambridge, Ma.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 237.

[6] Burns, *A History of the Osage People,* 342-343; Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1872* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1872), 246; Burrill, Robert M. "The Establishment of Ranching on the Osage Reservation," *Geographic Review*, 62 no. 4 (October 1972): 543.

[7] Garrick Alan Bailey, *Changes in Osage Social Organization: 1673-1906* (Eugene, Or.: University of Oregon Press, 1973), 71-72.

point, to trek to their new, unwanted home. Women were raped, disease was rampant, and nearly twenty-five percent of those making the journey died along the way.[8] Thus, the Osages' personal familiarity with federal Indian removal was not nearly as shocking as it could have been had they resisted their white neighbors intrusions more passionately. This may be because by 1870, Congress had put forth enough attention on the Osages to create for the tribe their own Removal Act, uniquely developed for the deletion of their singular nation from Kansas lands, instead of writing an ineffective, blanket document with many tribes in the region.[9] And perchance the Osages may have even heard Cherokee tales of removal and took it upon themselves to prevent the gravity of the Trail of Tears from being repeated with their own wives, children, and friends, like the Kaws.

What completely sets apart the Osages in the Reconstruction Era from other Indian nations in the removal process is that their knowledge of federal politics and American capitalism permitted them to *buy* land from the government both legally and successfully. Unlike other tribes, such as the Cherokees, whose land usually was bestowed to them by the government through a series of complicated leases, the Osages had much more autonomy to utilize the assets of their land and make a profit from it without the government's watchful, disapproving eye. To secure these rights, the Osages demanded the formal deed specifying this land was wholly theirs soon after the agreement was made.[10] Now all they had to do was identify a profitable crop to harvest on their prairies and ship it through the network of railroads being built in southern Kansas.

But as the years passed the Osage came to the somber conclusion that no profitable crop could grow on their "broken, rocky, sterile"[11] grounds for a number of reasons. Wheat first planted during their move in 1872 was stolen by "a Cherokee named Joseph Bennett [who] had taken possession of the crop and was threshing and wasting it."[12] No other produce was planted that year due to the severity of its destruction, forcing the Osages to hunt animals and gather fruit and nuts from wild plants for food. Neither of these options was viable due to game depletion in the area that had occurred for many years prior to the Osages' immigration into northern Oklahoma.[13] So

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[8] Glyndon G. Van Deusen, *The Jacksonian Era 1828-1848* (Evanston, Il.: Harper & Row, 1959), 48-50; Rainey, *The Cherokee Strip*, 34-36.

[9] Burns, *A History of the Osage People,* 244.

[10] Though the Osages demanded this deed in the 1870s, it was not physically transferred until June 14, 1883 when Cherokee Chief Dennis W. Bushyhead deeded the said lands in trust for the Osages to the federal government. The reason for the delay had nothing to do with the Osages, but rather to the fact that at the time of the Osages' sale of their Kansas lands to the federal government, the U.S. Treasury did not have sufficient funds set in the Osages' account to pay the Cherokees for the Osages' new territory. As implausible as that may seem, it must also be remembered that this was the era where, in 1895, President Cleveland had to ask private business tycoon, J.P. Morgan, for sixty-two million dollars, as the U.S. Treasury barely maintained forty-two million in the account, let alone the agreed upon one hundred million dollars at all times. Rainey, *The Cherokee Strip,* 76-77; Burns, *A History of the Osage People,* 345; *Brief and Argument on Right of Osage Allottees and Purchasers—Mineral Trust* (Tulsa, Ok.: Osage Oil and Gas Lessees Association, December, 1920), 2.

[11] Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1871* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1871), 490.

[12] Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Isaac T. Gibson to Enoch Hoag, Report of the Commissioner,* September 1873 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1873), 215.

[13]Burns, *A History of the Osage People*, 347; An extensive contributing factor in the swift, severe economic decline of the Osages during the 1870s correlates to an acute lack of allocating promised annuities to the Osages during that decade. In reality, it would take the federal government another eighty years and numerous court battles to hand over guaranteed Osage funds. In 1955 the total promised for Osage survival in 1870s came to a disturbing $864,107.55. *The Osage Nation of Indians v. The United States of America,* March 1, 1955," *Indian Claims Commission Decisions, vol. 3, doc. 9* (Boulder, Co.: Native American Rights Fund, Inc., n.d.), 3 334-3 343.

without much capital left after the sale of their new home, the Osages braced themselves for the worst American life had to offer them.

As poverty came knocking on their doors, the Osage Nation noticed a particular problem on their unarable land: cattle. Apparently during the Civil War longhorn cattle in Texas went wild, greatly multiplied in number, and wandered around Indian lands at length. Their stockmen and ranchers had desperately run to the southeastern portion of America to help Confederate soldiers fend off Union attackers. Especially towards the end of the war, Texas ranchers had no time to saunter across the Midwest looking for their grazing cattle, let alone ship them off to slaughterhouses after fattening up on grasslands during the trek to Kansas rails.[14] After all, preventing the slaughter of soldiers was inherently more important to cowboys than preventing the slaughter of mangy, low-priced cattle.

In the same span of history, more homesteading families began settling in the Midwest, forcing the demand for, and price of, beef to skyrocket. In pre-Civil War days pork was by far the meat of choice among hungry Americans but due to its need to be prepared properly in a timely manner and wartime shortages of it, the distant second choice, beef, slowly rose to the top of foods found sumptuous to American palates. The problem with cattle however was that it was best raised in the Southwest--nowhere near its most desired markets back East. Since railroads at the time only went as far south as Kansas, it was obvious a new strategy for raising and shipping the heifers became a necessity. While pondering such a question on their journey up north to slaughterhouses, returning cattlemen noticed a significant change in the appearance of their stock after grazing in northern Oklahoma. Upon examination they concluded that it was the rare, nourishing fields which grew between destinations—that of bluestem grass.[15]

Indeed, bluestem became very desirable to Texas ranchers due to its ability to bulk up herds of cattle quickly, many of which had been severely malnourished by endlessly wandering, returning to Texas, and marching off to slaughterhouses in the chaos of restructuring the South. Obviously for the rancher, bigger cows meant a bigger pocketbook so with time these 'layovers' in Osage territory expanded into permanent ranches. After assurance that the government now controlled pillaging Indians, and harsh winters appeared to be a memory of the 1860s past, Texas ranchers began transforming 'the long drive' to northern railroads into deliberate, longstanding stopovers in northern Oklahoma.[16] Surprisingly, it was more profitable to graze in that single area of Oklahoma known as the Cherokee Strip[17] or Cherokee Outlet than the entire Southwest region.[18]

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[14] Burns, *A History of the Osage People*, 368-369. Miner and Unrau clearly showed the significance of the Osage's ability to find a profitable business on lands given to them because those lands were undesired by other Americans. Miner and Unrau explain that following the Osage Treaties of 1865 and 1868, the Osages, now forced to leave Kansas for Oklahoma, "expressed a clear desire" (31) that their lands be sold to specific, nearby railroad companies so that they could "obtain ready cash to care for starving Indians who were not particularly interested in pretending to be yeomen farmers" (32). These words support the notion that, by the history of their culture, the Osage people were not apt at learning the techniques of western agriculture and would most likely starve on their Oklahoma lands if farming was their only alternative to death. Thus, the Osage's ability to lease land for tribal profit proved vital to their existence in America. Craig H. Miner and William E. Unrau. *The End of Indian Kansas: A Study of Cultural Revolution, 1854-1871* (Lawrence, Ks.: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978).

[15] Burns, *A History of the Osage People*, 368-369.

[16] For an illustrated look into those driving cattle along Osage lands, see Appendix A.

[17] To put Osage lands and the Cherokee Strip into a visual perspective, see Appendix B.

[18] Burrill, 527; Please note that the name given to this prosperous section of land is known, collectively, as the Cherokee Strip or Cherokee Outlet, though the actual grazing lands given to the Cherokee nation are only a portion of that Strip. Many other tribes, such as the Kaws, Pawnees, and Poncas, also live in the Strip, though the Osages are the most successful and largest of nations other than the Cherokee to lease to ranchers in this region. They are also the only ones to independently own their land and live on it concurrently; the Cherokees have a separate section

Contrary to popular belief, Osage ranching lands in Oklahoma were actually of better quality and more in demand that those in neighboring Cherokee ranching areas. According to James C. Malin's work "An Introduction to the History of the Bluestem-Pasture Region of Kansas: A Study in Adaptation to Geographical Environment," the most pristine grazing region in the Southwest was located on a vertical strip of grass between Pottawatomie county, Kansas and Osage county, Oklahoma. Cherokee land is located to the *west* of this region. On this beloved vertical plane, precipitation falls around thirty-five inches per year with a long period of frost-free days so that grass can absorb needed nutrients from soil, such as calcium from underground limestone, growing tall within a few, short months to bulk up cattle rapidly. [19] Naturally, most ranchers would drive their cattle northward through the Strip during the Spring and early Summer months when grass swells with nutrients so that cattle can rest on the rich prairies during May, June and July when the grass is most wholesome.[20]

In any event, by the time the Osages realized the demand cattle ranchers had for their prairies, the tribe quickly generated a plan to profit from this unexpected business: grass leasing. Instead of attempting to steal a few heads of cattle to survive on for the week, the Osages finally took the advice of their white American neighbors and entered into the capitalistic cattle industry.[21] However clever the concoction, the Osages' idea to profit off Texas ranchers was not new to the area. Several attempts were made by other surrounding Indian nations in the past, especially the Cherokees, though most of them were not lucrative ventures. In 1867 for example many tribes invoked a head tax on cattle passing through their reservations. It was the faulty, poorly written administrative procedures of the Indians that toppled the enterprise since collecting the head tax from each rancher was virtually impossible. According to Robert M. Burrill, author of "The Establishment of Osage Ranching," Texas cattlemen were aware of Indian bluestem even *before* the Civil War.[22] Perhaps once the war ceased, cattlemen, already familiarized with the topography of Oklahoman land, including off-beat, unmapped trails, managed to avoid Indian tax collectors before shipping their cattle off to rails. The lengths these ranchers were willing to go in order to sell their beef in Kansas City markets cannot be underestimated either. By 1870, what sold for a meager three dollars a head in Texas eagerly was snatched up in Kansas City for *ten times* that amount.[23]

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of land east of the ninety-sixth parallel designated entirely for their day-to-day living since ranching is conducted west of the ninety-sixth parallel and west of those other nations engaging in leasing and living on their specified section of land. Lefebvre, 73.

[19] James C. Malin, "An Introduction to the History of the Bluestem-Pasture Region of Kansas: A Study in Adaptation to Geographical Environment," *Kansas Historical Quarterly*, 11 no. 2 (February 1942): 3; Within this area of the Southwest, two major types of Bluestem exist: Big Bluestem (*Andropogon furcatus*) best seen in lower, wide, gaping regions and Little Bluestem (*Andropogon scoparius*) seen in higher elevations such as uplands. Due to its sweeping, long stemmed shape, many still refer to Bluestem as "Tallgrass." Ibid., 3, 7.

[20]Malin, 4.

[21]Burrill, 527.

[22]Burrill, 527, 525; The most known of these Civil War age cattle routes was that of Jesse Chisholm's Chisholm Trail, which sought to create a means for Texas ranchers to stop off in southern Kansas for last minute feedings before being shipped off to Northern markets through the ever-developing Kansas railroad system. The trail also helped to cut down a rancher's disregard for farmers in Oklahoma and Kansas since, before the trail's creation, cattle on a cattle drive would stomp over growing agriculture and ruin a farmer's crop yield for the year. In 1866, the formal Chisholm Trail was open to driving cattle ranchers. In a five-year span, nearly three million cattle trod the trail from their Texas homes up to their Kansas shipping docs. John W. Morris, Charles R. Goins, and Edwin C. McReynolds, *Historical Atlas of Oklahoma* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976),46; Louise and Fullen Artrip, *Memoirs of Daniel Fore (Jim) Chisholm and The Chisholm Trail* (Topeka, Ks.: Artrip Publications, 1949), 6-12; Geo. Rainey, *The Cherokee Strip, Its History* (Stockton, CA: Gaylord, 1925), 13.

[23] *Sodbusters, Sidewinders & Dandies: Two Decades in the Territories* (Tulsa, Ok.: Western National Bank, 1982), 7.

As for the Osages, they decided to *watch* the outcome of Amerindians engaging in unwritten agreements with ranchers before practicing this risky business on their own. Tribes formally charging heads of cattle ran into all sorts of problems with the greedy U.S. government concerning the legality of their trail taxes. At one point Judge I.C. Parker remarked that "a tax imposed by the Creek nation on cattle passing through their country is a burden laid upon commerce between the States, the regulation of which belongs to Congress alone."[24] Though most of this constitutional banter remained empty words, it was a serious, lingering headache for those Indians regulating the headtax system. In spite of this dilemma, stock ranchers paying a head tax of ten cents or more still flourished in the Cherokee's area of the Strip so well that in 1876[25] the Osages and other nearby tribes began contracting their lands independently. The Osages' business became so successful that by 1880, there was almost no uninhabited land found in the Strip without grazing cattle.[26] The Osages' lands were, serendipitously and unexpectedly, located in an area packed with rich, profitable grass and conveniently on a rancher's way to the slaughterhouses. These experiences with cattle contracts proved to the Osages and many other tribes that tumultuous, unarable land is not synonymous with poverty; on the contrary it can be associated with considerable wealth.[27]

Another key reason Osage ranching reached such heights had nothing to do with the quality of land they possessed, but with their own open door policy. During the late 1870s and early 1880s, the vast majority of the booming railroad industry had yet to reach the state of Texas. Mainline, national rails at the time--which connected ranchers to major slaughterhouses in Kansas City, St. Louis, and Chicago--only ran as far south as Colorado and New Mexico. In tandem with the commencement of the Osage's cattle leasing business, certain branches of the Santa Fe line began to stretch to the southern Kansas border—on the front door of the Osage's luscious bluestem prairies. Unfortunately for stockmen, when Kansas legislatures were not in session they doubled as local farmers and subsequently passed laws stating that cattle infected with an insidious disease known as "Texas Fever" were no longer permitted to graze within the state. The cause was mysterious at the time, but small Kansas farmers agreed that for some reason, whenever Texas longhorn cattle came

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[24] Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1884* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1884), xxxix.

[25] Towards the end of 1875 the Osage's Indian Agent, Isaac T. Gibson spoke of the happenings of cattle ranchers resting adjacent to Osage land: "I have no doubt it is true, as alleged that, the Osages have killed several head of these cattle. Drovers having authority to herd them should be well paid for such losses. Five horses were also stolen from a rancher on the cattle-trail, which was returned to the owners. This summer three families of thriftless, indigent Osages left the reservation without permission, and located on the Chisholm cattle-trail, to gain a living by collecting tax of the drovers," Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1875* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1875), 276-281. This recollection paints a rather unhealthy portrait of the Osage people which may be the result of Osages still starving from a lack of harvested crops for food or money from ranching to buy food from other areas. It may also be Gibson's response to the longstanding problems/disregard he possessed for the plight of the Osage nation. The year prior to this statement the Osage nation was so upset with Gibson's ill-treatment of them that they took their petitions directly to Washington, D.C. so that an investigation of the Indian agent would be conducted formally. Everything from distributing rations and money in a discriminatory manner to intruding on religious practices to firing employees who signed petitions against him. Predictably Gibson was absolved of all charges. In 1876 Gibson was promptly replaced with another Indian agent, Cyrus Beede, who was not much better for the Osages than Gibson. Fortuitously, 1876 also marked the beginning of the Osages' wildly successful grass leasing business. Burns, *A History of the Osage People*, 348-349, 357.

[26] "Money in Cattle Ranges: Keeping Hooks in a Skillful Manner to Swell the Profits," *Arkansas City Republican* (Arkansas City, Ks.), 11 April 1883; Burrill, 527; William W. Savage, Jr., *The Cherokee Strip Live Stock Association: Federal Regulation and the Cattleman's Last Frontier* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 19.

[27] Burns, *A History of the Osage People*, 348-349, 357.

into contact with their own healthy herds, their assets would grow ill and die shortly thereafter. Hence, Texas ranchers sorrowfully accepted an agreement with the state stipulating that Texas cattle could only be *loaded* onto rails in the southern portion of the state and immediately be shipped off to the slaughterhouses so as to avoid unnecessary animal contact.[28]

A major problem with this quarantine law was many Texas cattlemens' longstanding practice of utilizing bluestem grasses on the *Kansas* side of the vertical bluestem strip to increase the profit margin of their livestock. A favored spot for last-minute feedings centered around Emporia, Kansas which dubbed itself "Bluestem Capital of the World" due to its popularity.[29] But now that legislatures banned some of Emporia's most valued customers, Texas ranchers dreamt up a scheme to travel *around* Kansas for driving and grazing purposes in order to reach major railroads like the Union Pacific. With time many states, including Colorado and New Mexico, joined Kansas' precedent, outlawing Texas cattle. [30]

Now stranded in the Southwest, Texas stockmen reached out their dollars to the Osage Nation who, by the mid to late 1870s, were heading for poverty. Seizing the financial opportunity, Osage Indians accepted Texas longhorns onto their expansive grasslands with a clever way of removing whatever infectious agent was causing them to spread Texas Fever: cattle dipping. As recollected in *History of Chatauqua County* (located across the border from Osage land), before crossing into Kansas, the Osage would team up with ranchers and force stock to pass through a viaduct directly on the state line. One participant remembered that "We drove em' *to* the viaduct, they went *over* the line not *across* it; we made em *swim* to Kansas, just to be sure they were not *driven across*." The statement creates quite the chuckle, but also abides by the Kansas quarantine law quite well. To ensure obedience to the law's requisites, Osages, ranchers, and those living in the border city of Elgin, Kansas, set up cowpens on the border in order to prevent possibly infected cattle from straying into the fields of an angry farmer.[31] At one point a 'quarantine wall' built of stone was created around the town to enforce stationary movement of the longhorns.[32]

For Elgin, Osage ranching had a tremendous impact on the dynamics of the town. Not only did ranching make Elgin a profitable place for railroads to contract with, it also gave numerous unemployed or poorly employed men lucrative jobs. Dipping, driving, and loading cattle all required locals to complete each process since a steady supply of longhorns came to the area, especially in the

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[28] "Oklahoma," *Arkansas City Traveler*, 15 September 1886; Malin, 12-14; "Cattle Diseases: Mystery Connected with the Appearances and Disappearances of Disease Among Animals," *Arkansas City Republican*, 20 June 1883.

[29] Walter M. Kollmorgen and David S. Simonett, "Grazing Operations in the Flint Hills Blue Stem Pastures of Chase County, Ks.," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 55 no. 2 (June 1965): 264; While Emporia was known for its precious grasslands, Wichita was known as a leading center for livestock and grain shipping in the Midwest. For instance, at the height of the cattle season in 1874, two thousand cowboys drove two hundred thousand cattle into Wichita. Cattle driving into Wichita came from a myriad of states—Colorado, New Mexico, and Kansas, though it would still be some time before ranchers in Texas would reach the pique of their success by leasing with tribesmen in the Cherokee Outlet. Dee Brown and Martin F. Schmitt, *Trail Driving Days* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 86.

[30]Malin, 14.

[31] Such sophistication of technique and clarity of the law regarding Elgin's cattle-dipping practice is hard to picture in the mind's eye. To see the event being performed first hand in Elgin, see Appendix C.

[32] Louis F. Burns, "Jim Town: Elgin, Kansas," *History of Chatauqua County*, vol. 1, Chautauqua County Heritage Association (Chautauqua, Co., Ks.: Curtis Media Corporation, 1897), 48; At the time of Elgin's developing cattle industry came Gen. James S. Brisbin's text entitled *The Beef Bonanza or How to get Rich on the Plains* published in 1881. Its wild popularity inspired numerous individuals in the Panhandle to cash in on the cattle trade, especially those driving their stock through the Cherokee Strip. Brisbin's impact on the development of the western cattle trade was substantial to say the least. Brown and Schmitt, 144.

summer months. One train of cattle, for instance, carried thirty cars, which could hold about sixty animals each. Citizen Victor Noe mentions that on a good day his group of men could load up to eighteen trains during night hours and eighteen trains during the day as a standard for them. Elgin was one of the most important cattle towns in Kansas because it was the last stop for railroads before heading back North to the slaughterhouses. Subsequently, Osage ranching transformed the town from a fumbling, agriculturally dependent community to one focused on the rapidly expanding American industries of beef production and railroads.[33]

When the Osages realized that their cattle business was extremely profitable, they once again looked towards the government-friendly Cherokee Nation to work out the bugs in this newly organized system of ranching on the Strip. As the Cherokees began negotiations in 1880, perhaps out of jealousy, the U.S. Department of the Interior created regulations for the Indian Department to follow--a good section of which focused on grass leasing. In short, these regulations stated that Indians had no legal authority to lease their lands whatsoever. They also gave a perplexing argument that whites (like Texas cattle ranchers) could use Indian grasses if those cattlemen were granted consent by the specified Indian Agent, the Indian tribe, *and* provided rent to the agent for the use of the land. The agent would then have to approve a negotiated rate for use of the tribe's land that subsequently needed to be sent to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for final approval.[34] The long-term effect of this runaround basically indicated to cattlemen that they were not permitted to give their American-made dollars to a group of people whose citizenship was in question with the government.

By 1881 the Cherokee Nation, sick of federal games, began talks to try a more businesslike approach to ranching. By 1883 they had chartered the Cherokee Strip Live Stock Association (CSLSA) in Caldwell, Kansas, aiming "to promote 'improvement of the breed of domestic animals by the importation, grazing, breeding, selling, bartering, and exchange thereof' in places most advantageously located."[35] The society was comprised of ranchers whose assets grazed in the Cherokee's portion of the Strip. Following several negotiations, the CSLSA managed to sign an agreement leasing the entire area of the Outlet owned by the Cherokees—some six million acres—to various stockmen in 1883. The remarkable feat spawned several 'state of the land' meetings with CSLSA members. What is so interesting about this process is that less than one year after the six million-acre agreement transpired, ranchers located in surrounding tribes, namely the Osages, began attending the frequent CSLSA meetings. These tribes learned how to emulate the success of the CSLSA and put the structure of this organization into practice within their own reservations. After the shock wore off from the fact that there was no legal way for the government to harass the CSLSA (though they had tried mightily to do so), Osage ranchers formed their own, independent group entitled the Osage Live Stock Association (OLSA) in 1884.[36]

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[33] Burns "Jim Town: Elgin, Kansas," 48.

[34] Given the timing of the Department's tightening restrictions on grass leasing, such jealously may stem from the notion that in 1880 Washington was still in the process of reorganizing and restructuring the entire United States. The American economy was still healing from the economic affects of the Civil War. Coupled with the embarrassing presidential years of Johnson and the ever-corruptible Grant administration, it is arguable that the stable, prosperous industry of grass leasing along the Cherokee Strip was, according to the government, either an American business which should support America's redevelopment or cease to exist so that some wholly-American version of it can be created in its place. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Regulations of the Indian Department,* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1884), No. 532; Ibid., No. 529; Burrill, 528.

[35] Savage, Jr., 47-48; Miner, *The Corporation and the Indian*, 126.

[36] Les Warehime, *The Osage "Its Ranching Legacy,"* (Tulsa, Ok.: W.W. Publishing, 2005), 153-154; Savage, Jr., 60; Those non member lessee Osage ranches represented at the CSLSA's meeting in 1884 were as follows: Florer and Pllock, Hewins and Titus, Crane and Larimer, Wait and King, Carpenter and Leahy, Soderstrom and Shoals, and Osage Brown and Sons ranches. Ibid., 154; *The History of the Cherokee Strip and the Cherokee Strip Museum—Arkansas City, Kansas* (Stockton, Ca: Gaylord, c. 1969), 6-7.

What may have pushed the Osage Nation to create a livestock association more than any other factor was the sharp rise in prices cattle ranchers were willing to pay for premium grasslands between 1881 and 1882. Apparently over the previous ten years, beef vendors noticed the positive reaction of their customers to cattle coming from grasslands on the Strip. When prices rose at meat markets, butchers returned some of their profits to ranchers who then used that money as capital to buy more acres of grass on the Strip.[37] The fencing-in of one's cattle became common practice during the summer of 1881, which greatly reduced the hassle of certain Outlet ranchers from relocating fugitive stock that had grazed on into the lands of another leasee in the spring and summer months.[38] In conjunction, this period also witnessed the signing of the Osages first organized, written constitution, much in the style of the U.S. Constitution. After December 31, 1881, many Osage landowners felt more at ease with the stability of their tribe, thereby allowing them to direct more attention towards improving the economic state of their people.[39]

So with these reassurances prosperity, the Osages and their newly created livestock association took shape. Several meetings determined that an OLSA member named Horace Crane of the Crane & Larimer ranch would be president of the association while W.J. Pollock of Florer and Pollack became his secretary. Wisely the OLSA made clear reference to the notion that they would work *in harmony* with other like-minded groups (particularly the CSLSA) and had no qualms about permitting its own Osage people who legally owned cattle to become OLSA members as well. According to Les Warehime, author of *The Osage: 'Its Ranching Legacy,"* the principle difference between the structure of these two organizations, the CSLSA and the OLSA, was that the Cherokees' process was a bit more involved. In order to obtain a lease on Cherokee Territory in the Outlet, the CSLSA had to acquire a lease from Cherokee Indians on the desired land and then act as an intermediary to serve the agreement to an associated member for confirmation. Those requesting lands held by other Strip nations, like the Osages, bargained directly with the tribe.[40]

Though the difference in methodology is not specified in the 1884 CSLSA contract with the Cherokees—which is when and where the OLSA formed—it may be inferred that Cherokee people, persuaded by their long, troubled history with American citizens, simply grew tired of broken, undocumented agreements and wanted an explicit organization to deal with citizens for them instead of continuing unproductive direct contact. By employing the CSLSA to negotiate between the owners of land and prospective ranchers, they weeded out unreasonable demands by ranchers so that the Cherokee people would receive only reasonable agreements—accepted for review by those in the CSLSA they knew and trusted. Those agreements were also subjected to a uniform set of standards to which no rancher could manipulate, for instance, by negotiating with a Cherokee land owner who spoke only broken English. If this was the Cherokees' reason for the

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[37]Burrill, 528.

[38] Ralph H. Records, "The Round-Up of 1883: A Recollection," *Chronicles of Oklahoma*, 23 no. 2 (December 1945): 119-138. What is unique about Ralph Records' record of fencing on the Cherokee Strip is its firsthand detail of the event. Due to the date of his publication over sixty years ago, and his residence in the Cherokee Strip, Records was able to use many more primary documents than what is available to today's researcher. He later became a Professor of History at the University of Oklahoma where he published and researched many aspects of ranching life in Indian Territory—including the history of formal fencing that commenced, as he recalled, in 1883.

[39] This information can be found in the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Annual Indian Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs*, 1900 (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1900), 173-174, which not only explains the nature of the constitution from 1881, but also explains reasons for its demise less than two decades later in 1900. The Commissioner gives four basic elements to the Osages' decision to dissolve their own government: caustic disputes over election results between the Big Osages and Little Osages; severe discord between the Osage tribal officers and their Indian agent when managing tribal affairs; selecting unqualified men to hold important offices; and directing money received from the collection of permit taxes for inappropriate, unnecessary uses.

[40] Warehime, *The Osage 'Its Ranching Legacy,"* 154.

structure of their association, it is no wonder that the OLSA and its members ran into fewer disputes over land with its ranchers and, more ominously later on, with the federal government.[41]

What was also different about the OLSA was its willingness to work with other Indian nations in the area. When the OLSA had its first formal meeting in September of 1884, member Ed Hewins advocated and passed a decree stating that any Osage Indian, any stock owning Indian, and/or anyone with ranges on Indian territory could become members of the OSLA. All they had to do was pay a fee of $2 to its treasurer, rancher John Florer.[42] The CSLSA, on the other hand, was created exclusively for the dealings of ranchers with the Cherokee Indians and their land. In spite of this stipulation, the OSLA still invited the Cherokee nation to join their association and benefit from its network of people.

In addition to maintaining the OLSA's treasury, Florer was also asked to create a book describing, listing, and picturing the brands held by each of its members. The benefits of this publication were two-fold. First, ranchers could identify and keep track of their own stock easily, also reporting which ranchers permitted their wandering cattle to graze in another's territory. The text served as a means of recognizing all possible stock held within Osage land so that fugitive cattle from unregistered ranchers, like the Texas cattlemen whose livestock grazed in leased land in Texas, could be returned quickly. Ranchers in violation of grazing rules could be sanctioned for their lack of attention—inadvertently eating up the potential profits carried within Osage grasses. Second, the text served to identify where unusually nourishing grass existed in Osage land so that beef suppliers, like butchers and market managers, could price meat accordingly for its customers. [43] In other words, if a slaughterhouse vendor could recognize that well-received beef came from the Hewins ranch in Osage territory, he could indicate that to an interested butcher easily, based on the brand symbol left on the cow at the time of slaughter. Vice versa, if a particularly poor meat product came from a certain ranch, the vendor could sell it to a customer for less money.

As for the organization of the book, association members had about one and a half months to submit their brand symbols and information to Florer in order to be alphabetized and categorized. In the interest of good faith, Florer also included a list of miscellaneous brands from ranchers who did not pay the $2 membership fee (and subsequently were not part of the association) but wanted to be listed in the comprehensive volume. The fee for non-members to be included was

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[41]In regard to the backgrounds of OLSA ranchers, many of them possessed upstanding histories. Ed M. Hewins, one of the most successful of the Osage ranchers, was a Kansas State Senator living in southern Kansas near Elgin and was part of the CSLSA, though he also leased about 75,000 acres from the Osages. Elgin merchant and stock dealer, Louis C. Wait, partnered up with Richard B. King to hold 46,000 acres of Osage land. Another Elgin man, George M. Carpenter was a banker, businessman and rancher simultaneously, even bequeathing land to build Elgin upon. He was so loved by the community and those industries that ran through it that when he died in 1921 the last funeral train to run in America, sent by the Santa Fe line, took Carpenter to Independence to be buried. Together with William T. Leahy they took over 54,000 acres of Osage territory. John Florer traded with the Osages since 1871 while his partner, William J. Pollock served as their Indian agent and mayor of Arkansas City, Kansas. They utilized 75,000 acres of territory. J.M. Hall opened the first store in Tulsa, Oklahoma for the Osages, whose trading license for the establishment was paid for by the inspiring William Larimer. Together Larimer and partner Horrace Crane employed 80,000 acres of Osage territory. Larimer also founded Denver, Colorado (hence Denver's county—Larimer). William Osage Brown and his sons rented 30,000 acres of the Osage region. Brown taught his sons the value of banking, especially when dealing with the American economy. Two of his three sons, Charles and Alpheus became Osage Chiefs. Warehime, *The Osage "Its Ranching Legacy,"* 155-156.

[42] Warehime, *The Osage "Its Ranching Legacy,"* 156-157; Those Indian nations joining the OSLA soon after its creation were the Osages, Cherokees, Kaws, Nez Perce, and Poncas. Ibid., 157.

[43]Warehime, *The Osage "Its Ranching Legacy,"* 157; "Live Stock Letter: Report to the Cattle Market in Kansas City," *Arkansas City Traveler*, 21 October 1885.

double the cost of membership--$4.[44] The advantage of allowing these non-registered ranchers into the book was in building an interstate network of stockmen.

Another benefit of being in the OLSA was the information members received about other stockowners residing *throughout* the United States, not just in Texas. Seven delegates of the association were chosen to attend the National Live Stock Association conference held in St. Louis that year. They reported back to Osage ranchers on the state of the livestock industry on a national scale, tried to bring new interest to their lands, and saw what, if any, new developments had been made in the grazing enterprise such as potential railroad paths or new trends in raising and herding cattle.[45] With all of the advantages ranchers and cattlemen gained by joining the OLSA, it is safe to say that their business ventures would not have been as prosperous had it not been for the help of that special Osage association.

But in the midst of the Osage internal and external tribal reorganization, and the beginning of unforeseen profit from its land, came a quiet storm from Washington. In the early 1880s grass leasing, in some form, by Indian tribes was employed on a national scale so much so that congressmen and leaders of the government began establishing rules based on one tribe's problems with leasing, which eventually applied to the Indian ranching community as a whole. This became the focus of tribal-governmental relations in the Midwest since debates between the Cherokees and Congress had already proven that Indian nations would find someway to profit from their land legally.

By 1883 a man named Edward Felon petitioned the government, especially Secretary of the Interior Henry M. Teller, to uphold his lease agreement with the bellicose Cheyenne and Arapaho Nations. In response to Felon, Sec. Teller explained that "it is not the present policy of the Department to affirmatively recognize any agreements or leases of the character you mention."[46] Thus indicating to the distraught rancher that the government would not defend him, nor any other rancher leasing in Indian lands, in broken contracts since, according to Sec. Teller, they were created illegally. In juxtaposition to this statement, Sec. Teller went on to say that he saw "no objection to allowing the Indians to grant permission to parties desiring to graze cattle on the reservation to do so on fair and reasonable terms, ... [And only be] recognized when granted by the proper authority of the tribe, [where] benefits must be participated in by all the tribe, not just a favored few."[47] In other words, according to the U.S. government, as long as the Indians leasing their grasses were happy with their arrangements with cattle ranchers, they could continue. If those Indians were not pleased with the state of their relations, they could immediately repeal the signed lease agreement without a legitimate reason or process.[48]

Ranchers now clearly understood that they had no protection for their grazing investments either from the government nor from Native Americans. Other stockmen could steal their cattle, re-brand them, or use that rancher's rented land for their own cattle to graze upon, free of charge--and there was nothing they could legally do about it. Technically, small time farmers and squatters, sometimes known as *boomers*, could race into a rancher's land and settle upon it without sanctions taken against them by the rancher or the government.[49] With this spat between

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[44]Warehime, *The Osage "Its Ranching Legacy,"* 157.

[45] Ibid., 157.

[46]U.S. Congress, Senate, "Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting in compliance with Senate resolution of December 4, 1883, copies of documents and correspondence relating to leases of lands in the Indian Territory to citizens of the United States for cattle-grazing and other purposes, January 14, 1884," Senate Executive Document 54, 48th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1884), 99.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Burrill, 529.

[49] Perhaps Sec. Teller's perplexing remarks concerning ranching were said in protest to having white Americans enter into a lucrative business with individuals (Indians) who were not American citizens and did not have to give back to the economy to the same extent as citizens. Thus, Sec. Teller's view on the enterprise may have been an attempt to make ranchers realize a better investment of their cattle could be found in leasing with other

boomers/farmers and cattlemen, many Indians, including the Osages, seized this opportunity to increase their annual income even more. As boomers and ranchers argued, the Osages came to realize that ranchers with large cattle herds could best deliver rent quickly by paying relatively large portions of the total lease price since they had the money kept in secure, interstate banks and readily dispensable. Small ranchers and farmers/boomers did not have this financial advantage to pay in full or when asked, leaving the Osages to carve out liberal portions of their land to a few wealthy cattlemen with large herds.

And so in September of 1883, five months after Felon's disconcerting correspondence with Sec. Teller, the Osage began signing lease agreements to large cattle owners. In total six ranchers were permitted formal use of Osage grasses, absorbing some 380,000 acres of land for ranching.[50] Their Indian agent, Laben J. Miles,[51] was known to fight vehemently for the rights and privileges of the nations he represented; his character in the early-mid 1880s was no exception. When giving his report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1885, Miles, a government agent, clearly supported the use and legality of grass leasing in order to build Osage revenue. In his 1883-1884 report, he announced to the commissioner that the Osages made over *ten times* the amount of money initially brought in from utilizing the land before grass leasing was permitted. Furthermore, the pesky problem of stray cattle never bothered Osage ranchers because, upon signing the agreement, ranchers were required to set up fences along the exterior borders of their rented lands. Since leased grass was located on unused portions of Osage land, most leases lined up against the borders of their reservation where, without fences, fugitive cattle could have become a serious problem, probably pushing away cattle drivers instead of luring them into the territory.[52] So for varying amounts, each of the original six rancher's leases' were eligible for renewal after five years of grazing on the Osages' contracts.[53] Yet as cattlemen began to see the rewards of their Osage leases after the first year, federal threats of closing down Indian grass leases, permanently, were upon them.

As if the state of grass leasing could not reach a new low, by the winter of 1885, Mother Nature came around to prove otherwise. This time, she brought friend Jack Frost to do the damage with one of the worst blizzards in history . Some areas went to thirty-one degrees below zero while others took the brunt of snow drifting down from south from Montana and east from the Colorado Rockies. By January of 1886, snow and wind became so violent, coupled with temperatures like "21-degrees below zero" in mid-morning that trains were literally stopped in their tracks. It would take emergency trains at least twenty-four hours to dig out of the icy mess they had found themselves in at numerous times during this harsh winter. To the Southeast of the Osage reservation, a distressing tale unfolded where nine people and four horses were frozen to death after getting lost in the snowdrifts around them. They were only twenty miles from their destination. Even the tropical

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American citizens owning similar prairies in the Midwest. "Oklahoma," *Arkansas City Republican*, 14 July 1886; "Favored Oklahoma: Ninety Miles Through Its Grasses," *Kansas City Evening Star* (Kansas City, Ks.), 31 July 1885; "Leasees In Council: The Secret Meeting of Cattlemen," *Kansas City Evening Star*, 28 July 1885; "The Boomers," *Kansas City Evening Star*, 8 May 1885.

[50] Burrill, 535.

[51] As an interesting side note, during the economic prime of the Osages on the Strip, Agent Miles decided to bring his nephew along one summer to show him the prosperity, sophistication, and intelligence of Indians in an ubiquitous fashion. The visit arguably influenced the young boy's positive views of Native Americans which may have lessened government-Indian friction in the early twentieth century. The reason for the far-reaching conclusion is that the young boy grew up to become the thirty-first president of the United States—Herbert Hoover. Rainey, *The Cherokee Strip*, 88.

[52] Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, *Annual report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1885* (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1885), 90.

[53] Burns, *A History of the Osage People*, 374.

climate of south Florida reported millions upon millions of fresh fruit frozen and inedible by daybreak.[54]

The typical pattern of this winter revolved around several days of a deep, penetrating snow following by an even longer period of sleet, freezing rain, and in severe cases, huge sheets of ice covering nearly the entire reservation. Combined with the established Outlet problem of lands being overstocked and overgrazed, the winter of 1885-1886 was unpredictably atrocious. According to Les Warehime's *History of Ranching the Osage*, the Osage nation did not suffer nearly as badly as other neighboring tribes, though cattle losses were no less appalling. Osage rancher Ed Hewins, for instance estimated that about 15,000 of his 75,000 heads of Osage cattle would make it through the winter. When the snow melted and the ice cracked away, only sixty-two were left standing. Other ranchers reported that they found numerous heads of cattle all huddled together in knee-deep snow when, suddenly, rain and sleet turned to massive sheets of ice so stiff that it literally locked the cattle in place as they froze to death like popsicles. Part of the problem of mortality was the ranchers' foolish belief that the undergrowth of the bluestem grass (cured stems) would be enough to stabilize their stock until spring—assuming that the undergrowth would not be covered with a thick sheet of ice. Though it was a cold, hard lesson to learn, cattlemen largely stopped this practice after the winter of 1885 and supplemented the stem-cured grass with feed enriched with a high protein content. [55]

The impact of the severe 1885-1886 winter was significant to the prosperity of the Osage Nation, regardless of its unprecedented success in the ranching business for years. According to the *Osage Red Book*—the Osage standard in important records and statistics for its tribe, from 1880 to 1885, a consistent increase in profit allocated to Osages was found to be at least twenty-five to fifty percent of the previous year's earnings—from $10.50 recorded in 1880 to $107.75 recorded in 1885. Published earnings for the 1885-year (released in 1886) reveal no increase in revenue, but rather a *sharp decrease* to less than sixty-three dollars per person—roughly *half* of expected earnings for the previous year. George Rainey's *The Cherokee Strip* documents this immense hardship by commenting on how many ruined cattlemen and families in 1885 began picking up the bones of those animals scattered along the Strip, dead and decaying from the horrid winter, and depositing them to the nearest railroad so that they could be sold as fertilizer in the East. [56]

In spite of these losses and hardships, through hard work and an increase in leasing, expected revenue for the 1886 shot up to a remarkable $157.85. In 1887 this number skyrocketed to an incredible $243.35, though credit for this sudden hike in revenue can, once again, be traced back to the federal government.[57] To complicate the lives of many Amerindians even more, in 1887 the Dawes Act sailed through Congress demanding Indian tribes break up their mutual land holdings and reorganize them into allotted, individual plots owned by singular members as private property. In short this policy radically changed the way in which most Indians passed on land to their families in a selfish attempt by Congress to compel them to acculturate into the American lifestyle. It also narrowed a tribe's ability to freely lease land to ranchers, who were on a tight, annual schedule to produce profitable cattle and had no time to sort out new grazing issues with affected nations.

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[54] " Snow Bound," *Kansas City Star*, 22 January 1886; "The Boss Blizzard," *Kansas City Star*, 3 February 1886; "A Cold Job," *Kansas City Star*, 23 January 1886; "Nine Rovers Frozen," *Kansas City Star*, 28 January 1886; "Hazen, The Blizzard Agent," *Kansas City Star*, 22 January 1886; "Another Blizzard," *Kansas City Star*, 19 January 1886; "Frozen Fruit," *Kansas City Star*, 22 January 1886.

[55] Les Warehime, *History of Ranching the Osage* (Tulsa: Ok., W.W. Publishing, 2000), 30-31; Rainey, *The Cherokee Strip*, 173; U.S. Congress, Senate, "Report of the Select Committee on Transportation and Sale of Meat Products," Senate Report 829. 51st Congress. 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1889).; Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Letter From L.J. Miles Osage agent to T.J. Morgan Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Dated January 6, 1892," found in Osage Agency Archives, Pawhuska, Ok.. (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1892),1; Burns, *A History of the Osage People*, 374-375; Warehime, *The Osage "Its Ranching Legacy,"* 156-157.

[56] "Osage Head-right History (Per Share)" *Osage Red Book* (Pawhuska, Ok., 2006); Rainey, *The Cherokee Strip*, 174-175.

[57] Ibid.

What negatively impacted other tribes' ability to remain financially stable while respecting the Dawes Act revolved around two conditions. First, only 160 acres could be given to each Indian *head of household* which later would be divided up into continuously smaller plots of land for descendants to own . . . until land was sectioned into areas too small to be given to the next generation. Secondly, the act stated that any surplus land resulting from the new allotment process would be sold away—a clever idea given the numerous land speculators and homesteaders on the front door of the open territories in the Midwest. The key here between the Dawes Act of 1887 and the Osage's spike in revenue by the end of that year is that there were only two groups of Amerindians in the Outlet area exempt from having to abide by the new allotment procedures—the Five Civilized Tribes (Choctaws, Chicasaws, Seminoles, Creeks, and Cherokees) and the Osages. Hence, ranchers who were either locked out of existing agreements with other tribes or simply did not wish to go through the hassle of new Dawes Act stipulations began ranching with those few nations exempt—only two of which settled on the prized bluestem grass in Oklahoma Territory.[58] Compounded by the recent influx of Cheyenne-Arapaho ranchers who were now recovering from the 1885-1886 winter, the upsurge in Osage revenue was almost an expected event.

Consequently, one of the major contributions of the Osage Nation to the American economy correlates with the development of the American cattle industry. According to Osage expert and mixed-blood, Louis F. Burns, with the implementation of the Dawes Act, actual prairie lands available for leasing located off Osage or Cherokee territory were severely reduced due to the invasion of homesteaders and restrictions placed on other tribes. Thus, Osage and Cherokee lands "were about the only available grass between Texas and the packing plants at Kansas City and Chicago"[59] to plump up ranchers' profits. In point of fact, if Texas ranchers wanted to venture northward past the Osages' preferred cuisine in Oklahoma, they would have no place making a home for themselves in Kansas since the Sunflower state enforced their strict quarantine laws against Texas livestock. In part because of their strategic location in the Midwest and their favorable feeding grounds, the Osage Territory was destined to expand the American cattle industry substantially.

Likewise, while most Amerindians were sorting out the impact of the Dawes Act on their leasing businesses, the Osages also managed to tap into very important advances in American transportation systems. It was during this time of Osage grass leasing that the American railroad industry was booming and building at an exponential pace. The Santa Fe, Midland Valley, Missouri, Kansas, Katy (from Texas) and even Frisco rail lines all served Osage cattle ranchers from afar—perhaps touching Oklahoma Territory in order to dip into the rising meat market in Osage lands.[60]

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[58] "General Allotment Act (Dawes Act) February 8, 1887" found in Prucha, 170-173; Burns *A History of the Osage People,* 384; H. Craig Miner, *The Corporation and the Indian: Tribal Sovereignty and Industrial Civilization in Indian Territory, 1865-1907* (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1976), 116. As Miner concludes, a major reason as to why the Dawes Act did not initially apply to the Five Civilized Tribes nor the Osages was "because of the fear of tribes there that allotment would ratify the railroad land grants" (116). A noteworthy observation of the Osages' exclusion from the Dawes Act is that the event serves as a reminder of the bitter debate between Indians and the government over their control and removal, stemming from the presidency of Andrew Jackson in the 1830s. Whether they were foreign peoples, recognized citizens, or wards of the government, it is clear that Congress's determination to obtain complete control over Native Americans would be achieved by any means necessary, however long it took. Miner also points out that in 1893, some six years after the Osages and Five Civilized Tribes' original exclusion from the Dawes Act, came the Dawes Commission developed by Congress "to negotiate with [the said tribes] to accomplish allotment. . . . [since] allotment was terribly central to the plans of the U.S. for the Indian Territory" (116). After all, the breaking up of communal lands inherently created social, political, and cultural rifts among tribal members—where disunity and commotion only encouraged the government and its economically significant businesses, like cattle slaughtering and railroad building, to thrive and expand.

[59]Burns, *A History of the Osage People,* 384; "Railroads for Kansas," *Weekly Kansas Chief* (Troy, Ks.) 14 February 1886.

[60]Burns, *A History of the Osage People,* 386-387.

Like a domino effect, railways were drawn up to drive cattle through Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas in order to feed the citizens of America and increase the population of the West since the voyage, via the railroad, was now easier, faster, and more affordable to settlers.

Arguably, without Osage grass leases, Oklahoma's modern economy may not have reached its admirable level since fewer homesteaders and businesses would have been able to settle there due to a lack of available transportation. In order to accommodate the relatively large size of the Osage reservation, and therefore its widespread ranches, major rail lines began to stop off at the northern and southern borders of the reservation. The northern, Kansas border, as mentioned previously, permitted cattle shipment via the Santa Fe line in Elgin, and sometimes Hewins, Kansas (named after the prominent Osage rancher). For ranches located in the southern portion of the reservation, Tulsa, Oklahoma, served as the drop-off point for the Pacific and Atlantic lines to transport cattle. Realizing the profitable nature of grass-leasing on the Strip, the Pacific and Atlantic rail lines finished their first productions to Tulsa by August of 1882—a full two years before the Osages even created the OLSA.[61] Though railroads going directly into Osage land were eventually built, the steady flow of people and goods stemming from rail traffic significantly boosted Tulsa's status as a developing, prosperous town to reside in and boosted Oklahoma's revenue and population during those pivotal years when it was slowly preparing to apply for statehood.

With respect to the growth of railroads, the expansion of the cattle industry, and their own necessity to overcome poverty, the development of Osage grass leasing of the 1880s was a necessary business venture for the Osage nation in hopes of preventing their economic downfall. Their success as businessmen was unremarkable by Amerindian standards and became even more extraordinary at the peak of their annual leasing revenue when, in 1896, they discovered what was making the water on their land taste so bitter . . . oil.[62]

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[61]Warehime, *History of Ranching the Osage*, 30; Cattle buyer for Chicago packing houses, Joseph McCoy, realized the importance of railroad assistance for Texas ranchers in Oklahoma long before the success of the Cherokee was known nationally. In 1867 he convinced the Kansas Pacific railroad to build a switchline in Abilene, Kansas, though the line refused to help McCoy fund a cow town or even shipping pens for that matter. Nevertheless, McCoy soon went to talk with the Chisholm family and direct ranchers up to Abilene for national distribution. By the time McCoy completed such talks, Chisholm Trail had only been open for one complete year. With time Abilene did develop into a known cattle depot for western transportation of livestock. By 1871, Abilene's feat as a prosperous cow town was still said to be mild at best. In spring of that year the Santa Fe line took over cattle shipping to Kansas City and opened a port in Newton, Kansas, since Newton was some sixty-five miles closer to Texas than Abilene. Likewise, as Newton's prosperity declined Ellsworth, Kansas became yet another cow town with a focus not on the Santa Fe line but that of the Kansas Pacific again. Brown and Schmitt, 22-24, 80; Henry B. Jameson, *Miracle of Chisholm Trail* (Stockton, Ca.: Tri-State Chisholm Trail Centennial Commission, 1967), 6-10.

[62] Burns, 417-418; It was the brilliant success of grass leasing coupled with the discovery of oil which made the Osages the richest Native Americans alive and some of the richest individuals in the entire United States of America. Ponca City Chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution, 343.

Women and the War Effort:
The Timing of the Federal Suffrage Amendment

Christine A. Farrell

A question involved in the debate over women's enfranchisement was whether the right to vote should obligate the voter to military service.[1] A not uncommon argument during the Gilded Age that "the ballot is the inseparable concomitant of the bayonet . . . To introduce woman at the polls is to enroll her in the militia"[2] eventually metamorphosed into an argument that women should be advocates for peace.[3] Yet the advent of the Great War prompted the reverse question as to whether military service (albeit noncombatant) should qualify women for their enfranchisement. Woodrow Wilson eventually answered the latter question in the affirmative; however, he arrived at this conclusion in the context of war: the impact of U.S. mobilization against the Central Powers brought this issue to the fore. Wilson's reasons for endorsing the federal amendment were twofold. Not only did Wilson recognize that women had the potential to patriotically contribute to the war effort, he also strove to keep the Democratic Party in power by means of women's votes. The diplomatic National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) was integral in swaying Wilson's convictions toward his active endorsement of the federal amendment for woman suffrage.

Women's political history naturally is the most applicable methodology in this endeavor. Although women's movements were forces to contend with, ultimately these movements have no real consequence unless they amend the Constitution. Hence this study stresses the importance of Wilson's active endorsement of the federal amendment toward the latter part of his presidency and shows him as the pivotal force in the suffrage movement to convince federal and state legislatures to accept this amendment.

In 1871 the suffragist Tennie C. Clafin published *Constitutional Equality: A Right of Woman.*[4] Clafin discussed the controversial question of whether to link military service to the right to vote in her chapter "Will Women Accept the Consequences of Equality?" She believed that she spoke for all women when she stated plainly, "Well, we have no objection."[5] Clafin did work through this rationale by saying that if only combatants should vote, then noncombatant men should not have that right.[6] Early in the Gilded Age, prominent men and women both believed that some sort of patriotic obligation should be inherent in the right to vote. The argument to link military service to women's enfranchisement was based on the fact that emancipated African-American men fought in the Civil War. A few male politicians and editors felt that African-American men earned the right to vote because they had made that ultimate sacrifice in war, unlike the "public tea-drinking" women suffragists.[7]

Yet women soldiers who served in male guises during the Civil War apparently were a well

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[1]Linda K. Kerber, *No Constitutional Rights To Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship* (New York: Hill & Wang, a division of Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1998), 243-246.

[2]Senator Justin Smith Morrill, as cited in Kerber, 366.

[3]ibid., 245-246.

[4]Tennie C. Clafin, *Constitutional Equality: A Right of Woman* (New York: Woodhull, Clafin & Co., 1871), 44-46.

[5]ibid., 44.

[6] ibid., 44-45.

[7] Kerber, 243-244; editors of the *New York World*, as cited in Kerber, 243.

known fact by this time. Published accounts of disguised women soldiers were popular choices of literature for the reading public. The national director of the United States Sanitary Commission during the war, Mary Ashton Rice Livermore (1820-1905), published her memoir of her service in 1892. Livermore had personal contact with female soldiers. She did not know the exact number of women who served as soldiers; however, she disputed an approximate figure, that of nearly four hundred, as a gross underestimate.[8] Although she was a suffragist,[9] her stance on the military service obligation was emblematic of the shift toward positioning women as peace advocates. "Such service was not the noblest that women rendered the country during its four years' struggle for life, and no one can regret that these soldier women were exceptional and rare. It is better to heal a wound than to make one."[10]

Yet ten years earlier the editors of the *History of Woman Suffrage*, two of the more notable were Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, honored women soldiers in their chapter "Woman's Patriotism In The War."[11] They gleaned newspaper reports of heroic women soldiers and provided a lengthy essay citing these accounts. Moreover, the editors explained singular instances in which Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis offered promotions to women who proved themselves on the battlefield. Stanton and Anthony believed that the Civil War was a catalyst for political change for women. The ideal was that "woman shall stand by man's side his recognized equal in rights as she is now in duties."[12]

Sara Emma Edmonds published her active role in the Civil War in *Memoirs Of A Soldier, Nurse And Spy: A Woman's Adventures In The Union Army*.[13] She fought in some of the major battles of the war as "Franklin Thompson." The publisher to the 1865 edition, which sold 175, 000 copies, stated that her male guise that was implemented in order to fight in the war was from the "most praiseworthy patriotism." Nonetheless Edmonds's intent was to entertain the reader despite the fact that her account has been considered more or less a true rendering.[14]

General George West published his interpretive account of the diary of "Charles Hatfield," the former Mrs. E. J. Guerin, with her permission, after 1885. West had already known of her male guise when they served together as Unionists in the Civil War. In his account, he explained

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[8]Mary Livermore, *My Story Of The War: A Woman's Narrative Of Four Years Personal Experience*, "cheap edition" – minus the illustrative plates (Hartford: A. D. Worthington And Company, 1892), 119-120 (page citations are to the illustrated edition).

[9]Kerber, 86-87.

[10]Livermore, 120.

[11]Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, eds., *History of Woman Suffrage*, vol. 2 (New York: Fowler & Wells, Publishers, 1882; reprint, New York: Arno & The New York Times, 1969), 1.

[12]ibid., 18-23.

[13]Edmonds, Sara Emma, *Memoirs Of A Soldier, Nurse And Spy: A Woman's Adventures In The Union Army* (originally *Nurse and Spy in the Union Army*), with an introduction by Elizabeth D. Leonard (Hartford, CT: Williams, 1865; reprint, DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1999), xiii-266.

[14]ibid., xiii-xxviii.

the battle experiences of the "brave young heroine" and her promotion to Lieutenant Hatfield.[15] Observers and chroniclers of the war also made special note of the phenomenon of female soldiers. Frank Moore published in 1866 *Women of the War: Their Heroism and Self-Sacrifice* which included women's incognita military service[16] and Frazar Kirkland's *Reminiscences of the Blue and the Gray*, published in the same year, mentioned that newspapers frequently reported the "valorous deeds of females fighting in the ranks."[17] So popular published accounts of women soldiers disabused the public from the presumption that only men rendered combatant military service.

Women's gallantry in war resonated over the next several decades. The fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Civil War occurred in the midst of the First World War. Hence the citizenry of the early twentieth century looked back to the Civil War and made comparisons. In April 1915, the *New York Times* included an article that glorified Civil War women soldiers after making an initial brief reference to women soldiers fighting in the Great War across the Atlantic. NAWSA might have influenced the publication of this article: by 1912, this organization successfully disseminated news articles to the general media.[18] Nonetheless, it may have been a factor in raising Woodrow Wilson's awareness of women soldiers from the Civil War era.

James Kerney, who was the Director of American Information in 1918, knew Wilson personally and published a biography of him in 1926; however, this contemporary author barely addressed Wilson's position on women's rights.[19] In fact, unfortunately, recent biographies fare no better.[20] The reader must resort to biographical renderings from the time of the Johnson administration, albeit able interpretations, in order to find Wilson's stance towards women's equal rights. Thomas Woodrow Wilson was born in Virginia in 1856 and grew up in Georgia and "the Carolinas." Wilson was "always thoroughly Southern in sentiment, and naturally adhered to the Calvinist philosophy."[21] He went to Princeton in 1875 where he was interested in history and political science.[22] His negative sentiments towards women's rights surfaced around this time: in 1876, he wrote in his diary that woman's suffrage was "at the foundation of every evil in this

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[15]George West, "Mountain Charley: A Sequel," in *Mountain Charley*, E.J. Guerin, new ed., with an introduction by Fred W. Mazzulla and William Kostka (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), x-xii; 79-112.

[16]Frank Moore, *Women of the War: Their Heroism and Self-Sacrifice* (Hartford: S. S. Scranton, 1866), 17-19.

[17]Frazar Kirkland, *Reminiscences of the Blue and the Gray* (Chicago: Preston Publishing Co., 1866), 173.

[18]James D. Startt, *Woodrow Wilson And The Press: Prelude To The Presidency* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 191.

[19] James Kerney, *The Political Education Of Woodrow Wilson* (New York: The Century Co., 1926), vii-503.

[20]The most recent biography to this date, in reference to suffrage or women's equal rights, only makes the briefest allusion to the Nineteenth Amendment. Please refer to Brands, H.W. *Woodrow Wilson.* The American Presidents, gen. ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. New York: Times Books, 2003.

[21]Kerney, 4.

[22]ibid., 3-5.

country."[23] After attending law school at the University of Virginia in 1882 Wilson briefly practiced law. Disillusioned with the chicaneries of his peers in the legal profession, Wilson concluded, perhaps naively, that practicing law was incongruous with his developing aspirations for a dual career in politics and academics. So he began his graduate program in history and political science at Johns Hopkins University in 1883. Although he became a published author on governance and earned a fellowship at the university whilst he was a graduate student, Wilson chose not to pursue a doctorate at that time; a decision born out of his willful and independent-minded regard for studying, as remarked by the meticulous biographer George C. Osborn, "according to his own tastes and choosing" and not for "the necessary reading for a Ph.D."[24] Afterwards he taught at a women's college, Bryn Mawr, as well as at Johns Hopkins and Wesleyan. While at Bryn Mawr, Wilson seriously reconsidered the practical value of a Ph.D. in order to further his career; Johns Hopkins awarded Wilson his doctorate in 1886. In 1890 he taught jurisprudence at Princeton University and eventually became its President.[25]

Wilson's stance towards his teaching post at Bryn Mawr illustrates an enigmatic Weltanschauung of women's equal rights. Wilson would not marry Ellen Axson, whom he had met shortly prior to commencing his graduate studies, until he obtained gainful employment. At the end of his graduate career, the recently instituted Bryn Mawr College (founded by a trustee of Johns Hopkins University) needed administrative as well as professorial leadership. Dr. Adams, one of Wilson's professors, recommended the young scholar. Wilson delighted in the opportunity of organizing the incipient stages of the history and political science departments. Also, not only did he have a light teaching schedule in order to pursue his own academic endeavors, but also the dean, Miss Carey Thomas, granted Wilson license to choose his own teaching methodology.[26] Ideologically, Wilson "had none of the objections to a girls' school that he held for a coeducational institution."[27] All the same, "he did prefer to teach young men, however, and if he found that Bryn Mawr stood in the way of his going to a man's college, he would resign."[28] Although Wilson viewed this opportunity at Bryn Mawr in a favorable light, his acceptance was not without misgivings.[29]

This juncture in Wilson's life induced a spate of antipathy towards women who tread outside their own relegated sphere.[30] Again Osborn elucidates Wilson's stand on this issue:

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[23]Woodrow Wilson, as cited in Christine A. Lunardini and Thomas J. Knock, "Woodrow Wilson and Woman Suffrage: A New Look," *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (Winter 1980-81): 657.

[24]George C. Osborn, *Woodrow Wilson: The Early Years* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), 51, 100, 103, 108, 119, 125.

[25]ibid., 154-155. Kerney, 3-5.

[26]ibid., 125, 145.

[27]ibid., 125.

[28]ibid., 125.

[29] ibid., 103, 124, 125.

[30]Historiographers of women's history have rendered the historiographical metaphor, the sphere, as a problematic trope in assessing women's political and societal boundaries because of, for example, socio-economic fissures among women in aggregate. Please refer to Kerber, Linda K. "Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's History." *Journal of American History* 75

His southern provincialism with its chivalrous and romantic attitude towards women kept him from having any sympathy with the movement to extend higher education to them. He recognized, as he wrote to his fiancée, that he was on the losing side of the issue. "The question of the higher education of women," he said, "is certain to be settled in the affirmative, in this country at least, whether my sympathy be

> enlisted or not." Wilson was not particularly pleased when he learned that the person who was to be in authority on the Bryn Mawr campus was a woman [Dean Thomas] who had a doctoral degree and who was actually younger than he. He talked the matter over with President Rhoads [President of Bryn Mawr], and assured Ellen [Wilson's fiancée]: "I would not be under a woman, so far as I can learn, but my own master, under Dr. Rhoads."[31]

Despite these disparaging remarks, however, Wilson gave his fiancée the final decision in the acceptance of his teaching post at Bryn Mawr.[32]

Historian Henry Wilkinson Bragdon, who wrote *Woodrow Wilson: The Academic Years*, also capably elaborated on the theme of Wilson's point of view of women in academia. Bragdon includes the students' perceptions of Wilson's teaching style at Bryn Mawr. Bragdon assesses the classroom dynamics: "The fundamental difficulty with Wilson's classes at Bryn Mawr was that many of the girls did not think he took them seriously. This was essentially true. He did not believe in higher education for women. . . . They should be adored for their sensibilities, but the serious work of the mind was not their province."[33] Bragdon quoted Wilson as saying, in 1887, "Lecturing to young women of the present generation on the history and principles of politics is about as appropriate and profitable as would be lecturing to stone masons on the evolution of fashion and dress."[34] Nonetheless, Wilson seemed not to short-change his students. He had both a charismatic and explanatory teaching style. An alumna from Bryn Mawr reported:

> He was the most interesting and inspiring college lecturer that I ever heard. . . . [He would] emphasize the main facts and conclusions, so clearly and closely connected, so logically developed that it was impossible to misunderstand or to forget the essential matter. Though serious in intent and solidly informing, every lesson was lighted up with touches of the most delightful humor.[35]

Yet his perception of women's professional capabilities is nuanced. Bragdon quotes another alumna, "He seemed to regard his students not as of a *lower* sort of intelligence, but as of a *different* sort from himself."[36] In sum, Bragdon finds that Wilson was concerned that women must retain

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(June 1988): 9-39. Nonetheless, in the context of Wilson's view of the proper social order between the genders, this analytical tool sufficiently applies in this instance.

[31]Osborn, 147; Wilson, as cited in Osborn, 147.

[32] ibid., 147.

[33]Henry Wilkinson Bragdon, *Woodrow Wilson: The Academic Years* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 150, 151.

[34] Wilson, as cited in Bragdon, 143.

[35] A Bryn Mawr alumna, as cited in Bragdon, 149, 150.

[36] A Bryn Mawr alumna, as cited in Bragdon, 151.

their femininity: by devolving outside their own sphere, they lose their iconic status.[37]

Both Osburn and Bragdon used an inductive approach to their monographs, hence, perhaps, the inclusion of Wilson's stance on the topic of women in the public world, a rare endeavor among the literature on Wilson. Based on the aforementioned illustrations of Wilson, he held a measured opinion of the proper role of women: iconically inert, they required chivalrous guardianship whilst they prepare the loving home that the family valued. His decision to teach at Bryn Mawr might not have been nonsensically incongruous with his ideology; he may have presumed that an "all-girls" school did not require the same academic rigor of women as that of a co-educational school. By evaluating his experiences at Bryn Mawr in comparison to his reaction to the suffrage movement during his presidency, one could see his drastic reconfiguring of women's role in society, a metamorphosis indicative of the changing expectations of women in the Progressive Era and the First World War.[38]

Indeed, as a historian, Wilson, too, studied past administrations. Bragdon begins his monograph with a prescient quote from Wilson: alluding to Abraham Lincoln, Wilson believed that the student of history could only understand Lincoln by means of "a close and prolonged study of his life *before* [italics mine] he became President. The years of his Presidency were not years to form but rather years to test character."[39] Whether well-founded or otherwise, Wilson had displayed a resolute and scrupulous regard for his own integrity during the early stages of his life. Hence the question why Wilson redefined his position on women's rights during the pinnacle of his political career merits serious consideration.

The fundamental premise of the history of the suffrage movement hinges on the rights of citizenship.[40] Before women won full federal enfranchisement in 1920, women were not deemed citizens, but rather subjects. Moreover, married women suffered a "civil death"[41] according to common law: devoid of political rights, the wife depended on the husband to act as her proxy, who in turn reputedly voted in the best interest of his wife and family. According to the astute historian Nancy Isenberg, some activist antebellum women realized that before they could obtain their enfranchisement, they needed "to acquire a relationship with the state, a quid pro quo relationship that acknowledged their civil standing in return for civil support."[42] Naturally the question remains, what are the qualifiers for civic capacity? In 1816 Thomas Jefferson considered that taxpayer ability and military enlistment, along with property ownership, could possibly act as qualifiers for citizenship status. Nonetheless, these qualifiers constitute privileged rights, for people who had a vested stake in society, not natural rights, in which both men and women were born with equal rights, a discrepancy that was a divisive issue in the antebellum suffrage

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[37] Bragdon, 150-151.

[38] See Paula Baker, "The Domestication of Politics: Women and American Political Society, 1780-1920." *The American Historical Review* 89 (June 1984): 620-647. In her discussion of female political culture, Baker argues that the expanding definition of the home delved into the political arena, by means of women's social and moral reform movements, thus ultimately dissolving the two separate spheres.

[39] Wilson, as cited in Bragdon, vii; Bragdon, vii.

[40] See Nancy Isenberg, *Sex & Citizenship in Antebellum America* (Chapel Hill: University of Carolina Press, 1998).

[41] ibid., 7.

[42] ibid., 39.

movement.[43] So although the Nineteenth Amendment granted all women full enfranchisement as a consequence of women's war effort during the First World War, women's right to vote was premised on the principle of vested rights – women's non-combative participation in war rendered them as having a stake in society.

The woman's suffrage movement evolved over time. Historians argue over the impetus for the suffrage movement;[44] however, a basic timeline would provide the reader an understanding of the direction of the women's movement during the nineteenth century. Historians commonly cite the 1840 World's Antislavery Convention, held in London, as the stimulus of the suffrage movement.[45] This anti-slavery convention refused admittance to two American abolitionist attendees, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, because they were women. These women saw the irony in this situation. At the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848, tentatively cited as the "birth of the movement for women's rights,"[46] Stanton and Mott were two of several women who devised a Women's Rights Convention in the state of New York. Obtaining enfranchisement for women, based on natural rights, was one of several resolutions that passed. Other conventions occurred: in 1850, the first National Woman's Rights Convention took place in Worcester, Massachusetts, which, in contrast, espoused a vested rights theory of enfranchisement.[47]

Yet the leaders of the women's rights movement, at first, were organizationally entwined with the abolitionist movement. Consequently the cause for abolitionism and the cause for women's rights each vied to be the forerunner for securing federal legislation. During Reconstruction, the abolitionists did not want woman's suffrage to impinge on the potential constitutional gains for the freedmen; activists with divided loyalties chose sides, and in 1869, Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, the leading lights in the nineteenth century suffrage movement, formed the single-issue National Woman's Suffrage Association. This organization rivaled with other suffragists as to the method for obtaining woman suffrage. The National American Woman's Suffrage Association emerged in 1890, with Stanton as president.[48]

Consequently all three branches of government wrestled with the issue of woman's suffrage. In 1874, the Supreme Court ruled, in *Minor v. Happersett*, that women did not have the right to vote under the Fifteenth Amendment. Senator A. A. Sargeant introduced the federal amendment, otherwise known as the "Anthony Amendment," for the first time in 1878.[49] After the turn of the twentieth century, the fight for women's enfranchisement was ingrained in national issues

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[43]ibid., 25, 37.

[44]See Isenberg as well as Ellen Carol DuBois, *Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence Of An Independent Women's Movement In America, 1848-1869* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).

[45] Historians commonly herald Eleanor Flexner's narrative, originally published in 1959, as the inaugural source of modern literature for the suffrage movement. Please refer to Eleanor Flexner, *Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States*, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975).

[46]ibid., 77.

[47]See Flexner and Isenberg.

[48]See Flexner, DuBois, and Isenberg.

[49]Doris Weatherford, *A History of the American Suffragist Movement*, with a forward by Geraldine Ferraro (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 247. Flexner, 176.

during the entirety of Wilson's administration (1913-1921). Louis Brownlow, who was commissioner of the District of Columbia from 1915 to 1920 and also "an ardent advocate of votes for women,"[50] regularly communicated with the President regarding the suffrage militants and later published his autobiography in 1958. He observed that President Wilson initially was against a federal suffrage amendment: he believed that this issue belonged to the states themselves to determine.[51] As a cautionary note, author Linda G. Ford stated that in 1914, "all his supporters assumed that Wilson's states' rights position was an anti-suffrage position."[52] Brownlow asserts that "later, however, Mr. Wilson changed his mind and during the greater part of his presidency heartily favored the proposed amendment."[53]

An unresolved question looms as to how women won federal enfranchisement. Was it the woman suffrage movement or the government's opportunism in time of war that led to the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment? Current authors argue over this question. Mary Katzenstein questions, "The U. S. Congress may have passed the suffrage amendment in part to undergird the war effort; but would it have done so in the absence of an organized women's movement?"[54] Linda G. Ford[55] and Sally Hunter Graham,[56] dispute Christine A. Lunardini and Thomas J. Knock, who assert that Wilson actively endorsed the amendment in order to positively acknowledge the contributions of women in the war effort.[57] Ford and Graham espouse the belief that persistent suffrage militancy pushed Wilson into lobbying for this amendment. Ford exclaims, "In light of NWP [National Woman's Party] activism, it is ludicrous to argue simply that Wilson 'gave' women the vote 'for their war services.' As E. P. Thompson has written regarding (male) workers, women in history are still often seen as passive; 'the degree to which they contributed, by conscious efforts, to making of history' is omitted."[58] Yet evidence proves that the women's war effort, at home and abroad, was initially integral to Wilson's change of mind

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[50]Louis Brownlow, *A Passion for Anonymity: The Autobiography of Louis Brownlow, second Half* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 74-75, 99.

[51]ibid., 74-75, 99.

[52]Linda G. Ford, *Iron-Jawed Angels: The Suffrage Militancy of the National Woman's Party*, 1912-1920 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1991), 61.

[53]Brownlow, 75.

[54]Mary Katzenstein, "Feminism and the Meaning of the Vote," *Signs* 10 (1984): 10-12.

[55]Ford, xi, 246.

[56]Sally Hunter Graham, "Woodrow Wilson, Alice Paul, and the Woman Suffrage Movement," *Political Science Quarterly* 98 (Winter 1983-84): 666.

[57]Christine A. Lunardini and Thomas J. Knock, "Woodrow Wilson and Woman Suffrage: A New Look," *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (Winter 1980-81): 655-671.

[58]Ford, 246. British historian E.P. Thompson wrote the 1964 *The Making of the English Working Class.* See Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession.* Ideas In Context, eds. Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind, Quentin Skinner, and Wolf Lepenies. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

toward the amendment. Wilson's letters and speeches elucidate the evolution of his approach toward woman suffrage. As the president of NAWSA, which was distinct from Alice Paul's militant National Woman's Party, Carrie Chapman Catt had a positive influence on altering Wilson's stance toward the federal amendment.

The suffrage movement during the Progressive Era, similar to that of the Gilded Age, was bitterly divided over the method of obtaining woman's enfranchisement. The two main rival suffrage organizations were NAWSA and the Woman's Party (formerly the Congressional Union). As reported by the historian Flexner, severe bias rendered the respective suffragists' records reliably problematic. In 1943, Stanton admitted to the potentially non-evidentiary status of their official histories. Flexner quotes Stanton, "I am inclined do think that the suffragists, who have written their own history, have not always known all the facts at the time of writing and perhaps they have not been free enough from prejudice to tell the whole truth."[59] Consequently the reader could accord Flexner's narrative a measure of objectivity because of her careful evaluation of these primary sources.

After decades of NAWSA plodding along in order to win suffrage at the state level, Alice Paul, while she was a member of NAWSA, galvanized the movement with her aggressive tactics and ideology that she had personally acquired from the women suffragists in Great Britain. In April 1913, she energetically rejuvenated the idea of winning women full enfranchisement by means of a federal amendment. When Dr. Anna Howard Shaw was president of NAWSA, Paul formed an internal organization, the Congressional Union; however, Paul's strategy of singular pressure on the executive and legislative branches to obtain enfranchisement alienated NAWSA in 1914, ultimately leading to Paul's termination of her position. The Congressional Union, along with Alice Paul, formed a separate entity, and adopted militant tactics in 1917 against the executive branch and its political party in order to win suffrage. Flexner credits the Congressional Union for the beginning stages of activity in the legislative branch on the suffrage amendment.[60]

Carrie Chapman Catt assumed presidency of NAWSA in 1915. In 1916, growing disenchanted with the state-by-state approach to woman suffrage, as proposed on the Democratic platform, Catt decided upon a serious pursuit of the federal amendment as well. Yet in contrast to Paul's methods, Catt's approach was to woo the president in a cordial manner. Winning Wilson over to woman's suffrage, was, according to Flexner's narrative of Catt, ". . . a matter of time and tactics, and that he must on no account be personally antagonized or challenged on this issue. . . . Above all, she kept the door of communication between the National [NAWSA] and the White House open."[61] Ironically, each organization's position on women's war effort was diametrically opposite of their methodology for gaining enfranchisement. Flexner relates of the NAWSA leader, "Realist that she was, Mrs. Catt knew that the ability of suffragists to plead their cause successfully would depend in some measure on whether they too had joined in the national war effort. . .Not so the Woman's Party."[62]

So wartime opportunism may have played a factor; however, Wilson vigorously endorsed the amendment after the November 11, 1918 Armistice, as well as after the militant suffrage picketing ended, in late 1917. This fact suggests not only a genuine change of Wilson's moral conviction, but also it suggests an additional external factor that would prompt endorsement of the federal amendment. Although Wilson suffered a stroke which prevented him from a third term in office, he still eagerly wanted to keep the Democratic Party in power. The Nineteenth Amendment was enacted on August 26, 1920. Presidential elections of course were held in November, 1920. If the Democrats could win this political advancement for women, the Democratic Party could earn

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[59]Stanton, as cited in Flexner, 350; Flexner, 349, 350.

[60]ibid., chapters 20 and 21 .

[61]ibid., 288, 289.

[62]ibid., 294; chapters 20 and 21.

their loyalty. Woman suffrage initially as a war measure and eventually as a means for political expediency both negate the argument that Wilson begrudgingly gave in to the persistent militant suffragists.

Wilson's approach to woman suffrage changed over time. Several months before Wilson decided to make domestic and military preparations for war, he had met with "a Delegation of Democratic Women" in January 6, 1915. They had wanted him to support an "equal suffrage amendment" which the House of Representatives would vote on in six days. He commended the delegation's work toward suffrage; however, he stated that he believed this issue should be left to the states. "It is a long standing and deeply matured conviction on my part, and therefore, I would be without excuse to my own constitutional principles if I lent my support to this very important movement for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States."[63] The amendment did not pass the House: with 378 voting, there were 174 yeas and 204 nays.[64]

Wilson followed his credo when he traveled to his home state of New Jersey to vote for woman suffrage on October 19, 1915. Catt observed, "the higher class of men of both parties espoused suffrage."[65] The author David Morgan believes that Wilson voted for suffrage because he "was concerned with his re-election."[66] All the same, Democratic anti-suffrage men and women successfully worked against a favorable vote for suffrage in the state of New Jersey.[67]

The next year, 1916, was an election year. Women were able to vote in federal elections in twelve states. The connection between suffrage and military service resurfaced. At the Progressive Party national convention in June, the Progressives made a declaration that they "believe that the women of the country, who share with the men the burden of government in times of peace and make equal sacrifice in times of war, should be given the full political right of suffrage both by State and Federal action."[68] Apparently, this statement was premised on the idea that enfranchisement is a vested right.

Yet Wilson was particularly conscious that he should not suddenly change his stance and endorse the federal amendment out of fear that he would otherwise "seem to the country like nothing less than an angler of votes."[69] In August he explained to a friend and suffragist, Ellen Duane Davis, who wanted Wilson to endorse passage of the federal amendment, also known as

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[63]Wilson's Remarks to a Delegation of Democratic Women, 6 January 1915, in *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, 69 vols., eds. Arthur S. Link et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966-), 32:22 (hereafter cited as *PWW*).

[64]Carrie Chapman Catt and Nettie Rogers Shuler, *Woman Suffrage And Politics: The Inner Story Of The Suffrage Movement* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), 496.

[65]ibid., 292.

[66]David Morgan, *Suffragists and Democrats: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in America* (n.p.: Michigan State University Press, 1972), 81.

[67]Catt and Shuler, 292.

[68]Declaration of the Progressive political party, as cited in Ida Husted Harper, ed., *History of Woman Suffrage*, vol. 5 (New York: J. J. Little & Ives Company, 1922; reprint, New York: Arno & The New York Times, 1969), 714.

[69]Wilson to Ellen Duane Davis, 5 August 1916, *PWW*, 37:529.

the Susan B. Anthony amendment, in Congress that year,[70] "I would a great deal rather have the respect of the women than their votes, and I am sure they would not respect me if I departed from my usual course and made such an extraordinarily humble bow to expediency."[71]

A few days later, Wilson wrote to the Jane Jefferson Club of Colorado, which was "the first woman's Democratic voters organization in America."[72] This letter, which was printed in the *New York Times*, expressed his desire not to entangle the country into war. At the same time, he delved into the subject that "the old notion . . . that suffrage and service go hand in hand is a sound one, and women may well appeal to it, though it has long been invoked against them."[73] He pointed out the arduous tasks that women have been undergoing in Europe after he stated, "The war in Europe has forever set at rest the notion that nations depend in times of stress wholly upon their men."[74] One could see the incipient transformation of Wilson's belief in endorsing a federal amendment because of women's patriotic contributions to the war effort, despite his expressions against endorsing it.

Catt, president of NAWSA, noted Wilson's genuine change in personal conviction toward woman suffrage, despite the actions of the militants, in September 1916 when he was speaking before NAWSA during its yearly National Convention. Catt observed, "It places the very hour when conversion to the principle became with him conversion to an obligation to join the campaign."[75] Emblematic of Wilson's stance toward his role in the suffrage movement at that particular time, he asserted, "I have come to fight not for you but with you, and in the end I think we shall not quarrel over the method."[76]

Wilson contradicted himself, however, according to an October 5, 1916 news report printed in the Omaha *World-Herald*. Presumably in Nebraska, a crowd of women expressed to him that they wished they were enfranchised so that they could vote for him. Pleased with this statement, Wilson said, "I wish they could . . . This is substantial evidence that you are going to vote for me."[77] Perhaps he merely made light of a serious personal conviction; however, this was for him a curious statement to make a month prior to federal elections.

On April 6, 1917, Wilson formally entered into war against Germany. Ten days later he gave a speech, "The American People Must Support The War."[78] He appealed to the country's civilians that they must do their part on the domestic front; "the things without which mere fighting would be fruitless."[79] These things include producing large quantities of food, manufacturing ships, mining for coal, and working the looms to make clothes for the soldiers. Wilson asserted that "the men and the women who devote their thought and their energy to these

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[70]Ellen Duane Davis to Wilson, 3 August 1916, *PWW*, 37:523.

[71]Wilson to Ellen Duane Davis, 5 August 1916, *PWW*, 37: 529.

[72] Wilson to the Jane Jefferson Club of Colorado, 7 August 1916, *PWW*, 37:536-537.

[73]ibid..

[74]ibid.

[75]Catt and Shuler, 260.

[76]ibid..

[77]News report (printed in the Omaha *World Herald*), 5 October 1916, *PWW*, 38:336.

[78]Albert Bushnell Hart, ed., *Selected Addresses And Public Papers Of Woodrow Wilson*, with an introduction by Albert Bushnell Hart (New York: Boni & Liveright, Inc., 1918), 197-201.

[79]ibid., 197-201.

things will be serving their country . . ."[80] So Wilson acknowledged the important part women would play in the war effort. Wilson discussed an "Army bill" with the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, Representative Dent, the next day.[81]

The Selective Services Act passed through Congress in May. Catt wrote to Wilson on May 7th to request that he endorse the federal amendment in order to boost women's morale in their war effort. She wrestled with imposing this request on him during a time of war, ". . . however much we feel that it would add to our enthusiasm and usefulness during the war to be equipped with the ballot before we are placed on the firing line. We hoped that our willingness to serve our country even only half armed would appeal to the men with whom you and we must deal in Congress as good and sufficient reason for our enfranchisement – possibly as a war measure . . ."[82] Wilson responded the next day that he did not believe Congress would be receptive to considering the federal amendment because they were preoccupied with the war.[83] However, the important point is that Catt initiated to Wilson the idea of suffrage as a reward or compensation for women's contributions to the war effort. Enfranchisement as a reward is antithetical to Ford's interpretation that the Nineteenth Amendment passed because of suffrage militancy. To be sure, the National Woman's Party "quite pointedly took no stand on the war issue"[84] and would not contribute to the war effort.[85]

On May 14, 1917, however, Wilson met with a delegation of "Woman's," along with other "liberal Parties," regarding the federal amendment; they proclaimed that this amendment should be considered in Congress as part of the war program.[86] A week earlier, in a May 7th letter to Wilson, Catt emphasized that the National Woman's Party, and not NAWSA, were to meet with him in this delegation.[87] Catt did not join in this delegation because she did not want to associate with the militants.[88] Wilson responded to the attending delegation that even though it was an inopportune time to consider their request, in light of the war he would reappraise the woman suffrage movement.[89]

Yet on that day Wilson wrote a letter to Edward William Pou, Chairman of the Rules Committee, stating that he would approve of a Committee on Woman Suffrage in the House of

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[80]ibid., 197-201.

[81]From the Diary of Thomas W. Brahany, a presidential assistant, 17 April 1917, *PWW*, 42:91.

[82]Carrie Clinton Lane Chapman Catt to Wilson, 7 May 1917, *PWW*, 42:237.

[83]Wilson to Carrie Clinton Lane Chapmen Catt, second letter, 8 May 1917, *PWW*, 42:241.

[84]Barbara Steinson, *American Women's Activism In World War I*, Modern American History: A Garland Series, ed. Frank Freidel (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982), 241.

[85]Graham, 667.

[86]Ray Stannard Baker, ed., *Woodrow Wilson: Life And Letters,* vol. 6 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), 67. Baker was a journalist during Wilson's administration. See H.W. Brands' *Woodrow Wilson.*

[87]Carrie Clinton Lane Chapman Catt to Wilson, 7 May 1917, *PWW*, 42:237.

[88]Morgan, 118.

[89]Ray Stannard Baker, ed., vol. 6, 67.

Wilson agreed with the delegation and replied, ". . . just because we are quickened by the questions of this war, we ought to be quickened to give this question of woman suffrage our immediate consideration."[104] He noted that the nation recently had been "depending upon the women . . . for suggestions of service, which have been rendered in abundance and with distinction and originality."[105] This situation serves as another example of how Wilson is reminded of the need to endorse the federal amendment based on women's contributions to the war effort.

Women obtained full enfranchisement in New York by an "immense majority."[106] The suffragists believed that this victory eventually led the way to the passage of the federal amendment in the U.S. Congress. Moreover, they also believed that they won this majority in New York because of their contribution to the war effort. Not only was Wilson's speech an influence on the male voters of New York, but also "the actual conscription of all women over sixteen years of age by the Governor, proved that not only were women capable of war service but liable for it."[107]

NAWSA made significant strides in the advancement of the right to vote since the military preparedness measures; by 1918 New York state gained full women's enfranchisement and six additional states obtained federal enfranchisement for women.[108] Yet from 1913 to 1919, the militant suffrage movement – the National Woman's Party – aimed to make itself a thorn in Wilson's side. It was "the first organized militant political action in America."[109] Instead of using diplomacy, they picketed in front of the White House in order to force him to officially endorse the federal amendment. Wilson stated in a personal letter, "I fear that what these ladies are doing is doing [sic] a very great deal of damage to the cause they are trying to promote. That they are deeply mistaken I believe the whole country thinks, but that should not lead us to irregular action ourselves."[110] In a November 9th letter to Wilson, the director of the Committee on Public Information, George Creel, advised the President against meeting with the militant suffragists to discuss the federal amendment. "May I advise against such an audience and if you agree with me will you suggest form of refusal. Mrs. Catt and Dr. Shaw [Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, former president of NAWSA] speak for equal suffrage in the nation, and the Congressional Union [also known as the National Woman's Party] is without standing and deserves no recognition."[111] This statement signifies the trust that the Wilson administration had developed with the more accommodating and diplomatic National American Woman's Suffrage Association. Wilson followed Creel's advice. Creel's statement could also signify a political power struggle between the parties. While NAWSA was bipartisan,[112] the militant suffragists were partial to the

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[104]A Reply from Wilson, 25 October 1917, *PWW*, 44:442.

[105]ibid.

[106]Harper, ed., xxiii.

[107] Harper, ed., 737.

[108] Weatherford, 249.

[109] Doris Stevens, *Jailed for Freedom* (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1920; reprint, Salem, NH: Ayer Company, Publishers, Inc., 1990), vii (page citations are to the reprint edition).

[110] Wilson to Dee Richardson, a concerned federal civil servant who wrote to cabinet members frequently, 25 July 1917, *PWW*, 43:272, 273.

[111] George Creel to Wilson, with Enclosure, 9 November 1917, *PWW*, 44:551.

[112] Morgan, 90.

Republicans. Doris Stevens, who was a militant suffragist prisoner, wrote *Jailed for Freedom*, included a chapter, "Republican Congress Passes Amendment."[113] In this chapter she stated, ". . . our attack upon the party in power, which happened to be President Wilson's party, had been the most decisive factor in stimulating the opposition party to espouse our side."[114]

Yet according to the commissioner of the District of Columbia, Louis Brownlow, Wilson was adamant about not imprisoning the picketers. He wanted them to have as little publicity as possible. Other members of the administration wanted them arrested because, especially in reference to one occasion, they were deliberately embarrassing the President when he was receiving ambassadors from the Allied powers; the suffrage militants displayed a "Kaiser Wilson" banner.[115] Brownlow arrested them on July 15, 1917. According to Brownlow, "Mr. Wilson was highly indignant. He told me that we had made a fearful blunder, that we never ought to have indulged these women in their desire for arrest and martyrdom, and that he had pardoned them and wanted that to end it."[116] Brownlow continued to dispute Wilson as to his policy. Brownlow asserted that as commissioner he had to take responsibility for controlling the continuous activities of the picketers. After defending his reasons, Brownlow wrote of Wilson, "There were a few seconds of silence and then the President said, with more sorrow than anger in his voice, 'The blood be on your head!'"[117] According to a November 9 report of the prisoners by William Gwynn Gardiner, an attorney and a commissioner for the District of Columbia, while Alice Paul was in the District Jail, she claimed that she was a political prisoner. In order to maintain international recognition as a political prisoner, she had to go on a hunger strike. Yet Wilson did not seem worried about anything in this report.[118] He was probably concerned about the treatment of the prisoner and how it would reflect on his Democratic Party. Brownlow recorded that the National Woman's Party believed that its methods led to federal enfranchisement. Yet Brownlow claimed, "I am equally convinced that they are wrong and that women were given the vote because of the wise and statesmanlike leadership of Mrs. Catt, Dr. Shaw, Mrs. Park, Mrs. Gardener, and other leaders of the National American Woman's Suffrage Association."[119] Nonetheless, Wilson's directions to prevent the occurrence of political martyrs might have been out of a wish to preserve the appearance of Democratic political party integrity.

According to Sally Hunter Graham, Alice Paul made a bargain with David Lawrence, assumed to be a White House envoy, in the third week of November, to end the picketing if Congress would pass the federal amendment by 1919. (The genuineness of this meeting was controvertible.) She was released from prison on November 28, 1917. In January Wilson officially announced his support for the federal amendment.[120] Graham implies that Wilson announced this endorsement as a direct result of this supposed bargain.

Yet economic issues came to the fore that may have been a factor in prompting Wilson to officially endorse the federal amendment. Royal Meeker of the Bureau of Labor Statistics wrote

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[113] Stevens, 341-343.

[114] Stevens, 342.

[115] Brownlow, 77-79.

[116] ibid.

[117] ibid.

[118] Wilson to Joseph Patrick Tumulty, Wilson's private secretary, with Enclosure, circa 10 November 1917, *PWW*, 44:559-561, 562n.1; Enclosure: letter from William Gwynn Gardiner, 9 November 1917, *PWW*, 44:559-561, 562n.1.

[119] Brownlow, 81-82.

[120] Graham, 677-678.

to Wilson regarding the state of labor economics particularly in relation to the war effort, on November 27. He found it crucial to investigate the "extent and possibilities of the substitution of female labor for male labor in our principle industries."[121] He had been receiving questions from the general public as to policy on replacing men with women – businesses had been complaining about the low availability of labor. Meeker asserts, "The labor of fighting the Germans face to face is no whit more important than any other labor in the great industry of beating the Germans, though it is undoubtedly more dangerous. . . I feel if we are to win this war we must lay down a definite labor policy immediately and adhere to it rigorously."[122] This dilemma underscored the critical need for women's services in the war effort – again this would prompt the issue of the federal amendment for woman suffrage. Yet Wilson did not act upon Meeker's advice in his usual timely manner. He discussed Meeker's letter to the Secretary of Labor, William B. Wilson, on January 10, 1918, upon his return from a trip.[123] President Wilson already gave his announcement of his endorsement on the preceding day.

On January 9, Wilson met with "Democratic members of the Suffrage Committee of the House of Representatives."[124] This suffrage committee had been implemented by means of NAWSA's request to Wilson in May 1917. They discussed the suffrage question. Then Wilson wrote out a statement to be given to the press. The language represented his usual style of not appearing aggressively manipulative of congressional affairs. It read, "when we sought his advice he very frankly and earnestly advised us to vote for the amendment as an act of right and justice to the women of the country and of the world."[125] The next day Jeanette Rankin, the first female representative in Congress, began the debate in the House of Representatives to pass the amendment[126] (the date for the vote was determined in December.)[127] It passed with 274 ayes and 136 nays; it passed with an extremely narrow margin – by one vote. It only passed because five representatives who were ill had shown up to vote despite their physical pain.[128]

Wilson sent a message to the French Union for Woman Suffrage, by means of Catt, on June 7, 1918. He stated, "The war could not have been fought without them, or its sacrifices endured. It is high time that some part of our debt of gratitude to them should be acknowledged and paid, and the only acknowledgement they ask is their admission to the suffrage. . . ."[129] Again, this statement spells plainly his developing position on suffrage as a reward for women's war efforts as well as his trust in Catt in conveying this conviction.

On September 25, Creel suggested that Wilson give a speech before the Senate to endorse the federal amendment for the October 1 Senate vote. Creel stated, "I feel deeply that the passage of this Amendment is a war necessity for it will release the minds and energies of

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[121]Royal Meeker to Wilson, 27 November 1917, *PWW*, 45:132, 133.

[122]Royal Meeker to Wilson, 27 November 1917, *PWW*, 45:132, 133, 133n.1.

[123]Editors' discursive note to the correspondence from Royal Meeker to Wilson, 27 November 1917, *PWW*, 45:134n.3.

[124]A statement "written from Washington" that was printed in the January 10, 1918 *New York Times*, 9 January 1918, *PWW*, 45:545n.1.

[125]Ray Stannard Baker, ed., vol. 6, 458.

[126]Van Voris, 148.

[127]Catt and Shuler, 320.

[128]Van Voris, 148.

[129] Ray Stannard Baker, ed., vol. 7, 199.

thousands of women for war work and war enhusiasm."[130] Additionally, Creel divulged, "I feel deeply also that it is necessary to have the Administration receive full credit for its consistently courageous and friendly attitude."[131] Probably in order to placate the Republicans, in Wilson's address, he stated, "there is and can be no party issue involved in it."[132] Perhaps Creel wanted the Administration to receive the credit in order to divert the public's attention away from the suffrage militants as well as to point out the Democratic Party's espousal of the federal suffrage amendment.

On September 29, Catt wrote to Wilson. She was concerned that a few Senators did not view suffrage as a war measure. Catt exclaimed, "Our country is asking women to give their all, and upon their voluntary and free offering may depend the outcome of the war."[133] Catt related a conversation she had with a woman working in the Ordnance Department. The woman viewed suffrage as a war measure "Because it is an incentive to better and more work."[134]

The next day Wilson gave a speech to the Senate. Probably in reference to the suffrage militants, in order to deny that he was not succumbing to their pressure tactics, he pointedly stressed that "the voices of foolish and intemperate agitators do not reach me at all."[135] To continue, he eloquently states:

> We have made partners of the women in this war; shall we admit them only to a partnership of suffering and sacrifice and toil and not to a partnership of privilege and right? This war could not have been fought, either by the other nations engaged or by America, if it had not been for the services of the women, – services rendered in every sphere, – not merely in the fields of effort in which we have been accustomed to see them work, but wherever men have worked and upon the very skirts and edges of the battle itself. . . .
>
> I propose it as I would propose to admit soldiers to the suffrage, the men fighting in the field of our liberties and the liberties of the world, were they excluded.[136]

Unfortunately the amendment did not pass the Senate; there were 62 yeas, "including pairs," and 34 nays.[137] Yet "those suffragists who knew just what the President was doing knew that he was not only sincere but using the full extent of his influence with his party."[138]

November 11, 1918 was Armistice Day, the end of the Great War. Yet Wilson continued to advocate for woman suffrage, not only as a reward for women's services in the war effort, but also with party survival in mind. On November 29, 1918 Wilson wrote to Senator John Sharp Williams. Wilson observed, ". . . our party is the party that is preventing the adoption of the Federal Amendment. . . . I am going to take the liberty of asking you if you think that it is at all possible for you to lend your aid to the passage of the amendment. . . . the matter is one of great

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[130]George Creel to Wilson, first letter, 25 September 1918, *PWW*, 51:117-118.

[131]ibid.,51:118.

[132] Wilson's Address to the Senate, 30 September 1918, *PWW*, 51:158.

[133]Carrie Clinton Lane Chapman Catt to Wilson, 29 September 1918, *PWW*, 51:155, 156, 157.

[134]ibid., 51:155, 156, 157.

[135]Wilson's Address to the Senate, 30 September 1918, *PWW*, 51:158, 159, 160, 161.

[136]ibid., 51:159,160.

[137]Catt and Shuler, 496.

[138] Catt and Shuler, 325, 326.

anxiety to me."[139] Yet Wilson continued to commend women in the war effort. In the State of the Union Address on December 2, 1918, Wilson stated, "Their contribution to the great result is beyond appraisal. . . . The least tribute we can pay them is to make them the equals of men in political rights as they have proved themselves their equals . . . ."[140] Wilson praises, and wishes to reward, what would have been called unfeminine by nineteenth century standards, women's participatory activities in the public realm.

Still there seemed to have been a race between the two major parties over which party could outvote the other party over the suffrage amendment. On January 11, 1919, Wilson's secretary, Joseph Patrick Tumulty, informed the President, "Best information Moses of New Hampshire will vote for suffrage. This makes one Democratic vote all the more necessary."[141] Wilson had been becoming increasingly distressed over the precarious status of the proposed federal amendment. The day before the February 10, 1919 vote in the Senate, Wilson sent a telegram to Lee Slater Overman and Senator Williams, "I hope that you will pardon me if I again express my deep anxiety about the vote on the Suffrage Amendment. It assumes a more important aspect every day, and the fortunes of our party are of such consequence at this particular turn in the world's events that I take great liberty of again urging upon you favorable action."[142] Nonetheless, the amendment did not pass the Senate.[143] Yet the amendment did pass the House and Senate in May and June of that year respectively.[144] In a message to Congress on May 20, 1919, a day before the vote in the House of Representatives, Wilson expressed, "I, for one, covet for our country the distinction of being among the first to act in a great reform."[145] So Wilson continued to endorse the federal amendment even after the Armistice on November 11, 1918.

Not only did he endorse the federal amendment in Congress, he contacted the state governors and state legislators to endorse its ratification, actions contrary to his stance in the 1916 election year during which he would not make "such an extraordinarily humble bow to expediency."[146] On July 15, 1919, Wilson sent a telegram to Hugh Manson Dorsey, the Governor of Georgia, stating that "I believe that it is absolutely essential to the political future of the country that this Amendment should be passed, and absolutely essential to the fortunes of the Democratic Party that it should play a leading part in the support of this great reform."[147] On September 2, 1919, Wilson sent a telegram to James Campbell Cantrill, a Democratic Congressman from Kentucky, calling upon the State Convention to include a plank to vote on woman suffrage. Wilson asserted, "It would serve mankind and the party by doing so."[148] After recovering from his stroke, Wilson congratulated Catt for the eventual transformation of NAWSA into the League of Women Voters "to carry on the development of good citizenship

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[139]Wilson to John Sharp Williams, 29 November 1918, *PWW*, 53:244.

[140]Wilson's Annual Message on the State of the Union, 2 December 1918, *PWW*, 53:277.

[141]Joseph Patrick Tumulty to Wilson, 11 January, 1919, 1A.M., *PWW*, 53:717.

[142] Wilson to Lee Slater Overman, 9 February 1919, *PWW*, 55:37.

[143]Catt and Shuler, 496.

[144]ibid., 496.

[145] Wilson's Special Message to Congress, 20 May 1919, *PWW*, 59:296, 289-297.

[146]Wilson to Ellen Duane Davis, 5 August 1916, *PWW*, 37:529.

[147]Wilson to Hugh Manson Dorsey, 15 July 1919, *PWW*, 61:480, 481.

[148] Wilson to James Campbell Cantrill, 2 September 1919, *PWW*, 62:615.

and real democracy."[149] An editorial comment in *The Papers Of Woodrow Wilson* speculates that Wilson's "fervor" probably was born out of New Jersey's ratification of the federal amendment.[150]

Analyzing the personalities of the leading political and social leaders is integral to understanding the course of events that led to suffrage. Carrie Chapman Catt, nee Clinton Lane, was a non-partisan Midwesterner. She was born in 1859 in Ripon, Wisconsin and moved to Charles City, Iowa when she was seven years old. Her family did not seem to have a strong religious affiliation. As a strong-minded youth she had displayed interest not only in women's rights but also in biological science. After high school she went to Oread Collegiate Institute (headed by Eli Thayer) in Worcester, Massachusetts and later obtained her B.S. in the General Science Course for Women at Iowa State Agricultural College.[151] Although her background differs from that of Wilson, they were both nearly the same age and obtained a high level of education. In fact, her bi-partisanship and lack of religious indoctrination probably made her more amenable than Alice Paul, a staunch anti-Democrat and a Quaker who headed her own newly formed political party, the National Woman's Party,[152] to Wilson's single-minded approach toward his own administration. Brownlow offered his own insight in his autobiography, ". . . the fact that the President worked so cordially and intimately with the leaders of the National American Woman Suffrage Association, Dr. Shaw, Mrs. Catt, Mrs. Park, and Mrs. Gardener, infuriated the leaders of the Woman's party – Miss Paul and others. Miss Paul . . . had developed an appetite for jails and hunger strikes."[153] For Catt, as president of NAWSA, to maintain a cordial communication with Wilson during the suffrage movement shows tact on her part. In a letter addressed to Catt on May 8, 1917, Wilson began, "You are always thoughtful and considerate, and I greatly value your generous attitude."[154] In this instance, he was probably referring to Catt's request to endorse the federal amendment while she was also expressing an understanding that discussion over this matter might be inopportune at that time considering the imminent demands of planning for U.S. entry into the war. Wilson, who responded in a timely manner, agreed it was an inopportune time, but his tone was friendly, responsive, and polite. He held similar feelings toward other members of NAWSA. Wilson paid a tribute to the late Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, former president of NAWSA, on August 8, 1919, "When the war came, I saw her in action and she won my sincere admiration and homage."[155] In contrast, Wilson's biographer, Kerney, in his penultimate chapter entitled "Party Disaster" describes Wilson's approach to his administrative affairs.

> With the coming of increased power, he had walled himself in and completely departed from the old practice of common counsel. He was utterly deficient in

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[149] Wilson to Carrie Clinton Lane Chapman Catt, 10 February 1920, *PWW*, 64:396.

[150]ibid., 64:396, 396n.1.

[151]Van Voris, 4-7.

[152]Irwin, a historian, knew Paul personally. Inez Hayes Irwin, *The Story of Alice Paul and The National Woman's Party* (Fairfax, VA: Delinger's Publishers, LTD, 1977), 7, 152, 177.

[153]Brownlow, 76.

[154]Wilson to Carrie Clinton Lane Chapman Catt, second letter, 8 May 1917, *PWW*, 42:241.

[155]Wilson to Justina Leavitt Wilson, corresponding secretary at NAWSA, 8 August 1919, *PWW*, 62:225, 225n.1.

gregarious instinct. "I rarely consult anybody," he said in an interview with Ida Tarbell published in "Collier's" on October 28, 1916. Thus isolated, he found it easy to convince himself that he had devised the correct pattern of human behavior, and that those who differed with him were "blind and ignorant." He had no patience with that part of the historical record that would seem to show that any progress that humanity has made through the ages has been painful and slow, and that progress of any permanent kind never comes at a gallop. No other leadership than his was permitted during his eight years in the White House. He had early made it plain that he was to do the guiding.[156]

After the war, the Democratic Party was concerned about the next presidential election. Wilson had suffered a near fatal cerebral stroke on October 4, 1919 and was not able to respond to his administrative duties for a period of time.[157] His wife, Mrs. Edith Wilson, despite her personal stance against woman suffrage, nonetheless continued Wilson's work on the ratification of the federal amendment that passed Congress earlier that summer.[158] Yet Kerney, who paid scant attention to the suffrage movement in his biography, said of Wilson, "his failure to follow through with a definite post-war domestic program, mired the Democracy."[159] The Republicans successfully instigated a war of propaganda toward the next presidential election. "There was never a political campaign more heavily laden with exaggeration. War-weary, and equally weary of the wrangling over peace, the voters swallowed the misstatements . . . and Cox [the 1920 Democratic presidential candidate] . . . was defeated by an electoral majority of 277 and a popular majority of more than seven millions."[160] Governor James Cox of Ohio supported the federal amendment.[161]

The last months before the thirty-sixth state's ratification of the amendment were rife with contention between the suffragists and the anti-suffragists. Anti-suffragist organizations had met in Tennessee. They warned the voting public that suffrage would ". . . add the undesirable, corrupt, and job hunting female politician to the ranks of the male . . ."[162] According to the Tennessee state constitution, the governor did not have the power to assemble the legislature. To the anti-suffragists' dismay, however, Governor Albert Houston Roberts did so on July 17, 1920. The president of the Tennessee Division of the Southern Women's League for the Rejection of the Susan B. Anthony Amendment, Miss Josephine Pearson, exclaimed, "Mrs. Catt arrived. . . . Extra called session (sic) imminently by the Governor, our forces notified to gather at once."[163] (The National Woman's Party was present as well,[164] but the author Anne M. Benjamin does not indicate concern on the part of the anti-suffragists toward the National Woman's Party.) The Democratic Party was contestable terrain between the suffragists and the anti-suffragists. Both Mrs. James S. Pinckard, president of the Southern Women's League for the Rejection of the

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[156]Kerney, 452.

[157]ibid., 429, 433.

[158]Anne M. Benjamin, *A History Of The Anti-Suffrage Movement In The United States From 1895 to 1920* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), 224.

[159]Kerney, 450-465, 450.

[160]ibid., 457.

[161]Benjamin, 312, 313.

[162] 'protest,' as cited in Benjamin, 310.

[163]Miss Josephine Pearson, as cited in Benjamin, 311.

[164]Flexner, 335.

Susan B. Anthony Amendment, who was also the grand niece of John C. Calhoun, and Catt sent correspondences to the Democratic presidential candidate, Governor James Cox of Ohio, to safeguard their respective political positions. While Mrs. Pinckard wanted to prevent woman suffrage in order "to save the soul of the Democratic party and the White Civilization of Eleven Democratic States"[165] Catt was warning Cox about "outsiders" who were actively working against ratification.[166] The state Senate ratified the amendment on August 13, 1920. On that day, Wilson sent a telegram to Seth M. Walker, the speaker of the Tennessee House of Representatives, requesting that the state House "concur" with the amendment.[167] Walker sent a telegram the next day chastising Wilson for his intrusion, "You were too great to ask it and I do not believe that the men of Tennessee will surrender honest convictions for political expediency or harmony."[168] Nonetheless, on August 18, the amendment passed the state House by a vote of fifty to forty-six. On August 19, Governor Roberts sent a telegram to Wilson requesting he send to the state legislature a "congratulatory message" to ennoble the suffragists because Roberts wanted "to prevent reconsideration of vote of ratification."[169] Walker was not able to garner enough support for a re-vote. Still, soon afterwards, anti-suffragists prevented Governor Roberts from certifying the ratification. Yet on August 24, the state Supreme Court nullified the order of the lower court, thus allowing Roberts to finally certify the ratification.[170] On August 26, 1920, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby signed the Proclamation.[171] Catt helped to ensure the safe standing of the Nineteenth Amendment in February 1922 "when the United States Supreme Court handed down the second of two decisions upholding the Nineteenth Amendment against further challenge."[172]

So women gained the right to vote because they sought it during a time of war. These two factors combined were indispensable: the suffrage movement was weak during the Civil War because women focused solely on the war. By the Great War, however, women's war efforts were rewarded with their enfranchisement by means of a diplomatic and effective suffrage movement on the part of NAWSA. The executive and legislative branches determined, with the conscientious prodding of the suffragists, that women were capable of having a vested stake in society; women deserved the privilege of the vote. Conversely, without the aggravating impact of a war, women probably could not have proven a strength in civic capacity that would be worthy of the vote. Yet in this context, the militant actions of the National Woman's Party did not display a vested stake in society: on the contrary, their intent was to be as burdensome as possible. In contrast, Catt nicely articulated the connection between suffrage and the economic and political necessities of women's war effort to an increasingly receptive wartime president. Isenberg's discussion of antebellum citizenship corresponds to that of the early twentieth century: in alignment with the 1789 Constitution which recognizes enfranchisement as a vested right,[173] wartime recognition of the civic capacity for military service, or service in the war effort, behooves the "disabled caste"[174] to act accordingly – to obtain a relationship with the state.[175] In

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[165]Mrs. James S. Pinckard, as cited in Benjamin, 312.

[166]Catt, as cited in Benjamin, 312.

[167]Wilson to Seth M. Walker, 13 August 1920, *PWW*, 66:30, 30n.1.

[168] Seth M. Walker to Wilson, 14 August 1920, *PWW*, 66:35.

[169]Albert Houston Roberts to Wilson, 19 August 1920, *PWW*, 66:54, 54n.1.

[170]ibid.

[171] Catt and Shuler, 455.

[172]Flexner, 337.

[173] Isenberg, 35.

[174]ibid.

addition, the administration's need to keep the Democratic Party in power became another motive for Wilson to vigorously endorse the federal amendment, particularly after the war. Although Wilson's eventual endorsement of the federal amendment was in part opportunistic, the language of his speeches and letters, in light of his scrupulous regard for his own integrity, as displayed in his youth and tested during his presidency, suggest a genuine change of moral conviction toward woman suffrage.

[175] See Isenberg, *Sex & Citizenship in Antebellum America.*

The Collaboration of Neutrals:
Vatican-American Diplomacy, 1939-1941

Nathan Heiman

As events in Europe continued to devolve after the Munich Pact of 1938, two influential, neutral states were becoming increasingly vocal in putting to an end the continent's downward spiral. The Vatican in Rome, led first by fiery Pope Pius XI before the succession of Pope Pius XII in March 1939, recognized a war would be catastrophic for Christianity in Europe, not to mention its fears of the tremendous loss of life which would be inflicted upon Europeans of all faiths. Across the Atlantic Ocean, President Franklin Roosevelt, hamstrung by isolationist policies imposed by Congress after involvement in the First World War, understood the necessity of making his voice heard in the name of peace before it was too late. The Vatican and the United States indirectly worked with each other throughout 1939 before officially joining forces in early 1940.

It only made sense that the two collaborated with each other during this period. The Pope's moral authority over the millions of Catholics in Europe could not be ignored, and Europe was keeping a wary eye on an America that was potentially a sleeping tiger. Additionally, the Vatican felt American support would give its words—since words were all it had without an army of its own—more value to European leaders. The Roosevelt administration, on the other hand, believed the Vatican to be a source of vast intelligence on European affairs that could be mined, and much more importantly, the Pope could mitigate, if not silence altogether, the President's numerous detractors among the American Catholic hierarchy.

The relationship evolved from first establishing quasi-official relations and voicing concerns over the possibility of war throughout 1939, to attempting to keep Italy out of the war in 1940, to finally convincing American Catholics to support Lend-Lease aid to Russia after its German invasion in 1941. The relationship would prove to be amicable, and although it would not stop the war, the coordinated diplomacy represented the last unified front to limit the number of participants. Once that also could not be achieved, Pius XII and Roosevelt began to work to conclude the war as quickly as possible, including preparing isolationist American Catholics for intervention. The relationship would ultimately be much more fruitful for the United States than for the Vatican in terms of tangible results, but it was not a one-way street regarding benefits. Indeed, each side had its needs met in different ways, which is why for two years of official relations—plus 1939—the relationship was so important.

Before expounding any further on the collaboration of these neutral sovereigns, the debate over the Vatican's purported silence over the Holocaust and other wartime atrocities (such as the indiscriminate Allied bombings of German cities) must be acknowledged, but it falls out of the purview of this study. There are numerous other works which address the issue, some of which might be described as either unfairly polemical or hopelessly apologetic.[1] Whether or not

[1] Perhaps a few books worth perusing on both sides of the debate are John Cornwell's *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII* (New York: Viking, 1999); Carlo Falconi, *The Silence of Pope Pius XII*, trans. Bernard Wall (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970); Michael O'Carroll, *Pius XII: Greatness Dishonoured* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980); Oscar Halecki, *Eugenio Pacelli: Pope of Peace* (New York: Creative Age Press, 1951).

the criticisms leveled against the Vatican for its post-1941 (in)actions are valid, analysis of its efforts alongside those of the United States to contain the scope of the war in Europe foreshadows the reticence of Pope Pius XII of which he would be accused in his handling of crimes against humanity during the course of the war. Nevertheless, analysis will also show the Vatican's usefulness in aiding President Roosevelt's efforts for peace, and, ultimately, war.

The path to diplomatic relations between the United States and the Vatican had been in the works for several years prior to 1940. Vatican Secretary of State Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli visited the United States in autumn of 1936, the highest ranking Vatican official to ever come to America. During the course of his tour, he met President Roosevelt—*after* the election for fear of angering Protestants—and the two men agreed to begin the process of establishing official relations.[2] After the meeting, the Vatican made its voice heard on the world stage, impressing the United States. Pope Pius XI recognized the threat of Hitler and the National Socialist Party to the peace of Europe and to the existence of the Church. The persecution of the Catholic Church in Germany and the rearmament of that nation greatly troubled the Pontiff, so much so that he risked incurring even more of the Gestapo's wrath by issuing the encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge* (*With Deep Anxiety*) in March 1937. Described as "one of the greatest condemnations of a national regime ever pronounced by the Vatican," it denounced the neo-paganism extolled by the German state and the subjugation of all other creeds.[3] The Nazis exacted revenge on the Church with attacks against both the clergy and laity, but the Pope refused to relent in his pronouncements against "exaggerated nationalism," and he would continue to speak out against Nazi policies for the remainder of his papacy.[4]

Pius XI, however, was actually more concerned with the Communist menace emanating from the Soviet Union. Whereas Germany allowed the practice of religion—at least for the time being—Red Russia denied religious freedom and systematically closed all but a few Catholic churches.[5] Fearing that Communism would spread westward, Pius XI issued yet another encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris*, only five days after *Mit Brennender Sorge*. Just as he had condemned the neo-paganism of the Nazis, he vehemently spoke against the militant atheism of Communism, expounding that "Communism is intrinsically wrong, and no one who would save Christian civilization may collaborate with it in any undertaking whatsoever."[6] This pronouncement would have important ramifications with the United States when Roosevelt attempted to convince American Catholics to support Lend-Lease aid to Russia in 1941.

Knowing that the Vatican wanted a resumption of relations ever since the United States had severed ties in 1870, the initiative was placed solely in Roosevelt's hands, but the idea was politically risky in a nation traditionally wary of the papacy. Nevertheless, he did not shy away from the subject, broaching it in the summer of 1937 to entice Catholics to support revisions to

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[2] John Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope* (New York: Viking, 1999), 176.

[3] Anthony Rhodes, *The Vatican in the Age of Dictators, 1922-1945* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), 204. An encyclical is the most important document the Pope can issue, as the document represents the official teaching of the Catholic Church.

[4] Ibid., 210.

[5] George Flynn, *Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and American Diplomacy, 1937-1945,* Contributions in American History, ed. Jon L. Wakelyn, no. 47 (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1976), 148

[6] Ibid., 138.

neutrality laws as well as in a speech that October expressing a desire for nations to isolate and cut ties with aggressor nations. The plan, the President told Chicago prelate George Cardinal Mundelein, would include the Vatican.[7]

When Pius XI died in February 1939, the most important conclave of the century resulted with the election of Secretary of State Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli, who took the name Pius XII. The new pope had plenty of experience with diplomacy. For the nine years prior to his elevation to the papacy, Pacelli served as the Vatican's Secretary of State, the second highest position inside the Vatican. Throughout the turbulent 1930s, Pacelli and Pope Pius XI closely collaborated in formulating foreign policy for the Catholic Church.[8] Even before his appointment to lead the Secretariat, Pacelli had spent all but his first two years as a priest serving in the Vatican bureaucracy. In February of 1917, Pope Benedict XV appointed him to become the nuncio (ambassador) to Munich, promptly making Pacelli a key figure in attempts to negotiate an end to the First World War. After the war, he remained Benedict's—and in early 1922, Pius XI's—liaison to the Weimar Republic and moved to Berlin. His diplomatic skills provided the Vatican with more power over the German Church at the expense of the secular government. As he adapted to his role as Secretary of State in the 1930s, he firmly opposed the Communist menace which was evident in Russia, Mexico, and Spain.[9] He also traveled extensively, visiting most all of Europe, crossing the Atlantic to South America, and, as previously mentioned, touring the United States. Undoubtedly, Cardinal Pacelli felt the pulse of world affairs firsthand. Historian John Cornwell argues that the Secretary of State continually appeased Hitler throughout the 1930s, but he fails to acknowledge that appeasement was the prevailing diplomatic approach to Hitler up through the conference at Munich in late 1938. Therefore, the Vatican's efforts under Pacelli should be deemed no more (or less) contemptible than those of the English and French governments.

Because of his previous experience with the German nation in the 1920s and his efforts as Pius XI's right-hand man as the Secretary of State, the English and French governments—each of which took the unusual step of speaking to their native Cardinals in order to influence their votes for Pacelli—welcomed the outcome, as did the United States, but Italy and Germany both feared he would continue his predecessor's policies.[10] The new Pope certainly sought to prevent another war just as his predecessor did, but Pius XII would prove to be much less forceful in his pronouncements than the recently-deceased Pontiff, preferring instead to adopt a more conciliatory manner. His less-aggressive approach to resolving European tensions quickly became evident.

On March 12, 1939, one day after the papal coronation, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia. President Roosevelt had sent telegrams to Hitler and Mussolini requesting that they pledge a guarantee against further aggression a mere day before the invasion, but Pius XII refused to support the message due to the poor timing of it, and because it singled out the Axis for bearing the sole responsibility of maintaining the peace. Such support, the new, cautious Pope reasoned, would make the Vatican appear to be breaking its neutrality in favor of the West.[11] While the United States had hoped for the moral reinforcement the Holy See could provide, administration officials did not appear to be overly disappointed by the lack of cooperation. In fact, when the Vatican announced its plan for a conference of the five European powers in April,

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[7] Gerald P. Fogarty, *The Vatican and the American Hierarchy*, Päpste Und Papsttum, Band 21 (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1982), 249.

[8] Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope*, 111.

[9] Ibid., 112.

[10] Ibid., 217-218.

[11] Fogarty, *The Vatican and the American Hierarchy*, 259; Flynn, *Roosevelt and Romanism*, 102.

some American officials in Europe believed it signified "belated collaboration" despite the purposely omitted invitation to America to participate.[12]

The proposed conference, though, never materialized. Even though the Munich Conference the previous fall had been recognized as a thorough disaster, Pius XII naïvely, if not arrogantly, believed he could broker peace with Hitler before a war could start. He was not without encouragement, however. Several members in the British and French governments were still willing to concede more to Hitler but could not say so publicly.[13] Furthermore, Secretary of State Luigi Cardinal Maglione knew that Mussolini did not want to go to war—at least not at this stage—and Maglione even attempted to enlist the dictator to mitigate Hitler's demands, but to no avail.[14] The United States was probably the most enthusiastic about the Pope's initiative. Cardinal Maglione made assurances that if the conference actually convened, President Roosevelt's "assistance and co-operation" would be requested by Pius XII.[15] American Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles declared, "Regardless of the outcome of the attempts to bring about a conference of nations, the efforts of the Holy Father have been of the utmost value" because of his influence at a time of international crisis.[16]

The invitation to Roosevelt never had to be extended, because predictably, the idea fell apart. Mussolini announced that the tensions which might lead to war had effectively subsided, and thus there was no longer a need for the European powers to meet. Amazingly, the Vatican accepted this absurd notion and dropped its proposal on May 10, 1939.[17] How quickly Pius XII discarded his proposal can only call into question his sincerity to see it come to fruition. If he and Secretary of State Maglione actually believed the European situation had decreased in gravity, then both men were incredibly naïve. This could hardly be the case, however, as both men were savvy enough after years of diplomatic experience to know that Hitler had more on his agenda than Czechoslovakia. The peace conference proposal has to be deemed an empty gesture to show that, like his predecessor, Pius XII possessed a commitment to peace and that he was willing to be the mediator.[18] When the situation clearly remained unsettled, though, letting the conference collapse without any objection was a curious way of showing this desire.

Perhaps more curious is that, in the Vatican's efforts to foster relations with the United

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[12] Flynn, *Roosevelt and Romanism*, 103. The five invited nations were France, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Poland.

[13] Owen Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican During the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 60; Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope*, 224.

[14] Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, 61.

[15] "Cicognani to Carroll, 15 May 1939," in *Le Saint Siege et la guerre en Europe: Mars 1949-Aout 1940* (1965); English edition by Gerard Noel, *The Holy See and the War in Europe, March 1939-August 1940* ("Records and Documents of the Holy See Relating to the Second World War," Vol. 1 [Washington, D.C., and Cleveland: Corpus Books, 1968]), 136. Hereafter cited as *The Holy See*.

[16] "National Catholic Welfare Council Under-Secretary Carroll to Washington Apostolic Delegate Cicognani, 16 May 1939," *The Holy See*, vol. 1, 136.

[17] Flynn, *Roosevelt and Romanism*, 104.

[18] Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope*, 223.

States, it snubbed the Americans for a conference which had little hope of ever taking place. The reason for not inviting the United States to the conference table can only be speculated, but it is likely that Pius XII did not believe an American presence would have been beneficial since the United States did not have a direct interest in the situation. Nevertheless, such a gesture certainly would have signaled the Vatican's seriousness for cooperation. Instead, it would seem relations between the two sovereigns were off to an inauspicious beginning.

Roosevelt and the State Department bore no hard feelings, however, as the following month in June, Sumner Welles expressed to Washington's Apostolic Delegate, Archbishop Amleto Cicognani, the President's "wishes to co-operate with any Government or Power inclined to promote peace" and how Roosevelt "would be honored and pleased to receive suitable suggestions from the Holy See" in such an endeavor.[19] Despite the overture, Roosevelt remained unprepared to announce the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. The State Department, particularly Under-Secretary of State Welles, prodded him to do so. Welles wrote that the relationship would be highly advantageous to the United States because "it is unquestionable that the Vatican has many sources of information, particularly with regard to what is actually going on in Germany, Italy, and Spain, which we do not possess."[20] Ambassador to Italy William Phillips concurred, and he further argued that America "would be supporting the Holy See in its well-known efforts to preserve peace in Europe at a moment of great tension."[21]

By October of 1939, a month after Germany's invasion of Poland, President Roosevelt made the decision to establish relations with the Vatican for the somewhat-disingenuous reason of working together to help place war refugees.[22] That he had to devise such a poor excuse is indicative of the fear he had of the inevitable Protestant opposition to such a move. Francis Spellman, Archbishop of New York, reported this to Rome, stating that Roosevelt "was looking for a moment and occasion for a persuasive appeal to the American people."[23] The moment arrived just days before Christmas. Roosevelt personally wrote Pope Pius XII requesting His Holiness to accept Myron Taylor as a personal representative of the President—as opposed to being an actual ambassador in charge of an embassy—"in order that our parallel endeavors for peace and the alleviation of suffering may be assisted."[24] After his first discussion with Roosevelt

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[19] "Apostolic Delegate in Washington Cicognani to Maglione, 11 June 1939," *The Holy See*, vol. 1, 194.

[20] Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1939*, 5 vols. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956), "The Under-Secretary of State (Welles) to President Roosevelt, 1 August 1939," vol. 2, 868.

[21] "Ambassador Phillips to Sumner Welles," *Foreign Relations, 1939*, vol. 2, 869.

[22] "Memorandum By President Roosevelt to the Secretary of State, 2 October 1939," *Foreign Relations, 1939*, vol. 2, 869. Both the United States and the Vatican shared an interest in the plight of refugees, but there is no reason to believe this convenient excuse superseded the necessity for official diplomatic communications.

[23] "Archbishop Spellman of New York to Cardinal Maglione, 25 October 1939," *The Holy See*, vol. 1, 302.

[24] "Letter from President Roosevelt to His Holiness, 23 December 1939," in *Wartime Correspondence Between President*

just three years before had raised the possibility for official relations, the Pontiff was ecstatic that it was now a reality. He announced the news in his Christmas message, saying:

> Nothing could be more pleasing than this Christmas news as it signifies the coming from the Eminent Head of such a great and powerful nation and promising contribution to . . . the attainment of a just and honourable peace and a more fruitful and widespread action to relieve the suffering of the victims of war.[25]

The first nine months of Pius XII's papacy he displayed peculiar behavior towards the United States. He refused to endorse President Roosevelt's message calling for Hitler and Mussolini to cease their aggressive behavior, nor did he invite the United States to his proposed peace conference the previous May. Perhaps Pius XII believed he could better negotiate with the European rivals without an isolationist transatlantic partner, or perhaps he simply wanted the glory of brokering peace all to himself. Regardless of the reasons for the Vatican's odd behavior, the United States remained eager to assist in the peace efforts of the Holy See. With war finally a reality, Roosevelt opted to send a delegate to Rome, and Pius XII recognized he needed the help of the Americans to limit the war. When Myron Taylor arrived at the Vatican, a fresh period of collaboration was set to begin between the two neutrals.

As if he were an actual ambassador, Myron Taylor presented his credentials to the Pope in February 1940. Taylor's mission was to apprise Roosevelt of the possibility of promoting a negotiated peace to conclude the war and, if no possibility existed, if the United States could exert its influence on Mussolini to prevent his entry into the war.[26] Ending the war as soon as possible remained the Vatican's first priority, but a tour of the European capitals by Sumner Welles—including a meeting with Pius XII—led the American Under-Secretary of State to determine that this was not feasible.[27] As a result, the United States and the Vatican agreed to put all of their weight into maintaining Italy's neutrality.

Taylor enjoyed privileged access to the Pontiff. He met with Pius XII seven times during his initial stay in Rome from February 27 to May 23, a highly unusual number of audiences in such a short span of time.[28] As the Vatican was surrounded by nations either at war or preparing for hostilities, it is no surprise that the American envoy curried special favor with the

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Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII, Myron C. Taylor, ed. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1947), 19. Roosevelt encountered a fair amount of outrage over the appointment, but this was assuaged in several ways. First, he did this while Congress was at recess to prevent debate. Second, since Taylor was not an ambassador, approval of his funding did not require Congressional approval. Third, Taylor was an Episcopalian. Fourth, and most importantly, Roosevelt reached out to Protestant and Jewish leaders and encouraged their opinions alongside those of the Catholic leader.

[25] "Christmas Message of Pope Pius XII (Extracts), 24 December 1939," *The Holy See*, vol. 1, 336.

[26] Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, 102.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., *Inside the Vatican of Pius XII: The Memoir of an American Diplomat During World War II*, ed. Harold H. Tittmann III (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 10.

Holy See. At the March 18 audience in which Sumner Welles also attended, the Pope told the American diplomats that he believed President Roosevelt's personal intercession would have a very positive impact on Italy's dictator.[29] Welles was much more skeptical of a push by the neutral leaders because he had no reason to believe the antiwar stances of the Church, Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano, or the Italian public in general meant anything to Mussolini, much less the pleadings of a distant leader who had done little to demonstrate that his nation was willing to get involved.[30] Afterwards, when Welles met with Vatican Secretary of State Maglione, the latter confided that any peace overtures to Germany and Italy would be rebuffed because the two nations were certain of complete victory at this point in the war. Welles agreed with the Cardinal's assessment.[31] The gloomy outlooks of the diplomats were being validated as Mussolini and Hitler discussed their plans at the same time as the Vatican-American meetings, and the Duce declared his intention to take Italy to war when the time was right.[32]

Despite the pessimism of Welles and blissfully ignorant of the details of the summit between the two fascist dictators, Pope Pius XII and President Roosevelt pressed forward in pressuring Mussolini. In the spirit of open exchanges of ideas, Maglione suggested to Myron Taylor a relaxing of the Atlantic blockade so Italy would have a window to the ocean, as well as for the Americans to make concrete proposals rather than simply indicate a willingness to negotiate. The President's representative agreed on both points and promised to advise his superiors.[33] Roosevelt, however, expected a mutual partnership. Rather than taking all action by himself, the President was confident that joining forces with the Pope would apply the right amount of pressure to keep Mussolini from becoming a belligerent.[34] The Pope agreed to take a "parallel action" if Roosevelt made a personal appeal to the Duce, but he asked for his role to be kept quiet in order to maintain the Vatican's neutral status.[35] Pius XII wanted his actions to appear to be independent of America's, a nation which openly voiced its sympathies for their fellow democracies in Great Britain and France, fearing such collaboration could result in retribution against the Church in both Germany and Italy.

Roosevelt and the Pontiff simultaneously appealed to Mussolini to keep Italy peaceful by tag-teaming him with flattery. In the Pope's letter dated April 24, Pius XII praised Italy's dictator for his efforts "to avoid and then to localise the war," attributing to him "the high merit of having contained the calamity with certain limits." The Holy See then trusted Mussolini would continue his policies, and therefore "Europe may be saved from greater ruins and grief; and in

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[29] Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940*, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), "Welles to Roosevelt, 18 March 1940," vol. 1, 107.

[30] Elisa A. Carrillo, "Italy, the Holy See and the United States, 1939-1945," in *Papal Diplomacy in the Modern Age*, ed. Peter C. Kent and John F. Pollard (Westport, CN: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 138.

[31] "Cardinal Maglione's Notes, 18 March 1940," *The Holy See*, vol. 1, 375.

[32] Ibid.

[33] "Cardinal Maglione's Notes, 2 May 1940," *The Holy See*, vol. 1, 404.

[34] Flynn, *Roosevelt and Romanism*, 117.

[35] Tittmann, *Inside the Vatican*, 12.

particular Your and Our beloved country may be saved from this calamity."[36] Likewise, in the letter Ambassador William Phillips read to Mussolini one week later, President Roosevelt commended the dictator's promotions of peace, but the letter also possessed a caveat which tacitly threatened the intervention of the United States if fascism continued its quest for world domination.[37]

The Duce appeared to be genuinely happy to receive the note of gratitude when he responded to Pius XII on April 30. He gave no assurance of remaining peaceful, however, stating that the situation was dependent upon "the will and the intention of third parties," conveniently placing the onus of Italy's status on the British and the French.[38] Mussolini issued a much more curt response to the American President, saying that no guarantee of peace could be made until basic issues concerning Italian liberty had been resolved, and he told Roosevelt to mind his own business and stay out of European affairs.[39] Such an undiplomatic response might have brought an end to American pressure on Mussolini had Pius XII not implored President Roosevelt to continue pressuring the Italian leader. Keeping Italy neutral received all the more importance when Germany invaded Belgium and the Netherlands on May 10 to begin its Western offensive. Roosevelt sent another three messages on May 14, May 27, and May 31, but these were given to Italian Foreign Minister Ciano because Mussolini refused to receive Ambassador Phillips.[40] Despite being rebuffed on each attempt, some in Washington recommended another try, and a draft was composed but never sent.[41]

The efforts of both the Pope and President Roosevelt failed when Mussolini announced on June 10 that Italy would enter the war the following day. The declaration caught neither neutral by surprise. Sumner Welles, as mentioned above, had possessed little faith in the diplomatic overtures being successful since the plan's genesis, and by the middle of May, Vatican Secretary of State Maglione had also lost all hope of keeping Italy neutral.[42] Pius XII himself had told Myron Taylor on May 23 of his belief that Mussolini would enter the war within three weeks of their meeting.[43]

In examining the onslaught of pleas to Mussolini, it is curious Pius XII and Cardinal Maglione were content to let the Americans assume the primary burden of keeping Italy out of the war. Roosevelt personally sent four notes on the subject, and it should be recalled that Maglione requested a relaxation of the Atlantic blockade of the Mediterranean Sea. There is no reason to believe that the Vatican was not serious about maintaining Italian neutrality, but the Pope's single letter seems a meager contribution when compared to Roosevelt's efforts. The reason for this, the Pontiff intimated to Taylor on May 23, was because he had lost his influence on the Duce.[44] This claim certainly had validity. As early as April 25, Mussolini proclaimed in a

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[36] "Pope Pius XII to Mussolini, 24 April 1940," *The Holy See*, vol. 1, 395.

[37] "The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips), 29 April 1940, *Foreign Relations, 1940*, vol. 1, 691-692.

[38] "Mussolini to Pope Pius XII, 30 April 1940," *The Holy See*, vol. 1, 402.

[39] Tittmann, *Inside the Vatican*, 14.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., 15.

[42] Flynn, *Roosevelt and Romanism*, 118; Taylor, *Wartime Correspondence*, 33.

[43] Carrillo, "Italy, the Holy See, and the United States," 138.

[44] Ibid.

speech, "The Vatican is the chronic appendicitis of Italy," weakening the country each day.[45] The Pope did little to assuage Mussolini's vitriolic sentiment. When the Vatican received intelligence that Germany was preparing to invade Holland and Belgium in early May, the Pope sent those two nations warnings to prepare, but the messages were deciphered by Italian intelligence.[46] A furious Mussolini effectively severed his ties to the Vatican. Regardless, the Vatican possessed intermediaries in the Italian Foreign Ministry to send its messages just as the Americans passed Roosevelt's messages to the Italian Foreign Minister. After all, Roosevelt had little reason for hope, either, but he exerted his energies for peace until the last possible moment. It does not speak well for His Holiness to have ceased his efforts so quickly.

The only other possible explanation in his defense is that he was losing the propaganda battle against Mussolini, and he feared a further erosion of his leadership among Italian Catholics. On the streets of Rome, marching youth chanted, "Down with the Pope," and Mussolini banned the influential Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano*, beyond the walls of the Vatican.[47] Perhaps Pius XII believed he could not lead if no one would follow. Whatever the reason for the Pope's reticence, his inaction sharply contrasted with his predecessor who damned the consequences and tirelessly championed peace.

Italy's new status as a belligerent devastated the Vatican. Because the city-state inside Rome was encapsulated by a nation at war, Church officials worried that the Vatican might be overrun by Mussolini's forces or could suffer damage from Allied bombing raids or Rome.[48] Even worse in the eyes of the Pope and Secretary of State Maglione, the Vatican's prestige and importance diminished on the world stage.[49] If the Pope could not convince Catholic Italy to ignore the call to arms, what other nation would listen to his appeals for peace?

Pius XII despaired. The Axis Powers were dominating the battlefield in the summer of 1940, conquering France and forcing Britain back to the home island at Dunkirk, and the United States appeared to have no interest in intervening despite assurances to the contrary. The Pope's spirits flagged under the possibility of Nazi victory, requiring President Roosevelt to write a letter of encouragement asserting, "The whole world needs You in its search for peace and good will."[50] Pius XII desperately wanted an end to hostilities and death—although he regrettably was not willing to speak as vociferously as his predecessor had—but he felt his opportunity had passed. The close relationship he had enjoyed with the United States became estranged but for sporadic notes of enquiry on benign matters. His Holiness was looking for an event in which he could reassert his leadership in the international community. When he got his second chance a year later, the Pope was hesitant to seize it.

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[45] Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, 107.

[46] Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope*, 242.

[47] Carrillo, "Italy, the Holy See, and the United States," 138.

[48] Tittmann, *Inside the Vatican*, 17. The fear of the Vatican being targeted by bombing raids was not paranoia. Later in the war, after failing to condemn the German blitzkrieg of England in which Italy participated, the British wanted revenge on the Italians and the pleadings of the Holy See to spare the Vatican carried little weight when His Holiness opted not to speak when he was not threatened. Britain never took the option off the table to the Vatican's deep consternation.

[49] Rhodes, *The Vatican in the Age of Dictators*, 248-249.

[50] "Roosevelt to Pope Pius XII, 1 October 1940," in *Wartime Correspondence*, 38.

Hitler changed the tide of the war when he opened the Eastern front by invading the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Just as it did in Western Europe, the German army continued its rapid-paced assaults to which the Soviets slowly reacted. It appeared that the German juggernaut would achieve success in Stalin's land, quickly laying siege to Leningrad and Moscow by October. Only the brutal Russian winter slowed the advance.

The Soviets desperately needed supplies from the West, and President Roosevelt was fully prepared to offer the Communists assistance through the Lend-Lease program which had already been extended to the British. Anticommunist sentiment in America, however, presented a major stumbling block to aiding the Soviets, led particularly by the Catholic Church. It must be recalled that Pope Pius XI had condemned any measure of aid only four years before the invasion of the Soviet Union, and the majority of the American hierarchy, which was already strongly isolationist (and several who were strongly anti-Roosevelt in general), intended to rigidly follow the late Pontiff's encyclical and instruct their congregations to do the same. Roosevelt, looking to acquire broad support on the matter, sought to capitalize on the rapport built with the Vatican over the course of a year and a half and convince Pius XII of the necessity of helping the Communists at this critical juncture. This was not an easy sell.

First, a Pope dismissing the teachings of a predecessor is rarely done; in fact, such teachings of an encyclical are usually built upon further. The more prevalent problem facing Roosevelt, however, was that he assumed the Vatican viewed Nazism as worse than Communism, which was not necessarily the case. Whereas Pius XII grew increasingly apprehensive about the treatment of the Church in Germany, he looked to the Soviet Union and saw a full-blown offensive against the Catholic Church.[51] The only thing more disconcerting to the Pope than religious conditions inside Russia was his belief that should the Soviets achieve victory, Stalin would seek to expand Communism and its atheism into Eastern Europe and square off against the Christian West in yet another disastrous world war.[52]

Furthermore, plenty of conservative American bishops and clergy had few qualms about denouncing President Roosevelt's domestic and foreign policies. The most vitriolic was Father Charles Coughlin, a priest in a Detroit suburb whose radio program developed into a political rather than spiritual pulpit, and although at first a Roosevelt supporter, his views evolved into rage against the New Deal and Communism (and by the end of the decade, the Jews). Millions listened to his program every Sunday afternoon.[53] Another, lesser known priest, James Gillis, also used the airwaves to denounce Roosevelt's supposed undermining individual liberty through the creation of the leviathan state and the evil of interventionist policies.[54] While these priests are now considered radicals, mainstream Catholic publications, such as *America* and *Commonweal*, adopted cautious stances on the president's initiatives.[55]

Although generally strong supporters of Roosevelt's domestic programs as part of a wave of social justice dominating Catholic thought during the 1930s, the American Catholic laity

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[51] Tittmann, *Inside the Vatican*, 57.

[52] Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope*, 260. The fear of an Eastern bloc, of course, would prove to be quite prescient.

[53] Jay Dolan, *The American Catholic Experience: A History from Colonial Times to the Present* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1985), 403-404.

[54] Richard Gribble, "The Other Radio Priest: James Gillis's Opposition to Franklin Roosevelt's Foreign Policy," *Journal of Church and State* 44 (Summer 2002), 505.

[55] Ibid., 508.

agreed with the opposition to involvement in global conflicts.[56] Catholics took great pride in their religious identity in the 1930s as the Church grew in both adherents and parishes. The visibility of Catholics in the Roosevelt administration won the President support, and Catholic intellectuals wrote of the New Deal being in line with papal encyclicals concerning social justice.[57] Thus, Catholics were willing to support Roosevelt as long as it did not conflict with Church teaching, and this was evident as the laity followed their bishops on the matter of interventionism in the latter part of the decade. If Roosevelt could win over the bishops, he would win over most all of America's twenty-some million Catholics.

Yet President Roosevelt had to tread carefully in his courtship of the American hierarchy. Protestants maintained their historical suspicions of the Catholic Church and its undemocratic leadership under a pope who has the option of invoking papal infallibility. This was directly counter to the ideals of a democratic nation. Furthermore, Protestants did not readily understand how Catholics could claim to follow two leaders—the pope and the president—and therefore the papists "could not be considered loyal citizens of the United States."[58] The 1930s, however, served as the beginning of the wane of anti-Catholicism in this nation. Roosevelt's appointment of Catholic officials did wonders for assuaging fears of Catholics in office, and the descendants of the immigrants who were loathed by the Know-Nothing Party of the nineteenth century had become established, well-to-do members of society. Although not eradicated by any means (recall footnote 24 in which Roosevelt made several conciliatory gestures to non-Catholic leaders for his announcement of the Taylor mission), anti-Catholicism began its decline during this period.

Regardless of Protestant reaction to Roosevelt's overtures to Catholics, there were weaknesses in the anticommunist beliefs of the Vatican, and the United States government would seek to exploit them in order to secure aid for the Soviets against Germany. Just as Pius XI's encyclical forbidding aid to Communists could not be ignored, neither could his encyclical condemning the evils of Nazism. The Pope refused to commend the German invasion as an anti-Bolshevik crusade, and his silence led to accusations by the Axis leaders of being a pawn of the Allies. More than a few leaders in the Vatican administration shared those sentiments.[59] The Pope had no intentions of siding for a nation whose religious repression—among other crimes—neared Soviet levels.[60] Privately, though, Pius XII hoped the Germans would destroy Communist Russia and be so weakened in its effort that the West would in turn conquer National Socialism.[61] By August the Vatican began preparing for the inevitability that the United States would be pulled into the war. Vatican Secretary of State Maglione instructed the Apostolic Delegate Amleto Cicognani to start informing American Catholics of the religious conditions in Germany to lay the groundwork for their support of Roosevelt's eventual intervention.[62] This was not a repudiation

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[56] Ibid., 510; Dolan, *The American Catholic Experience*, 401-403.

[57] Gribble, "The Other Radio Priest," 506.

[58] Dolan, *The American Catholic Experience*, 296.

[59] Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, 195.

[60] Pierre Blet, S.J., *Pius XII and the Second World War: According to the Archives of the Vatican*, trans. by Lawrence J. Johnson (New York: Paulist Press, 1997).

[61] Rhodes, *The Vatican in the Age of Dictators*, 262-263. Some Americans, including Senator Harry S Truman, possessed this hope, as well.

[62] Fogarty, *The Vatican and the American Hierarchy*, 272-73.

of Nazism in favor of Communism, but rather a realistic view given American affinities with Great Britain and sympathies for the Soviets. The Vatican certainly had to believe it was important for American Catholics to support their leaders rather than be labeled as perfidious by Protestant America.

Pius XII, despite serving as the head of a neutral state, had to decide which ideology was the biggest threat to the Church he oversaw, and Roosevelt began the campaign to help the Holy See make the decision which would be favorable to the Allied cause. At a press conference, Roosevelt astounded those in attendance by declaring that the Soviet Constitution guaranteed a religious liberty which was not dissimilar to the religious freedom granted by America's own Constitution.[63] While his statement was not false, it certainly discounted the fact that it was a freedom unexercised under Stalin's regime. On September 3, 1941, the President dispatched Myron Taylor to deliver to Pius XII a letter intended to bolster the image of the irreverent Soviets. In the letter, Roosevelt reiterated what he said at the press conference:

> In so far as I am informed, churches in Russia are open. I believe there is a real possibility that Russia may as a result of the present conflict recognize freedom of religion in Russia. . . . In my opinion, the fact is that Russia is governed by a dictatorship, as rigid in its manner of being as is the dictatorship of Germany. I believe, however, that this Russian dictatorship is less dangerous to the safety of other nations than is the German form of dictatorship.[64]

On the first point of churches in Russia being open, the Pope and Secretary of State Maglione found the claim to be entirely ludicrous. Churches throughout Russia had been shut down but for one in Moscow and one in Leningrad, and the priests who obstinately practiced their faith in the open rather than going underground suffered imprisonment or execution.[65] Roosevelt knew this, too. A month before he dispatched his letter, the State Department cabled Harold Tittmann, who served as the Vatican liaison when Myron Taylor was not in Rome, and told him that the United States had no indication of increased religious tolerance in Russia and that there would be no pressure placed upon the Soviets to foster such tolerance.[66] The comparison of religious freedom in Germany and Russia elicited no response from the Vatican because neither the Pope nor Cardinal Maglione knew what to think of one dictator being better than the other—they thought both nations were oppressive, but Germany at least allowed religious practice despite ever-increasing crackdowns. Roosevelt's first attempt to win over Pius XII failed, but he persisted.

The American hierarchy remained virulently opposed to any such aid. Led by the archbishops of influential dioceses such as Boston, Dubuque, Baltimore, and Cincinnati, as well as the Catholic press, the laity flooded the White House and their representatives in Congress their own opposition to aiding the Communists. Only a few bishops had the courage to defy the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* and support Lend-Lease aid to the Soviets. The most prominent among this small group were Archbishop Francis Spellman of New York, Archbishop Edward Mooney of Detroit, and Bishop Joseph Hurley of St. Augustine, Florida. The latter two, especially, played a vital role in helping the Roosevelt Administration convince Catholics,

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[63] Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, 193.

[64] "Letter from President Roosevelt to His Holiness, 3 September 1941," in *Wartime Correspondence*, 61.

[65] Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope*, 263.

[66] Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941*, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), "The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Phillips), 31 July 1941," vol. 1, 999.

including the Vatican, to support Lend-Lease to Russia. Hurley in 1941 had returned from working for Cardinal Maglione in the Secretariat of State, and his outspokenness in support of intervention in Europe led many to believe he spoke on behalf of the Vatican.[67] Archbishop Mooney, though, was the first to call for a different interpretation of *Divini Redemptoris*, arguing that the encyclical did not prohibit aid to Russians, just to Communists.[68] Despite the efforts of these men, they were still being drowned out by the much louder isolationist clergymen.

The pro-administration bishops may not have had a large impact on the laity, but others listened and took notice. President Roosevelt and his minions, recognizing that promoting Communism over National Socialism failed to make any headway with the Vatican, adopted Mooney's approach in their courting of Pius XII. In a meeting with Secretary of State Maglione, Myron Taylor asked for *Divini Redemptoris* to be interpreted as Archbishop Mooney had suggested, and in a subsequent meeting, Cardinal Maglione informed Taylor that the Pope had accepted this idea.[69] Of course, His Holiness requested for this to be done discreetly in order to avoid the appearance of collusion with the United States.

The hierarchy received instructions through Apostolic Delegate Cicognani in Washington a few weeks after Taylor's meeting to again make it seem that this was being done on the Vatican's own initiative. The plan called for Archbishop John McNicholas of Cincinnati, an outspoken critic of Roosevelt's aid to Russia, to write a pastoral letter for his archdiocese elaborating on Pius XI's words which would then be carried across the nation by the Catholic News Service in late October.[70] McNicholas was chosen because Cicognani believed his words would carry more weight than those of a supporter of Roosevelt's. But if the Vatican was hoping to spurn accusations that it was working with the Americans on this issue, the abrupt about-face of a prominent clergyman should have required an explanation. To the relief of Pope Pius XII, no inquiries were made on the matter, and the letter rallied Catholics behind Roosevelt in the fight against fascism. Public criticism among the hierarchy ceased for good in November when the bishops at a national conference voted to yield to Roosevelt's leadership on foreign policy, and the Vatican let it be known that public dissent would not be tolerated.[71] It is ironic that although Pius XII had a deep interest in preventing the expansion of the war, his greatest achievement in his diplomatic exchanges with the United States helped another nation enter the fray.

Shortly after the conference, the United States ended its neutrality after the attack at Pearl Harbor. With the Americans at war, the Vatican grew optimistic about the war's final outcome as both the Pope and Secretary of State Maglione were certain of the defeat of the Axis.[72] The relationship nevertheless changed as a result of America's entry into the war. Over the course of the war, the United States would protest the Vatican's acceptance of a Japanese delegation despite the known atrocities being committed in the Far East, as well as the Vatican's small voice in denouncing wartime atrocities in Europe, and Pius XII would chafe at America's refusal to rule out bombing Rome during its Italian campaign.[73] But relations always remained

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[67] Flynn, *Roosevelt and Romanism*, 152.

[68] Ibid., 163. Recall that the line of the encyclical in question is: "Communism is intrinsically wrong, and no one who would save Christian civilization may collaborate with it in any undertaking whatsoever."

[69] Blet, *Pius XII and the Second World War*, 123.

[70] Fogarty, *The Vatican and the American Hierarchy*, 274.

[71] Ibid., 276.

[72] Tittmann, *Inside the Vatican*, 130.

[73] Robert Trisco, "The Department of State and the Apostolic Delegation in Washington During World War II," in *FDR, the*

cordial as a result of the affection the Pope and the President shared for each other.

Was the relationship worthwhile? From Myron Taylor's first audience with Pope Pius XII as President Roosevelt's personal representative in early 1940 until the bombing at Pearl Harbor in late 1941—not to mention most of 1939—each sought to work in concert and employ the moral authority of the Vatican and the ever-increasing military might of the United States to influence events in Europe. Of course, the Vatican had no military to back up its words, and the Americans were entrenched in isolationism an ocean away; therefore, it is no surprise that they possessed little influence. The only instances when the relationship bore fruit were when the two neutrals were influencing each other. Pius XII convinced Roosevelt to personally implore Mussolini to keep Italy out of the war, and the United States pressured the Vatican to support assistance to the Soviet Union as well as to silence critical members of the American hierarchy.

Despite the limited success in attaining their goals, each needed the other to varying extents. The Vatican believed it received instant credibility with another neutral power lobbying Mussolini, and perhaps more importantly, it was Roosevelt who encouraged Pius XII in the dismal latter half of 1940 to maintain faith that the neo-paganism of the Nazis would not prevail. But the friendship with the United States ultimately provided few tangible benefits. Granted, Roosevelt was much more active in the efforts to convince Italy to remain neutral than was the Pope, but the President of an isolationist country could not exert as much influence on Mussolini as had been originally hoped. The bottom line is that with the exception of moral support, the Vatican gained little, if anything, from its relationship, especially after Italy entered the war.

It is in these terms of tangible results that the United States clearly got the better end of the bargain. The disclosure to American Catholics of Germany's religious persecution and the Pope's consent to a re-interpretation of an unambiguous encyclical statement cleared the way for Catholics to drop their opposition to aid for the Soviets and effectively silenced the Catholic hierarchy. The re-interpretation was the coup of the relationship, and it served as the basis for historian Owen Chadwick's assertion, "In short, Myron Taylor was sent to Rome for the domestic purposes of the United States."[74]

Two of the most important neutral leaders in the world joined forces to work towards limiting a war both knew would be devastating. In doing so, regardless of which sovereign gained the most out of the relationship, they both had crucial needs met by the other. Although President Roosevelt and Pope Pius XII were unsuccessful in their efforts to prevent and then minimize a war, the genuine friendship between the two laid the groundwork for future cooperation. Before America entered into hostilities, their joint efforts served not only as the last hope to save Europe from itself, but also to support each other in their own times of need.

Vatican, and the Roman Catholic Church, 224, 228. The Pope later agreed to accept a delegation from Chinese leader Chiang Kai-Shek to mollify the American outrage over the Japanese delegation.

[74] Chadwick, *Britain and the Vatican*, 113.

When Lady Liberty turns a Blind Eye: United States Foreign Policy during the Invasion of Greece, 1940-1941

Athena Stephanopoulos

"I remember hiding in an oven when I was ten," she lamented. "The Germans had broken down our door and were demanding to take all the children away from our parents, probably to kill us first. When they peeked in oven window, I held my breath and prayed that the pots and pans were piled over my head because if not, I would be burned alive. That's when I first knew of fear."[1] The months that followed Thomai Stephan's first encounter with German "hunters" as she deemed them, were no less frightening or menacing than the day she hid in the oven. Soon after the hunters left her village in northern Greece, Thomai and her family labored through a series of barriers to escape her now occupied community. "Oh it was petrifying. They stole all of our animals so that we'd starve; we ran into the caves and hid for days so they wouldn't find us; and when more came in from Macedonia, everyone dug a secret trench with a wooden cover piled under dirt and waited for their footsteps to soften—that day I almost suffocated to death."[2]

Her memories are shocking though this is only a small portion of what the little girl experienced when the Axis powers came to Greece during the Second World War. By the time Germans ravaged her village of Hiliothendro, the war had been ingrained in the lives of Greek peasants for seven months. What is most interesting about the German invasion is that Greece had been petitioning the all-powerful United States of America for more than half a year to obtain some sort of relief from this uncalled for aggression. Sadly, the Americans failed to answer the call of their fellow man.

Before delving into this intriguing subject matter, it must be noted that recent scholarship in this area is scarce, at best. One reason for this shortage is the perception that the arsenal of democracy pitted against the spreading threat of communism, resulting in the Cold War after WWII, touched on larger eastern European nations during the 1940s which subsequently became Russia's Iron Curtain nations. Greece fought heavily to escape from under those gates and since her economic impact during the Second World War was not widely felt in Europe, she is sadly forgotten in this political game of communal chess.

Sparse publications are also a problem due to the complexity of research individuals must undergo in order to uncover just what happened during those tense years during the invasion of Greece. President Roosevelt had a long history with the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh and his *personal,* private correspondence with this man often revealed more about the federal barriers to aid for Greece than those formal, congressional letters sent back to the ambassador in the midst of gunfire and bombshells. Thus, placing this Balkan country in the proper context of the political turmoil of the early-mid Twentieth Century globally, in Europe, and even within Greece itself draws the writer into a web of intricate quandaries with which only time and analysis can untangle. Regardless of its difficulty to explore, the interplay between the United States and Greece during the Invasion of Greece is a pertinent portion of history which has been sadly overlooked for the last sixty years.

As for America's reasons for refusing to assist their long-time European ally, they are more complicated than one may surmise. American relief efforts *were* established for Greece, but

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[1] Thomai Stephan, telephone interview by author, 17 March 2006, Wichita, KS to Cincinnati, OH.

[2] Ibid.

not until 1947—two years after the end of WWII and five years after the Greeks desperately required material. To determine why this aid was so late in coming to the Balkan peninsula, four major factors must be examined: if any previous American efforts to assist Greece in war had been established; President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR) interest in sending arms in WWII to a nation that may draw attention to a German attack on his own land; the interest of the U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, in reporting the matters of a minor Balkan state to America; and the evolution public opinion of up to the early 1940s.

The threat of invasion begins for Greece with the Great Depression. Numerous political parties representing separate factions in Greece were formed in the 1930s, all hoping to rearrange the Greek government in their favor since it had been in violently unstable for the last hundred years. As the Communist Party of Greece began instigating political uproar against followers of Greece's leader, King George II's, the King soon appointed austere General Ioannis Metaxas as his Prime Minister in 1936. After crushing all opposing political parties, Metaxas prepared Greece for the employment of an authoritarian government, in part to quell what he knew would soon transpire: a war with Italy. Metaxas' judgement was wise; shortly before World War II in 1939, Italy annexed their neighbor, Albania. Repeating its formula from World War I, the nation of Greece immediately chose an official policy of neutrality with its surrounding, combative nations. Unofficially the nation was sympathetic towards British efforts due to their long-standing, positive relations for over a century. Greece also held on to an unstated anti-German sentiment, stemming from their King's choice to wed a German, not Greek, bride, which only heightened the public's desire to avoid German occupation.[3] Unfortunately, hopes of remaining neutral and out of Germany's reach would soon be abandoned.

In 1940 while Adolf Hitler was focusing his attention towards capturing the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa, his collaborator, Benito Mussolini (Il Duce) was making plans to equal his fame and honor to that of Hitler's. Mussolini's original scheme to boost his reputation hovered around an invasion of Yugoslavia and subsequent base with which to acquire needed resources from Russian dominated nations, especially oil. Yugoslavia was attractive to the Italian leader because the country was only second in production to raw materials—Romania produced an impressive six million tons of oil per year. If seized, Yugoslavia would also serve as a base to steal Romanian materials. But the problem with a Yugoslavian takeover was two fold. First, Yugoslavia currently was a buffer zone between Hitler and Mussolini's spheres of influence, meaning that its Italian occupation would likely cause Hitler to retaliate and create an even larger war. Second, the nation was determined to possess a military too strong for the Italians to defeat on their own. So the plan was axed. Another way into the Balkans was through Greece. The Balkan peninsula, Mussolini reasoned, would secure an orbit of Italian domination, serve as a stepping stone to Romania, and threaten British standing in the Mediterranean simultaneously. Il Duce fancifully believed Balkan control would restore Italy's ancient command encircling what the Romans called "Mare Nostrum" (Our Sea).[4]

To materialize these dreams, on August 15, 1940, Mussolini ordered one of his submarines to torpedo a Greek cruiser. After two months of silence between the two nations, Il Duce creatively cited that he was compelled to attack Greece since the Greek government

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[3] S. Victor Papacosma, *The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d'Etat* (Cleveland: Kent State University Press, 1977), ix, 1-14; Jon V. Kofas, *Authorianism in Greece, the Metaxas Regime* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 168-174.

[4] M. K. Dziewanowski, *War at Any Price: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945* (Englewood Clifs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1987), 148-151; Anita J. Prazmowska, *Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Second World War* (New York: St. Martins' Press, 2000), 186-195; *For the President: Personal and Secret: Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt,* Orville H. Bullitt, ed. (New York: Houghton Mifflin CO., 1972), 409, interestingly, William C. Bullitt, was the Secretary of State during World War II and was one of the first officials in Washington to hear about the invasion of Greece in the early 1940s and prevent future destruction in the nation, before the Germans were to plunder the area in 1941. Bullitt paid little attention to affairs in the Balkans. In his memoirs, he only speaks of Greece twice: first to mention Mussolini's plan to invade the area and second to study why the Germans were able to overtake the region so easily.

had not followed a policy of neutrality and was in fact permitting the British to host air and naval bases on their lands. Faced with Mussolini's ultimatum, General Metaxas, who believed the Italians did not have the martial support to induce a successful invasion, responded to the Italian leader in a one-word telegram: "Oxi!" (No!).[5]

Based on this insulting response Mussolini ordered his soldiers into the Grecian border on October 28th, 1940. Metaxas maintained a strong counteroffensive and cautiously permitted a few British divisions to occupy the mainland with Royal Air Force (RAF) squadrons to reinforce Greek air defenses. In addition, massive groups of guerrilla fighters independently fought to dispel the Italians and, due to the intricacies of the rugged, deceptive, mountainous Greek landscape, largely succeeded. But when it was clear to the Italian dictator that the Greeks may soon announce victory and that this may persuade Yugoslavia and Turkey to support them against Italy, Hitler was informed of Mussolini's brash actions; he was more than outraged.[6]

Surprised by the Grecian triumph and upset at Mussolini's defeat from a nation sustained by aid from his adversary, Britain, Hitler decided to intervene with German forces that December, upsetting his schedule to execute Operation Barbarossa. In an effort to make up for lost time, in 1941 Hitler went after both Yugoslavia and Greece concurrently. Once Yugoslavian forces dissolved along the Grecian border, Metaxas' reluctance to accept any and all British aid they offered, expired. Britain, in its own predicament, was caught between leaving forces to defend disputed territory in North Africa, like Tripoli, and sending forces to Greece. Keeping troops around Tripoli would secure a southern base with which to attack Sicily, prevent an Axis invasion of Egypt, and possibly of the Middle East as well. Sending the majority of those troops to Greece would prevent Britain from being portrayed as militarily weak, which could threaten support from powerful political allies such as the U.S.S.R. and the United States later in the war.[7]

Britain sided in Greece's favor. In order to compensate for the difference in Italian versus German military strength, Britain pulled most of its North African troops, along with new men from Indian, Australian, and New Zealand units, to fortify Grecian lines. Nearly 56,000 men traveled to the Balkan peninsula in a matter of days. As for the Greek army, over half of their men were still focused on keeping Italians behind Albanian lines instead of bolstering the "Metaxas line" against Bulgaria which held back the incoming Germans. Due to this lapse in proper strategy and the poor organization of guerrilla fighters, the Germans were able to conquer the Greek mainland systematically. Once the British and Germans were embroiled in heavy combat, British General Maitland Wilson called for an evacuation, mainly to Crete, and saved 43,000 of his men; fifteen-thousand had already become casualties.[8]

Before 30,000 of those evacuated secured the island, the Greek military's defense of Crete consisted of only one infantry regiment, three coastal defense and antiaircraft batteries, and twenty-four antiquated planes. With a defense like this, even Mussolini could have come back for a second chance at victory. In any event British war veteran, Major General Bernard C. Freyberg, commanded his fatigued, shell-shocked soldiers into Crete. Expectedly he faced staunch opposition from German military expert, General Karl Student, and his able-bodied men, full of the air power and equipment. Britain now lacked these attributes since no other major nations, like the United States, would lend material support. Foolishly Freyberg focused

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[5] Kofas, *Authorianism in Greece, the Metaxas Regime*, 174-189; Dziewanowski, *War at Any Price: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945*, 150-151; "Memorandum by the Director of Political Department," *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D *1937-1945), vol. XII: The War Years, February 1-June 22, 1941, (GPO, Washington D.C.: 1962), 106-107.

[6] Charles Cruickshank, *Greece, 1940-1941* (Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 1976), 37-51; Dziewanowski, *War at Any Price: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945*, 150-151.

[7] Cruickshank, *Greece, 1940-1941, 73-86;* Dziewanowski, *War at Any Price: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945*, 156-157.

[8] Dziewanowski, *War at Any Price: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945*, 158-159; *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence: III. Alliance Declining, February 1944-April 1945*, Warren F. Kimball, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 202.

on possible amphibious landings since the British were not able to secure more planes to fight an air attack. By May 20th, 1941, this proved to be a serious error in his judgement. General Student had chosen a three-pronged air offensive on Crete, inflicting serious wounds upon the British. The invasion of Crete was a soaring victory for German air forces and a serious blow for the British military and the independence and neutrality of Greece. Once Hitler had secured the Balkans, he turned his attention back to Soviet Russia.[9]

As for those still within the borders of Greece, Germans continued to loot their homes, kill their family members, and starve them to death. When the Germans departed at the end of the war, Greece was unable to recover economically, politically, or socially from the ordeal. According to the author of *By Fire and Axe: The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece, 1944-1949* and first hand participant, Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, the first appearance of a Greek civil war was seen toward the end of German occupation. Much of the grassroots combat and resistance that occurred during the invasion of Greece was the product of the Communist's National Liberation Front (EAM) and its military, the People's National Army of Liberation (ELAS). As the Germans abandoned Greece, Britain reconstituted the former Royalist Greek government and attempted to include EAM-ELAS members into power in order to avoid future conflict. When those leaders naively refused to participate in the reorganization process, skirmishes between the Royalists and Communists ensued.[10]

Consequently, Josip Broz Tito, leader of Communist Yugoslavia, supported the EAM-ELAS bloc, forcing Britain to return to Greece with 40,000 troops and a large amount of monetary aid for Greek Royalists. Once financial concerns arose in Britain two years after the end of WWII, the United States finally came to the aid of their Balkan ally and helped push back EAM-ELAS forces. President Truman's grant of $400 million to quell these problems on the Balkan peninsula was permitted by Congress in agreement with his newly issued Truman Doctrine. This legislation allowed the U.S. to come to the aid of nations, like Greece, defending themselves against Communist forces. Later and without question, it was the continued American, not British, effort into Greece under their Marshall Plan—a program to revitalize European economies and strengthen them against Communist threats—that miraculously restored order to the Greek government in the tense decades after the civil war. American influence in the Balkans clearly was substantial.[11]

By observing the significant influence the United States had upon the future of Greece, and the large cost Americans spent to ensure Greek freedom, the question must be asked as to why America did not come to the aid of Greece before the chaos of a civil war eventuated. Surely by helping the British and guerilla Greek fighters *during* the invasion, America would not have had to invest economically in securing Greek freedom against Communism so heavily after WWII. Moreover, if the British and American governments were willing to work together during the war to secure the Balkan peninsula from a German attack, the tremendous expenses incurred by the use of the Marshall Plan in Greece may not have been needed. An Axis invasion in the face of British sea and American land and air power would have been short lived, if at all. Most importantly, the Americans would not have had to financially support Greece into the 1950s, and to such a large degree, had their aid come to the Greeks when they initially petitioned for it--during their invasion from 1940-1941.[12]

What makes America's lack of interest in Greece even more perplexing is that Americans previously were responsible for supplying the nation with large amounts of aid

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[9] Cruickshank, *Greece, 1940-1941,* 156-163;. Dziewanowski, *War at Any Price: World War II in Europe, 1939-1945,* 160-162.

[10] Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza, *By Fire and Ice: The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece, 1944-1949,* translated by Sarah Arnold Rigos (New Rochelle, NY: Caratzas Brothers, Publishers, 1978), 24-37.

[11] Ibid., 136-152; C.M. Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949* (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1976), 234-247.

[12]Woodhouse, *The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949*, 245-259. Thomas Parrish, *Roosevelt and marshall, Partners in Politics and War* (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1989), 511.

during another war of aggression against them—not from Germany, but Turkey. In 1821, the Turk's Ottoman Empire in Grecian lands had deteriorated so much that rebel Greek leaders were able to create a national campaign of resistance against such rule. Much like the later German invasion, in order to obtain their independence successfully, Greece required aid from other more stable and financially sound nations. Just like the German invasion, America was called upon relief. Despite President James Monroe's recent enacted policy of non-intervention in European affairs, he could not help but challenge the Ottoman enemies of national freedom and liberty for the Greeks. In addition to protecting shipping rights for America, the popular American sentiment concerning the Greek Revolution, despite the Monroe Doctrine, was to suspend isolationism in favor of helping their fellow man acquire freedom.[13] One century later Greece was, again, fighting their adversary in order to regain liberty and freedom from an oppressive nation. Just like with the Revolution, it was the president who made the final decision during the invasion as to whether that aid would be sent to Greece.

In 1940, that President was Franklin D. Roosevelt. And while it would easy to state that Roosevelt's strong support of an evolved non-intervention policy is what kept America from assisting Greek fighters, that assumption would be wrong. From his initial election to the end of the Greek invasion in 1941, President Roosevelt remained remarkably divided between balancing his personal views of American involvement with foreign issues versus a national disposition towards isolationism that, since the Greek War for Independence, had grown substantially.[14] Had Roosevelt been given the unrestricted authority to involve his nation with World War II, he would have sent aid, in some form, to the Greeks during their invasion. But by the time the invasion was reported to him in autumn of 1940, he had experienced the American public's strong attitude for isolationism to the point at which he knew he could not chance entering the nation into the war and remain president of one of the most influential nations on earth.

Where the President was first familiarized with the public's strong opinion against assisting Europe began years before the invasion. Following his introduction of the Good Neighbor Policy to respect Latin American issues and governments, Roosevelt was faced with a number of Neutrality Acts that rapidly passed through Congress in the mid-late 1930s. These acts were increasingly supported by the American people the more stringent they became in preventing U.S. arms to be shipped to belligerent nations--though a clear distinction as to who was the aggressor was not specified. In response, Roosevelt increasingly opposed these acts since they castigated *victims* of aggression, like those from Italy's recent attack on Abyssinia and the Axis' future attack on Greece, who could truly use the help of American materials. To the further disappointment of Roosevelt, the acts additionally confined his personal right as President to aid amicable nations. Due to its overwhelming popularity with American citizens, FDR grudgingly singed the last act in 1937. When World War II exploded across Europe in 1939, he was compelled by his own character to take action and investigate the degree to which his presidential powers permitted him to help friendly European nations. Most notably this endeavor is discovered as Roosevelt engaged in a secret, recurring correspondence with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that dealt with how the Allied power faired in WWII without America's official participation. Many times the two men were found discussing ways to sidestep the Neutrality Acts.[15]

Interestingly, and probably a result of these conspicuous talks, when Hitler was planning to attack Britain in 1940, Roosevelt sought to shift public isolationist opinion softly

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[13] Paul Constantine Pappas, *The United States and the Greek War for Independence, 1821-1828* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), vvi, xiv-xvi.

[14] Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 163-179; Whitney H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs, *The United States in World Affairs: An Account of American Foreign Relations, 1940* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), 350-351, 354.

[15]Ibid.; *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds. (New York: Saturday Review Press/E.P.Dutton and Co., Inc., 1975), 81, 156, 159-169.

by creating the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA). The CDAAA, chaired by like-minded presidential appointees, Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox, Secretaries of War and Navy, sent American military material to Great Britain. In order not to disobey public sentiments, the CDAAA was classified as being a pro-aid organization, not technically attempting to engage in WWII, though it obviously countered the Neutrality Acts.[16]

Certainly Roosevelt's desire to avert U.S. participation can be attributed to the fact that the Battle of Britain, like the invasion of Greece, occurred during an election year. Making bold moves to involve uninterested voters in another World War would do nothing for his campaign but result in his failure to be reelected. Beyond the loss of employment, Roosevelt would have also forfeited his powerful position to fascinate American relief efforts in European affairs for an extended period of time. Once his inauguration was complete, Roosevelt would have at least four solid years to lead the American war response than had he engaged in stronger diplomatic relations with Greece the year it was invaded—coinciding with the election.

The President further sought to assist friendly European nations but creating the Lend-Lease agreement between America and Britain where massive military and economic aid was sent to the United Kingdom, that in turn helped other nations suffering under the threat of Axis domination. Sadly for Greece, however, Lend-Lease was implemented just *after* Britain withdrew from the Greek mainland during their invasion—a decision made in response to the lack of support given to Greece by other major nations. Had Roosevelt negotiated Lend-Lease with Britain before the Axis attack on the Balkan peninsula, the approaching Greek civil war, with all of its lasting and serious consequences for Greece, may have been averted.[17] After all, America did pay for British troops to remain in Greece in 1947 and put down their civil war once financial problems in the United Kingdom were too numerous to continue defending the nation single-handedly.

The problem with attributing the age-old policy of non-intervention as to why Americans did not aid Greece appears too simplistic. In 1821, not only did the American government provide necessary material to fight of Turks, but wealthy Greek-Americans donated substantial amounts of funding to the project in hopes that their relatives would obtain the liberty and freedom Greeks in the states had.[18] Surely the descendants of these wealthy individuals still existed in World War II and could donate again to the Greek cause. What caused such a stir in America over the Revolution in the 1800s was the American press' intense portrayal of the trauma Greeks were experiencing within their lands. Major contributors came from Philadelphia once the *National Gazette* said that the Greek cause was "sacred and solemn." "Greek fever" spread around America so fast that the *New York*

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[16]Donald F. Drummond, *The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), 181.

[17] Ibid., 208-210, 212. It should be noted that as soon as Congress approved Lend-Lease and Roosevelt officially was permitted to help victims of Axis aggression, he immediately sent relief to Greece. In particular the President authorized a number of French 75s located in Fort Bragg, North Carolina to be shipped to the Balkan State in haste. By this point Greek guerrilla resistance had been raging for over half a year and once the Germans invaded in the spring of 1941, the Greeks had no more arms to forestall German occupation. By the time American weapons reached Grecian shores, it was too late. "American Sending Guns to Greece," *The Times* (London) 1 Apr. 1941, 2.

[18] Pappas, *The United States and the Greek War for Independence,* 27-43; Roosevelt's anti-isolationist views went so deep that in 1941, four days before he knew Germany would ravage Greece in a land attack, he issued a statement to the press saying that he wanted the American people to truly know the events of World War II, in whole. Though Roosevelt had no formal means of controlling radio or newspapers strictly by utilizing his Presidential powers, he states that he would not want to thwart such communication with events transpiring in the world. Perhaps if the American people came to realize, on their own, that an American invasion would occur, they would loosen their ties to isolationism and support relief efforts to countries already in need, like Greece, "Says Roosevelt Bars Censorship," *The New York Times,* 2 Apr. 1941, 2.

Commercial Advertiser stated that "We cannot keep the record of the numerous meetings called in every part of the country to procure aid for the Greek cause."[19] Since American media outlets had increased extensively in the hundred years following the Revolution, it would be logical to conclude that Americans would have helped again if they knew about the sufferings in 1940s Greece. One of the most crucial means for the American press to obtain knowledge of the severity of the Grecian conflict is by sifting through documents written by America's ambassador in Greece, Lincoln MacVeagh, who, day by day, chronicled Axis bombings of the land. Likewise, it would be understandable to believe that Roosevelt's failure to the Grecian campaign was the result of a lack of information on the subject reported to him by the ambassador.

If MacVeagh was indifferent to the invasion of Greece, then the insufficiency of reports to the U.S. government on the crisis would be understandable—especially since Greece was one of the poorest and politically unstable European nations during the war. Its strategic value to the U.S. paled in comparison to nations with similar invasions, like France or Britain, where aid would have been received before Greece for that reason. But blaming the lack of U.S. aid to Greece squarely on the shoulders of Lincoln MacVeagh is unfounded for a myriad of reasons; namely that the Ambassador's love of Greece was a lifelong affair.

As the member of an affluent family, MacVeagh's education was filled with courses in Classical Greek that sparked his interest in ancient philosophy so deeply that he earned a Harvard degree in it in 1913—condensing his schooling into three years. In 1917 he chose to marry Margaret Charlton Lewis, whose fluency was in both classical and modern Greek. Over two-decades before he was appointed Ambassador to Greece, MacVeagh began reading the newspapers of Athens while teaching their young daughter, Margaret Ewen, Greek as well. Once he established a successful career with the Henry Holt Publishing Co., MacVeagh and his family traveled to Europe, his favorite stop being Greece, and read aloud from the ancient texts of Herodotus and Xenophon as they visited the historical sites. By the early 1930s his passion for Greece found its way into his private diaries where words like "It's a genuine place [and] there is no limit to its future," are intertwined with his believe that the ancient nation was on the doorsill of new economic and social development. "The story of modern Greece is really amazing," he notes, they "are my passion in life!" Only one year after these remarks, Roosevelt appointed him as the U.S. Ambassador to Greece in 1933.[20]

What further topples the assumption that MacVeagh did not care to report to Washington the seriousness of the invasion is his lifelong friendship with the President, himself. Though his brothers went to the same high school as FDR—Groton, MacVeagh's first close interaction with the Roosevelts was at Harvard when FDR's brother-in-law (and Eleanor's brother), G. Hall Roosevelt, roomed with the future Ambassador.[21] MacVeagh even had one of the Roosevelts become the godparent to his newly born daughter. In any event, from this point forward MacVeagh kept in touch with FDR on a regular basis. When MacVeagh formally asked FDR to be appointed as the Ambassador to Greece, he solidified that his political beliefs were nearly identical to the President's, not to the policy of isolationism. MacVeagh proclaimed that his appointment would allow FDR to "have another pair of your own eyes in Greece if I were there . . . .you can't have too many people working for you who are devoted to you."[22] Thus, MacVeagh, more than any other possible candidate to be the Ambassador to Greece, would have made it a point to broadcast Grecian difficulties to those who could do something about them in Washington D.C.

Moreover, MacVeagh's determination to transmit his sentiments about the invasion were so pervasive that it became his life. He would purposely stay up late into the evening to keep a personal diary of his time in Greece and write personal letters to President Roosevelt

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[19] Pappas, *The United States and the Greek War for Independence,* 37.

[20] *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports: Greece, 1933-1947,* John O. Iatrides, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 4-6; quotes, 6, 8.

[21] Hall was affectionately known to FDR and MacVeagh as "Smouch," *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports,* 4-5.

[22] *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports,* 4-7; quote 7.

that specifically pertained to Greece and what he was trying to do with the State Department to acquire American aid for them. MacVeagh did become the eyes and ears of Roosevelt in Greece since his personal communication with the man occurred nearly everyday during the war years. These letters, which were supposed to concern the personal relationship between he and the President, became much like the President's secret correspondence to Churchill. MacVeagh's correspondence was an oblique means of informing Roosevelt of the Grecian conflict, sans interference from the State Department, and guiding him to look for ways to assist the Greeks. Rarely did these personal documents relate to anything personal about MacVeagh's life or that of the President's.

In fact, while MacVeagh was writing about the invasion to the President by night, he reported on the invasion to the U.S. Department of State by day. Of course MacVeagh's governmental letters are of a much more stoic, resolute tone, especially when conversing with other Balkan ambassadors, but they do prove that he was actively, incessantly, trying to get aid to the Greeks in their time of need. Sadly the destruction becomes so great in the ancient nation that the leader of Greece, himself, King George II, personally has MacVeagh send a message directly to President Roosevelt for help, thought it is intercepted by a member of the State Department instead. The Department expressly replied to the distraught King by saying "it is the settled policy of the United States Government to extend aid to those governments and peoples who defend themselves against aggression," and that Washington *assures* "steps are being taken to extend such aid to Greece." In reality, the words of United States Government were filled with nothing but lies. King George II's plea was received in Washington at the beginning of December in 1940; when Germany occupied Greece the following Spring, absolutely no federal aid had docked in its Mediterranean harbors.[23]

Finally, MacVeagh's devotion to help Greeks with American resources becomes so great that by winter of 1940, nearly everyday thereafter he laments to Roosevelt about the Balkan state's need for American weapons, especially 100 air planes, even saying that Greece has mustered up enough funds to pay for the bill, immediately and in full. What is most abhorrent about the situation is that, in order to quell the carping Ambassador, the State Department began informing him that needed supplies and planes had been on their way to Greece, starting in late November. In February he questioned the Department's integrity by asserting, "I trust our authorities will not be insensible of such heroic resolution. Greece's failure to obtain any planes whatever from the United States of America after 3 months of effort has been heartbreaking." By March of the following year when word of a German invasion was rampant in the Balkans, MacVeagh had realized that the State Department's claims were meaningless.[24]

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[23] "King George II of Greece to President Roosevelt," Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940*, 5 vols. (GPO, Washington D.C.: 1958), vol. III: The British Commonwealth, The Soviet Union, The Near East and Africa, 568; "The Secretary of State to the Minister in Greece (MacVeagh), Washington, December 6, 1940—3 p.m." Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940*, 5 vols. (GPO, Washington D.C.: 1958), vol. III: The British Commonwealth, The Soviet Union, The Near East and Africa, 569; quotes, 569.

[24] *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports,* 255-321; quote, 298. Because little to no media was present in Greece during the last phases of the Axis invasion, many Greek officials did not know what was preventing American relief from arriving on their shores. Since the Greek leader was an all-powerful King, many Greeks concluded that it was the United States' leader, President Roosevelt, who did not wish to involve his nation with European matters. In an effort to assuage this difference, Mr. Plytas, the Mayor of Athens, gave a telegram to MacVeagh to send directly to the President. It stated that the City Fathers of Athens in Council decided to make Roosevelt an Honorary Citizen of the City and name on of its chief avenues after him. Before he sent it off at the end of March in 1941, MacVeagh felt so bad about the imperding slaughter of Greeks by an imminent German invasion given the failure to send promised artillery from America, that he personally told the State Department to tell the President that Athens had never before named a

Disgusted with the reaction of his nation at the atrocity befalling Greece, MacVeagh sent in a formal letter of resignation to the Department of State, citing that his requests in the Balkan Peninsula were completely fruitless, if the Department listened to them at all. Greece was such a secondary concern for the Department in the 1930s-early 1940s that they grouped the nation's documents not with U.S. foreign relations pertaining to Europe, but with their relations pertaining to Africa and the Near East—neither places of which Greece is located correctly.[25]

When the Germans began invading in spring, MacVeagh had the option of fleeing from the country like many other international diplomats and officials had in the preceding days and weeks. In the thick of bullet fire, exploding bombs, and slicing knives the Ambassador writes in his diary that the Greeks "would, in fact, feel a little more confident . . . if [they] knew that the American Minister were here during the first dark days."[26] MacVeagh's love of Greece became so great during his time as their American Ambassador that he was willing to suffer through the war with them.

So if the lack of American relief to Greece was not the fault of Roosevelt or MacVeagh, then the question remains as to whom or what was the culprit preventing the requests of these men from being granted. That explanation can be found in one deep-rooted policy of the American public: isolationism. In the words of American historian, John E. Wiltz, "From its birth the United States had enjoyed security to a degree unparalleled in the history of modern nations."[27] Geographically, the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans prevented uncomplicated attacks by Asia or Europe upon their lands, while most American energy had been focused on exploring its own land and seeking to resemble Europe as little as possible—hence their separation from England in the 1700s. Though isolationist policies weakened the following century--a case in point is America's aid in the War for Greek Independence, by 1918 the overall result of American participation in the First World War was a resurgence of American detachment from international issues. As Wiltz explains, "Despite Wilson's exalted ideas the war had been a European affair, fought over European problems, for European ends. No American interest...had been at stake."[28]

In conjunction, World War I caused a substantial amount of disillusion in America due to the postwar debt they acquired from this European venture. Though American troops technically were not fighting until the end of the conflict, Americans, in an effort to strengthen diplomatic relations with their European allies, had been supporting those nations with goods and funds for a large portion of the war. Once the devastating effects of the Great Depression compounded the loss of funds donated to the war effort, American attitudes towards helping their neighbors across the pond soured. In addition, unlike the War for Independence in 1821, the events preceding the invasion of Greece in 1940 consisted of the Americans engaging in the most total, gruesome, and violent war mankind had ever seen[29]. They were shocked by it; their families had been torn apart or lost in it; and they vowed never again to chance participation in another world war, for any price.

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major avenue after a foreigner. His efforts were futile when, two weeks after the telegram was sent, the Germans reached northern Greece and began butchering poor farmers. *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports,* 315-316, 238.

[25] *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports* , 286-287; "The Near East and Africa," Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940,* 5 vols. (GPO, Washington D.C.: 1958), vol. III: The British Commonwealth, The Soviet Union, The Near East and Africa, v.

[26] *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports,* 342.

[27] John E. Wiltz, *From Isolation to War, 1931-1941* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1968), 5.

[28] Wiltz, *From Isolation to War, 1931-1941* 5-7; quote, 7; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1952), 539, 480-485.

[29] Gerald D. Nash, *The Crucial Era: The Great Depression and World War II, 1929-1945,* 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 111, 132-137.

Consequently, when veterans recounted their horrific memories and still asked for unpaid dues from their participation in the first of these World Wars, general American sympathy for those caught in the invasion of Greece quickly dissolved. The unparalleled carnage Americans experienced in World War I was enough to prevent even Greek-American families, who had donated to Greece in the 1800s, from becoming the harbingers of aid to Greece in WWII.[30]

By the late 1930s, when it was clear that European powers were preparing for another international conflict and Americans had not yet overcome the pains of World War I, a constitutional amendment was proposed by Indiana Representative Louis Ludlow which represented the public opinion since World War I. It stated that unless an invasion of the United States or its territories occurred, Congress' authority to declare war would not be affirmed until a national referendum secured a majority vote on the matter. Ludlow's idea made the path towards American intervention in Greece that much more narrow to walk.[31]

Also although newly elected President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR) "New Deal" campaign supported isolationism by focusing American energies inward for economic repair from the Depression, social and political unrest became exceedingly ubiquitous in the world around him. As the war neared, he would find it harder and harder to separate his people from the world's accelerating chaos. During the interwar period, for example, Francisco Franco and other military leaders staged a coup d'etat and subsequent Spanish Civil War; Japan invaded Manchuria, killing nearly 400,000 civilians and prisoners of Nanking; and Adolf Hitler was elected Chancellor of Germany—shortly thereafter he opened his first concentration camp at Dachau.[32] And while Grecian conflicts in the 1930s were not of this magnitude, a simple attack by another nation upon them would, sooner or later, require Americans to open their eyes to European issues. As history would dictate, the time for Americans to awaken from isolationism and help their fellow man in the Balkans would not come until 1947. The State Department's apathy for MacVeagh's pleas from 1940-1941, then, was the government's submission to its nation's request.

Indeed, it was not the disinterest of President Roosevelt or Ambassador MacVeagh, or even a lack of experience in sending assistance to Greece that caused such an impediment during the German invasion of their lands. On the contrary, it was the American people, shell-shocked and enraged at the atrocities they experienced by intervening in a European affair, which ultimately granted the Germans full access to Grecian lands. By the late 1930s the undertones of isolationism in America had matured into a stifling cloud which citizens could not rise above to see the brutality being inflicted upon their Balkan neighbor. In essence, Lady Liberty had turned a blind eye to the sufferings of Greece.

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[30] Averoff-Tossizza, *By Fire and Ice: The Communist Party and the Civil War in Greece*, 37-42, 45.

[31] Drummond, *The Passing of American Neutrality, 1937-1941*, 59, 108.

[32] Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45*, 6, 8, 39-50; Wiltz, *From Isolation to War, 1931-1941*, 8-16; Henri Michel, *World War II*, translated by Gilles Cemonesi (Hampshire, England: D.C. Heath, Ltd., 1973), 1-14.

FISKE HALL NON-SEMINAR PAPER

The Sage of Baltimore
A Life of H.L. Mencken

Luke Chennell

On a blazing hot Sunday afternoon in 1925, Henry Louis Mencken sat at his typewriter in a hotel room in Dayton, Tennessee, stripped to his underwear. While he pecked away in his usual manner, he paused occasionally only to light up another Uncle Willie cigar and to roar with laughter at his own writing. The dispatch he wrote to the Baltimore *Evening Sun* was inarguably some of his best work. Mencken's dispatch told in flowing prose of a visit he and a female journalist took to a Holy Roller revival in the hills outside of Dayton, where "the old-time religion was genuinely on tap." The dispatch, later edited and published as "The Hills of Zion," would be one of Mencken's most reprinted essays.[1]

Mencken was understandably concerned with religion at the time. The trial of John Scopes, a junior-high school teacher charged with teaching evolutionary doctrine contrary to Tennessee's anti-evolution laws, brought national attention to rising Christian fundamentalists across the nation. Though Scopes was eventually found guilty, the sensational battle of Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan provided endless amounts of amusement for the country at large, no matter what the legal outcome.

Always near the center of attention was Mencken. His lengthy and subjective dispatches to the Sun describing the atmosphere of the town and the trial are pieces of reporting which have hardly been repeated nor equaled in the history of journalism. Mencken truly was at the top of his game.[2]

Mencken was easily the most celebrated journalist of the early twentieth century. His brash, bold and witty style of writing and reporting made him instantly quotable. Particularly with the rise of mass media, Mencken's fame spread nationwide. His opinions on everything from religion to the virtue of steam locomotives were widely disseminated and read by a growing intellectual elite in the United States.

Mencken left his cultural mark on much more of the literary world than just journalism, though. Mencken was a driving critical force behind theater, fiction and nonfiction. His criticism of *belles lettres* shaped much of the literary revolution of the early 1920s. His vocal and constant attacks on Victorian morality and censorship were vital to the creation of the Jazz Age and the great revival of American fiction during the 1920s. Mencken edited two major national literary magazines, the *Smart Set* and the *American Mercury*. He cultivated important authors including Theodore Dreiser and Sinclair Lewis,

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[1] Mencken's essay originally appeared in the *Baltimore Evening Sun*, 13 July 1925. After much editing, it reappeared in H.L. Mencken, *Prejudices: Fifth Series*. (New York: Knopf, 1923.) Most people today cite the version in _____, *A Mencken Chrestomathy* (New York: Knopf, 1949), 392-398.

[2] Mencken's dispatches are collected in Marion Elizabeth Rodgers, ed., *The Impossible H.L. Mencken: A Selection of His Best Newspaper Stories* (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 562-608.

but was also a champion of many other writers. Mencken published nearly 700 authors in the *American Mercury* during its ten year run.[3]

Behind Mencken's drive were a number of factors. His strong opinions were drawn largely from his middle-class background of the late nineteenth century and from his belief in the philosophy of Frederich Nietzsche and the agnosticism of Thomas Henry Huxley. Mencken's lifelong distrust of religion in any organized form conditioned largely his opinions on the events of his day, as did his lifelong belief in a sort of Jeffersonian natural aristocracy. Mostly, though, his belief that anyone in power should be a target of criticism and even scorn drove his political, literary and public efforts. Mencken always considered himself an iconoclast, one who was a "gay fellow who heaves dead cats into sanctuaries and then goes roistering down the highways of the world, proving to all men that doubt, after all, is safe."[4]

Mencken was born on September 12, 1880, in the place that would be his home forever, Baltimore, Maryland. Mencken's birth came on as fortunate a date as he could wish – Defender's day, the day of the anniversary of the battle at Fort McHenry in which Francis Scott Key wrote "The Star Spangled Banner" during the war of 1812. Each year Mencken's birthday was thus celebrated with fireworks, parades and much ballyhoo.[5]

Mencken was a healthy baby, his birth costing the sum of ten dollars. Mencken's slight mother Anna was often accosted by passerby on the street asking, "Good God, girl, is that boy yours?" He later remarked that "had cannibalism not been abolished in Maryland some time before my birth, I'd have butchered beautifully."[6]

The better part of Mencken's nonage was spent in the typical mode of a middle-class child of the bourgeois in the late nineteenth century. Mencken grew up on Hollins Street just off of Union Square in Baltimore, which at that time was on the outskirts of the city. Mencken would live virtually all of his life, save for five years during his marriage, in the same row house on Hollins street. Mencken's father, August, was a second-generation cigar merchant whose business, August Mencken & Brothers, was quite successful. To Mencken, his father was "the center of his small world, and in my eyes a man of illimitable puissance and resourcefulness... There was never an instant in my childhood when I doubted my father's capacity to resolve any difficulty that menaced me..." His father indulged his oldest son to a great deal, buying him a pony, and taking him weekly on his forty mile trip to Washington on business.[7]

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[3] Johnny L. Kloefkorn, *A Critical Study of the Work of H.L. Mencken As Literary Editor and Critic of The American Mercury*, (Emporia, Kansas: Emporia State University, 1958.)

[4] Mencken, *Chrestomathy*, 17.

[5] Fred Hobson, *Mencken: A Life*, (New York: Random House, 1994), 17.

[6] H.L. Mencken, *Happy Days*, (New York: Knopf, 1940), 7.

[7] Ibid., vii. Mencken's Happy Days was one of three books – *Newspaper Days* (New York: Knopf, 1941) and *Heathen Days* (New York: Knopf, 1943) are the others - that composed his for-public-consumption autobiography. Mencken also wrote two other volumes to be time-sealed until 35 years after his death that were of a much more personal nature and concerned his life in the literary world. These are *My Life as Author and Editor* (New York: Knopf, 1993) and *Thirty-Five Years of Newspaper Work* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1994).

Mencken recalled the events of his youth with both humor and pride. Mencken's yearly trips to the family's summer home in Ellicott City, then far outside the city of Baltimore, provided him broad new places to explore, and was the first place that he caught a glimpse of a newspaper being printed. It was one of many stupendous experiences, things that left a mark on him.[8]

Many years later, Mencken would trace many of the defining moments of his life to the blissful period during the time between his third and thirteenth birthday, a time which he reflected on as "placid, secure, uneventful and happy." Mencken later pegged two incidents as critical during these years: the first was the gift from his father of a Dorman Baltimore no. 10 self-inker printing press. The Dorman press provided Mencken with a short-lived business printing business cards, though his father mangled much of the type so badly that he was forced to abbreviate his name to H.L., as he had no lower case r's. It "got the smell of printer's ink up my nose at the tender age of eight, and it has been swirling through my sinuses ever since."[9]

The second was his discovery of Mark Twain. Poking through the house at Hollins street, Mencken discovered his father's collection of books and quickly began to devour them. Though most of his father's works were dull – a history of Freemasonry in Maryland, *A Pictorial History of the World's Great Nations From the Earliest Dates to the Present Time*, and other popular literature of the time, August Mencken had been a fan of Mark Twain during his younger days. Henry Mencken's first reading of Twain was in *Huckleberry Finn*. He called his first reading of *Huckleberry Finn* "genuinely terrific... If I undertook to tell you the effect it had upon me my talk would sound frantic, and even delirious." Mencken would thereafter read *Huckleberry Finn* once a year well into his forties. He said that it was "as transparent to a boy of eight as to a man of eighty," and his impressions of it would later largely color his views of American literature.[10]

Henry Mencken's youth might have been happy, but his teenage years were anything but. Much of this can be blamed on his father and the culture of the Mencken family. Mencken had originally been schooled at F. Knapp's institute for boys, then a common place for sons of upper-middle class Baltimore. Mencken's experiences at F. Knapp's Institute were happy. He experimented during this time with a number of pastimes, including photography and chemistry. Mistakenly, August Mencken thought the boy was of a scientific and mechanical bent. He thus enrolled him in the Baltimore Polytechnic for several years, a time at which Henry Mencken suffered greatly. He said that after his graduation "all I learned at the Polytechnic was forgotten a year after my graduation. I can't imagine a more useless education than I received there." He could hardly understand why he was being put through such torture. Even in the midst of such turmoil, though, Mencken proved an adept scholar. He took a special interest in numbers, earning $100 from his father for receiving the highest mark of his class on the graduation exam. Still, the future did not look bright – to Henry. August Mencken fully expected his oldest son to take over the family business, something that the younger Mencken could barely understand. He had no taste for figures and cigar making, finding the pursuit of *belles lettres* much more enticing. Frustrated with his father's wishes, Mencken did everything but to openly rebel against his father. Though he worked at the cigar factory until 1899,

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[8] Ibid., 212-215.

[9] Mencken, *Happy Days*, 203.

[10] Ibid., 166-170.

Mencken was seriously unhappy – probably the unhappiest that he would ever be in his life. Mencken noted privately that he contemplated suicide during this period, but thought better of it.[11]

Mencken's inner rebellion finally turned to another form that would prove much more fruitful. Immediately after his father's death on January 13, 1899, Mencken reported the following Monday to hang around the city room of the Baltimore *Herald*, hoping to gain an assignment from the city editor, Max Ways. Ways reported at first that there were no specific assignments available at the time, but that if Mencken were to report back, he might have something. Mencken did so diligently for some four weeks, and finally received the assignment to go to Govanstown, a small suburb, whose correspondent hadn't been heard from for six days – there was an immense blizzard going on at the time. Mencken, finding nothing much to report, managed to scare up a story that a horse and buggy had been stolen. He dutifully wrote the piece and it was published the next day.[12]

His first assignment might have been inauspicious, but he apparently did a good enough job that Ways eventually, after many more trial assignments, hired him on as a cub reporter. Working two jobs – one at the cigar factory and at the *Herald* (at no pay), Mencken was sorely worn out. Not until the summer of 1899 did Ways finally hire Mencken at the salary of $7 a week, allowing Mencken to quit his job at the cigar factory.[13]

Mencken's meteoric rise within the newspaper is confounding to explain. Mencken first began covering the suburbs of Baltimore, often riding trolley cars at his own expense to retrieve a story. Soon he was moved up to a court reporter for one of the less-busy police districts. However, a stroke of luck bestowed itself when the court reporter for the central police district – the busiest and thus most prestigious – failed to show up to work one day after drinking too much. Max Ways immediately gave Mencken the job as a reprimand to the other reporter.[14]

Mencken was now 19, and his rise in the ranks of the paper had only begun. Shortly after his assignment to the central police districts, he was quickly elevated to covering City Hall. Immediately after this came the assignment of Sunday editor in 1901. By the time he was 21, he was city editor, and by the time he was 24, he was managing editor, and by 25 was editor-in-chief. Though Mencken was fond of recalling his days as a young reporter, calling it the "maddest, gladdest, damndest existence ever enjoyed by mortal youth", his actual years as a working reporter were a relatively small part of his writing career. While Mencken did report on national events for most of his life – never missing a single national political convention from 1904-1948--the vast majority of his time was spent editing newspapers and writing editorial content, not reporting actively.[15]

Mencken managed during his salad days of reporting to cover a number of important events, including the Jacksonville Fire of 1901[16] and both political conventions

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[11] Marion Elizabeth Rodgers, *Mencken: The American Iconoclast* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 37-50.

[12] Mencken, *Newspaper Days*, 6-7.

[13] Ibid., 12-13.

[14] Ibid., 20-24.

[15] Ibid., 300-305.

of 1904. But the main event that was to leave a major mark on both Mencken and his home city was the great Baltimore Fire of 1904. The fire ravaged some 140 acres, 1,500 buildings and left 35,000 Baltimoreans jobless. It forever changed the look of the city and fundamentally altered the places that Mencken recalled growing up. One of the buildings burned was the *Herald* building in which Mencken worked. Even as the fire raged around them, the *Herald* staff continued working on the next morning's edition, as they knew that any copy they could get out about the fire would be in great demand and could mean a huge increase in circulation. The paper managed to publish during the early part of the fire, but eventually as the fire department began to dynamite buildings in the path near the fire, the Herald staff was forced to evacuate.[17]

Though they thought that they would return soon – and thus did not bring anything but a few halftones with them – the building soon burned to its steel structure. Mencken's sole remaining artifact of his youthful reporting days was his bent and twisted copy hook, which he kept until his death. The *Herald* continued to publish throughout the fire – the only one of nine Baltimore papers that did. By chartering an agreement with first a Washington paper and then a Philadelphia paper as well as with the B&O railroad, the staff somehow managed to print a Baltimore paper in Philadelphia and yet maintain a daily circulation. However, the toll it took on the staff was incredible. At the end of the period, Mencken hadn't slept for at least three days, and was clearly fatigued from working fourteen hours a day nonstop. The rest of the *Herald* staff was no better. But the staff was justifiably proud of their work. They had produced a paper throughout the midst of one of the great disasters of the early twentieth century.[18]

Circulation of the *Herald* picked up for a time, but eventually the paper ran again into financial difficulties which had plagued it long before the fire. The *Herald* was eventually sold to a new owner, and Mencken amicably declined to continue on as editor. Fortunately, Mencken had cultivated prospects at other papers and was even offered a position at *Leslie's*. He was immediately hired onto the Baltimore *Sun*, the paper which he would remain involved with until his crippling stroke in 1948. Mencken's transition to the *Sun* was important, and he knew it. Editors' talents are not easy to transfer to other papers, while reporters can usually find a job at almost any place they try. Mencken's successful transition to Sunday editor of the *Sun* was an important, watershed event in his life, and one that he never forgot. Mencken was to spend nearly all of his life attempting to make the *Sun* franchise into a first-rate entity, though he never considered his work complete.[19]

But the *Sun* papers would thrust Mencken into what was clearly his most visible public role and provide him with what would be his print outlet for the rest of his life. The earliest incarnation of these efforts, a column entitled the "Free Lance," brought Mencken both his first local and national acclaim – and criticism. The "Free Lance" was Mencken's vehicle to bombard any local figure of importance. The "Free Lance" was Mencken's first major use of his strong acerbic wit and his signature style. It "served to clarify and organize my ideas... Before it had gone on a year I knew precisely what I was about and where I was heading." Mencken wrote the column to bring about some sort of

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[16] Ibid., 94-108.

[17] Rodgers, *Mencken: The American Iconoclast*, 80-93.
[18] Ibid.

[19] Mencken, *Thirty-Five Years of Newspaper Work*, 7-17.

reaction, whether it was good or bad – and it did just that. It also increased circulation substantially.[20]

Mencken's attacks took a few forms. Mostly, he said,

I derided all the rich bankers and industrialists of the town, I denounced both the uplifters and the boomers, and I invented opprobrious nicknames for most of the politicians... In it, I worked out much of the material that was later to enter into my books, and to color the editorial policy of the *American Mercury*.[21]

For most of his career, Mencken sought to produce a magazine that contained material for the "civilized man," a publication of culture and class for the enlightened few who could truly appreciate it.

The first of these efforts began in 1908 with Mencken's involvement with the *Smart Set*, at first a rather tawdry magazine owned by John Adams Thayer with relatively little circulation. Mencken began as a book reviewer, taking on these duties in addition to his newspaper work. Mencken saw potential in it, and with partner George Jean Nathan, took on duties as co-editor of the *Smart Set* in 1914.[22]

The work schedule was hectic, to say the least. Mencken kept offices in both New York and Baltimore, traveling weekly by train to see to his interests in New York. This would continue for many, many years. Mencken was always adamant that Baltimore was his home, and that he would not move to New York as he thought it "a society founded upon the wealth of Monte Cristo and upon the tastes of sailors home from a long voyage."[23]

Under Mencken and Nathan's tutelage, the *Smart Set* grew into a weekly of some class and distinction, publishing authors including James Branch Cabell, Ruth Suckow, Willa Cather, Sinclair Lewis, Sherwood Anderson and many others. The *Smart Set* was by no means the leader in the magazine field – other magazines including the *Atlantic Monthly* and others clearly held that distinction – but it was a strong effort at a monthly literary. Mencken and Nathan's working relationship was both playful and productive. Their method of approving manuscripts was simple – both Mencken and Nathan had to agree that something was worth publishing. If one thought a work should be published but the other not, the work was sent back and no further questions were asked.[24]

All the while, Mencken continued to work for the *Sun* and to produce editorials. Though the "Free Lance" blew up with the beginning of World War I – for reasons to be discussed later - Mencken's constant devotion to work was a major theme in his life. Even until his death, Mencken worked diligently on a number of projects. He also worked with incredible diligence at preserving the materials of his life – an entire room at

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[20] Ibid., 32-33.

[21] Ibid.

[22] _____, *My Life As Author and Editor*, 37-47.

[23] Terry Teachout, ed. *A Second Mencken Chrestomathy* (New York: Knopf, 1995), 181.

[24] Carl Bode, *Mencken* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), 59-77.

the Enoch Pratt Free Library in Baltimore is dedicated to his papers, which were carefully organized by him and his secretary before his death.[25] But Mencken's life was not all work. He devoted himself quite as ardently to the enjoyment of a number of hobbies as diligently as he did to his literary work.

The first of Mencken's after-hours exploits was a group called the "Stevedores Club," whose members included mostly newspaper men, and whose purpose was to hoist schooners of beer, thus their rather apt title. The "Stevedores" club was of relatively short duration, though Mencken created a number of similar clubs, devoted mostly to the drinking of beer and the discussion of ideas.[26]

But by far, Mencken's longest and most diverting hobby was music. Mencken played the piano, forming a number of musical "clubs" throughout his life. The one that came most to be associated with him was the Saturday Night Club, an association which he did not found but joined. The Saturday Night Club's purpose was to rehearse and play classical music of a Saturday night. After the musical portion of the evening was complete, the members devoted themselves to "the habit of proceeding... to a nearby drinking place for two or three hours."[27] Membership was limited to those who could play an instrument, though occasionally guests were allowed who did not play. The Saturday Night Club was a fixture of Mencken's life, meeting every week until his death. Among its members were "first-rate professionals and some amateurs hardly worth shooting," and any other number of "distinguished university, governmental or ecclesiastical dignitaries."[28]

Mencken also took time off to go on a number of vacations. He traveled to Jamaica during 1900, and to Europe a number of times to recover from the effects of too much work or to help ease his respiratory system. These vacations added color to his life – his travels both to Europe and to Jamaica gave him both time to recuperate and, in the case of his European trip, gave him a book length work to publish.[29]

Mencken's book publishing career had begun in 1903, with *Ventures into Verse*.[30] Mencken's poetic skills did not win him large acclaim, though the book did receive at least one favorable review. Mencken's other early effort (1904) was a critical work on the plays of George Bernard Shaw, one of his favorite dramatists. Mencken also wrote an analysis

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[25] Enoch Pratt Free Library (Corp. Author), *H.L. Mencken Room and Collection*, accessed December 21, 2006. available at http://www.epfl.net/slrc/hum/mencken.html; internet.

[26] Mencken, *Newspaper Days*, 218-221.

[27] Hobson, 78.

[28] Mencken, *Heathen Days*, 90.

[29] Mencken's trip to Jamaica is recorded in *Newspaper Days*, 76-93. Earlier adventures in Europe – before World War I – are recorded in _____, George Jean Nathan, Willard Huntington Wright, *Europe After 8:15* (New York: John Lane, 1914). His later adventures in Europe are covered in _____, *Heathen Days*, 239-277.

[30] _____, *Ventures into Verse* (New York: Marshall, Beek and Gordon, 1903)

and partial translation of the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (1908), a then-unknown figure in the country whose works influenced Mencken's own thoughts enormously.[31]

Once Mencken began publishing books, the pace rapidly accelerated. In 1910 came *What You Ought to Know About Your Baby*, a tome that Mencken ghost-wrote for a pediatrician, and *Men Versus the Man*, an epistolary debate with a Socialist.[32] In 1912 came *The Artist: A Drama Without Words*.[33] 1914 brought *Europe After 8:15*.[34] 1916 brought two works: *A Book of Burlesques* and *A Little Book in C Major*.[35] 1917 brought Mencken's first widely received work, *A Book of Prefaces*, and then in 1918 *Damn! A Book of Calumny* and *In Defense of Women*.[36]

Both Mencken's personal interests and his book-length works would come to dominate the period before and during World War I. Growing anti-German sentiment in the country caused Mencken to cease publication of the "Free Lance" in 1915, and drew him more and more towards his scholarly interests and away from controversy. Mencken was particularly pro-German during the lead-up to the war. His own personal relations and distant German heritage led him to believe that the German cause was immensely important and on the side of right. Mencken was, in fact, in Germany as the war unfolded, and owing largely to the bungling of the German ambassador, barely escaped the country as the war began.[37]

Mencken's pro-German sentiments came under fire from any number of detractors. George Creel and his Committee on Public Information began a file on Mencken, adding sundry details about him and his supposedly seditious activities. Mencken remained largely silent in any public forums. Instead, he devoted much time to his clubs – he helped with a Saturday Night Club composition entitled "I am a 100 %

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[31] _____, *The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche*, (reprint, Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1967) and _____, *George Bernard Shaw: His Plays* (reprint, New York: Glaser, 1969).

[32] Mencken's baby book, though not published under his name, was actually read widely for a number of years. While he was hardly Dr. Spock, Mencken's book contained sound advice for the time. It has been reprinted lately as Howard Markel and Frank A. Oski, ed. *The H.L. Mencken Baby Book* (Philadelphia: Hanley and Belfus, 1990.) For the debate with the Socialist, see H.L. Mencken and Robert La Monte, *Men Versus the Man* (New York: Holt, 1910.)

[33] H.L. Mencken, *The Artist: A Drama Without Words*, (Boston: John Luce, 1912).

[34] Mencken, et al., *Europe After 8:15*.

[35] H.L. Mencken, *A Book of Burlesques* (New York: John Lane, 1916). and _____, *A Little Book in C Major* (New York: John Lane, 1916).

[36] _____, *A Book of Prefaces* (New York: Knopf, 1917) and _____, *Damn! A Book of Calumny* (New York: Knopf, 1918) and _____, *In Defense of Women* (New York: Philip Goodman, 1918).

[37] Rodgers, *Mencken: The American Iconoclast*, 163-174.

American, God Damn!" [38] and to a new scholarly project that interested him, a study of the differentiation between the English spoken in England and that spoken in America.

The resulting work, *The American Language*, published in 1919, would be revised numerous times and would eventually become Mencken's best-selling work. A review of the differences and a history of the use of English words in America, The American Language served two purposes in Mencken's mind. First, it "showed the professors," who had disparaged Mencken for his lack of scholarship and his combative nature. Second, and most importantly, it brought Mencken a new status as a scholar of American culture and language and gained him a new level of respect among many intellectuals of the country. While it was clear that Mencken could write with the best of them, *The American Language* served also to prove that Mencken could interpret sources and that he had delved deeply into the cultural fabric of the country. *The American Language* made Mencken that much more believable – and he would be widely believed in the decade to come.[39]

Many called the 1920's the "Age of Mencken." Mencken, now entering his 40's, was probably the most widely-read journalist of his era. Walter Lippman called him in 1926 "the most powerful personal influence on this whole generation of educated people."[40]

Several factors were important. Mencken was among the first vanguard of syndicated columnists, a new and revolutionary feature of papers of the 1920's. Syndication was yet one more effect of the "mass culture" that developed during the 1920's, and along with their automobiles, jazz music, washing machines and refrigerators, Mencken's editorials were now even more easily attainable in the local newspaper.

Yet more, Mencken's most productive years coincided with a time when at least some of the country moved largely in a more politically and economically conservative direction and a more socially liberal direction. Mencken hardly agreed with such moral reforms as prohibition - he was a staunch libertarian who believed that government interference in any sort of private enterprise was inherently wrong. More, he believed that governments should be composed of a "civilized minority" whose interests were in elevating civilization to its highest reaches.[41]

Mencken's irreverent tone and ideological stance made him a hero of some and a pariah of others. Mencken always took particular delight in pitting the rural against the urban. Using phrases such as "Cow State John the Baptist" and creating any number of "belts," from the "hog cholera and no-more-scrub bulls belt" to the infamous "bible belt," Mencken thought that the country folk were responsible for foisting "all of the

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[38] Mencken wrote that the tune "radiates woof and it reeks with brrrrrrr." Mencken, *Heathen Days*, 92.

[39] As noted in the text, Mencken's *The American Language* was originally published in 1919. It went through revisions by his own pen in 1921, 1923, 1936, 1945, 1948 and by other scholars working through Mencken's notes in 1963. This is drawn from _____, *The American Language*, (New York: Knopf, 1989), i-vii.

[40] Walter Lippman, "Review of *Notes on Democracy*," *Saturday Review of Literature*, December 11, 1926.

[41] Mencken's best articulation of his sometimes contradictory political philosophy was written in *Notes on Democracy*, published in 1926. _____, *Notes on Democracy*, (New York: Knopf, 1926).

nonsensical legislation which makes the United States a buffoon among the great nations." He put it simply that "all the benefit that a New Yorker gets out of Kansas is no more than what he might get out of Saskatchewan, the Argentine pampas, or Siberia. But New York to a Kansas is not only a place where he may get drunk, look at dirty shows and buy bogus antiques; it is also a place where he may enforce his dunghill ideas on his betters."[42]

Mencken fought many battles in the 1920's, but he chose them carefully. The one that has received the most attention is the Scopes trial, but the more important personal battle during the decade involved a short story, "Hatrack," about a prostitute, published under his aegis in the *American Mercury*. It set a battle between the Society for the Suppression of Vice headed by Anthony Comstock and the publishers of the *Mercury*, and Mencken himself. Mencken's publication of the story led to the issue being banned from the mails and an eventual trial. The mails of the issue were first blocked in Boston where the Society for the Suppression of Vice was particularly strong, part of the expression "banned in Boston." After Mencken successfully won the trial, he appeared at Harvard and was cheered wildly as he attempted to make a speech about the event.[43]

"Hatrack" represented a triumph of free speech for Mencken, but the greater ideological battle of the Scopes trial proved more glamorous and in tune with Mencken's ideals. The trial of John Scopes for teaching evolution in the Tennessee public schools was an irresistible draw for Mencken. The trial was "invented by a man named George Rappelyea, a New Yorker who was the manager of a nearby coal mine. He suggested to the yokels of Dayton that jugging Scopes would get the town a lot of free advertising – and neglected to mention that it would be unfavorable." Mencken immediately argued that any effort to find Scopes innocent would be foolish – it would "put a quick end to the show, and leave the defense with an empty victory. The thing to do... was to use the case to make Tennessee forever infamous, and to that end the sacrifice of Scopes would be a small matter."[44]

Mencken's activities at the Scopes trial made him a national celebrity. Mencken's dispatches from Dayton, including his famous "The Hills of Zion," were artfully crafted descriptions of the town, its inhabitants, and the show that unfolded in the Tennessee hills. Mencken's pen worked furiously at Clarence Darrow and William Jennings Bryan, dramatically illustrating Mencken's idea of the villainry of Bryan and the clearly civilized tone of Darrow.[45]

Further cementing Mencken's status as a star of the 1920s were the publication of the three books that Mencken considered his finest and most fundamental work: *Treatise on Right and Wrong*, *Treatise on the Gods*, and *Notes on Democracy*.[46] This trilogy, at least to

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[42] _____, *A Mencken Chrestomathy*, 199, 363.

[43] Rodgers, *Mencken: The American Iconoclast*, 300-305.

[44] Mencken, *Thirty Five Years of Newspaper Work*, 137. Mencken's assertions are a bit controversial – but he clearly was a key player in the case. He even convinced the *Evening Sun* to pay for Scopes defense.

[45] Rodgers, *The Impossible H.L. Mencken*, 562-608.

[46] H.L. Mencken, *Treatise on Right and Wrong*, (New York: Knopf, 1934) _____, *Treatise on the Gods* (New York: Knopf, 1930), and _____, *Notes on Democracy*.

Mencken's mind, explained fully Mencken's basic philosophies on all of the important issues in life – morality, government and religion. The three books reflected the influences of Nietzsche on Mencken's philosophy and added his own spin to each of the subjects. The most widely sold and read, *Notes on Democracy*, produced a critique by Walter Lippman which called him "this Holy Terror from Baltimore (who) is splendidly and exultantly and contagiously alive. He calls you a swine, and an imbecile, and he increases your will to live."[47] While the other two works were not nearly as widely read, each was important in outlining Mencken's basic idea of the way the cosmos worked and how it should work.

But more than that, the books symbolized Mencken's transition as a critic. Mencken's first role was that of theater critic (Shaw), then literary critic (*Smart Set*), a scholar – and critic – of language, and then a "critic of ideas," one whom deconstructed the intellectual basis behind life and art. This trilogy symbolized his transition from a critic of individual works of art to a one of larger significance, a status that he attempted to maintain for the rest of his life. It was this status that cemented him as one of the mainstays of the 1920s.[48]

Mencken's philosophy was perfect for the 1920s – but harder times did not weather his ideas well. When the stock market crashed in late 1929, Mencken was not visibly affected – in fact, he had argued violently that the stock market boom was dangerous and should not be allowed to continue. But mounting evidence of the depression left Mencken silent in his weekly columns. He continued in much the same vein as always, criticizing whatever figure might have been in power at the moment and writing long tributes to anything he felt like.

But as the depression mounted, Mencken looked on as most of the country did with something akin to despair. He thought and wrote that the country might simply get itself back on track by simple hard work and virtue – attributes that he had praised since the beginning of his career.

While Mencken hardly realized it, the end of his wide influence and amazing national power came with the Depression and the election of Franklin Roosevelt. Early in Roosevelt's term, he wrote cautious praise for the president: "He is not an inflated pedagogue with a messianic delusion (as Wilson was), but a highly civilized fellow, and there is a good deal of humor in him." Still, Mencken, thought, it was a "time to be wary" – but Mencken rarely trusted any figure in power.[49]

Mencken turned strongly against Roosevelt after an incident at the Gridiron club. Called on to give dueling speeches in a friendly exchange of blasts, Mencken prepared a speech that was generally thought by those in attendance to have been rather mild. But Roosevelt attacked Mencken viciously, using a piece that Mencken had written previously on the ineptitude of journalists. Though the speeches have never been recorded, most at the dinner agreed that Roosevelt's remarks were out of character and

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[47] Lippman.

[48] For Mencken's own view of his criticism, see Mencken, *A Mencken Chrestomathy*, 429-441. An excellent secondary work of analysis on Mencken's literary work is Nick Nolte's *H.L. Mencken: Literary Critic* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1966). Nolte's analysis is detailed and written in a flowing style. For a quantitative analysis of Mencken's decline as literary critic, see Kloefkorn.

[49] *Baltimore Evening Sun*, 13 March 1933.

out of tune with the feel of the evening. Mencken quickly penned a reply, but no time was allowed for it and he was thus not allowed to deliver it. He did, however, gracefully shake FDR's hand afterwards, gaining a round of applause from bystanders.[50]

Mencken's career in the 1930s can almost be traced on an opposite arc of Franklin Roosevelt's. As FDR rose in the public's perception, Mencken quickly declined. Mencken began to write long and protracted arguments against the New Deal, digging up obscure examples from the history of other countries to illustrate the perils of such government largesse.[51] By the middle of the 1930's, Mencken had become alienated from much of the American public and from many of his friends. Mencken's hatred of FDR descended to a rabid preoccupation. Few were even allowed to mention Roosevelt in Mencken's presence for fear he might descend into a sputtering rage.[52]

Alienation from his longtime friend George Jean Nathan also caused Mencken much grief. Mencken also had a falling out with his longtime friend Theodore Dreiser, whose career Mencken helped to further during his days as editor of the *Smart Set* and the *American Mercury*.[53]

Though Mencken's personal life was hardly rosy during this period, there was one bright spot: Sara Haardt. Mencken had always courted a number of women, including a woman named Marion Bloom and the movie star Aileen Pringle. But Mencken never seriously entertained the notion of marrying either. But then came Haardt, a young writer from Alabama that Mencken found "a hell of a psychologist," among other things. Haardt was an aspiring writer that Mencken found charming and considered a fine prize.[54]

Sara Haardt was, to Mencken, his perfect match. Unfortunately, Haardt suffered from tuberculosis, and was not expected to live beyond her mid-20s. Mencken worked diligently to care for her, using many of his acquaintances at Johns Hopkins to further her treatment. Through this, the two developed a warm relationship that eventually led to their marriage on August 27, 1930.[55]

Mencken had never been particularly fond of marriage, declaring that "no man is genuinely happy, married, who has to drink worse whiskey than he used to drink when he was single." Thus, many questioned him as to his sudden reversal on taking a wife. He could answer only that he had perhaps been wrong.[56]

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[50] Terry Teachout, *The Skeptic: A Life of H.L. Mencken* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 3-7.

[51] Mencken referred to politics in France in 1845, which, at least by his estimation, bore a striking resemblance to those of his own time. See *Baltimore Evening Sun*, 31 December 1934.

[52] Hobson, 385-388.

[53] Ibid., 243-245.

[54] Marion Elizabeth Rodgers, ed., *Mencken & Sara: A Life in Letters* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987), 122.

[55] Rodgers, *Mencken: The American Iconoclast*, 349.

[56] Mencken, *A Mencken Chrestomathy*, 58.

Mencken called his years with Sara the "happiest of my life." Unfortunately, Sara's illnesses kept recurring and finally became worse and worse. She succumbed to them on May 31, 1935. Mencken never entertained the notion of remarrying, and in fact never carried on any sort of relationship with a woman after Sara's death.[57]

The 1930's were a decade that simply wore Mencken down. FDR's rise to power irritated him mightily, and ongoing problems at the *Sun* papers finally convinced him that "it would be eternally impossible to make a really first-rate newspaper of the *Sun*."[58] Mencken took 1938 to travel to Germany and to the Holy Land for what he thought (presciently) would be his final trip abroad.[59]

On this trip, as usual, political and racial issues were at the front of Mencken's concern. Mencken's stance toward the Jews is, to say the least, complicated. Though many have charged him with anti-Semitism, particularly after his diary was published in 1989, Mencken wrote several editorials during the period leading up to World War II, saying, "It is to be hoped that the poor Jews now being robbed and mauled in Germany will not take too seriously the plans of various politicians to rescue them."[60]

But Mencken's trip to Germany and the Holy Land still did not change his predictable stance against the United States' entry into World War II. Mencken, much as in World War I, firmly believed that England had duped the United States into entering the war, a sentiment that made him again extremely unpopular for the duration of World War II.

Again Mencken turned to other pursuits during wartime. He began writing a series of articles for the *New Yorker*, reminiscing of his childhood days in Baltimore. The articles, written in rosy, glowing tones of the past with plenty of Mencken's signature humor thrown in, eventually were collected into a book, *Happy Days*, which provides a great deal of the material for most biographers of Mencken's youth. Eventually, Mencken wrote reminisces of his early days as a reporter, compiling them into *Newspaper Days*, and a final set of reminisces came together in *Heathen Days*. The three constituted Mencken's fit-for-public-consumption notion of his own life and activities.[61]

Mencken also worked diligently at revising *The American Language*. The initial publication of the work brought much scholarly praise, and some have even credited the book with beginning the study of American as a separate entity from English. Mencken took advantage of his position as the "first' scholar in the field to significantly add to his work and to further cement his status.

By the time World War II began, Mencken's spirits had lifted a great deal. He gradually tapered off work at the *Sun*, finally relinquishing day-to-day activities in 1940. Still, though, he kept writing editorials and columns for the newspaper. In 1948, even as

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[57] Rodgers, *Mencken: The American Iconoclast*, 417.

[58] Mencken, *Thirty-Five Years of Newspaper Work*, 3.

[59] This journey was recorded in _____, *Heathen Days*, 256-277.

[60] *Baltimore Evening Sun*, 27 November 1938.

[61] I have drawn heavily on these three sources, mainly because of their clear first-hand accounts of Mencken's life. Clearly, these sources contain some bias, but are so well written that it can be difficult to resist them. I have used other biographers to fill details untold in Mencken's three books.

he was 68 years old, Mencken covered both national political conventions. He was a fixture of the convention, and drew much attention from younger reporters whom he amazed by both working and drinking late into the night.[62]

But 1948 would bring what was essentially the end of Mencken's writing career. On the afternoon of November 23, Mencken went to his secretary's house to update her on some manuscripts and began babbling incoherently. Mencken's doctor was summoned and he was rushed to the hospital – the victim of a cruel stroke.[63]

The verdict was not good. Mencken had been suffering over the past few years from a series of strokes. This last one was the most crippling yet, and the doctors were unsure if he would live. But Mencken did survive – and that was the worst part. The Mencken that woke up in 1948 from that stroke was an incredibly different man. The stroke had robbed him of virtually all ability to write or read, and his state depressed him terribly. He talked of killing himself for a while and had to be restrained.[64]

Gradually, Mencken regained some of his composure. He held great hopes for a full recovery that would never come. He worked diligently at every exercise the doctors prescribed, eventually regaining some of his lost faculties. He did finally regain enough to be able with the help of his secretary Rosalind Lohrfinck to work on several collections of his work and to dictate notes. Mencken spent much of the last years of his life collecting and organizing his papers for future researchers. Eventually these efforts would result in Mencken's last book, published posthumously – *H.L. Mencken's Minority Report.*[65]

Few authors have so carefully managed their future presence and interpretation as Mencken. His papers, diaries and private reminisces came with a carefully worded and written will that did not allow the release of certain materials for 15, 25 and some for 35 years. Thus, Mencken did two things: he allowed himself to indulge in his own subjective judgments of the people around him, and he ensured that he would be a topic of scholarly interest for many years to come. When the last of his papers were released in 1991, they were accompanied by a flurry of scholarly interest. Much primary work on Mencken's life has been published, including his own diary, his correspondence and his letters to and from Sara.

Mencken's role in American society during the period from 1900-1945 cannot be easily estimated. He was a cultural force. His ideas were clearly expressed, and while they were often contradictory or outlandish, they had the ability to instantly polarize one for or against him. Seldom does one, reading Mencken's essays, find themselves drifting off.

Mencken's social commentary on the era ranged all over the place. Underlying them all was a certain coda, though. He stated it once as this:

I believe in the complete freedom of thought and speech...

I believe in the capacity of man to conquer his world, and to find out what it is made of, and how it is run.
I believe in the reality of progress.

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[62] Rodgers, *Mencken: The American Iconoclast*, 516-526.

[63] Hobson, 501.

[64] Ibid., 502-508.

[65] H.L. Mencken, *H.L. Mencken's Minority Report* (New York: Knopf, 1956).

I - But the whole thing, after all, may be put very simply. I believe that it is better to tell the truth than to lie. I believe that it is better to be free than to be a slave. And I believe that it is better to know than be ignorant.[66]

[66] _____, *Mencken's Creed*, accessed December 21, 2006 available from http://www.io.com/~gibbonsb/mencken.html; internet.

THE LEE AND DOUGLAS BENDEL AWARD

A Look into the Past of America's Pastime

Christine McDonald

Amidst the cheers a familiar crack, the sound of bat meeting ball, resounded throughout the stadium. Silence ensued as the fans held their breath in anticipation; suddenly the roar of their voices resumed as the ball sailed gracefully over the wall. As the crowd chanted his name, the batter trotted around the bases, wondering if one day his legacy would join the historic players in the baseball Hall of Fame. The names of baseball's greats—Mickey Mantle, Babe Ruth, Hank Aaron, and Jackie Robinson to name a few—are known throughout the country. The mere word baseball conjures up patriotic sentiments, images of cheering crowds joined together, singing "Take Me Out to the Ball Game," and of fathers and sons playing catch. Yet the actual history of baseball is not mere grand slams; baseball gathered quite a few strikes against it throughout its days as America's pastime. Two examples of negative experiences in baseball are the Black Sox scandal of 1919 and the modern day steroid scandal. Neither of the events were isolated incidents, but instead were a significant part of baseball's development. While differences existed between the ways the baseball industry eventually addressed these two issues, a closer look reveals that during the early twentieth century and during the modern era, baseball's initial response toward them was disregard. In both instances the baseball industry's reactions were intimately linked with protecting the sport's national image and the management's investments within it.

For more than a century baseball has occupied a significant place in American culture. According to Michael Kimmel, author of "Baseball and the Reconstitution of American Masculinity, 1880-1920," "Participation in sports around the turn of the twentieth century was seen as a patriotic duty calculated to reverse the slide into lethargy that came with lifestyle changes brought on by new technology."[1] Prominent individuals, including President Theodore Roosevelt, believed sports instilled in young men morality, spirituality, and physical fitness. Baseball was viewed as the superior athletic activity, and its benefits were spoken throughout the land; even preachers and parental advice manuals spoke favorably of it. According to Kimmel, society regarded baseball as an activity that encouraged independent thinking, but at the

[1] Michael S. Kimmel, "Baseball and the Reconstitution of American Masculinity, 1880-1920," in *Baseball History from Outside the Lines*, ed. John Dreifort, (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 47.

same time taught teamwork, self-discipline and obedience. However, baseball was not beneficial just for the players; it was also a prime recreational activity for the spectators. President Taft recognized in baseball a way of bringing all levels of people, from laborers to businessmen, into fresh air and sunshine.[2] Kimmel quoted Donald Hall, "...Baseball is the generations, looping backward forever with a million apparitions of sticks and balls, cricket and rounders... the profound archaic song of birth, growth, age, and death. This diamond encloses what we are."[3]

By the 1900s baseball claimed the title of America's national pastime and was considered to be uniquely American.[4] Because baseball was linked intimately with American identity, society believed in its honesty and morality. In his book *Blackball, the Black Sox, and the Babe* Robert Cottrell quoted the *Chicago Tribune's* writer I. B. Sanborn, who wrote that baseball was an honest game "...because it cannot be fixed or made dishonest as long as there are honest men identified with it in any way...."[5] Most individuals, such as F. C. Lane, a writer for the *Chicago Tribune* during 1912, and Reverend George Perin did not believe throwing a baseball game was possible. Too many players' cooperation was required to purposefully lose, including individuals with high moral standards, like the pitchers. These players would not, they believed, stoop to that level.[6] Therefore, when the news of the 1919 World Series gambling scandal first became public, America refused to believe the rumors.

In reality, however, gambling existed within baseball for nearly half a century before the Black Sox scandal. It merely was ignored and kept out of public scrutiny. Cottrell wrote

> Charges of corruption had afflicted organized baseball since it first emerged after the close of the Civil War. An 1865 contest between the New York Mutuals and the Brooklyn Eckfords was marred by the determination of three Mutual players to throw the game. But with a dearth of quality ballplayers, the two teams allowed the fixers to play again and downplayed the incident. The great Cincinnati Red Stockings of 1869-70 suffered one tie in the midst of a long winning streak, but that stalemate occurred because of a reputed $60,000 that had been bet by gamblers, including the Troy Haymakers' owner John Morrisey.[7]

Formed in 1876, the charter of the National League stated that gambling was not allowed; yet limited punishments were handed out to the guilty parties. In fact, the National League's creator William Hulbert "...ran with a fast crowd. He piled up some gambling debts."[8] David Voigt provided other examples of gambling in early baseball. His article stated that in 1877 some Louisville players were expelled for selling games, and a brief time later an umpire was fired for dishonesty. In the second World Series Rube Waddell was offered $17,000 to sit out of the games. Voigt wrote,

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[2] Ibid., 47-59.
[3] Ibid., 50.
[4] Steven A. Reiss, "Professional Baseball," in *Baseball History*, ed. John Dreifort, 34-37.
[5] Robert C. Cottrell, *Blackball, the Black Sox, and the Babe* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2002), 9.
[6] Ibid., 6-11.
[7] Ibid., 197.
[8] Ibid., 197.

"Coincidentally or not, he injured himself falling over a suitcase and did not appear."[9] In the early years of the twentieth century, gambling thrived at baseball parks with players betting on their own teams. Some historians argue that during the period of 1916-1918, the number of fixed games rose dramatically. These years during World War I found the league financially downtrodden because of competition by the new Federal League, and players were unsure about their financial situation. Also during this time the United States closed the horse racetracks where gambling was popular; thus the gamblers found a new outlet in baseball.[10] In 1917 Boston Red Sox pitcher Carl Mays was charged with breach of contract. He had failed to repay a several hundred dollar loan that the plaintiff had given to gambler "Sport Sullivan" in Mays' name to cover a debt which the pitcher owed. His case, however, was dismissed on a technicality. Hal Chase, who was the Cincinnati Reds' first basemen during the 1916-1918 seasons, was another significant player associated with twentieth century gambling. Susan Dellinger wrote about her grandmother's opinion of Chase's baseball skills.

> Essie [Edd Roush's wife and Dellinger's grandmother] remembered how she felt about Hal Chase in the beginning. She had never seen a man play first base like he did. He played so far from the base that she held her breath each time for fear he wouldn't get back to tag the runner. But he was pure lightning. He was all over the infield, even running close to third base on catches behind the pitcher. His movements were fluid and graceful, and he seemed to pick the ball out of the air as if it were a meaningless tap in a practice session. Essie knew her baseball, and this guy could play first base.[11]

Essie Roush's opinion of Chase lessened, however, when she discovered he stole for enjoyment and threw baseball games. In fact during the 1918 season the Reds' players believed Chase caused them twenty-seven losses. Finally in September 1918 Christy Mathewson, Chase's manager, suspended him for these dishonest actions on the field. Mathewson filed a formal complaint with the President of the National League, John Heydler. Because of insufficient evidence, however, the National Commission reinstated Chase with only a $200 fine. The actual reason for a lack of suspension may have been to avoid bad publicity for baseball. Dellinger noted that Heydler admitted privately that he believed Chase was guilty. "Correspondence between Herrmann and Heydler strongly suggested a cover-up to prevent a 'severe black eye for the game if the details became fully known.'"[12] Asinof wrote gambling was kept secret by the team owners. He stated

> They knew, as all baseball men came to know. They knew, but pretended they didn't. Terrified of exposing dishonest practices in major-league ball games, their solution was no solution at all. ...The official, if unspoken, policy was to let the rottenness grow rather than risk the dangers involved in exposure and cleanup. So all the investigations were squashed. This was business, pure and

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[9] Voigt, "The Chicago Black Sox and the Myth," in *Baseball History*, ed. John Dreifort, 102.
[10] Cottrell, *Blackball, the Black Sox and the Babe*, 198.
[11] Susan Dellinger, *Red Legs and Black Sox*, (Cincinnati: Emmis Books, 2006), 124-125.
[12] Ibid., 127-44.

> simple, for all the pious phrases about the nobility of the game and its inspirational value for American youth. In fact, that, too, was part of the business.[13]

In *Never Just a Game* Robert Burk provided a reason for the gambling. He wrote

> The continuous squeezing of players' legitimate incomes had made illicit avenues of alternative pay more and more alluring. At the same time, ironically, the absence of certain and meaningful punishment encouraged players to assume that even their worst transgressions still would not, at bottom, cost them a baseball livelihood.[14]

Baseball owners did not want to tarnish their teams' names with scandal or lose key players; either of these actions led to diminished profits. Therefore, with no or at least minor consequences, players and other individuals linked to the baseball industry lacked little reason not to gamble. Until the 1919 World Series scandal exploded, the possible benefits of gambling outweighed its repercussions.

From the beginning, the 1919 World Series shocked the baseball fans. Few people thought the Cincinnati Reds would reach the pennant race. Yet, the World Series opened in Cincinnati on October 1. A nervous excitement filled the city streets and especially the Cincinnati fans.

> For all their enthusiasm, few could realistically anticipate a World's Championship. Deep down inside, they foresaw the adversary walking all over them. Not even Miracle Men could be expected to stop the all-powerful colossus from the West. For they were the Chicago White Sox, a mighty ball club with a history of triumphs. It was said that Chicago fans did not come to see them win: they came to see *how*.[15]

However, this series held more unexpected events. At the outset of the pennant race, the White Sox were favored to win five out of eight games by many individuals, including *Chicago Herald and Examiner* sports writer and baseball statistician Hugh Fullerton. According to Susan Dellinger in *Red Legs and Black Sox*, Fullerton is credited for creating the concept of "doping," or predicting the result of a game or series by studying the teams' past performances. Fullerton's predictions were highly respected, and in 1919 he was so certain the White Sox would win that he said he would quit his job if he was wrong.[16] Unfortunately Fullerton made these predictions prior to learning about a possible series fix by the White Sox.

Before the World Series even began, rumors circulated that gamblers had penetrated the White Sox, and some of the players were planning to throw the series. Many individuals suddenly switched their bets to the Reds. Hugh Fullerton and retired

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[13] Eliot Asinof, *Eight Men Out*, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 14.

[14] Robert F. Burke, *Never Just a Game*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 176-77.
In fact, some entire ball clubs practiced the "...custom whereby a contending ball club offered a suit of clothes to a noncontending pitcher for beating another contender." Voigt, "The Chicago Black Sox and the Myth," in *Baseball History*, ed. John Dreifort, 2-3.

[15] Asinof, *Eight Men*,4-5.

[16] Dellinger, *Red Legs*, 192.

player and manager Christy Mathewson scrutinized each play of that first game, believing that some White Sox's plays, particularly plays made by pitcher Eddie Cicotte, hinted at a fix. When the game ended in a White Sox defeat, the two gentlemen were unable to dismiss a possible scandal; the White Sox had played the first game of the series like a defeated team.[17] That night Chicago manager Kid Gleason and owner Charles Comiskey also did not believe the game was straight. Asinof wrote, "Comiskey was adamant in his belief that something terrible was going on...."[18] However, he allowed himself to be dissuaded and took no action.

On October 9, 1919 after eight games, the World Series ended, crowning the Cincinnati Reds the pennant winners. However, the 1919 story was not over. While the victorious Reds celebrated, Comiskey and Gleason fumed. To Gleason, no doubt existed; his team had sold him out. Comiskey, however, felt trapped. If he dealt with the series as a fix, he would probably destroy his ball club and million dollar investment; if, on the other hand, he ignored the scandal, he feared the dishonesty would ruin him in the end. Comiskey sought advice from his lawyer Alfred Austrian, and the two men decided that Comiskey should act upon both parts. He merely would "investigate" the rumors, asking for information about any dishonesty in the series. "It was a way of protecting himself, especially since there was no likelihood of any 'evidence' resulting from it. In fact, Ban Johnson [American League President] and the National Commission could be relied on to do absolutely nothing."[19] Any proof Comiskey received, such as a letter from White Sox player Joe Jackson requesting a meeting to confess the scandal, was quietly filed away.

By November 1919 rumors of the scandal had ceased, and Comiskey believed he was in the clear until Hugh Fullerton began writing. Fullerton wrote numerous articles about the 1919 World Series, attempting to reveal the scandal to the public, but he was ignored and "...crushed for his attack on baseball. The establishment assailed him, and his reputation was ruined. *Baseball Magazine* called him an 'erratic writer' who knew so little about baseball that he thought games could be fixed!"[20] Fullerton believed much of the blame for the scandal lay with the owners. Daniel Nathan, author of *Saying It's So*, quoted Fullerton.

> Their [the owners] commercialism is directly responsible for the same spirit among the athletes and their failure to punish even the appearance of evil has led to the present situation, for the entire scandal could have been prevented and the future of the game made safe by drastic action in the Hal Chase case.[21]

As the 1920 season opened, new stories were printed about baseball gambling. By September 1920 the gambling problem, including the gambling involved with the 1919 World Series, was common knowledge. Baseball's name and image were in trouble. Action needed to be taken before the American people began to believe that gamblers ran the game. Baseball finally started to act in September when a Cook

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[17] Ibid., 214.
[18] Asinof, *Eight Men*, 77.
[19] Ibid., 127-29.
[20] Gene Carney, "Uncovering the Fix of the 1919 World Series," *Nine: A Journal of Baseball History and Culture*, 13.1 (2004), 39-49.
[21] Daniel A. Nathan, *Saying It's So*, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 18.

County grand jury investigation into the 1919-20 rumors began.[22] Charles Comiskey was one of the first men to appear before the jury, but his statements proved useless. He only said he had heard the rumors, but neither he nor Ban Johnson had pursued them. However, in late September 1920 the grand jury faced a surprise: Cicotte was ready to talk. With tears in his eyes, he confessed before the court. "I never did anything I regretted so much in my life...I've played a crooked game and I have lost, and I am here to tell the whole truth. I've lived a thousand years in the last year."[23] According to court officials Cicotte said, "In the first game at Cincinnati...I wasn't putting anything on the ball...In the fourth game...I deliberately intercepted a throw from the outfield to the plate which might have cut off a run...I did not try to win."[24] Joe Jackson was the next player to talk to the court and according to his testimony on September 28, he also confessed of his involvement. The transcriptions read:

> ...Did anybody pay you any money to help throw that series in favor of Cincinnati? They did. How much did they pay? They promised me $20,000, and paid me five...Did you make any intentional errors yourself that day? No, sir, not during the whole series.[25]

Eventually Oscar Felsch and Claude Williams also provided the grand jury with a confession, and soon eight members of the 1919 White Sox team and a number of gamblers were indicted and appeared before the Cook County grand jury. The players were: first baseman Charles (Chick) Gandil, pitcher Edward Cicotte, outfielder Joseph (Shoeless Joe) Jackson, third baseman George (Buck) Weaver, shortstop Charles (Swede) Risberg, center fielder Oscar (Happy) Felsch, pitcher Claude (Lefty) Williams, and utility infielder Frederick McMullin.[26]

The trial, however, met with difficulties from the beginning. Norman Rosenberg wrote in his article

> Since baseball's magnates obviously feared having their trade secrets—including Comiskey's scandously tight-fisted salary schedule—exposed in a public trial, they did not simply allow 'blind justice' to run its course. At the outset, for example, they helped the players, the very same ones whose salaries Comiskey continually tried to shave, obtain very expensive legal talent.[27]

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[22] David Q. Voigt, *The Chicago Black Sox and the Myth*, in *Baseball History*, ed. John Dreifort, 99.

[23] "Eight White Sox Players Are Indicted On Charge of Fixing 1919 World Series; Cicotte Got $10,000 and Jackson $5,000," *New York Times*, 29 September 1920, 1:8.

[24] Ibid., 1

[25] Joe Jackson, interviewed by Hon. Charles A. McDonald, September 28, 1920, 5-12, www.apbnews.com.

[26] Dave Condon, *The Go-Go Chicago White Sox*, (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1960), 75-7.

[27] Norman L Rosenberg, "Here Comes the Judge! The Origins of Baseball's Commissioner System and American Legal Culture," in *Baseball History*, ed. John Dreifort, 114. "The White Sox were commonly regarded as the team with the most talent, though their salaries were often lower than those of mediocre and poor teams...." Robin F. Bachin, "At the Nexus of Labor and Leisure: Baseball, Nativism, and the 1919 Black Sox Scandal," *Journal of Social History*, 36.4 (2003): 941-962.

Another hindrance to the case occurred when the court realized that the state attorney George Gorman had lost vital documents, including the four confessions gathered by the grand jury.[28] "In their petitions [during the trial] Williams and Jackson asserted that they did not make any admission of 'game throwing,' as they were said to have made before the Grand Jury."[29] Legal officials also found it difficult to discover any law the Black Sox had broken. Conspiracy to throw games constituted a breach of contract between owner and player.[30] On August 2, 1921 Judge Friend stated, "The State must prove that it was the intent of the ballplayers and gamblers charged with conspiracy through the throwing of the World Series, to defraud the public and others, and not merely to throw ballgames!"[31] The defense faced too many obstacles, and on August 3 all individuals indicted were declared not guilty.[32]

However, during the trial and investigation in 1920-21, baseball officials had worked to create a new position of commissioner to clean baseball's image and restore the public faith in the game. In 1921 Chicago federal judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis filled this position. Landis' original contract gave him the power to recommend that action be taken if he suspected foul play in baseball, but he did not accept these terms. "But I [Landis] want you to know that either I must have power to take such action as I wish or else you had better seek a new Commissioner. I wouldn't take this job for all the gold in the world unless I knew my hands were to be free."[33] Thus he received powers to investigate and act upon any suspected practice that might be detrimental to baseball. Judge Landis made his first statement as baseball commissioner immediately after the eight players were declared not guilty. Landis, banned the eight players for life, stating

> Regardless of the verdict of juries, no player that throws a ball game, no player that entertains proposals or promises to throw a game, no player that sits in conference with a bunch of crooked players and gamblers where the ways and means of throwing games are discussed, and does not promptly tell his club about it, will ever again play professional ball.[34]

When Kennesaw Mountain Landis became commissioner and banned the Black Sox players, American society believed the new commissioner had purified baseball once again, and they returned in droves to watch their sport. However, Landis merely had

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[28] Ibid, 115-16.

[29] "Indicted White Sox Demand Particulars," *New York Times*, 15 February 1921, 6:2.

[30] Norman L Rosenberg, "Here Comes the Judge!" in *Baseball History*, ed. John Dreifort, 115-16. During this time Sidney Mudd, United States Congress Representative for Maryland, became infuriated. If there was no law against throwing games, he decided to make one. He stated, "Congress must make it a Federal offense to bribe ballplayers and throw ball games. Since professional baseball was played in leagues that cover two or more states, it was therefore in violation of interstate commerce." In 1921 individual states, such as Maryland, Ohio and Missouri drafted bills to serve this purpose. "Ohio Bill Provides Prison Term for Bribed Players," *New York Times*, 20 January 1921, 11:5.

[31] Asinof, *Eight Men*, 270.

[32] Ibid., 272.

[33] "Majors and Minors Reach Agreement," *New York Times*, 13 January 1921, 15:2.

[34] Norman L Rosenberg, "Here Comes the Judge!" in *Baseball History*, ed. John Dreifort, 112-116.

painted the surface of the problem. Banning the eight players did not solve the issue. While their dishonesty deserved reprimand, their exclusion from baseball did not punish the gamblers involved or the owners who had remained silent. Landis' scapegoats, Gandil, Cicotte, Jackson, Weaver, Risberg, Felsch, Williams, and McMullin, paid the price for all of baseball; some even losing their opportunity to be inducted into the Hall of Fame.

To the average person, Landis' verdict meant that baseball was able to keep itself clean; in reality however, Landis just allowed the owners to escape a scandal and resume the business of their investments unscathed. Numerous other gambling charges arose after his 1921 ruling, and many of Landis' verdicts mirrored his first: life-time bans. In his first year as commissioner, Landis banished seven ballplayers in addition to the eight Black Sox. Nearly a dozen prominent names associated with baseball faced Landis for gambling-related charges throughout his two decade term. For example, in November 1943 Landis named baseball owner William Cox permanently ineligible to hold office or be employed in the baseball industry for betting on his own team. At another time fifty-three players were put on his ineligible list.[35] Landis' actions ascertained that these incidences were brought to public attention, broadcasting his speedy judgments on corruption. Yet Landis' actions appeared to be more for show since he did not maintain fairness throughout his rulings. If his interests or those of baseball were at stake, justice was sacrificed. "Demonstrating the selective nature of his justice, several other players with 'guilty knowledge' of the plot [Black Sox scandal] received no punishment at all nor did the longtime player/fixer Hal Chase."[36] When Philadelphia's Heinie Sand reported he had been offered $500 by Giants outfielder Jimmy O'Connell to help the Giants' pennant chances, O'Connell confessed. He also implicated coach Cozy Dolan and players Frisch, Youngs, and Kelly. Yet only Dolan and O'Connell were blacklisted. Another example showed itself in December 1926. Reporters quoted Landis as saying that Ty Cobb and Tris Speaker

> ...had been "permitted" to resign in the face of long-standing game-fixing allegations dating back to the 1919 AL pennant race...Publication of the charge, however, unleashed other game-fixing claims...against Cobb...The revelations in turn unraveled the commissioner's undercover resignation deal with Cobb and Speaker, who now backed out...On January 5, 1927, Landis...concluded that the pot of money the Chicagoans had collected for their Detroit adversaries had been a retroactive "reward" for beating Boston rather than a bribe soliciting the Tigers to lay down.[37]

Cobb and Speaker were both reinstated with their teams. Finally in 1927 the magnates, impatient with both the reoccurrence of game-fixing and Landis' confusing and random responses, drafted their own penalties. "The codification of formal rules and

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[35] "Kenesaw Mountain Landis," http://www.baseballlibrary.com/baseballlibrary/ballplayers/L/Landis_Kenesaw_Mountain.stm, (accessed 25 April 2006).
[36] Robert F. Burke, *Much More than a Game*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 14.
[37] Ibid., 15-16.

punishments on baseball game-fixing, bribery, and betting represented the forced withdrawal of Landis from his initial celebrated role as baseball's public policeman."[38]

Even with the end of Landis' era and the implementation of new guidelines, baseball failed to deal with many of its problems in a timely and honest manner. In fact baseball's focus on its business rather than its ethical behavior during the early twentieth century repeated itself during the end of the twentieth century. The Juiced Era, as many sports writers named the ten years between 1994 and 2004, began after the baseball strike. It received its name because of the wide-spread use of drugs, particularly steroids, within baseball. Like the gambling problem, for nearly two decades many people did not believe steroids were a concern in baseball. Not only would drug use make the sport dishonest, especially since Congress outlawed steroids in 1990, but to baseball steroids were not an issue; thus they did not test for them. Big muscles were seen as a hindrance to batters, making them slower at swinging the bat. According to this view, players lacked a reason to employ steroids in their fitness regiment. In fact in the 1960s and 1970s baseball clubs discouraged weightlifting by threatening to fine players who lifted.[39] However, America's pastime was once again blackened when wide-spread steroid use was revealed.

Like the gambling problem, baseball's drug issue was not a simple isolated incident. The baseball players living in the Juiced Era were surrounded by drugs just as the early twentieth century players lived amongst gambling. Burke wrote in his book *Much More than a Game*

> By the late 1970s, besides baseball's traditional problem of alcoholism, the use of prescription and performance-enhancing drugs, from amphetamines to steroids, and the abuse of so-called recreational drugs, especially cocaine had risen sharply.[40]

To Jerry Goldman, the Oakland A's team physician during the late 1980s, it was only a matter of time before steroids entered baseball. Goldman believed the weightlifting way of life the team had implemented would lead to a disastrous outcome. With the other major league teams following Oakland's example and embracing weightlifting, Goldman worried the players eventually would realize supplements existed that would increase their strength training; not all of these substances were legal.[41]

To add to the temptation of drug use, a variety of new supplements were made available after October 1994. With the World Series cancelled, President Clinton signed into law the Dietary Supplements Health and Education Act, known as DSHEA, which shifted the burden of proof of a product's safety from the producer to the Food and Drug Administration. The FDA was already an overburdened agency and was unable to keep pace with the numerous dietary supplements issued. The result was a billion dollar supplement industry that developed many muscle building products. Naturally these products were popular with professional athletes.[42] One example of this type of product was creatine. While ball clubs once discouraged their players from gaining more muscle for fear it would slow their swing, the discovery of creatine, a

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[38] Ibid., 17.
[39] Howard Bryant, *Juicing the Game*, (London: Viking Penguin Publishers, 2005), 90-1.
[40] Robert F. Burke, *Much More than a Game*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 213.
[41] Bryant, *Juicing the Game*, 102-03.
[42] Ibid., 48.

supplement that aided in gaining muscle and strength without some of the bulk, changed this practice. Creatine meant the players could lift weights and still maintain bat speed. Howard Bryant, author of *Juicing the Game,* is a senior sportswriter for the *Boston Herald.* In 2002 his first book won the Casey Award for the Best Baseball Book and was a finalist for the Seymour Medal by the Society for American Baseball Research. In his recent book Bryant stated, "By the mid-1990s, creatine was as ubiquitous in major league clubhouses as tobacco. Several teams, including the Oakland A's and St. Louis Cardinals, purchased creatine for their players."[43] In fact prominent players like Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa employed creatine as a part of their exercise regiment.

Baseball enthusiasm had waned since the 1994 strike, but in the summer of 1998, just like in Babe Ruth's era of the 1920s, baseball was rescued once again by a power hitter. In fact it was two power hitters that drew the crowd's enthusiasm that season: Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa. As Conseco suggested in his book *Juiced,* the homerun race between the two players was just what baseball needed. "The McGwire-Sosa contest was great for ratings, great for attendance, and great for the viability of the game. That summer was everything the owners were hoping for."[44] It proved to be such a good experience for baseball that when Associated Press reporter Steve Wilstein stumbled upon androstenedione ("Andro") in McGwire's locker, Bud Selig, baseball commissioner, panicked. Androstendedione is a testosterone-producing pill intended to raise levels of the male hormone, which builds lean muscle mass and promotes recovery from injuries. McGwire admitted using "Andro" and creatine. McGwire told the press, "Everything I've done is natural...Everybody that I know in the game of baseball uses the same stuff I use."[45] Selig feared his perfect season was ending, and he told the press he had no knowledge of the supplement use, although McGwire spoke about it as if it were common knowledge. Merle Baker III, a Red Sox strength coach in 1998, viewed the McGwire story as a warning sign upon which baseball should have acted; however they ignored it.[46] Instead the Players Association was quick to remind the media that neither supplement was illegal, and during the time baseball had no rules in regard to supplement or even anabolic steroid use, although both the NFL and the Olympics had illegalized "Andro." Doctors believed it could be dangerous.[47] According to Bryant, Selig wanted the 1998 season's focus to remain on the homerun race between Sosa and McGwire, not drugs. Thus the story lasted two weeks was dropped, and the two players became sensations.[48] Bryant asserted

> By the late 1990s, virtually every sport had been faced with the reality that performance-enhancing drugs threatened their

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[43] Ibid., 96.

[44] Jose Conseco, *Juiced: Wild Times, Rampant 'Roids, Smash Hits, and How Baseball Got Big*, (New York: Regan Books, 2005), 201.

[45] Joe Drape, "McGwire Admits Taking Controversial Substance," *New York Times*, 22 August 1998: 3:1.

[46] Bryant, *Juicing the Game*, 134-42.

[47] Joe Drape, "McGwire Admits," *New York Times*, 3. Bud Selig, present-day baseball commissioner, officially became commissioner in 1998. In the absence of a commissioner, however, he became a significant figure in baseball's power structure when named Chairman of the Major League Executive Council in 1992. "MLB Executives," http://mlb.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/official_info/about_mlb/executives.jsp?bio=selig_bud.html. (accessed April 3, 2006).

[48] Bryant, *Juicing the Game,* 134-42.

> traditions, raised new ethical questions, and required a special vigilance unlike anything they had faced before...Yet baseball was different. It mobilized and silenced dissent almost immediately.[49]

To Selig's credit, he immediately asked Rob Manfred to research the supplement and discovered it was a steroid. However, it was not until five years later that "Andro" was reclassified as a steroid, and the baseball industry banned it on April 12, 2004.[50]

Baseball waited six years to ban "Andro" when it entered the spotlight, but steroid use within the sport existed years before 1998. In 1983 nineteen year old Jose Conseco turned to steroids to improve his baseball performance. During the '83 season Conseco's batting average was .159 with three homeruns. By 1985, while using steroids, Conseco's average climbed to .318 with twenty-five homeruns. Three years later he was batting a .307 with forty-two homeruns, 124 RBIs and forty stolen bases.[51] By 1990 the Oakland A's offered Jose Conseco $4.7 million per season, which, up to that point, was the highest contract ever given in the history of baseball.[52] In his book Conseco related his own steroid story in his book *Juiced: Wild Times, Rampant 'Roids, Smash Hits, and How Baseball Got Big.* He wrote that at the same time that he was taking steroids, he was also researching and promoting them. Because Conseco was such a believer in the way he thought steroids aided his career, he encouraged other players to use them and provided them with first-hand knowledge. According to Conseco, by 1988 Mark McGwire began discussing steroids with him. He wrote

> ...soon we started using them together. I injected Mark in the bathrooms at the Coliseum more times that I can remember...Nobody knew that much about steroids back then and nobody really knew what we were doing. As the years went on, more and more players started talking to me about how they could get bigger, faster, stronger, but at that time, as far as I know, Mark and I were the only ones doing steroids.[53]

In 1992 the A's traded Conseco to the Texas Rangers, and the ballplayer wrote that he wondered if his steroid use caused the change. He believed that by the early '90s the baseball teams knew all about steroids. He wrote that no one in the A's organization ever came right out and said it, but by that time there were a lot of rumors about Conseco using steroids. Everyone in baseball knew in 1992 that he was the godfather of steroids, but it did not seem to bother the Rangers. In 2004 CNN's Paul Begala commented on President Bush's State of the Union address.

> But when he was the owner of a baseball team, Mr. Bush did nothing about steroids. Although other sports were cracking down on steroids, Mr. Bush and his fellow baseball owners refused to do a thing. In fact, Mr. Bush even traded for Jose Conseco...a

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[49] Ibid., 40-41.
[50] Robert Dvorchak, "Officials bungled steroid rules from start Pittsburg lawyer pieces together evidence that puts the government in center ring of this controlled-substance controversy," *Pittsburg Post-Gazette*, 3 October 2005, E-1.
[51] Bryant, *Juicing the Game*, 105.
[52] Bryant, *Juicing the Game*, 105-111.
[53] Conseco, *Juiced*, 74.

> man who one sports agent told the UPI was the 'Typhoid Mary of steroids.'"[54]

When Conseco moved to the Rangers, he picked up three new students: Rafael Palmeiro, Juan Gonzalez, and Ivan Rodriguez. Soon he was injecting them until they understood how to inject themselves. Conseco also wrote he acted as teacher to other ballplayers, including Wilson Alvarez and Dave Martinez; according to Conseco, Bret Boone also used steroids, although Conseco did not teach him. In his book Conseco wrote that after using steroids in 2001, Boone's batting percentages increased and so did his salary. Boone went from making $3.25 million a year to $8 million.[55]

Goldman believed that pressure to succeed in the industry was the drive behind steroid use, and the huge pay increases, such as seen among the industry's power hitters, reaffirm this point. Bryant related

> For A. J. Hinch [Oakland A's], steroid use was a fact of his major league existence. The margins were so thin for players that a little more distance on a fly ball, a little more velocity on a fastball, or a bit more durability could be the difference between earning a big league salary worth several hundred thousand dollars a year and the lousy $1200 per-month pay in the minors. That made steroid use a critical issue.[56]

Instead of punishing steroid users, baseball inadvertently had developed a system that encouraged drug use. By rewarding the players who hit the ball further and throw faster with increased salaries, baseball compelled other players to use steroids in order gain that advantage. Results of a 2002 *USA Today* poll conveyed that forty-four percent of players said they felt pressure to use steroids or other performance-enhancing drugs to keep up with the players already taking them.[57]

The late Ken Caminiti was the first professional baseball player to openly confess of steroid use. In 2002 he told *Sports Illustrated* that he began using steroids to finish the season after in injury in 1996. He ended the season with nearly twice as many homeruns and a batting average that increased by twenty-four points; he also won the MVP award that season. Even after his injury healed, however, Caminiti continued using steroids.

He stated, "At first I felt like a cheater. But I looked around, and everybody was doing it."[58] Caminiti and Conseco were not the only players who believed numerous ballplayers used steroids. According to one minor league player, Pete, "...steroid use is discussed so openly among players that everyone knows who's using and who's not...[In 2001] Pete tested positive for steroids...So did several other players on his team. Here's what happened to them: nothing."[59] Joe Morgan, Hall of Fame second baseman and prominent broadcaster, examined the homerun numbers, believing steroids were partially responsible for the dramatic increase. Between the years 1876

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[54] Ibid., 132-35.
[55] Ibid., 135, 263-65.
[56] Bryant, *Juicing the Game*, 197.
[57] Ibid., 270.
[58] Tom Verducci, "Totally Juiced: With the use of steroids and other performance enhancers rampant, according to a former MVP and other sources, baseball players and their reliance on drugs have grown to alarming proportions," *Sports Illustrated*, 3 June 2002, (96), 34.
[59] Ibid., 34.

and 1994, a period of 118 years, only eighteen times did players reach fifty homeruns in a season. However, between the years of 1995 and 2002, a period of only eight years, fifty homerun seasons were reached by players eighteen more times.[60] In 1996 Atlanta pitcher John Smoltz stated, "I hate to stereotype people because they're big and strong, to say the only reason they got big was through steroids. But I'm not naïve, either."[61]

Some people believe baseball must be naïve. For example, while baseball commissioner Bud Selig and other officials claimed they were unaware of the use of steroids among the players, many players stated the drug use was obvious. Gary Walker, a scientist employed with the USADA, or anti-doping agency, also believed differently. He was convinced that the wide-spread drug use within baseball existed because baseball had refused to confront it for years, "...embracing the steroid culture for profit."[62] Bryant believed that too much information existed about the dangers of steroids from the NFL, the Olympics, and research for baseball to be unaware of its use.[63] In 2005 FBI agent Greg Stejskal told the *Daily News* he alerted baseball in 1994 of steroid use within the sport. His information was based on a steroid investigation called Operation Equine through which significant baseball names, like Conseco and McGwire, surfaced. He commented on baseball's response. "Major League Baseball in effect, they didn't sanction it, but they certainly looked the other way."[64] Baseball officials were not the only ones to look the other way, however. Curt Schilling spoke to the press who were criticizing players suspected of drug use during a March 2005 press conference, pointing out that they hid the truth the same as everyone else. He said

> For seventeen years there has been this elephant in the room that has been danced around by the lot of you guys as well as by us...The same players you guys are vilifying and crushing now are the same guys you taunted to the world for the last fifteen to twenty years, with the same suspicions that we had.[65]

The Juiced Era issues, like the Black Sox scandal, have been slow in obtaining the necessary attention and actions to fix the drug problem within baseball. Commissioner Selig began a steroid-testing program in the minor leagues in 2001, and the results revealed that baseball was plagued with a steroid epidemic. Eleven percent of the two thousand minor league players that took part in the program tested positive for steroids even with prior knowledge of the tests. However, Selig only released the results when Congress pressured him three years later. To Congress, it was proof that baseball did not intend to be honest about its steroid problem, but Bud Selig blamed it on the union. They told Selig that releasing the numbers would make major league drug policy implementation more difficult.[66]

USA Today's 2002 poll of major league players illustrated that seventy-nine percent of players approved steroid testing; yet it was not until nearly a decade after the Juiced Era began in 2003, that baseball finally tested the major league for steroids.

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[60] Bryant, *Juicing the Game*,150-51.
[61] Ibid., 91-92.
[62] Ibid., 158.
[63] Ibid., 175.
[64] Christian Red, "Jose's Book Proves Juicy Pumps Up Steroid Scam," *Daily News* (New York), 29 December 2005, 70.
[65] Bryant, *Juicing the Game*, 393.
[66] Ibid., 256-57.

Even then the testing was for "informational basis only." Selig decided if five percent of the major league players tested positive for steroids, then baseball would move to a punitive stage in 2004. However, the consequences for testing positive were relatively lenient, and amphetamines, which had become widely used within baseball, were omitted from the test. Despite the leniency, the results of the testing revealed that of 1200 players tested, 5%-7% were using steroids. While many people thought that was a low number of players, Howard Bryant pointed out those percentages equal sixty to eighty players, which would be both entire teams of the Yankees and the Mets. Also to take into consideration was the fact that many steroids are now undetectable by urine tests. Selig, however, abided by his plan and confirmed that in 2004 the next step, the punitive stage, would be implemented once baseball agreed upon penalties. Just like in the Black Sox scandal, however, it took the involvement of a government authority for that decision to be reached; in the case of steroids that authority was Congress.[67] Yet the severity of baseball's drug problem did not reach the public until two topics reached the spotlight: the release of Jose Conseco's book and the FBI raid on the Bay Area Laboratory Co-operative (BALCO).

While Jose Conseco's book drew public attention to drug use in baseball, the issue became even more controversial during the BALCO raid and the following grand-jury investigation. Baseball's inaction for so many years now exploded into a full-blown scandal that needed immediate attention. On September 3, 2003 the FBI raided BALCO, a laboratory that made supplements and was believed to be a source for the new steroid tetrahydrogestrinone (THG).[68] Major athletes names appeared connected to the company, including Barry Bonds, Gary Sheffield, and Jason Giambi. According to grand jury testimony, on December 4, 2003 Barry Bonds testified at the hearing that he had used "...a clear substance and a cream supplied by... [BALCO]...but he said he never thought they were steroids."[69] To the prosecutors, the substances Bonds said he was using sounded like the "cream" and the "clear," two undetectable steroids marketed by Victor Conte, founder of BALCO; the prosecutors believed Greg Anderson, Bonds' personal trainer was Conte's middleman. Bonds believed the substances were flaxseed oil and arthritis rubbing balm.

During the three-hour proceeding, two prosecutors presented Bonds with documents that allegedly detailed his use of a long list of drugs: human growth hormone, Depo-Testosterone..."the cream" and "the clear," insulin and Clomid...The documents, many with Bonds' name on them, are dated from 2001 through 2003. They include a laboratory test result that could reflect steroid use and what appeared to be schedules of drug use with billing information...But Bonds said he had no knowledge of the doping calendars and other records that indicated he had used banned drugs. He said he had never paid Anderson for steroids and had never knowingly used them.[70]

Faced with the same questions, five other players admitted to using performance-enhancing drugs provided by Anderson. These players were former Giants Armando Rios, Benito Santiago, and Bobby Estalella and New York Yankees Jason Giambi and his brother Jeremy, all of whom had come in contact with Anderson

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[67] Ibid., 270-280.
[68] Ibid., 303.
[69] Lance Williams and Mark Fainaru-Wada, "What Bonds Told BALCO Grand Jury," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 3 December 2004, A1.
[70] Ibid., A1.

through Barry Bonds.[71] Jason Giambi, 2000 American League Most Valuable Player, testified he had used several different steroids obtained from Greg Anderson. The grand jury testimony related

> Did Mr. Anderson provide you with actual injectable testosterone?...Yes...And he [Anderson] started talking about that it ["the cream" and "the clear"] would raise your testosterone levels, you know, which would basically make it a steroid...or maybe he said it's an alternative of taking an injectable steroid, Giambi said. That might be a better way to put it.[72]

In February 2006 Victor Conte, owner of BALCO, was sentenced to four months in federal prison and four months of home confinement. Greg Anderson, Bonds' trainer, was sentenced to three months in federal prison and three months of home confinement. Both James Valente, vice president of Burlingame-based BALCO, and Castro Valley track coach Remi Korchemny were sentenced to one year probation. All four individuals pleaded guilty of steroid distribution.[73] On March 30, 2006 Baseball commissioner Selig announced he was beginning an investigation into baseball's steroid involvement. He named George J. Mitchell, former Senate majority leader, as its lead. While Selig believed him to be the best-qualified, many individuals expressed concern with this choice. "Mitchell has deep connections to baseball that could call into question his ability to act in a fully independent manner. Mitchell is on the board of the Boston Red Sox and is chairman of the Walt Disney Company, which owns ESPN, a broadcast partner of Major League Baseball that is televising a reality series starring Bonds."[74] After denying the steroid problem for over a decade, was this appointment another way to protect baseball and its investments, a return to the cover-ups of 1919 and unjust rulings of Landis? The possibility exists, however, that Selig chose the best person for the investigation, someone who will act honestly and judiciously. After all, particularly beginning with Congressional involvement, Bud Selig's actions in the past few years have reflected a man determined to rid baseball of drugs.

Throughout 2005 Congress met with various individuals in the Major Leagues, including commissioner Selig and well-known players in an attempt to push through a strong drug policy. On March 17, 2005 Congress met with Jose Conseco, Sammy Sosa, Curt Schilling, Frank Thomas, Mark McGwire, and Rafael Palmeiro. At this time, baseball's drug policy was in its early stages, and Congress was unsatisfied with it. The Congressmen asked each player basically the same question, and they had an opportunity to respond. Mark McGwire's responses mirrored themselves. With tears in his eyes, he answered, "I'm not here to discuss the past. I'm here to be positive about this subject," "I have accepted, by my attorney's advice not to comment on this

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[71] Ibid., A1

[72] Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, "Giambi Admitted Taking Steroids," *San Fransico Chronicle*, 2 December 2004, A1

[73] Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, "Castro Valley; Coach Gets 1 Year Probation in BALCO Case; Adviser to Track Star Kelli White is Last of 4 Sentenced," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 25 February 2006, B8.

[74] Jack Curry, "Steroid Investigation Begins, But Not Without Some Concerns," *New York Times*, 31 March 2006, D:1.

issue," or "Not up to me to determine that."[75] However, some of the players' responses illustrated their desire to rid baseball of steroids as the 2002 poll discovered.

> Mr. Lantos: Obviously, the Olympics are internationally recognized as it has been referred to as the gold standard. If, in fact, that is the gold standard, would you be in favor of applying it to baseball?
> Mr. Palmeiro: I would play under any type of deal that would clean our sport and make it level playing field for everyone...
> Mr. Sosa: Yes, I am definitely in favor of it..."[76]

Mr. Lantos also asked the players if, within a reasonable period of time, baseball does not improve, would they be in favor of Federal legislation; all players present agreed.[77]

In September 2005 Congress met again, this time speaking primarily to Bud Selig and Donald Fehr, executive director for the major league baseball players association. Selig was still negotiating with the players' union at this point, and Congress spoke with finality. Selig informed the committee about the delays, almost as if seeking their support and authority. "At the Major League level, my staff has diligently pressed the Players Association and in recent weeks has negotiated...to effectuate the goals I articulated in my letter to Mr. Fehr. Unfortunately, the Players Association has yet to agree with the proposal I made to them five months ago."[78] Selig appeared to receive his support when Senator Dorgan addressed Fehr.

> But, Mr. Fehr, you still speak as if this is negotiable. I submit that if you listen carefully to Senator McCain's opening statement and other statements from the House and the Senate, I think this is non-negotiable at this point. I think you waited too long. And by that I simply mean that we've gone way past the point of no return. It's quite clear Congress is simply going to slap on a routine here or an approach to testing and penalties unless the commissioner and you do it first...I submit I think it's non-negotiable at this point.[79]

In November 2005 baseball agreed upon the "three strikes and your out" policy. Scheduled to begin in 2006, the policy stated a first positive test for steroids would mean a fifty game suspension, a second positive test would mean a one hundred game suspension, and a third positive test would lead to a lifetime ban from baseball.[80]

Throughout its history baseball has not addressed its problems until outside influences placed pressure on them. For example

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[75] "Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: Evaluating Major League Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use," Hearing before the Committee on Government Reform, 17 March 2005, Serial No. 109-8, http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house, (accessed March 11, 2006), 78-9.
[76] Ibid., 82. Under the Olympic program the first violation results in a two year suspension and the second would bring a lifetime ban. Ibid., 77.
[77] Ibid., 82.
[78] "Hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee Subject: The Clean Sports Act and the Professional Sports Integrity and Accountability Act," *Federal News Service*, 28 September 2005, 13.
[79] Ibid., 26.
[80] Tom Haudricourt, "Steroid penalties fortified," *Press Enterprise*, 16 November 2005, A1.

> [w]hen baseball tried to retain the renewal clause in its player contracts against legal challenges, a federal arbitrator, Peter Seitz, declared Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally free agents in 1975, thereby opening the gates of the multimillion-dollar fee-agent era. When a Pittsburgh grand jury implicated 27 players in the 1985 trial of a drug trafficker, baseball finally acknowledged that cocaine might be a problem. When the owners ignored several star players, notably the National League batting champion Tim Raines, early in 1987 before signing them to contracts well under market value, they were ruled to have conspired in collusion, a decision that cost the owners millions in damages.[81]

Like these controversies, baseball gambling and drug use at first received little attention. The industry only addressed the two problems when the government threatened to take charge of the sport's management, which would diminish the sport's image and hinder the investment potential for baseball officials. When the Black Sox scandal became public knowledge, Americans were horrified. They had trusted the sport to be a teacher of morals to young men, but were instead faced with the spread of dishonesty. In modern times the sport faced another moral dilemma as many baseball heroes' negative influence on teen athletes was revealed. Perhaps this time, however, the urgency intertwined in baseball's honesty, the players' health, and teenagers' lives will ensure a legitimate end to the steroid problem. Rangers' pitcher Kenny Rogers told *Sports Illustrated* he has a nightmare about how it might end, giving a reason why he does not always throw his fastball as hard as he can.

> It is the thought of some beast pumped up on steroids whacking a line drive off his head. "We're the closest ones to the hitter...I don't want the ball coming back at me any faster. It's a wonder it hasn't happened already. When one of us is down there dead on the field, then something might happen. Maybe. And if it's me, I've already given very clear instructions to my wife: Sue every one of...[them]. Because everybody in baseball knows what's been going on.[82]

In the 1920s when baseball entered the era of Judge Landis, America was hopeful in an end to dishonesty and gambling and a restored purity to its pastime. In the twenty-first century as the sport entered a new era with the implementation of the "three strikes" drug policy and prepared to leave the Juiced Era in the past, Selig and officials also appeared hopeful, this time for a future drug-free baseball. However, the policy's effectiveness and the investigation into the BALCO accusations have not been evaluated. While examining these issues, baseball needs to glance into its past at one of its other major scandals: the Black Sox. Remembering the ending of that chapter in baseball's history, owners and officials need to ensure that they, unlike Judge Landis, are addressing the entire problem and not merely sacrificing players for the game's reputation and profits. Baseball remains America's pastime. Yet, its image has been

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[81] Dave Anderson, "When It Comes to Crisis, Baseball Ignores the Signs," *New York Times*, 19 March 2005, 1:5.
[82] Verducci, "Totally Juiced," 34.

tarnished; a simple coat of paint will only hide the flaws, not prevent the rust that could eventually erode the entire industry.